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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
The history of post-independent African countries is only just beginning to be 
written. For too long, the history of post-colonial Africa has been used as the 
site for analyses in political science, economics, development or whatever. It 
may be possible to make such analyses, if that is what is wanted, but they can 
only rest on the results of careful historical reconstruction. This is what this 
book provides, to a degree which in my experience is virtually unprecedented.  
The question is then, of course, what history is to be written. One of the 
great virtues of this book is that it shies away from the narrative of post-
independence Zambian history which UNIP under Kaunda attempted to impose 
on the country. Until the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, 
an attempt was made to snaffle all forms of dissent, which entailed inter alia 
that movements of opposition were not only repressed but also ignored in the 
dominant discourse. One major feature of this book, one that I totally, endorse, 
is that movements of opposition, and dissident individuals, are brought back 
into the story.  Zambia may have remained one nation, but that nation’s history 
is much more complicated than the rulers under UNIP would have had us 
believe – and also more complicated than the post-UNIP rulers would argue, so 
that a story of continual struggle against a monolithic state would also not apply. 
For this reason it is good that this volume has so much on religion, on the trade 
unions, on the women’s movement and on the creation of a self-conscious civil 
society. Polyvalence is seriously important to understand histories. 
Nevertheless, there is a great deal to be done. It would be churlish when 
celebrating what there is to pay too much attention to what still has to happen. 
Perhaps it is that historians are happier with failure in a good cause than failure 
in a dubious one. I can only hope that in a few years the many histories of 
independent Zambia will include a critical biography of Kenneth Kaunda, and 
the equivalent studies of UNIP rule, a good economic history of the crash of the 
copper industry and the inclusion of Western Zambia into Zambian national 
history. There could also be fascinating studies of less contentious matters, say 
the Tanzam railway and the Kafue dam. The many histories are far from ex-
hausted, but this is a great beginning. 
 
Robert Ross 
Leiden University 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar  
& Giacomo Macola  
In August 2005, the Network for Historical Research in Zambia (NHRZ) organ-
ised a three-day conference entitled Zambia: Independence and After. Towards A 
Historiography.1 The event was attended by no less than fifty participants, and 
papers were prepared and presented by speakers from Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, the DRC, Canada, the United States of America, the United King-
dom and the Netherlands. In summing up the conference, Dr. Webby Kalikiti, 
the then head of the department of History of the University of Zambia, noted, 
inter alia: 
Over the past three days, we have had twenty-two paper presentations on eight 
themes that have attempted to provide perspectives on current research on Zambia. 
[...] There is certainly need for a new Zambian historiography. Whereas historical 
studies elsewhere in the Western world, and indeed even in some of our neighbour-
ing countries, have moved into new directions, here in Zambia we have remained 
stuck in the past. When I joined the university, the Marxist and neo-Marxist histori-
cal paradigm was the norm for historical discourse, and such historical texts as 
Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-es-Salaam, 1971) were 
required reading for all first-year students. The theory of underdevelopment reigned 
supreme. This still remains largely the case today. Attempts to discard inadequate 
intellectual paradigms and adopt more insightful approaches are often met with 
                                               
1
  The conference was held at the Commonwealth Youth Programme Africa Centre, 
University of Zambia campus, Lusaka, on 11-13 August 2005. It was partly funded 
by the African Studies Centre, University of Leiden, and facilitated by the Centre of 
African Studies of the University of Cambridge. 
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resistance from both students and some local academics. It is through conferences 
such as this one that, together, we can chart a new course.2 
Before the proceedings were brought to an end, it was decided that a number 
of the conference papers be selected, and that, following, in some instances, 
substantial revision, these be published in an edited collection. The editors, 
however, also reserved the right to commission entirely new contributions with 
a view to filling some of the most obvious lacunae that had emerged during the 
conference. Four of the twelve essays presented in this volume fall into this lat-
ter category. 
At independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia, rich in copper deposits and 
agricultural potential, was rated as one of the most prosperous countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. To be sure, there were huge inequalities in income distribution, 
but these, many interested observers assumed, would soon be reversed by the 
enlightened social policies of President Kenneth Kaunda’s United National 
Independence Party (UNIP), the protagonist of nationalist agitation in the early 
1960s and Zambia’s ruling party from 1964. 
Unfortunately the great expectations of independence were soon dashed for 
the overwhelming majority of Zambians. Mismanagement, patronage, corrup-
tion and growing political authoritarianism all took their toll. The nationalized 
economy came to be truly ravaged when, in the early 1970s, the world price for 
copper collapsed and the oil crisis hit home. And the economic decline was 
exacerbated by the destabilizing effect on Zambia, one of the so-called ‘front-
line states’, of the guerrilla wars waged in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zim-
babwe, and South Africa. By the late 1970s, shortages of such basic foodstuffs 
as maize-meal, sugar, salt and cooking oil were commonplace, and queuing for 
essential commodities had become a significant part of everyday life in the 
urban areas of the country. By the beginning of the following decade, after a 
number of earlier aborted attempts, Zambia, bereft of capital, had half-heartedly 
submitted to the Structural Adjustment Programmes advocated by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Food riots in Zambia’s urban centres in 1986, as 
well as consistent defaulting on debt repayments and servicing, led to a tempo-
rary suspension of relations with the IMF and the further decline of what had 
once been widely seen as a vibrant economy, society and culture. 
By weakening state patronage, economic crisis ushered in political reform. 
In 1991, one-party rule in Zambia, which had officially begun in 1972-73, was 
ended when the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), led by trade 
unionist Frederick Chiluba, was swept to power in the first multi-party elections 
after nearly twenty years. But far from arresting the social and economic decline 
                                               
2
  The full text of Dr. Kalikiti’s speech is to be found in the NHRZ’s Newsletter, 3 
(2005), 14–17. 
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of Zambia’s people, and despite the continent-wide enthusiasm that accompa-
nied his accession to power, Chiluba’s appointees soon appeared to be as 
clientelistic and corrupt, and their democratic credentials as questionable, as 
those of Kaunda and his lieutenants. By the time Chiluba was evicted from 
power in 2001, unemployment, malnutrition and infant mortality were all at 
higher levels than they had been at any other stage in Zambia’s post-colonial 
history. Coupled to this, the HIV/AIDS pandemic had shifted from being an 
obscure notion and threat to a lived reality.  
In the last few years, however, Zambia’s liberalized economy has been 
experiencing a degree of sustained growth, while a culture of human and civic 
rights is finally showing unmistakable signs of consolidation. Nonetheless, 
tremendous income inequalities are still the norm, and the costs of education, 
housing, healthcare, nutrition and so on, are far beyond the reach of the majority 
of ordinary Zambians. Whereas Zambian life expectancy stood at no less than 
50 at independence, forty year later it had declined to a staggering 35. 
In contrast to the rich tradition of academic analysis and understanding of 
the pre-colonial and colonial history of Zambia, the above-sketched post-
colonial trajectory has been all but ignored by historians.3 The teleological 
assumptions of state-led developmentalism, the cultural hegemony of UNIP and 
its conflation with national interests, and a narrow focus on Zambia’s progres-
sive diplomatic role in Southern African affairs, have all contributed to a dearth 
of studies centring on the diverse lived experiences of Zambians.4 Zambia’s 
economic decline and the consequent reduction in practical opportunities for 
research (particularly for Zambian scholars) have also prevented the develop-
ment of a grounded and sophisticated post-colonial historiography. Much work 
since the late 1980s has taken the form of disparate studies inspired by new 
interests in democratisation, economic liberalization, and other contemporary 
                                               
3
  A point most recently made by G. Macola, ‘“It means as if we are excluded from the 
good freedom”: Thwarted expectations of independence in the Luapula province of 
Zambia, 1964-6’, Journal of African History, 47 (2006), 43. A manifest proof of the 
paucity of historical work being conducted in present-day Zambia is J.-P. Daloz and 
J.D. Chileshe, eds, La Zambie contemporaine (Paris, 1996), none of whose essays 
adopt an explicitly historical perspective. More satisfactory in this regard – though 
still predominantly concerned with the colonial era – is B.J. Phiri, A political history 
of Zambia:From the colonial period to the 3rd republic, 1890-2001 (Trenton and 
Asmara, 2004). 
4
  The principal examples of the literature we wish to take issue with are: R. Hall, The 
high price of principles: Kaunda and the white south (London, 1969); W. Tordoff, 
ed., Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1974); J. Pettman, Zambia: Security and 
conflict (Lewes, 1974); D.G. Anglin and T.M. Shaw, Zambia’s foreign policy: 
Studies in diplomacy and dependence (Boulder, 1979); C. Gertzel, ed., The 
dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia (Manchester, 1984). 
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trends. But these researches, though pertinent to the country’s current concerns 
and commendable for implicitly redressing the inbuilt nationalist bias of much 
of the earlier literature, are often insufficiently contextualized in Zambian his-
tory and political cultures.5 This volume, consisting of contributions by histori-
ans and social scientists adopting an historical perspective, seeks partly to 
rectify this comparative scholarly neglect and to deepen understanding of post-
colonial Zambia by bringing a new historical awareness and sensibility to a field 
of studies hitherto dominated by the synchronic approach and preoccupations of 
political science, development economics and anthropology. 
History in the present 
Both the popular appeal and the academic weakness of history in present-day 
Zambia are borne out by the frequent use of highly selective, simplified or even 
plainly fanciful versions of the past in contemporary political debate. A few 
weeks before the opening of the NHRZ conference, populist opposition leader 
Michael Sata, the President of the Patriotic Front, a splinter group of the ruling 
MMD, claimed that a revolution was being provoked by the policies imple-
mented by the incumbent Republican President, Patrick Levy Mwanawasa, 
whom he accused of behaving like the former ‘colonial governor’ Roy 
Welensky, ‘who went on the rampage suppressing people’.6 Invoking in such 
dramatic popular images of the colonial era, Sata sought to relate the alleged 
inequity and inefficiency of the current Zambian administration to a perceived 
historical past that holds within it all that is unjust. Clearly, for Sata, the colonial 
                                               
5
  See, e.g., M. Bratton, ‘Economic crisis and political realignment in Zambia’, in: J. 
Widner, ed., Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Baltimore and London, 1994), 101-28; J.O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil 
society, and democratization: The case of Zambia (Trenton, 1996); J.K. van Donge, 
‘Reflections on donors, opposition and popular will in the 1996 Zambian general 
elections’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 36 (1998), 71-99; D.M.C. Bartlett, 
‘Civil society and democracy: A Zambian case study’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 26 (2000), 429-46; L. Rakner, Political and economic liberalization in 
Zambia, 1991-2001 (Uppsala, 2003); B.E. Whitaker, ‘Citizens and foreigners: 
Democratization and the politics of exclusion in Africa’, African Studies Review, 48 
(2005), 109-26. Partial exceptions to the rule are the well-informed and incisive C. 
Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia’, Review 
of African Political Economy, 54 (1992), 75-91, and M. Szeftel, ‘“Eat with us”: 
Managing corruption and patronage under Zambia’s three republics, 1964-99’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 18 (2000), 207-224. 
6
  S. Mupuchi, ‘A revolution is being provoked, says Sata’, The Post, 20 June 2005. 
Welensky, of course, was not a former colonial governor, but the Prime Minister of 
the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland between 1956 and 1963, the year of 
its demise.  
 INTRODUCTION 5 
 
administration and the Federal Government of Welensky embodied the epitome 
of injustice; and the maverick politician was well aware that his remarks would 
strike a chord of recognition amongst Zambians, for whom the injustice of the 
colonial era still rankles. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the colonial past of Zambia continues to serve 
as a touchstone by which to test and evaluate the present. Every year, the much-
advertised celebrations held to mark the Africa Freedom Day offer Zambian 
Presidents and government top brass an opportunity to re-enact the drama of the 
anti-colonial agitation through high-sounding speeches and the bestowal of a 
subtly graded array of Republican awards to ‘freedom fighter’ of some (or little) 
renown. In recent years, however, the celebrations have been losing some of 
their poignancy and effectiveness, partly because critics of the current admini-
stration have been increasingly prepared to contest these brash attempts at 
legitimization through the appeal to a Manichean historical orthodoxy that 
glosses over the fractiousness of Zambian nationalism and the all-too-obvious 
failure of the promises it had once held out.  
A widely read popular satirist, for instance, imagined a short dialogue in 
which Kalaki, Sara, Jennifer, and Amock watched the Freedom Day proceed-
ings on television: 
‘Let’s see if they award a Freedom medal to yet another ancient leftover who has 
just been discovered to have thrown a stone at the colonial government in 1960’ […]  
‘Lucky the old boy didn’t get killed by his own stone when it came back down 
again’, [Kalaki] replied. ‘But why can’t we find heroic stone throwers nowadays?’ 
‘The heroic age of the stone thrower is over’, explained Amock. ‘Nowadays they are 
called terrorists, traitors, usurpers, rioters, anarchists or coup plotters. After 1964, all 
stone throwing became a criminal activity […] nowadays you can become a hero by 
arresting a stone thrower, not being one. By arresting a stone thrower you are 
defending our freedom. That’s the way to get a medal, and become a freedom 
fighter’.  
‘But where’, wondered Sara, ‘is this freedom that these heroes are defending?’  
‘There it is!’ laughed Jennifer, pointing at the TV. ‘The ruling class are keeping it 
safe, there in State House. They have the freedom to feed each other cake. Freedom 
to drink, and freedom to dance. They have the freedom to educate their children in 
England, buy their clothes in Paris, and seek medical attention in South Africa’. 
‘Just like the previous white elite!’ snorted Sara. 
‘Of course’, said Jennifer. ‘Our gallant freedom fighters chased out the white elite 
and replaced it with our own elite. That was the whole idea! Wasn’t that enough for 
you?’7 
Although far from being fully entrenched and institutionalized (the author of 
the above piece, Englishman Roy Clark, has repeatedly been threatened with 
deportation), this freedom of expression belies the extravagant claims of popu-
                                               
7
  Kalaki News, ‘Freedom Day’, The Post, 26 May 2005. 
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list politicians and is indicative the paradigm shift that has taken place in Zam-
bia since the intellectually stifling days of the one-party state (1973 to 1991). 
There is, in contemporary Zambia, an environment in which people can – and 
do – say exactly what they feel and believe, and they often do so by drawing on 
specific understandings and interpretations of the past. Convicted stone-throw-
ers of the past have become heroes in the present, post-colonial elites are 
equated with their colonial predecessors, and disgraced former president 
Chiluba, who oversaw the wholesale privatisation of Zambia’s assets in the 
1990s, is allowed to berate his erstwhile political allies in the MMD in the stri-
dent language of student activists by stating that ‘it [was] time that Zambia 
fought and controlled imperialists and their running dogs’.8 Given this incessant 
blurring of historical fact, fiction and opinion, it is hardly surprising that there 
should be some Zambian intellectuals who have sought to call the historical past 
to order and reinstate the clear boundaries of yesteryear. Historian-polemicist 
Owen Sichone, for instance, wrote caustically of the newly rediscovered anti-
imperialist vocation of the MMD leaders, ‘those champions of capitalism, 
foreign direct investment, retrenchments and human sacrifice for the sake of 
debt repayment’.9 
There is clearly a freer atmosphere of political and intellectual discourse in 
present-day Zambia than there ever has been during the past forty years.10 Yet it 
is precisely in this new dawn of openness that attention needs to be drawn to a 
past and a history that can be tested according to rigorous academic criteria and 
not merely used and abused in the heat of political competition. 
Autobiography and history, torture and memory 
It is regrettable that the intellectual space thrown open by Zambia’s political 
liberalization has so far been more readily occupied by memorialists than 
professional historians. In what is certainly a sign of an ongoing generational 
shift, numerous protagonists of Zambia’s early independent years have recently 
turned to the past and the pen with a view to describing, explaining, and justify-
ing the choices and decisions of their lives. Invariably male, the authors of the 
most significant of these autobiographies all played a role in the nationalist 
movement and then gained a position of influence within, or in close association 
with, the government and the civil service of the new state. In later years, a 
good many of these distinguished protagonists of Zambian political life turned 
                                               
8
  ‘Anti-corruption fight is an agenda of foreign forces’, The Post, 6 June 2005. 
9
  (O. Sichone, ‘Imperialism and Zambia’, The Post, 8 June 2005). 
10
  As Miles Larmer has recently argued in an inspiring review article on which the next 
section draws substantially: ‘What went wrong? Zambian political biography and 
post-colonial discourses of decline’, Historia (Pretoria), 51 (2006), 235-256. 
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their backs on UNIP and were instrumental in ushering in the economic, politi-
cal, and social changes that have characterised the years of liberalization and 
multi-partyism in the country from 1991 to the present.11 
Whether juicy or desperately boring, well written or barely readable, these 
autobiographies cannot take the place of formal histories. To be sure, they repre-
sent important historical sources that provide insights into the workings of the 
post-colonial Zambian state and the manner in which its leaders have sought to 
justify its frequently changing policy orientations. Yet these remain ‘ego-docu-
ments’, or, in the worst cases, and to use Macola’s polemical turn of phrase, 
‘dehumanised and monolithic commemorative monuments’.12 These are not 
attempts at an objective history. One, to take but one of the most glaring exam-
ples of the principal shortcoming of the genre, cannot expect elder statesmen to 
admit to their (indirect) complicity in the use of torture against opponents. 
Between 1979 and 1980, a small group of Zambian professionals and 
Congolese dissidents plotted a coup against the increasingly unpopular Kaunda. 
As shown by Larmer’s contribution to this volume, the acknowledged leaders of 
this heterogeneous coalition of conspirators were Valentine Musakanya, a for-
mer governor of the Bank of Zambia, noted businessman and secret financier of 
the United Progressive Party (UPP), an offshoot of UNIP that had posed a seri-
ous threat to the governing party’s position until its ban in 1972; Pierce Ann-
field, a white lawyer who had earlier led the defences of a number of opponents 
of UNIP, including Alice Lenshina and Simon Kapwepwe; Deogratias Symba, 
one of the leaders of the Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo, which 
had recently suffered defeat at the hands of Mobutu and his Western backers in 
two ill-fated invasions of Katanga from Angola (Shaba I and II, 1977-1978); 
and Edward Shamwana, a lawyer and colleague of Muskanya. After details of 
the impending coup were leaked to the authorities, Annfield was able to flee the 
country, but his fellow plotters were less fortunate or well-connected and ended 
up in detention. Musakanya and two other alleged conspirators were, as implied 
even by the Supreme Court that eventually acquitted them in 1985, severely 
tortured, an experience from which Musakanya never truly recovered, dying 
prematurely in 1994. 
                                               
11
  S.B. Zukas, Into exile and back (Lusaka, 2002); A. Sardanis, Africa: Another side of 
the coin. Northern Rhodesia’s final years and Zambia’s nationhood (London and 
New York, 2002); J. Mwanakatwe, Teacher, politician, lawyer: My autobiography 
(Lusaka, 2003). E. Mudenda, Zambia: A generation of struggle (Harare, 1999), is 
also partly autobiographical. Less personalized Zambian attempts at post-colonial 
history-writing are B.S. Chisala, The downfall of president Kaunda (Lusaka, 1994), 
and J. Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era (Lusaka, 1994). 
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  G. Macola, review of Mwanakatwe (to whose work the above remarks apply) and 
Zukas’s autobiograhics, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30 (2004), 903. 
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While Simon Ber Zukas, the leading white opponent of the Federation of the 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland before his deportation to England in 1952, is honest 
enough in his autobiography to expresses his horror at the torture that destroyed 
Musakanya,13 Andrew Sardanis, the one-time head of the Zambian Industrial 
Development Corporation and another recent Zambian memorialist, prefers 
instead to emphasize his shock at his former friend Musakanya having become a 
pawn ‘in the hands of apartheid South Africa’ (whose putative involvement in 
the coup is not, at present, supported by any definitive evidence), and, to the 
outrage of the families concerned, sees fit explicitly to deny the use of torture 
on the part of the Zambian authorities (for which, on the contrary, there is abun-
dant proof).14 This little exercise in source criticism illustrates a more general 
point: the conventions and the set of political and personal imperatives to which 
they obey make autobiographies an altogether different product from academic 
histories. By occupying the space left open by the absence of the latter, the 
former are contributing to popularize versions of Zambia’s most recent past that 
are not simply factually inaccurate, but also, and more seriously, unacceptably 
romanticized and homogeneous.  
Hidden histories 
With their conscious and unconscious lacunae, political memoirs are ill-
equipped to deal, not only with the darker side of Zambia’s independence, but 
also with the many and varied lines of conflict and contestation that complicated 
and enriched the country’s historical landscape from the early 1960s. In this 
sense, contemporary Zambian autobiographies replicate and magnify the fail-
ings of earlier Zambianist political science, whose almost exclusive focus on 
UNIP and the structures of its state provided the unwitting excuse for overlook-
ing the histories of all the actors and social forces situated outside the ambit of 
the ‘people’s party’. Poignant examples of this historical paramnesia are the 
facile dismissal of the unspectacular, but nonetheless significant, challenge to 
UNIP posed by Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC) throughout the 
                                               
13
  Zukas, Into exile and back, 151. Mwanakatwe (who acted as Musakanya’s lawyer!) 
coyly calls it ‘prolonged interrogation’ through which the ‘police managed to get 
[Musakanya] “to tell it all” to their satisfaction.’ Teacher, politician, lawyer, 327. 
14
  Sardanis, Africa, 290-1. Sardanis’s distasteful editorial choices are perhaps a conse-
quence of his adulation for Kaunda, ‘a magnanimous and forgiving man’, who 
would have certainly pardoned the leading plotters if only they had been ‘prepared 
to swallow their pride.’ Also, Sardanis’ stance may not be unrelated to the fact that, 
according to at least one of the surviving coup plotters, Goodwin Mumba, unsub-
stantiated reports circulated in the aftermath of the coup to the effect that the 
whistle-blower had been none other than Sardanis himself. For a different version, 
see Zukas, Into exile and back, 153. 
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First Republic,15 and, especially, the trajectory of the followers of the Lumpa 
Church of Alice Lenshina. 
In 1968, four years after independence and the traumatic events described in 
Gordon’s chapter, Elias Mulenga, the son of Alice Lenshina, wrote from exile to 
the Prime Minister of Great Britain and sought to draw attention to the forgotten 
history and plight of his mother’s scattered followers: 
[…] the ferocious UNIP leaders called at [sic] troops of soldiers, who went through 
the sect villages under the guidance of UNIP members. Mercilessly, uncountable 
people of the sect were shot to death. Some were left orphans while others were 
widows and widowers. At the sect headquarters (Sion), almost everyone was killed. 
The leader of the sect (Alice Lenshina) and a few of the members were [sic] sur-
vived. The survivors had to spend many days into [sic] the wilderness.16 
The pencilled words of Mulenga, a deacon in the church founded by his mother, 
to Harold Wilson exposed a part of Zambia’s and UNIP’s past that had but very 
little bearing on the humanist ideology publicly espoused by the party and its 
leader, Kenneth Kaunda. Mulenga’s desperate denunciation ran counter to the 
generally positive image of Zambia portrayed at the time by interested academ-
ics – an image that glossed over the considerable violence and repression that 
had accompanied the birth of the country and that continued to lurk below its 
surface.17   
Let us therefore be blunt. In the eyes of the editors, the major contribution of 
this volume is to remind readers that Zambian post-colonial history does not 
amount to a history of UNIP and its developmentalist agenda, and that a fuller 
and more honest account of the country’s most recent past must place at the 
centre of the analysis the counter-hegemonic political and religious histories and 
projects that stubbornly refused to be silenced in the name of national unity. 
Writing about Kenya, John Lonsdale put it more eloquently than these editors 
could: ‘Kenya’s nationalism, like all nationalism, was the work of many wills, 
                                               
15
  See, e.g., C. Gertzel, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘Introduction: The making of the 
one-party state’, in Gertzel, Dynamics, 7. 
16
  E. Mulenga to H. Wilson, Bulawayo, 30 July 1968, National Archives of the UK, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 29/368. 
17
  Andrew D. Roberts, the best historian of Zambia to date, was a notable exception, 
for as early as September 1964, he argued that the still ongoing suppression of the 
Lumpa Church by the UNIP government was casting a dark shadow over ‘the future 
of dissenting groups’ in newly independent African countries. (‘The Lumpa tra-
gedy’, Peace News (London), 11 Sept. 1964.) For a later, and much more exhaust-
ive, analysis by the same author, see ‘The Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina’, in: 
R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds, Protest and power in black Africa (NewYork, 
1970), 513-68. 
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with many visions of the future. It is an impoverished nationhood that fails to 
recognize them’.18  
Structure of the book 
The history of political and religious dissent – the subject of three of the four 
papers that constitute Part I of this volume – was, understandably, the principal 
victim of the process of selective historical obliteration brought about by the 
alliance between UNIP and its Western and African academic apologists. But 
Macola, Gordon and Larmer’s chapters do not merely insert for the first time 
within the mainstream of Zambian historiography the memory of obscure and 
subaltern political ideas and actors. For by suggesting that the political impact 
and social appeal of these alternative projects and movements was much more 
significant than it has hitherto been assumed, they effectively call into question 
the real extent of the hegemony of UNIP and its ability to impose a singular 
narrative of nation-building upon a fragmented and refractory body politic. 
Taken together, the articles demonstrate, in Larmer’s words, that the ‘divisions 
and problems experienced by Zambia during its Second Republic had their ori-
gins in the significant social, ethnic and regional conflicts experienced in the 
supposed honeymoon period of the late 1960s’ (larmer, in this volume, p. 107). 
If nothing else, the survival – and, in the late 1960s, growing strength – of a 
regionalized ANC under the shrewd leadership of Nkumbula and the continuing 
concern about the Lumpa exiles in neighbouring Katanga served to entrench the 
authoritarian inclination of UNIP nationalism and reinforce its ‘determination 
swiftly to abandon a multi-party system that it had always intimately resented 
and deemed unsuitable to the country’s needs’ (Macola, p. 19). While, as argued 
especially by DeRoche, there is little doubt that the authoritarianism of UNIP 
was partly a consequence of the adverse geopolitical context faced by Zambia in 
the aftermath of the Rhodesian UDI of 1965, it is also true that a strong degree 
of instrumentality motivated the often unsubstantiated accusations of betrayal 
waged against Kapwepwe’s UPP both before and after the party’s official 
demise early in 1972. And yet, that this and other opposition parties responded 
to a deeply felt dissatisfaction with the post-colonial political dispensation is 
brought out by the UPP’s underground survival throughout most of the 1970s 
and later re-emergence during the manoeuvres and alliances that would eventu-
ally ensue in the formation of the MMD. From this perspective, the triumph of 
the MMD in 1991 is to be interpreted as the result of the final coming to fruition 
                                               
18
  ‘Introduction’, in: E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and J. Lonsdale, eds, Mau mau & nation-
hood: Arms, authority & narration (Oxford, Nairobi and Athens [OH], 2003), p. 5. 
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of disparate and deep-rooted oppositional trajectories that the UNIP one-party 
state had proved unable to do away with in the 1970s and 1980s.  
If the silence surrounding the activities of UNIP’s opponents obeyed to a 
clear political logic, the dismissal of post-colonial religiosity as a worthy sub-
ject of analysis had possibly more to do with what Hinfelaar calls the ‘modern-
ist expectations to the effect that religious institutions and beliefs would slowly 
retreat with the demise of colonialism’ (Hinfelaar, p. 134). Yet, by confining the 
study of popular beliefs to the realm of religious studies or anthropology,19 
political scientists and development economists have overlooked a key determi-
nant of social action and introduced an artificial compartmentalization of human 
behaviour that does not speak to the daily experience of most ordinary Zambi-
ans. The coming of Zambian independence clearly meant different things to 
different people. With the benefit of hindsight, popular expectations and 
appraisals of political transformation might have been better analysed from 
within the field of religious history, for the millenarian ideals and beliefs 
ascribed to the Lumpa of Alice Lenshina in the run-up to independence were 
not, in essence, dissimilar from those espoused by the young UNIP activists 
who supported Kaunda. After all, Gordon himself sees the UNIP-Lumpa clash 
of the early 1960s as having been partly precipitated by the ‘absolute, almost 
theocratic, commitment demanded by local cadres of the nationalist movement’ 
(Gordon, p. 47). Kaunda was certainly not unaware of the palingenetic hopes of 
his supporters and, more in general, their deeply felt religiosity. It was this reali-
zation – Hinfelaar argues – that accounts for his frequent appeals to Christian 
morality and concerted attempts at minimizing the potential for open confronta-
tion between his regime and the Catholic hierarchy through both rhetorical and 
co-optive means. Hinfelaar’s call for a more sustained scholarly involvement in 
the study of the political implications of Zambian religiosity is taken up by 
Cheyeka and F. Phiri, who, in the last two essays of Part II of this volume, 
examine, respectively, the growth of Zambian Charismatic churches and their 
alliance with the MMD administration, and the contemporary revival of Islam 
and local Muslim associations. 
‘Religion and religious movements’ – Cheyeka reminds us – ‘neither origi-
nate nor survive in a social vacuum, and economic factors are seldom irrelevant 
to their emergence and subsequent development’ (Cheyeka, p. 162). This being 
the case, we are fortunate to be able to present, in Part III of this volume, two 
contributions by long-established scholars of Zambia. Focusing, respectively, on 
the impact of nationalization on rural retail-trading networks from the late 
1960s, and the effects of the ongoing economic liberalization on Lusaka’s mar-
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  See G. ter Haar, Spirit of Africa: The healing ministry of Archbishop Milingo (Lon-
don, 1992), and P. Gifford, African Christianity: Its public role (London, 1996). 
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ket vendors, Macmillan and Tranberg Hansen’s essays complement each other 
both chronologically and thematically. In opposition to much contemporary dis-
course on development, both authors take issue with the supposed neutrality of 
economics and bring out the ways in which the economic welfare (or lack 
thereof) of the Zambian population over the past forty years has been closely 
and directly shaped by what were ultimately political choices. If Macmillan’s 
piece can be read as an indictment of UNIP’s ill-informed and poorly executed 
economic policies – a well-recognized theme in the specialist literature,20 but 
one that the author approaches from a wholly original perspective – Hansen’s 
work blames the locally-enforced, but donor-driven, free-market policies for 
having had ‘adverse ramifications for the access to commercial and residential 
space of the great majority of Lusaka’s population whose livelihoods depend on 
the informal economy’. Tranberg Hansen’s empathetic treatment of the daily 
struggles of the urban poor also shows the benefits that stems from the adoption 
of an historically-informed perspective. For in contrast to most contemporary 
surveys of informal trading, she dwells on the historical roots of the phenome-
non in Lusaka and provides a crisp overview of the changes in gender and age 
that have taken place within the sector.  
If the future articulation of such socio-economic phenomena as those exam-
ined by Tranberg Hansen is presently uncertain, the same applies to the still 
unfolding political dynamics that form the subject of the fourth and final section 
of this volume. While the peaceful outcome of the heavily contested parliamen-
tary and presidential elections of 2006 confounded the worst predictions of the 
prophets of doom, Mulenga, B.J. Phiri and Gould essays discuss some of the 
factors that continue to militate against the consolidation of Zambian democ-
racy. A combination of past and present, endogenous and exogamous trends 
accounts for both the marginalization of trade unions in the Third Republic (the 
subject of Mulenga’s piece) and the poor electoral performances of female 
candidates in the general elections of 2001, the efforts of the Zambia National 
Women’s Lobby Group notwithstanding (see B.J. Phiri’s contribution). It is 
paradoxical that where Kaunda failed, Zambia’s greatest trade unionist, Frede-
rick Chiluba, and economic liberalization should have succeeded. Fragmented, 
penniless and emasculated, the Zambian labour movement is currently a shadow 
of its former self, and its future ability to influence the country’s economic 
                                               
20
 See, e.g., P. Meyns, ‘The political economy of Zambia’, and M. Burdette, ‘Were the 
copper nationalizations worth-while?’, both in: K. Woldring, ed., Beyond political 
independence: Zambia’s development predicament in the 1980s (Berlin, New York 
and Amsterdam, 1984), 7-22, 23-71, and M. Vaughan, ‘Exploitation and neglect: 
Rural producers and the state in Malawi and Zambia’, in: D, Birmingham and P. 
Martin, eds, History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960 (Harlow, 
1997), 167-201. 
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policy doubtful. The existence of a thriving civil society is commonly seen as an 
indispensable feature of liberal democracies.21 It is therefore fitting that the 
book should end with an examination of the ambivalent efforts on the part of the 
Oasis Forum, an unparalleled alliance of Zambia’s mainstream civic leadership, 
to energize political debate and mount a challenge to the established order from 
outside post-colonial formal political structures and institutions. In assessing the 
relevance of the notion of ‘subsidiary sovereignty’ to understand the trajectory 
of the Oasis Forum, Gould makes a case for overcoming the binary between 
‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ paradigms. ‘Asking where the blame lies for Zam-
bia’s marginal position in the world order would seem to be the wrong question. 
What we need to understand better is how, specifically, do the internal and 
external factors interact to produce states of subsidiary sovereignty’ (Gould, p. 
291). Gould’s ensuing call for close empirical studies and ‘rigorous scrutiny of 
the unfolding history of independent Zambia’ (p. 307) is one that the editors of 
this collection most wholeheartedly support. 
Let us end with a disclaimer. In publishing this volume, the editors are pain-
fully aware of its shortcomings. For even within its predominantly political 
purview, this remains a preliminary – and therefore somewhat superficial – his-
torical survey. The notion of politics that informs this volume, in particular, is 
entirely conventional and displays none of the subtleties of the culturally-
informed understanding advocated by Englund in a recent, and loosely com-
parable, collection of essays on contemporary Malawi.22 On the other hand, 
while making no claim to empirical or analytical completeness, it is hoped that 
the pioneering studies presented here will go some way towards laying the 
bases for subtler and more coherent future syntheses. Zambia and its historians 
urgently need them. 
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  But for counter-arguments, see Bartlett, ‘Civil society and democracy’, and, more 
generally, P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as political instrument 
(Oxford and Bloomington, 1999), esp. chapters 2 and 3. 
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  H. Englund, ed., A democracy of hameleons: Politics and culture in the new Malawi 
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PART I: 
 
POLITICAL UNITY AND 
DISSENT 
  
 
Photo 1 Harry Nkumbula emphasizing his non-racial credentials, Lusaka city  
 airport, prior to independence 
  
2 
Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP 
and the roots of authoritarianism  
in nationalist Zambia1 
 
Giacomo Macola 
Introduction 
Zambia’s First Republic, between 1964, the year of independence, and 1973, 
when the one-party regime came into being, witnessed a gradual reduction of 
toleration for internal dissent and a general contraction of civil liberties. This 
hardening of the political dispensation had undoubtedly something to do with 
Zambia’s vulnerable ‘frontline’ position. But it was also a consequence of the 
rapid and widespread disaffection caused by the ruling party’s inability to meet 
popular expectations of independence.2 This essay contends that the immediate 
antecedents of these later developments are to be found in the early 1960s, when 
UNIP and the ANC, the party from which UNIP had sprung and which it 
                                               
1
  I wish to thank Ompie Nkumbula, Bob Liebenthal and Bruce Munyama for their 
frank and illuminating comments on the paper. Faithful to the proverbial bonhomie 
of their illustrious relation, all three readers took even the most unpleasant of my 
written remarks on the chin and politely agreed to disagree with me on a number of 
issues. I, indeed, remain personally responsible for any error or misconception that 
remain in this article despite their much appreciated cooperation. 
2
  On this broader theme, see G. Macola, ‘“It means as if we are excluded from the 
good freedom”: Thwarted expectations of independence in the Luapula province of 
Zambia, 1964-1966’, Journal of African History, 47 (2006), 43-56; and M. Larmer, 
‘“A little bit like a volcano”: The United Progressive Party and resistance to one-
party rule in Zambia, 1964-1980’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 39 (2006), forthcoming. 
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eventually defeated in the general elections of 1964, were entangled in a vicious 
struggle for power and pre-eminence.  
A close examination of UNIP literature during these heady years – the sub-
ject of the first part of this chapter – reveals the fundamentally authoritarian 
character of the brand of nationalism espoused by the party’s leaders and activ-
ists. With party and nation seen as coterminous, the assertion of minority views 
and alternative political projects was viewed with profound suspicion.3 The 
tendency to identify opposition to UNIP as illegitimate and ‘treasonable’ went 
hand-in-hand with the denial of the right to full political citizenship in the new 
institutional dispensation to Nkumbula and his ANC. 
In the second and third parts of the paper, after a rapid analysis of the ANC’s 
inchoate ideology and fragile administrative structures, I discuss the conspirato-
rial strategies adopted by this latter party and its leader in response to UNIP’s 
exclusionary nation-building paradigm. While Nkumbula’s alliance with Katan-
gese President Tshombe brought home to the future leaders of independent 
Zambia the country’s manifest geopolitical weakness and permeability to exter-
nal efforts at destabilization, his tolerance of ethnic politics and ambiguity 
towards the use of political violence led to the consolidation of regionalist feel-
ings among the Bantu Botatwe of the Central and Southern provinces.4 Not only 
did the Bantu Botatwe continuing isolation from the Zambian body politic 
weaken UNIP’s claim to be the sole legitimate embodiment of the blossoming 
nation,5 but it also posed a concrete political menace once it threatened to 
coalesce with the disillusionment of erstwhile UNIP’s supporters from other 
provinces and ethnic groups. Both processes contributed to bolstering up 
UNIP’s authoritarianism and determination swiftly to abandon a multi-party 
system that it had always intimately resented and deemed unsuitable to the 
country’s needs.  
                                               
3
  Recent, inspiring analyses of the undemocratic nature of the ideology of hegemonic 
nationalist parties elsewhere in the region are J.R. Brennan, ‘The short history of 
political opposition & multi-party democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-64’, in: G.H. 
Maddox and J.L. Giblin, eds, In search of a nation: Histories of authority & 
dissidence in Tanzania (Oxford, Dar es Salaam and Athens, 2005), 250-76; T. 
Ranger, ‘Introduction to volume two’, in: Id., ed., The historical dimensions of 
democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. Volume Two: Nationalism, democracy 
and human rights (Harare, 2003), 1-37; and, especially, J. McCracken, ‘Democracy 
and nationalism in historical perspective: The case of Malawi’, African Affairs, 97 
(1998), 231-49. For a more contemporary perspective, see H. Melber, ‘The culture 
of politics’, in: Id., ed., Namibia: A decade of independence 1990-2000 (Windhoek, 
2000), esp. 181-87. 
4
  Bantu Botatwe is here used as a crude synonym for Tonga, Ila and Lenje. For a 
fuller explanation, see below. 
5
  A point first made by A.D. Roberts, A history of Zambia (London, 1976), 242. 
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Photo 2 African National Congress Officials, 1956. Left to right:  
 R.C. Kamanga (Vice-Treasurer), E.M. Liso (Vice-President),  
 S.M. Kapwepwe (Treasurer-General), H.M. Nkumbula  
 (National President), K.D. Kaunda (Secretary-General),  
 T. Mukupo (Vice-Secretary-General) 
 
 
The nature of UNIP nationalism 
Until the late 1950s, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was very much the public face 
of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia (colonial Zambia). The darling of 
progressive observers (Doris Lessing, for one, considered him a ‘magnificent 
orator’ and an ‘extraordinarily nice man’6) and the scourge of supporters of the 
white-dominated Central African Federation, Nkumbula had up to then fol-
lowed what might be termed a ‘classic’ nationalist trajectory. As most other 
emerging African leaders, he had come of age under missionary tutelage – in his 
case, that of the Methodist Missionary Society, which monopolized evangelical 
and educational activities in Namwala, his home district in Northern Rhodesia’s 
Southern province, and by which young Harry had been employed as a primary 
                                               
6
  D. Lessing, Walking in the Shade: Volume Two of my autobiography, 1949-1962 
(London, 1997), 181, 183. 
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school teacher in the late 1930s. Nkumbula’s first openly political experiences 
had taken place in the cosmopolitan environment of the Copperbelt, the 
colony’s urban and mining district, where he had settled in 1940 to take up the 
position of headmaster of Mufulira and, later, Wusakile African schools. A 
founding member of the Kitwe African Welfare Society and the African Teach-
ers’ Association, Nkumbula had sat on such colonial advisory bodies as the 
Kitwe Urban Advisory Council and the Western province’s African Provincial 
Council. In 1946, aged thirty, he had embarked on a period of further studies at 
Makerere University College and the University of London. While at the 
London School of Economics in the late 1940s, Nkumbula had been drawn into 
Pan-Africanist circles and worked closely with Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the 
future President of Malawi, with whom he co-authored ‘Federation in Central 
Africa’, ‘a point-by-point rebuttal of federationist arguments as well as the first 
comprehensive statement of political objectives ever made by Nyasas and 
Rhodesians’.7 Upon his return to Northern Rhodesia in 1950, Nkumbula had 
replaced the ineffective Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika as president of the newly 
formed Northern Rhodesia’s African National Congress (ANC) and spearheaded 
the party’s vehement – if ultimately unsuccessful – anti-Federation campaign.8  
It had all turned sour in 1958, when, as a result of Nkumbula’s increasingly 
autocratic running of the party, refractoriness to criticism and grudging accep-
tance of the gradualist approach to African political advancement enshrined in 
the constitution promulgated by Governor Benson in that same year, a group of 
younger radicals led by Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe – Congress’s 
erstwhile secretary general and treasurer, respectively – had broken away and 
given birth to the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).9 ZANC, which 
unlike the ANC had resolved to boycott the impending elections to the Legisla-
tive Council, was banned by the colonial government in March 1959, less than 
five months after its inception. Although deported to remote rural areas, its top 
leaders continued to command considerable support and to influence the pace of 
African politics in Northern Rhodesia. In the latter part of 1959, after two of 
                                               
7
  R.I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The making of Malawi and 
Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge [Mass.], 1965), 224. 
8
  A comprehensive analysis of Nkumbula’s formative years will be found in: G. 
Macola, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and the making of Zambia’s political culture, 
forthcoming. On Mbikusita-Lewanika, see B.J. Phiri, ‘Coping with contradictions – 
class, ethnicity and nationalism: The case of Godwin A. Mbikusita-Lewanika and 
Zambian nationalism’, unpublished paper, 1999. 
9
  For a detailed treatment of the circumstances leading to the formation of ZANC, see 
K.D. Kaunda to T. Fox-Pitt, Lusaka, 2 Dec. 1958, National Archives of Zambia 
(NAZ), Lusaka, HM 71/1; D.C. Mulford, Zambia: The politics of independence, 
1957-1964 (Oxford, 1967), chapter 2; and W.K. Sikalumbi (ed. H.W. Langworthy), 
Before UNIP (Lusaka, n.d. [but 1977]), 101-125. 
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ZANC’s offshoots, Paul Kalichini’s ANIP and Dixon Konkola’s UNFP, had 
merged into the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the ANC suffered 
a second crippling blow. Having failed in its bid to oust Nkumbula from the 
presidency of the party in September, a well-organized faction led by Mainza 
Chona and Titus Mukupo joined hands with the new organisation. Chona served 
as UNIP’s interim national president until the release of Kaunda at the begin-
ning of 1960.10 The consequences of the two successive breakaways were 
momentous, for while the creation of ZANC in October 1958 had detached 
from ANC its ‘most able and militant national leaders’, the departure of Chona 
and Mukupo, ‘splitting away large segments of ANC’s provincial-, district- and 
branch-level organization’, threw the party’s overall administrative structure 
into disarray.11 From then onwards, the lives of Nkumbula and his party would 
be dominated by a furious struggle for survival.  
ZANC/UNIP was a much younger party than the ANC – after the two splits, 
Job Michello, Nkumbula’s new national secretary, spoke explicitly of ‘old hands 
of Congress [being] back at the helm’12 – and its version of political national-
ism, built around the demands for immediate independence, the dissolution of 
Federation and universal adult suffrage, more impatient and less constitutional. 
Right from the outset, its leaders were convinced the future was theirs, as shown 
by the confident and condescending tone of early anti-Nkumbula writings. If 
Wittington Sikalumbi, the former vice-secretary-general of ZANC, poked fun at 
Nkumbula – ‘Mr. Easy come and Easy go with the money and a gentleman who 
wants to look [more] English than the English’ – and dismissed speculations on 
his political future – ‘let fools talk about him’ – Kalichini was certain that the 
‘last days’ of Congress ‘in the political arena [were] not remote’.13 Another 
ZANC restrictee, Sikota Wina, ‘[knew] Nkumbula was gone from the scene of 
nationalism. […]. From this point onwards it should be plain sailing’.14 
Once these optimistic expectations of a rapid demise did not materialize, and 
despite the occasional co-operation between the two parties on constitutional 
matters between 1960 and 1961, UNIP’s appraisals of Nkumbula became 
unmistakably harsher. Harry’s love for the good life offered UNIP’s moralists 
plenty of cheap ammunitions. In his newsletter, Nephas Tembo, one of the 
party’s key organizers in the Copperbelt, urged Kaunda not to stipulate any kind 
of alliance with  
                                               
10
  For all of the above, see Mulford, Zambia, chapter 3. 
11
  Ibid., 135-6. 
12
  J.E.M. Michello to E.M. Liso, Lusaka, 22 Oct. 1959, United National Independence 
Party’s Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, ANC 7/107. Cf. also Mulford, Zambia, 238. 
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  W.K. Sikalumbi to [R.S.K. Makasa], Namwala, 29 July 1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1; 
P.J. Kalichini to T. Fox-Pitt, Lusaka, 5 Aug. 1959, UNIPA, UNIP 6/7/4. 
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 S. Wina to W.K. Sikalumbi, [Luwingu], 19 Aug. 1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
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the pleasure-loving Nkumbula who has gone down to the level of a garden boy. 
Nkumbula, internationally, is finished; and locally he has no intelligent following. 
He is an alcoholic wreck and UNIP has no time to rebuild such wastrels surrounded 
by prostitutes and rogues.15 
As suggested by the above quotation, UNIP’s wrath at Nkumbula was more 
and more frequently converted into a blanket condemnation of his remaining 
followers – ‘idiots’, ‘simple souls’, ‘Tonga peasant farmers [...] whom [he] robs 
[of] their money to squander on beer and other immoral ways’.16  
These increasingly vitriolic attacks reached their climax with the ‘Catalogue 
of Nkumbula’s political masturbation’, an incendiary pamphlet issued by the 
divisional headquarters of UNIP in the Southern province at the beginning of 
1962. The text consists of a list of Nkumbula’s alleged financial and political 
blunders from the mid-1950s. Its vocabulary is both chilling and revealing. 
Nkumbula was a ‘political rat’, a ‘gangster’, a ‘hopeless and thinkless [sic] 
roting [sic] politican’ who ‘delayed our freedom’. 
Thank God, UNIP was born mainly to save our lot from entering into Harry’s King-
dom [of] tribalism, idiocy, drunkenness, uselessness and thinklessness [sic]. Candid-
ly, imperialism survives well on rotten minded politicians like this our politically 
useless man Harry Nkumbula.17 
The road accident in which Nkumbula was involved in July 1960, and for 
which he was eventually incarcerated between April 1961 and January 1962, is 
described in the following terms. On his way back from Katanga, where he had 
visited ‘this primitive clumsy looking man-eater’, Moise Tshombe, Nkumbula  
[killed] an innocent African constable. Drunk with the mighty and precious blood of 
our brother […], the whole ANC was transformed into a pile of fools barking day 
and night like desperate wounded dogs […]’.18 
It is tempting to explain away the virulence of the ‘Catalogue’ by pointing to 
its authors’ geographical provenance. After all, these were Southern province-
based officials whose efforts to hold the UNIP fort against a still hegemonic 
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ANC were meeting with very scant success. Nonetheless, I would suggest the 
entire anti-Nkumbula campaign from the end of 1959 was shaped by – and drew 
its strength from – less superficial ideological motives and processes. By 
refusing to go away, or to be slotted in the passive, tailor-made position of 
‘National Guardian’ that Wina at one point imagined for him,19 Nkumbula 
threatened to unmask the fragility of the edifice of UNIP nationalism. As 
Nkumbula’s survival against the odds forced UNIP to face the uncomfortable 
truth that a significant proportion of the future electorate did not subscribe to its 
nationalist vision and project, the party leadership reacted by elaborating an 
intellectual equivalence between party and national membership. As early as 
November 1959, UNIP portrayed itself as ‘the only party which command[ed] 
the respect, confidence and unanimous support of the African people in North-
ern Rhodesia’.20 UNIP’s dominance – Munukayumbwa Sipalo, the then national 
secretary of the party, argued a few months later – stemmed from its ‘superior’ 
‘devotion’ to the national cause and ‘knowledge of the wants of our people’.21 
The homology between party and nation in UNIP thought was brought out most 
clearly by Kaunda in January 1961. The ‘silly and small men’ who opposed 
UNIP, the party’s president said in his speech to the National Council, should 
realise that its historical role was ‘to save the people of Zambia […]. We must 
forget our individualism and put the Nation first before us. The party is 
supreme’.22 With UNIP conceived of as the embodiment of the embryonic 
nation, party ideologues found it both easy and natural to view the ANC as an 
‘illegitimate organisation’.23 
By denying Nkumbula and his party full rights to political citizenship in the 
new institutional dispensation that was then materializing, UNIP embarked on a 
dangerous intellectual trajectory, the endpoint of which would be the vindica-
tion of intolerance not only for open political opposition, but for independent 
expressions of the civil society as well. Taking place outside the party’s ambit, 
the latter presented UNIP with as unacceptable a threat as the former. When, in 
the summer of 1963, the secretary of the Broken Hill-Mumbwa region of UNIP 
asked the party’s headquarters how best to deal with a newly created ‘Lamba-
Lima Education and Cultural Society’, Aaron Milner, the deputy national 
secretary, recommended that it be ‘crushed’. 
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Our people must work towards the freedom of Zambia. This can only be done by 
having a National Party UNIP which has proved by its past record that the freedom 
of Zambia is in UNIP.24 
A similar fate awaited the Northern Rhodesia’s National Council of Women, 
founded on the Copperbelt at about the same time. The Council folded in the 
summer of 1964, a few months after the formation of an all-UNIP cabinet. It 
had been heavily criticized by Chona and Minister Dingiswayo Banda, who 
accused it of confining ‘itself to the educated class and clash[ing] with our 
[UNIP’s] Women’s Brigade’.25 Following the demise of the organisation, a 
distraught former member wrote a polemical letter to the press, stating that she 
had been wrong in assuming that: 
everyone had the liberty to join any organisation, as long as one does not interfere 
with other people’s rights. The UNIP Women’s Brigade is a political body, and even 
though UNIP is the ruling party, there is no obligation for everyone to join it. We 
need an organisation which can co-ordinate all the activities of women’s organisa-
tions. I don’t see how the Women’s Brigade can do this since some of its members 
cannot even tolerate the ideas of members of other political parties.26 
Kaunda, UNIP’s key policy-maker, has frequently been portrayed as having 
exerted a moderating influence over his more radical and authoritarian subordi-
nates.27 Yet there is little doubt that it was his appraisal of UNIP’s historical 
mission and emphasis on ‘absolute UNITY’ vis-à-vis the enemies of the nation 
that provided his lieutenants with the opportunity to articulate and popularize a 
monolithic vision of Zambian society and a hegemonic project with precious 
little room left for seeing minority or alternative views as legitimate.28 The 
idiom of intolerance was frequently infused with religious overtones. Sipalo 
spoke openly of ‘His Holiness’ Kaunda confronting a legion of ‘African Judas 
Escariots [sic]’.29 Among the latter was undoubtedly Lawrence Chola Kati-
lungu, the moderate trade unionist who served as acting national president of 
the ANC during most of Nkumbula’s jail term and whose death in a road 
accident at the end of 1961 Sipalo deemed ‘very heartening’.30 The ideological 
seeds of the one-party state and its natural corollaries, a much-heralded belief in 
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the leader’s infallibility and a totalitarian ambition to quash and/or encapsulate 
autonomous social movements, were already firmly embedded in the Zambian 
political soil well before the formal declaration of independence in October 
1964. 
Inter-party violence – an aspect of Zambian nationalist history grossly and 
culpably underestimated by such standard accounts as Mulford’s and Rot-
berg’s31 – was a consequence of this ideologically saturated context. The exist-
ence of a causal link between the nature of UNIP’s nationalism and the rise of 
political violence was implied as early as April 1960 by the provincial president 
of the ANC Women’s League in the Copperbelt. UNIP officials and members, 
said Mrs. Bwalya, were:  
‘creating absolute hatred with their fellow Africans. They are committed in a way to 
violence of all kinds while we are committed to non-violence. Our people are at-
tacked every now and again and are seriously beaten while we […] do not make any 
tit for tat’.32 
More will be said below about the dynamics of inter-party warfare in the 
early 1960s and the ANC’s alleged commitment to peaceful political compe-
tition. At this stage, and with a view to rounding up our argument so far, it 
suffices to point out that in the Copperbelt and other areas where UNIP was 
gaining the upper hand over Nkumbula’s party, political violence was almost 
always a consequence of card-demanding,33 the exercise through which grass 
roots militants checked and enforced membership of the new nation through its 
most visible manifestation: the possession of a UNIP card. To be found without 
a card meant nothing less than rejecting national affiliation and its necessary 
attributes: Freedom and independence. Speaking in the Legislative Council 
during a debate on ‘week-end rioting’ in the Copperbelt, Kaunda bemoaned the 
widespread tendency to see ‘a person [who] carries a different party card’ as an 
‘enemy who should be hit at any time’.34 What the then Minister of Local 
Government and Social Welfare appears not to have realized was that, far from 
being a result of the lack of ‘education of the public’, inter-party violence was 
the natural offshoot of an exclusionary political philosophy to the formulation 
of which he himself had made a decisive contribution.  
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The ideology and structure of the ANC  
Nkumbula’s initial reaction to the formation of ZANC was to blame his ‘ambi-
tious’ opponents for having ‘torn apart the solidarity of the Africans against 
colonialism and imperialism’35 Nkumbula’s defence of his nationalist creden-
tials also passed through a series of spirited performances in the Legislative 
Council, where he sat briefly between 1959 and 1960. On 25 June 1959, for 
instance, he opposed the extension of the anti-ZANC regulations by pointing 
out that ‘detention or further legislation to detain people is not the answer.  
The only way we can get any amicable solution in this country is to give the people 
what they want. If we do not […], then we shall be sitting in this House day after 
day, passing legislation after legislation. We shall be declaring states of emergency 
time and again’.36 
Of more lasting legacy, perhaps, was the sustained appeal to his personal 
history of militancy and leadership. ANC propaganda sought to counter the 
youthful enthusiasm of UNIP by stressing what Michello called Nkumbula’s 
‘world of experience’ and the need to be led by ‘one who has been on the 
battlefield long enough’, ‘one who has an Incyclopedia [sic] of the past at the 
back of his mind, for reference at will. One who is in reality an International 
Driver, and not a Learner Driver’.37 Nkumbula was the initiator of modern 
African politics in Northern Rhodesia. By denying him the respect traditionally 
accorded to fathers and elders, UNIP’s leaders and supporters behaved no better 
than ‘juvenile delinquents’.38 The ANC – Michello told the press in April 1962 
– was a party of ‘adults’; UNIP consisted of ‘teenagers and loafers’.39 This 
aspect of the ANC’s discourse was more than a simple propaganda ploy, for the 
dismissal of UNIP’s founders as mere ‘boys’ was as distinguishing a feature of 
private exchanges between ANC top leaders as it was of the texts they wrote for 
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public consumption.40 Conversely, members of the ANC executive would rou-
tinely address Nkumbula as ‘Sir’ or even ‘father’.41 
Of course, para-political loyalties and the celebration of gerontocracy could 
not be expected to keep the party together in the long run. What was most 
needed clearly to distinguish it from UNIP was a coherent political philosophy. 
And it was precisely at this level that the ANC was found wanting, for what is 
most striking about the party’s ideology until at least 1961 is its overall 
contradictoriness. For more than two years after the formation of ZANC, the 
ANC leadership appeared to be groping in the dark, sending mixed messages to 
the future electorate and losing much valuable ground to its ‘African socialist’ 
rivals. Take, for instance, the ‘Provincial statement’ issued in mid-1960 by 
Amos Sichilaba, the influential provincial general secretary of the party in the 
Southern province. The ‘moderate’ (and, as will be seen below, somewhat 
hypocritical) denunciation of UNIP’s ‘policy of intimidation’ and penchant for 
‘arson [and] stone throwing’ did not prevent Sichilaba from accusing Kaunda of 
opposing the nationalization of the mines and, hence, ‘complete African Indi-
pendence [sic]’.42 Sichilaba’s source was probably Freedom Magazine of May 
1960, where Edward Mungoni Liso, the then head of the publicity bureau of the 
ANC, had suggested that Kaunda, who could not ‘withstand temptations of the 
capitalists’, was on the payroll of Rhodesian Selection Trust, one of the two 
Copperbelt mining giants. The wording of Liso’s editorial, in turn, may not have 
been unrelated to the fact that during the same spring of 1960 Michello was 
striving to re-establish contact with the International Union of Socialist Youth 
and Nehru.43 These weak and improvised attempts to position the party to the 
left of UNIP were temporarily dropped in October, when the ANC headquarters 
issued an abrupt statement commending ‘private enterprise’ and ‘cuts in public 
expenditure’.44  But the party’s ideological gyrations were not yet over, for in 
January 1961 John Banda, Nkumbula’s deputy, sought to reinvigorate the argu-
ment about UNIP’s duplicity and covert imperialist leanings by calling into 
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question its professed policy of ‘multiracialism’: ‘[t]hey are trying to please two 
masters. We have one master to please, the AFRICAN’.45 
Signs of greater ideological cohesion around a moderate platform became 
detectable during Katilungu’s brief interlude as acting national president from 
April 1961. For the first time, Kaunda’s white supporters and ‘advisors’ were 
accused of hostility towards ‘the Western World’.46 Thereafter, open professions 
of anti-Communism became more frequent and raucous. The consolidation of 
the alliance with the secessionist regime of Katanga – about which more will be 
said below – had an obvious bearing on the ideological positioning of the ANC. 
Another key turning point was the chachacha, the campaign of civil disobe-
dience launched by UNIP against the constitutional proposals for Northern 
Rhodesia issued by Secretary of State Macleod in June. By dissociating itself 
from the ongoing ‘disturbances’, the ANC took its sharpest yet turn to the right 
of the political spectrum. While confirming UNIP’s assessment of the ANC 
leaders as ‘cowards’ and ‘stooges’,47 Katilungu and Nkumbula’s refusal to 
mobilize their followers against the Macleod plan granted their party an in-
controvertible badge of moderation and provided it with the chance to dispute 
UNIP and Kaunda’s much-heralded commitment to non-violence.48 Sykes 
Ndilila was among the first ANC officials to seize the opportunity.  
Mr. Kaunda himself has preached non-violence several times […]. But according to 
what his followers are doing, does it appear that they agree with what he says [?] 
Kaunda further preaches the protection of property, persons of all races and the 
protection of minority races. […]. Either Kaunda is dishonest in what he says or his 
followers do not obey him. […]. Can people who burn the only schools for their 
children protect you and your property? You have a good sense of humour. […].  
[W]hen Mr. Harry Nkumbula or his deputy Mr. Katilungu say non-violence, it is 
really so in word and deed. And when they say that they will protect people of all 
races and property, they really mean so. […]. Congress leaders have proved to you 
and to the whole world that they are responsible and that they can rule this country 
without bloodshed.49 
If anti-Communism and anti-Pan-Africanism came to dominate the ANC’s 
public discourse throughout 1962, Nkumbula’s release from prison at the be-
ginning of the year also coincided with the adoption of a more explicit and 
informed liberal-democratic agenda. In an important interview in July, Nkum-
bula accused UNIP of ‘believ[ing] in a totalitarian form of government’ upheld 
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by ‘coercion and intimidation’. His party, on the contrary, was committed to 
‘private enterprise’ and the ‘complete freedom of the individual’. Perceptively, 
Nkumbula pointed out that UNIP struggled to reconcile its vision of Zambian 
future with the existence of a strong parliamentary opposition. This was little 
wonder – he concluded – since ‘UNIP has aligned itself with the Casablanca 
Group of countries, which are Communist inclined. We in the ANC to the 
Monrovia Group which is democratically inclined. […] Kaunda is not carrying 
out his own policies. They are Nkrumah’s ideas’.50 
The coherence and candidness of Nkumbula’s liberalism should not be 
overemphasized, for, as will be seen below, his professed support for the West-
minister model of parliamentary democracy did not amount to a rejection of 
such opportunistic forms of political mobilization as ethnic chauvinism and 
violence. What needs to be stressed, however, is that Nkumbula’s opposition to 
UNIP’s state-driven blueprint for economic development from 1962 was both a 
cause and a consequence of his party’s enduring popularity among market-
oriented agricultural producers in the Central and Southern provinces. Building 
upon the legacy of Congress-sponsored agricultural protests from ca. 1950,51 
Nkumbula had openly employed his position in the Legislative Council in 1959-
60 to voice the multiple concerns of an increasingly differentiated peasantry. 
While his denunciation of the inefficiency and authoritarianism of the Ministry 
of African Agriculture’s soil conservation measures had been meant to court the 
support of subsistence farmers, upon whom the burden of unpaid conservation 
work tended invariably to fall,52 by questioning the performance of the African 
Farming Improvement Fund, Nkumbula had explicitly claimed for himself the 
role of spokesman of those ‘rich peasants’ who felt systematically discriminated 
by the workings of the colonial state’s credit and marketing systems.53 
By 1962 – and thanks also to the fervour with which Nkumbula and his 
lieutenants kept at the centre of the political debate the themes of the ‘lost lands’ 
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and the inadequacy of the ‘Native Reserves’ along the line of rail54 – few in-
formed observers could miss the rural orientation of the ANC. Agricultural 
matters featured prominently in the otherwise bland and unremarkable cam-
paign material issued by the party on the eve of the first Northern Rhodesian 
General Elections of October. In September, Nkumbula spoke of the need for a 
‘mighty agricultural revolution’, which he sought to justify by pointing to the 
vagaries of the international price of copper: ‘should those market prices be 
unsympathetic, then we should have to depend on our agricultural industry to 
offset losses and maintain a balance of overall trading, possibly even in a sense 
subsidising the metal industries’.55 The results of the elections – in which the 
ANC scooped three of the four lower roll seats comprised within the borders of 
the Southern and Central provinces – confirmed the successful outcome of 
Nkumbula’s attempt to portray himself and his organization as the defenders of 
rural interests and respectability against the onslaught of UNIP’s ‘young urban-
ised boys’.56 
The ideological cohesion that the ANC lacked in 1959-61 was compounded 
by its increasingly obvious administrative meltdown. Most of the organizational 
problems faced by the ANC stemmed from its desperate financial position. 
Nkumbula’s flamboyant life style and, more importantly, the haemorrhage of 
members and subscribers to the advantage of UNIP meant that the party proved 
less and less able to service existing debts without having access to new lines of 
credit.57 And with the ANC being widely perceived as being on the verge of 
total collapse, creditors themselves became both stricter and more assertive. The 
first of a long series of bankruptcy summons and notices was served upon 
Nkumbula in as early as September 1959.58 In May 1960, with Harry’s trip to 
the London Federal Review Conference looming large on the horizon, national 
treasurer Wingford Jere was forced openly to admit that the coffers of the party 
were ‘empty’.59 So dire was Jere and the party’s predicament that the costs of 
Nkumbula’s defence during the trial that followed his car accident in June could 
                                               
54
 See, e.g., The legislative council debates: Official report of the first session of the 
eleventh legislative council (Resumed), 26 Nov. 1959, col. 83; and ‘Land’, Freedom 
Magazine, May 1960. 
55
  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Presidential address 1962’, Lusaka, 19 Sept. 1962, UNIPA, ANC 
7/101. 
56
  Quote taken from J.T. Mawere to H.M. Nkumbula, Fort Jameson, 13 Apr. 1962, 
UNIPA, ANC 9/6. 
57
  Minutes of the ANC National Assembly, 14-19 April 1960. 
58
  Ellis & Co. to H.M. Nkumbula, Lusaka, 16 Sept. 1959, UNIPA, ANC 9/48. 
59
  W.K. Jere, ‘Statement from the national treasury’, Freedom Magazine, May 1960. 
 THE ROOTS OF AUTHORITARIANISM 31 
 
only be met through ad hoc fund-raising campaigns launched in Lusaka, the 
Copperbelt and elsewhere.60  
Lack of resources greatly reduced the party’s effectiveness at both the 
national and provincial levels. While Lusaka-based leaders could not tour the 
country as much as the threat posed by UNIP would have warranted, provincial 
officials had to cope with insufficient means and the erratic payment of personal 
allowances and emoluments.61 The chaotic series of provincial reshuffles by 
which the party was plagued in the years that followed the exit of Chona and 
Mukupo was partly a consequence of this state of affairs. In UNIP-dominated 
regions, where the costs and risks of political involvement were even higher 
than elsewhere, provincial officials were hard to find and harder to retain. Most 
new appointees would routinely hand in their notices after a mere few months in 
office or, at best, request a transfer to a less demanding area. Notable exceptions 
to the rule were the Southern and Central provinces, where the party could still 
count on strong mass support. In administrative terms, the Bantu Botatwe 
strongholds of the party were islands of stability, with the composition of 
provincial executives in both Monze and Lusaka-Broken Hill exhibiting a 
remarkable degree of continuity throughout the early 1960s. This, in turn, may 
have contributed to the coeval ‘southernization’ of the ANC’s national execu-
tive, where the positions of president, chairman, secretary, publicity officer and 
treasurer were all held by either southerners (Nkumbula, Millambo, Michello 
and Liso) or former Southern province-based officials (Jere).  
This was the party over which Nkumbula presided with an iron fist. For, and 
this is one of the many paradoxes and contradictions that characterized his 
political life, Nkumbula’s liberal-democratic faith and opposition to the one-
party state did not prevent him from establishing a truly dictatorial hold over the 
ANC. Having granted Nkumbula the constitutional right to appoint and dismiss 
members of both the national and provincial executives in 1959,62 the party was 
centralized to an extent unimaginable even by UNIP. The obvious disadvantage 
of the concentration of administrative powers in Nkumbula was that the party 
was brought to a complete standstill during the president’s enforced or wilful 
absences. On the other hand, it was precisely the ‘patrimonial’ nature of his rule 
that empowered Nkumbula freely to pursue those buccaneering strategies to 
which the ANC ultimately owed its survival in the early 1960. It is to these 
latter that we now turn. 
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Beneath the surface of formal politics 
The alliance with Katanga 
The formation of ZANC/UNIP ushered in a period of increasing international 
isolation for Nkumbula, whose former place in the hearts and minds of African 
and European anti-colonial leaders was rapidly taken over by Kaunda and his 
organization. When, in December 1958, both Nkumbula and Kaunda attended 
the All African Peoples’ Conference in newly independent Ghana, the former 
was genuinely ‘hurt’ to discover that the latter was now Kwame Nkrumah and 
Kamuzu Banda’s preferred interlocutor. Old acquaintances from his London 
days ‘would not pay attention to [him]’. George Padmore, now serving as 
Nkrumah’s special advisor, only ‘listened to Kaunda, who acted as Banda’s 
agent. […]. Nobody listened to me with sympathy […]’. Harry felt as if his 
‘presence [was] repugnant’ to the conference’s organizers and delegates.63 
Ghanaian authorities did not see fit to reply to this and later lamentations or to 
consider Nkumbula’s request ‘for financial assistance amounting to £6,000’.64  
Snubbed by Pan-Africanists, Nkumbula did not fare much better with British 
supporters of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. Although Nkumbula 
managed to retain a few ‘Labour Party friends’,65 the Labour Commonwealth 
office soon resolved to throw its weight behind the newly formed UNIP, with 
which it was keen to establish a ‘close liaison’ from as early as the end of 
1959.66 The same was true of such influential pressure groups as Fenner 
Brockway’s Movement for Colonial Freedom, Arthur Creech Jones’ Fabian 
Colonial Bureau and Thomas Fox-Pitt’s Anti-Slavery Society. Writing to Chona 
at the time of his faction’s merger with UNIP, Fox-Pitt typified the feelings of 
many of his colleagues by stating categorically that while Nkumbula went 
‘unregretted or regretted only by a few hangers on’, Kaunda, once released, 
‘will solve many of your problems for you and for the country and the Govern-
ment if they have the sense to realize it’.67  
This painful process of international marginalization was probably no less 
significant a factor than the ANC’s financial crisis in strengthening Nkumbula’s 
resolve to seek for new allies across the Katangese border, where Moïse 
Tshombe, the president of the secessionist regime since July 1960, was prepared 
to use his virtually limitless resources to ease the diplomatic isolation by which 
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his splinter state threatened to be suffocated and ensure the installation of a 
friendly government in neighbouring Northern Rhodesia. Nkumbula’s first 
meeting with Tshombe seems to have taken place shortly before the ANC 
president’s incarceration in April 1961.68 But as early as February of the same 
year, the UNIP’s national secretary had denounced Nkumbula’s overtures 
towards the ‘imperialist puppet Tshombe. […]. It is obvious that if Tshombe and 
Nkumbula start working together, then our political problems will be immensely 
increased’.69 In May, Katilungu, acting national president of the ANC, issued a 
statement condemning Kamuzu Banda for ‘demand[ing] that M. Tshombe be 
murdered in his telegram to [Congolese] President Kasavubu. […]. The African 
National Congress has taken no sides in Congo situation, but believes that 
Congo leaders if given the chance, including Moise Tshombe, would be able to 
find their solution’.70 During the same month, Ronald John Japau, Tshombe’s 
fellow Lunda and the ANC’s provincial general secretary in the North-Western 
province, paid his first visit to Elisabethville, where he was delayed until 
August by the Katangese president’s promise of ‘some valuable goods to help 
the ANC activities’.71 
While it is difficult to gauge the precise volume of Katangese financial 
assistance to the ANC in 1961, there is little doubt that the sums involved were 
considerable, oscillating between Mulford’s estimate of £10,000 and the African 
Mail’s reported figure of ‘2,000,000 francs (about £14,000) and six Land 
Rovers’.72 Before the end of the year, Berrings Lombe, the ANC’s deputy 
national secretary, settled in Katanga as the party’s local representative.73 
Thanks to Lombe’s exertions in Elisabethville and the ANC’s ever more open 
professions of support for the secession,74 the flow of Katangese aid continued 
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unabated and may well have reached a grand total of £25,000 by February 
1962.75 With ANC officials and Katangese dignitaries exchanging frequent 
visits throughout the year, UNIP was left ranting at Nkumbula’s party – ‘which 
was bankrupt [but] has suddenly become very wealthy, purchasing 20 motor 
vehicles; its officials have bought expensive suits and watches as well as 
furniture and other luxuries’ – and stigmatizing its alleged decision to dispatch 
some of its members to Katanga to receive military instruction.76 UNIP’s 
denunciations notwithstanding, following a new request from Nkumbula to 
Godefroid Munongo, the redoubtable Katangese Interior Minister, an additional 
£20,000 were seemingly made available to the ANC in September.77 
The solidity of the ANC’s alliance with Tshombe, and Federal Prime 
Minister Welensky’s absolute certainty that a UNIP victory in the general 
elections of October 1962 would ensue in the immediate dissolution of his 
cherished Federation, help explaining the relative ease with which Nkumbula 
pulled off his greatest yet tactical masterstroke. By dangling before Welensky 
and John Roberts’ eyes the possibility of a future coalition government between 
their United Federal Party (UFP) and the ANC, Nkumbula convinced them to 
support each other’s candidates on the so-called ‘national roll’, which com-
prised both upper (i.e. white) and lower roll voters. To the dismay and fury of 
UNIP – which only learnt of its existence on nomination day – the circum-
scribed electoral alliance between the UFP and the ANC proved successful, 
culminating in the ANC supplementing its three lower roll seats with two 
‘national’ ones (these would become four after the by-elections of December). 
As a result of Nkumbula’s coup – and since neither UNIP nor the UFP had the 
numbers to form monochrome governments – the ANC now ‘held the balance 
of power, a position of immense influence, […] radically disproportionate to the 
party’s actual strength in the country’.78 Having used the UFP’s votes to the 
greatest possible advantage and forced UNIP to enter negotiations from a 
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paradoxical position of weakness, Nkumbula proceeded to drop his federal 
allies and stipulate a coalition pact with UNIP. Despite having nearly twice as 
many parliamentarians as the ANC, UNIP was eventually compelled to accede 
to Nkumbula’s demands and allocate his party half of the six full ministerial 
posts reserved for elected representatives in the new cabinet.79   
Though the undisputed winner of the electoral contest, Education Minister 
Nkumbula’s position at the beginning of 1963 was fraught with dangers. For 
while relationships with UNIP remained tense and unfriendly both within and 
outside the cabinet, by forming a government with the latter party, Nkumbula 
was now exposed to the threat of retaliation from his former, disgruntled 
sponsors. Nkumbula had explicitly sought Tshombe’s blessing before signing 
his pact with ‘Lumumbist’ UNIP in December 1962.80 But there was little that 
he could do to reclaim his erstwhile stature among Katangese leaders. After the 
end of the secession in January 1963, the deposed Katangese president became 
deeply wary of Nkumbula and must have regarded his renewed requests for 
financial succour as, at best, impudent. The same, of course, was true of 
Welensky and the UFP (NPP from April 1963). Though resigned to the impend-
ing dissolution of Federation,81 federal politicians were not ready to forgive 
what Welensky called Nkumbula’s ‘“breach of faith”’82 and began actively to 
plot his demise by supporting the activities of a rebel faction grouped around 
national secretary Michello. The formation of Michello’s ephemeral PDC in 
August 1963 would soon remind Nkumbula of the power and vindictiveness of 
his enemies. 
With the ending of Katangese support, the ANC was plunged back into a 
state of serious financial turmoil. Late in the summer of 1963, the party’s debts 
were already ‘in the region of £25,000’.83 There was to be no repeat of Nkum-
bula’s coup of 1962 in the run-up to the general elections of January 1964, when 
a penniless ANC was cut down to size by a triumphant UNIP, the party under 
which Zambia would eventually achieve full independence in October 1964. 
Nonetheless, however short-lived, Nkumbula’s Katangese venture in the early 
1960s had left a lasting imprint upon Zambian politics. For the ANC, the 
Katangese episode meant that the temptation remained inscribed in the party’s 
DNA of overcoming the problem of limited internal popularity by enlisting the 
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support of powerful – if ideologically suspect – foreign partners. UNIP, on the 
other hand, was left with an enduring suspicion of external meddling; its 
readiness to resort to any means in order to prevent it would vindicate and 
bolster up its already entrenched authoritarian inclinations.  
Ethnic politics 
Even though Nkumbula never renounced the national frame of reference within 
which his early political career had taken place and was wont publicly to 
‘repudiate tribal chauvinism wherever it prevails among Africans’,84 it is clear 
that his political survival in the early 1960s owed much to the regionalization of 
his party and ethnicization of its support base. As pointed out above, the ANC’s 
half-baked liberal-democratic, free-market agenda was broad (or loose) enough 
to appeal to both market-oriented and subsistence farmers in the Southern and 
Central provinces, whose principal tribal groups – Tonga, Ila and Lenje – spoke 
mutually intelligible dialects and had indeed been conceived of by missionaries 
and colonial administrators as forming one distinct linguistic and cultural entity, 
the Bantu Botatwe.85 However, it was precisely the politicization of these cul-
tural affinities under the sponsorship of the ANC that cemented the solidarity 
between potentially antagonistic strata of rural producers. The ethnic propa-
ganda of the ANC took two different forms, each of which suited to a particular 
political arena.  
At the local level, the mobilization of regionalist feelings passed through the 
expression of open hostility towards the Bemba and Bemba-speaking peoples, 
with whom the formation of ZANC/UNIP was closely associated and who, in 
virtue of their long experience of labour migrancy, were seen as embodying that 
urban ethos against which the more sedentary Bantu Botatwe were prepared to 
rally. Unencumbered by the party’s national leadership, ANC provincial offi-
cials consistently portrayed UNIP founders and supporters as uprooted and poor 
‘thieves’ whose political activities were solely designed to rob honest peasants 
of the hard-won fruits of their agricultural labour. A UNIP government – ordi-
nary members of the ANC were told and generally believed throughout the early 
1960s and beyond – would put the Bemba in a position to colonize the Southern 
province and take away its women and cattle.86 ‘[Y]our land’ – future MP Edgar 
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Musangu warned Choma voters at the beginning of January 1964 – will only 
‘be safe’ in the event of an ANC’s electoral victory; ‘no piece of it will be given 
to Bembas and all jobs will be open to local people’.87 The scare tactics used by 
the ANC were much the same in Mumbwa, one of the party’s strongholds in the 
Central province, where such Tonga supporters of UNIP as Chona and Elijah 
Mudenda were ridiculed as ‘educated fools’ and mere ‘tools of the Bemba 
Regime’.88 
The emphasis placed by ANC propagandists on the alleged fragility of 
Kaunda’s position amounted to a variation on the theme of Bemba mischievous-
ness. The leadership of Kaunda, whose parents hailed from present-day Malawi, 
was said to be resented by ‘true’ Bemba leaders within UNIP. Their aim – 
charged the Congress Circular – was to give birth to a new political organi-
zation under the presidency of Kapwepwe.89 The rumoured tension between 
Kapwepwe and Kaunda and, more in general, Bemba hegemonic pretensions 
formed the kernel of ‘The Voice of Zambia Front’, a communiqué allegedly 
issued in the name of UNIP on the eve of the 1964 elections. The pamphlet – 
the author of which was in fact an ANC man, Dominic Mwansa – purported to 
be an appeal to the Bemba to support the ascent of Kapwepwe as a first step 
towards the attainment of a position of unassailable ethnic superiority.  
All tribes shall be under one BIG TRIBE in our Zambia, that is Bemba Tribe. We 
shall have one vernacular language in our Zambia. BEMBA will be the MAIN 
LANGUAGE in our Zambia. All tribes shall be united and shall be called “The 
United Tribes of Zambia”. Every one shall speak Bemba. In every school of Zambia 
children shall be taught in Bemba, white or Black. The Bemba tribe shall be 
honoured for their bravery for bringing Freedom in Zambia. Vote KAPWEPWE, our 
first Prime Minister.90 
However, given the pervasiveness of nationalist discourse, anti-Bemba pro-
paganda could hardly command the same prominence on the national stage as it 
did in the Southern and Central provinces. Its countrywide rendition was a 
bellicose form of nativism: the professed defence of the rights of ‘indigenous 
Northern Rhodesians’ against the onslaught of foreigners. Both because of 
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Kaunda’s origins and the privileged position they had historically occupied in 
Northern Rhodesia’s political economy, Malawians or ‘Nyasas’ were the pre-
ferred target of the ANC. What may have begun as mere resentment at the 
alliance between Kamuzu Banda and Kaunda from the end of 1958, or as a 
cheap tactical ploy during the aborted Federal Review and Northern Rhodesian 
Constitutional conferences of December 1960–January 1961,91 soon became a 
major propaganda tool to which the party resorted with monotonous regularity 
throughout the period under study. The tone for many successive pronounce-
ments was set by Nkumbula early in April 1961. In a speech entitled ‘Invasion 
of Northern Rhodesia by Nyasaland Africans’, he condemned Northern 
Rhodesia-based Nyasas for having ‘aligned themselves with United National 
Independence Party, which is apparently a branch of the Malawi Congress. It is 
their imagination that if there was a Malawi Government in Nyasaland and 
another government in Northern Rhodesia led by their fellow country man [i.e. 
Kaunda], Nyasaland will gain control of Northern Rhodesia for its economic 
redemption and also to enable them to hold key positions in our industry and 
commerce which they now enjoy at the prejudice of the Rhodesian Africans’.92 
At about the same time, Katilungu sought to impress ANC supporters by 
reminding them of his vernacular nickname – ‘Lesa wabufa’ or ‘jealous God’ – 
seemingly bestowed upon him on account of his hostility to ‘foreign natives 
meddling in our affairs’.93 Undeterred by the inconsistency between its anti-
Malawian stance and its coeval Katangese policy, the ANC continued to follow 
an openly chauvinistic course throughout 1962. Typical of the party’s mood at 
the time was the press release approved by the National Assembly of March. 
Authored by Liso, the communiqué demanded the immediate expulsion from 
Northern Rhodesia of Yatuta Chisiza, the Malawi Congress Party’s administra-
tive secretary, guilty of having called upon ‘Nyasas working in N. Rhodesia to 
rally behind UNIP which is led by his nephew Kenneth Kaunda’. Chisiza  
‘realises that Nyasaland is a poor country and is pulling wool over the eyes of true 
N. Rhodesia[ns], so that if Kaunda became the Prime Minister, Nyasaland shall be 
milking N. Rhodesia in the same way as she and S. Rhodesia are doing now […].94 
Even though the ANC’s nativism spread beyond the borders of the Southern 
and Central provinces, it resonated particularly powerfully among the Bantu 
Botatwe, who, aided by the absence or insignificance of migration narratives in 
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their traditional lore,95 saw themselves, and were widely perceived, as the first 
occupants of Northern Rhodesian soil and the ultimate ‘indigenous’. ‘Please do 
not let us be trodden by foreigners’ – pleaded a Mr. Ngwewa from Mazabuka – 
‘because this drives some of us mad – to think of being ruled by a foreigner in 
what we regard and know as our motherland’.96 UNIP officials, who knew that 
many Southerners felt as strongly as Ngwewa, took the ANC’s anti-Malawian 
propaganda seriously. National secretary Chona, for instance, thought it wise to 
reassure UNIP branch officials in Kalomo Rural district to the effect that 
Kaunda ‘[was] not Nyasalander’.  
‘If he was, how could he have been a secretary of ANC when it was still a strong 
organisation? Nyasalanders are not allowed to vote. If Mr. Kaunda is a Nyasalander, 
why is he being allowed to vote? Everyone should see that ANC is just foolish and 
deceiving our people and it is high time they woke up from sleep and leave the ANC 
led by drunkards and skirt-chasers, as well as liars’.97 
Chona’s frustration at the Bantu Botatwe unshakable faith in Nkumbula and 
stubborn refusal to ‘join UNIP like all other different tribes’ was understand-
able.98 He was, after all, the seniormost Tonga in UNIP. However, UNIP’s 
repeated accusations of gullibility or ignorance (‘if the people all over Northern 
Rhodesia have accepted UNIP there must be something in it which we do not 
know we Tonga people’99) served merely to reinforce the Bantu Botatwe’s 
convictions, rather than leading them to change alliances. By stereotyping and 
harassing the Tonga and other kindred groups, UNIP unwittingly strengthened 
the effects of the ANC’s own ethnic propaganda and favoured the emergence of 
a distinctly insular mentality among ANC supporters in the Southern and 
Central provinces. Thus crystallized along ethnic lines, Bantu Botatwe support 
for the ANC would stand the test of time and loose nothing of its poignancy in 
post-colonial Zambia, whose rulers would have to contend with the continuing 
opposition of the country’s richest agricultural areas and their willingness to 
rally behind most forms of anti-UNIP dissidence.  
Political violence 
The regionalization of the ANC influenced the pattern of inter-party warfare in 
the early 1960s. If UNIP was responsible for the bulk of political violence in the 
Copperbelt and other Bemba-speaking areas – a conclusion which the joint 
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Whelan Commission of July-August 1963 very clearly refused to draw, but 
which numerous internal ANC records forcefully suggest – the ANC made sure 
that in its southern and central strongholds Kaunda’s party was ‘treated with the 
same medicine that [it] treat[ed] others with in other parts of the Territory’.100 
This writer’s feeling – and that of a good number of people who knew him 
intimately101 – is that Nkumbula, as he once told the leader of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Northern Rhodesia, ‘personally abhorred violence’.102 However, 
given the very deteriorated political context in which his party operated and 
UNIP’s aggressive methods throughout much of the country, Nkumbula appears 
to have developed an awareness of violence’s potential political usefulness or, at 
any rate, justifiableness. In the early 1960s, despite being wont to appeal for 
tolerance and calm,103 Nkumbula did not shy away from occasionally condoning 
– or indeed encouraging – the resort to retaliatory violence on the part of his 
followers.  
‘[Y]ou have been too submissive and patient for too long’, he chided the delegates 
to the party’s National Assembly of March 1962. From now onwards, ‘if you are 
attacked you attack them too […] remember our Policy is that if one Congress 
member is attacked in one District that means the Province and the whole of N. 
Rhodesia has been attacked’.104 
Such pronouncements – and Nkumbula’s more general unwillingness unam-
biguously to condemn all forms of political violence – did little to curb the 
activities of those Bantu Botatwe officials who, going well beyond the letter of 
their national president’s public instructions, viewed preventive violence as the 
best possible means to defend Congress’ position in the Southern and Central 
provinces. In this latter interpretation, violence was more than an enforced 
response to UNIP intimidation; its principal function was to demarcate a 
political field and consolidate existing loyalties. In Choma and Namwala, for 
instance, Congress aggressive occupation of the territory made the staging of 
UNIP public meetings risky  
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‘and not very profitable, i.e. because Congress has not yet lost its grip among the 
illiterate who make-up the majority, the enlightened ones will always fear to come 
into the open until the resistance of the masses has been broken’.105 
Limited in the scattered southern and central townships, police protection 
was virtually non-existent in the outlying rural areas, where UNIP activists 
fought a thankless, solitary battle against a belligerent enemy. Unlike in the 
Copperbelt – where large and murderous, but geographically and temporally 
limited, riots were the most visible manifestation of inter-party hostility – 
political violence in the Bantu Botatwe areas consisted of a myriad acts of daily 
intimidation. Some insights into the dynamics of Congress violence at the local 
level are provided by the detailed reports of Daniel Siamusonde, a UNIP branch 
(later constituency) secretary in Kalomo Rural, whose experience may be safely 
assumed to typify that of a good number of UNIP organizers in the Southern 
and Central provinces in the early 1960.  
Right from the outset of his political career, Siamusonde was confronted 
with a barrage of increasingly truculent threats. No sooner had his Nkuntu 
Simwatachela branch of UNIP been formed than he was openly warned by ANC 
provincial general secretary Sichilaba to keep out of politics and discontinue the 
sale of UNIP membership cards in Kalomo Rural.106 During a public meeting on 
15 April 1962, the same Sichilaba and other ANC provincial leaders are said to 
have sought to impress upon their supporters in Kalomo that local ‘UNIP 
leaders must be attacked or killed as dogs’.107 Words finally gave way to action 
on 8 August, when Siamusonde, on his way back from the UNIP General 
Conference of Magoye, was beaten up in Kayuni Siamalamo’s village by ANC 
militants. When he went to report the incident to the UNIP constituency 
headquarters in Kalomo, he got involved in a fight between supporters of the 
two parties in the township’s beerhall and was yet once more cautioned to the 
effect that plans were afoot to dispatch the ‘ANCO-Mobile Unit to graze [sic] 
down or to distroy [sic] [his] home or village’.108 At the end of the same month, 
‘three headmen of chief Simwatachela’ travelled to Nkuntu Simwatachela with 
the seeming purpose of assassinating Siamusonde. The latter being fortuitously 
absent, the ANC men confined themselves to threatening his family. Upon their 
departure, four frightened members of Siamusonde’s minute local following 
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 UNIP (Choma-Namwala Region), Report to the eighth national council, Choma, 30 
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 S.B.D. Siamusonde to M.M. Chona, Nkuntu Simwatachela’s village, 13 August 
1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2. 
107
 [S.B.D. Siamusonde] to UNIP Regional Secretary (Livingstone), Nkuntu Simwata-
chela’s village, 19 April 1962, UNIPA, UNIP 5/4/1/2. 
108
  Siamusonde to Chona, 13 August 1962. 
42 MACOLA 
 
returned their UNIP membership cards.109 Siamusonde himself resolved tempo-
rarily to leave Nkuntu Simwatachela to relocate his family to Siajumba, the 
village of his father-in-law, ‘where they shall found save or safe from bitterly 
struggle of ANCO’.110 The formation of the ANC-UNIP coalition government at 
the end of 1962 did not dispel the poisonous atmosphere that surrounded 
Kalomo Rural’s political life. In April 1963, UNIP sympathizers were still 
physically prevented from attending one of Siamusonde’s many aborted public 
rallies.111 The following month, having been made to understand that Congress 
planned to destroy the future crops of UNIP supporters and that Daniel 
Munkombwe, the then provincial president of the ANC, had issued a renewed 
call for his murder, Siamusonde began to move around with his ‘axe and two 
clubs’ to ‘intimidate the hositel [sic] ignorant villagers’.112  
Actively promoted (if not effectively co-ordinated) by provincial officials, 
Congress violence proved successful in preventing UNIP from making any 
substantial inroads into the Bantu Botatwe areas. To the extent that it reinforced 
the party’s ethnic propaganda, the ANC’s aggressive anti-UNIP campaign 
enjoyed a remarkable degree of popular support among the Bantu Botatwe. 
ANC southern organisers achieved this objective by presenting the adoption of 
violent means on their part as being inextricably bound up with the situation 
obtaining in the Copperbelt, where, as even some UNIP leaders reluctantly 
admitted, UNIP intimidation was frequently infused with ethnic overtones. 
Early in 1963, during a meeting called by the Plateau Tonga Native Authority 
with a view to bringing to an end the wave of political violence by which 
Monze district had recently been engulfed, the ANC representatives  
‘told the Chiefs that their members were beating up UNIP members and particularly 
those from outside the Tonga area because UNIP members in towns beat up every 
Tonga man they find. He added that Tonga people who go to sell their fowls on the 
Copperbelt were beaten by UNIP members because all Tonga people were regarded 
as members if the African National Congress’. 
Samson Mukando, the UNIP regional secretary in Monze-Gwembe, felt the 
allegation serious enough to warrant explicit mention in a circular addressed to 
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  S.B.D. Siamusonde to UNIP Regional Secretary (Kalomo-Livingstone), Nkuntu 
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all of his peers in the Copperbelt and the Central province.113 While refuting the 
charge in public, Chona privately admitted to Daniel Munkombwe that UNIP 
was  
‘working hard to stop the violence against ANC on the Copperbelt. […] if Tonga 
people in towns are being attacked, it will be impossible to UNIPifiy the Southern 
Province and […] this, in turn, will or might lead to tribal warfare which we must 
fight against’.114  
Mukando’s worried missive was echoed a few months later by A.H.S. 
Munkombwe, the acting secretary of the Kalomo-Livingstone region of UNIP, 
who related Congress’ current ‘roughness’ in his area to the recent Nchanga 
riots, when ‘everyone who spoke Tonga had to be beaten whether he was a 
member of the United National Independence Party’ or not. As a result of this,  
organisers and members of the African National Congress have been instructed by 
top officials from Lusaka that they have to beat and kill anyone UNIP who does not 
speak Tonga. […]. If this system of beating anyone who speaks a different language 
apart from Tonga and Lozi will not come to an end and attacking anyone who does 
not belong to the African National Congress the result will be some series of injuries 
and deaths to the organisers and members of the United National Independence 
Party.115 
Once more, it is appropriate to stress that what we have been chiefly 
concerned with in the present section of this chapter are the origins of unhealthy 
political dynamics that would continue to haunt post-independence Zambia. 
Both because it was interwoven with the process of Bantu Botatwe ethnogenesis 
and because it formed such a central component of the ANC’s strategy in the 
Southern province, violence remained a distinctive feature of the region’s poli-
tics long after 1964, even though UNIP’s pervasive control of the state appa-
ratus meant that ANC supporters now found themselves more frequently in the 
position of victims than perpetrators. While this metamorphosis was probably 
not sufficient to turn the Bantu Botatwe into a veritable ‘community of suffer-
                                               
113
 S.C. Mukando to UNIP Regional Secretaries (Central and Western provinces), n.p. 
[but Monze (?)], n.d. [but April 1963 (?)], UNIPA, UNIP 16/1/14. 
114
  M.M. Chona to D. Munkombwe, Lusaka, 23 May 1963, UNIPA, ANC 9/25. But in 
the Voice of UNIP of June 1963, Chona advanced the counterclaim that the attacks 
against the Bantu Botatwe in the Copperbelt were in fact the work of hit squads of 
the ANC, the intention of which was ‘to say, “look how bad these UNIP people are. 
They attack you because of your tribe […].”’ 
115
  A.H.S. Munkombwe, ‘Report submitted to the National Council meeting on 3rd–5th 
August, 1963’, Livingstone, UNIPA, UNIP 1/2/1. 
44 MACOLA 
 
ing’ – to use David Gordon’s captivating expression116 – it most certainly contri-
buted to entrench their hostility to UNIP and ensuing alienation from the 
national body politic.  
Conclusion 
By examining the ideology and activities of Harry Nkumbula and his ANC, this 
essay has attempted to move away from the traditional, UNIP-dominated, 
narrative of political change in late-colonial Zambia. The analysis of Nkum-
bula’s career after the emergence of UNIP illuminates important – though 
hitherto neglected – traits of Zambian nationalist culture, and the article’s 
central contention is that these latter have had a profound influence on the 
nature of post-colonial Zambian politics. While the ideological apparatus that 
would later lead to the inception of the one-party state manifested itself for the 
first time during the ANC-UNIP conflict of 1959-1964, when UNIP thinkers 
and activists denied Nkumbula the right to full political citizenship and posited 
an intellectual equivalence between party and national membership, the survival 
strategies to which the ANC and its leader were forced to resort as a result of 
UNIP’s exclusionary nation-building paradigm and intolerance of dissent did 
little to broaden social consensus around democratic ideals in nationalist and 
independent Zambia. 
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3 
Rebellion or massacre?   
The UNIP-Lumpa conflict revisited 
 
David M. Gordon 
Introduction 
The events behind the ‘Lumpa uprising’ are seemingly well known. In July 
1964, while the United National Independence Party (UNIP) controlled the 
government but the colonial administration was still in charge of security, the 
interim administration sent in troops to resolve a violent conflict between UNIP 
cadres and the followers of Alice Mulenga Lenshina, who had formed the 
Lumpa Church in the mid-1950s. At the very least 1,000 people died as a 
consequence of troop action and Lumpa retaliatory attacks. In 1965, a Commis-
sion of Enquiry established the outlines of the conflict, the responsibilities of 
the various parties, and a diary of events from 26 June to 15 October 1964.1  
 
                                               
1
  Report of the commission of enquiry into the Lumpa church (Lusaka, 1965). The 
original security reports upon which the diary of events in the Report is based can be 
found, as ‘Diary of Events from 25 June to 15 October’, 16 Oct. 1964, in the 
National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, MHA 1/3/10. The MHA 1/3/10 
Lenshina file is not yet catalogued. It was viewed with the permission of the director 
of the National Archives. The number of those killed due to the conflict is unclear. 
Based on hospital records, the Report cites 707 killed and 404 wounded during 
security operations in northern and eastern provinces (probably between June and 
September, 1964). The Report only gives a few approximate figures for the earlier 
period and none for the period before June 1963. It also does not include those who 
died after security operations and those who starved in the bush or during the march 
to the Congo. In my view, the Report also underestimates the number killed by 
UNIP cadres.  
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Photo 3 The remnants of Lenshina’s Church at Zion, near Kasomo Village, 
 Chinsali. Kenneth Kaunda ordered the destruction of the Church in 1970.  
 Alice Lenshina is buried at the former altar of the church. Her gravestone  
 repeats the words of the original foundation stone and reads: ‘Alice  
 Lenshina Mulenga Lubusha. She was born in 1924. She died for the first  
 time on 25 October 1953. On the 26th she met with Jesus and was given  
 the work. Father builds on the rock. On 7/12/1978 she received rest and  
 returned to God, our father’. 
 
 
The established and conventional history of the Lumpa–UNIP conflict views 
it as the culmination of a Lumpa rebellion against authority that began almost a 
decade earlier. At least since 1991, however, a new but still marginal version of 
events has surfaced. This version is based more on reconstructed oral testimony 
than on official documentation. It has emerged from the remnants of the banned 
Lumpa Church, reconstituted as the Jerusalem Church after years of exile in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The new interpretation has joined 
longstanding opposition to Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP in the Chibemba-speak-
ing heartland of the Northern Province districts of Chinsali and Kasama. In 
essence, the claim is that there was never an uprising against authority but a 
massacre by authority. Kenneth Kaunda provoked a war between local UNIP 
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branches and Lumpa churches, which allowed him to send in troops to kill 
church members and ban the church. In the 1970s, when Bemba-affiliated 
leaders like Simon Kapwepwe became aware of Kaunda’s despotic nature, they 
repented and turned to Lenshina again. This version of events is espoused by the 
adherents of the Jerusalem Church, but has also entered the public realm, most 
notably in Kampamba Mulenga’s book, Blood on their hands.2 
The claim by the surviving members of the Lumpa Church that there was a 
massacre of Lumpa followers rather than a rebellion by Lumpa followers is 
clearly a partisan and partial rendering of the conflict. The Lumpa Church did 
rebel against established authority: through the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Lumpa Church replaced European-established mission churches in Chinsali; 
they rebelled against the political authority of the colonial administration; they 
evaded Bemba chiefs and spurned the latter’s claims to ancestral and religious 
authority; and, finally, by 1962 they had rejected the dominant nationalist 
movement in the Northern Province, UNIP. The Church offered an alternative 
corporate framework and even identity to Bemba ethnicity and Zambian 
nationalism.  
Yet, when one examines the events of 1962-1964 closely, the label of ‘rebel-
lion’ obfuscates more than it reveals. In many ways, this ‘rebellion’ was actually 
a war between local UNIP cadres and the Lumpa Church that culminated in the 
forced dispersal and occasional massacre of Lumpa followers by the colonial 
armed forces between July and October of 1964. In the established historiogra-
phy, the events of 1962-4 almost seem to be a natural progression of the anti-
establishment and rebellious nature of the Lumpa Church: the conflict was a 
result of the ‘radical’ or even ‘fanatical’ views of the Lumpa Church members. 
Instead, the origins of the conflict need to be seen as closely linked to the abso-
lute, almost theocratic, commitment demanded by local cadres of the nationalist 
movement, UNIP, from 1961. To understand the conflict, we have to place 
UNIP actions alongside those of the Lumpa Church. Moreover, our understand-
ing of the government and administration’s responses needs to be contextual-
ized and explained. The forced dispersals and massacres of 1964 were not the 
natural culmination of Lumpa rebellious ideology, but the result of ill-advised 
and in some cases badly executed policies, which left the impression that the 
colonial administration and armed forces were tools of UNIP rather than impar-
tial peacekeepers. In many ways, this first failure of the state to remain 
independent of the party presaged the more complete integration of the state and 
party structures several years later.  
A more nuanced interpretation of the events of 1962-4 challenges some of 
the central ideas of the established historiography of the Lumpa-UNIP conflict. 
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In the most subtle study of the episode thus far, Andrew Roberts recognizes that 
the ‘total commitment’ to the cause of UNIP contributed to the conflict with the 
Lumpa Church.3 Yet for Roberts, in the end, the sense of persecution and mille-
narian radicalism that flourished in the independent Lumpa villages of Chinsali 
and Lundazi Districts almost forced the government of Kenneth Kaunda to act 
against the Church.4 Yet much remains unanswered: What and who determined 
the nature of the government’s and the administration’s response? Why was it 
necessary forcefully to disperse church settlements instead of disarming them? 
What was Kaunda’s role in making these decisions and what can be attributed to 
other UNIP cadres or the colonial administration? Roberts devotes less than 
three pages of his 56-page article to the final conflict of July to October 1964, 
when troops were sent in to disperse the villages. His information is entirely 
reliant on the Commission’s Report and assorted press reports. We are left with 
vast lacunae in our understanding of this conflict at the dawn of Zambian inde-
pendence.  
The following study has benefited from a far greater array of unpublished 
documentary and interview evidence than was available to earlier scholars. 
Over the last ten years, since the end of UNIP rule, there has been greater open-
ness regarding the events of 1962-4. Members of the Lumpa Church and family 
of Lenshina talk openly about the ‘war’ and members of the post-UNIP govern-
ment are happy to allow an alternate version of events to emerge. From January 
to July 2005, I conducted over 50 in-depth interviews with Lumpa and UNIP 
members who witnessed the events of 1963-4. In addition, we now have access 
to detailed documentation relating to those years, including several files re-
leased by the National Archives of Zambia and documents scattered in the files 
of the newly-opened UNIP archives. The National Archives of the United King-
dom have opened their files regarding the Lumpa conflict. We also have access 
to mission diaries that report on the conflict. No previous study has been able to 
consult such an array of evidence. We are now able to reconstruct the views, 
motivations, and agency of the parties to the conflict, beyond the simple 
chronology and description provided by the Commission’s Report. 
Due to the density of the new evidence and the importance in our attempts to 
outline a fairly objective account of the events and their background, this study 
has restricted itself in several ways. The focus is on the events of 1962-4. The 
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is W.J. van Binsbergen, Religious change in Zambia: Exploratory studies (London 
and Boston, 1981), 267-316.  
4
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study only considers Lumpa ideology and the Lumpa Church in the 1950s in 
passing.5 It only briefly describes the fate of the Church from 1965 to the 
present. The aim here is to the use the substantial new documentary evidence 
accompanied with select interview evidence to throw light on the conflict of 
1962-4 and its immediate aftermath. Many died and many others were exposed 
to death and tragedy: Even after 40 years, Zambians have yet to discuss this 
episode openly, shorn of prejudice and with reference to all the available evi-
dence. I have attempted to be impartial, but invariably many will be upset by 
my rendering of this history; as in many cases of mass violence, there were 
more victims than perpetrators, and many unrecognized heroes.  
The Lumpa-UNIP war 
Popular African nationalism in northern Zambia grew out of the Lumpa Church 
movement. In 1953, the year that Alice Mulenga Lubusha ‘died’ and was resur-
rected as ‘Regina’ or ‘Lenshina’, the elite-led nationalist movement in the Chin-
sali region was little more than a group of schoolteachers protesting the onset of 
the Central African Federation and engaged in pranks directed against local 
celebrations of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth.6 Lenshina’s church, with an 
estimated 60,000 followers by the end of 1955, was the most vocal group 
opposing colonial authority and white missionaries, especially the Catholics.7 
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Church’, paper presented to the conference on ‘Ethno-history and the construction of 
identity in twentieth-century Africa’, University of Cambridge, 30 Mar.-1 Apr. 
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  For activities against the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, see J.M. Sokoni, ‘A novel 
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the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, see Kapasa Makasa, Zambia’s march to 
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organization, see his Zambia shall be free (London, 1962), 18-53. 
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  Exact membership numbers are unclear. Colonial authorities estimated that 60,000 
people had made a pilgrimage to visit Lenshina by the end of 1955; ‘Report of the 
Lenshina movement’, n.d. [1955-6(?)], NAZ, NP 3/12/3. The district commissioner 
(DC) of Chinsali estimated that 95% of all the residents of the district were sup-
porters. DC’s Report on Lenshina, 1956, NAZ, NP 3/12/3. By 1956, the movement 
had also spread to areas in the Eastern Province, especially Lundazi District, and had 
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The Lumpa Church allowed Africans to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. After 
Lenshina and her followers had built her Zion (or Sione) next to Kasomo 
Village, Chinsali District, in 1958, and after her beautiful hymns were heard 
across northern Zambia, heaven on earth was also a possibility. Only the 
infringement of colonial regulations enforced by Chiefs disturbed the utopian 
vision and reality: the need to pay tax, chiefs’ control over land, and respect for 
mission churches and schooling. 
For thousands of Zambians in the north, by the late 1950s the battle against 
the evil of ‘Satani’ became a battle against the evil of colonialism, against the 
Central African Federation and the ‘Colour Bar’.8 Lenshina and her Lumpa 
deacons began to lose the exclusive control that they had enjoyed over the 
struggle against evil. Tactics changed: Where Lenshina had encouraged evasion 
and escape from evil, the nationalist movement confronted it directly. Organiza-
tions changed: the African National Congress (ANC), then the Zambia African 
National Congress (ZANC), and finally UNIP, took up the struggle against evil. 
Leadership changed from a semi-literate but inspiring woman to schooled men 
who could converse in the language and the tactics of the colonizer. By 1960-
1961, during the anti-colonial chachacha revolt, violence against the objects of 
Lenshina’s and the nationalists’ wrath engulfed Chinsali District.  
Colonial retaliation was ruthless: Chinsali was one of four districts high-
lighted in UNIP’s well-known anti-colonial publication, A grim peep into the 
north, which revealed violent colonial abuses of civilians and UNIP activists. 
Mobile police platoons assaulted villagers suspected of sympathizing with 
UNIP rebels and UNIP rebels roamed the province, destroying bridges, colonial 
infrastructure, and assaulting those who worked with the colonial administra-
tion. Arson was a common tactic used by the security forces and UNIP. Accord-
ing to A grim peep into the north, ‘thousands of houses and granaries have been 
set on fire by security forces. Practically all [UNIP] constituency Branch 
Offices have been burnt and destroyed at the order of DCs’.9 The colonial 
administration, while denying many of these allegations, admitted that the secu-
rity forces had burned houses and granaries of UNIP supporters. They claimed, 
however, that most acts of arson were committed by UNIP against chiefs, 
                                               
several branches on the Copperbelt and line of rail; Northern Rhodesian Political 
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  Many of the early local leaders of the ANC in Chinsali, such as Robert Kaunda, the 
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  UNIP, A grim peep into the north, special issue of The Voice of UNIP, n.d. [Oct. 
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informers, and adherents of the Watchtower Church (Jehovah’s Witnesses), 
which at that time refused to join any political party. ‘These incidents of arson 
are petty in our eyes’, the Northern Province’s Provincial Commissioner (PC) 
wrote, ‘they are NOT to the chap whose house is burnt’.10 Indeed, for UNIP 
supporters or colonial agents and informers, acts of arson were serious – some-
times lives were lost, but more often arson destroyed food stores, the results of 
months of labor, and left villagers destitute and hungry. Burning houses, grana-
ries, and crops was the most effective way of ensuring that villagers toed the 
line, colonial or nationalist. By the end of 1961, as UNIP leadership reined in 
their supporters and the colonial administration doused the last fires of 
chachacha, all villagers were well versed in the tactics and uses of arson, a most 
effective way of spreading terror and demanding submission. Put a few match 
heads at the end of a burning cigarette and stuff this live fuse in the thatch 
roofing. A few minutes later, the hut would be up in flames, while the unknown 
perpetrators had long made their escape. Sometimes the doors would be barri-
caded, and the inhabitants would be fortunate to die of smoke inhalation before 
being consumed by flames.11 It was a fearsome time, where millenarian prophe-
cies of freedom and rebirth and apocalypse found voice.  
From early 1961 to May 1962, Lenshina preached to her followers on the 
Copperbelt. During this period, conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa church in 
Northern Province began. In some cases, competition over grazing and land 
allocation –‘trivial matters’, in the words one interviewee – lay behind the 
conflicts.12 But there were broader, political motivations as well. After UNIP’s 
disappointing performance in the 1962, 15-15-15 elections, local UNIP 
branches were determined to eradicate support for UNIP’s main African rival, 
Harry Nkumbula’s ANC, which showed signs of limited but growing support in 
the Northern Province.13 UNIP wanted to ensure undivided loyalty and per-
ceived any organization, political or civilian, to be a threat. During 1961, there 
had already been conflict with Watchtower Church members who refused to 
join UNIP. By the end of 1962, the Church of Scotland complained that activists 
                                               
10
  PC’s report on ‘Review of the military situation – Northern Province as at 9 Sept. 
1961’; for burning of Watchtower churches, see DC’s report on ‘Allegations in the 
“Voice of UNIP”’, 28 Oct. 1961; for burning of chiefs’ houses in Chinsali, see 
Report by DC (Chinsali), 1 Nov. 1961, NAZ, NP 3/12/9. 
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discouraged their congregations from attending church despite their open and 
acknowledged support for UNIP.14 The ANC complained of heightened 
intimidation in the form of ‘beatings arson woundings and damage to property 
[…]. People are not at peace now, they so not sleep or move freely but live in 
fear, the demand for political identity [party cards] in the streets roads bus stops 
and terminals is extensively going on faster than one expects even worse than 
Copperbelt’.15 The number of UNIP branches in the Northern Province had 
more than doubled from 276 in July 1961 to 573 in September 1962.16 A 
shadowy group of radical UNIP youths who called themselves the ‘Unity Front 
of Zambia’ was active in the Chinsali and Kasama Districts, disciplining even 
those within the party who disagreed with more extreme tactics.17 
In the midst of this political turbulence, Jameson Chapoloko, UNIP Regional 
Secretary in Mpika and future Member of Parliament for Chinsali, emerged as 
the local UNIP strongman. He attempted to assert UNIP authority over both the 
district administration and the villages. At the end of 1962, Chapoloko sent a 
letter to the DCs of Chinsali, Isoka, and Mpika Districts, which demanded: 
1. An end to all unlawful mass arrests of leaders and our people.  
2. That the die-hard imperialistic minded District Commissioners should take note 
of the political situation we are in now, and behave. 
3. That the imperialistic tactics of dividing the African people into camps will never 
help these quisling Agents of the now defunct British Colonialism.18 
In May 1963, when the DC of Chinsali, Priestley, complained to Chapoloko 
of numerous instances where UNIP members had demanded party cards from 
the public, Chapoloko advised the DC to ignore the law that disallowed UNIP 
members to demand cards, so as ‘not to create a presidency [sic] here where 
chiefs and ordinary members of the state should consider themselves enemies of 
the Party leaders […]’.19 Priestley persisted, and after instructions from Simon 
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Kapwepwe, Chapoloko acquiesced, claiming that party cards would no longer 
be demanded of the public.20 There is however little indication that Chapoloko’s 
acquiescence to the DC and the national UNIP leadership actually translated 
into orders to the UNIP militants and a suspension of the demands for party 
cards. 
By the middle of 1963, conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa Church 
intensified. Prior to 1963, Lumpa members had agreed to purchase UNIP party 
cards, but relations soured – perhaps because UNIP insisted that Lumpas attend 
meetings on Sundays.21 Since the Lumpa refused to buy party cards, UNIP burnt 
Lumpa churches. At Kapimpi Village in Chinsali district, Lumpa members 
allegedly set fire to several houses in retaliation for the burning of their 
churches. Lumpa deacons told their congregations to burn their UNIP cards. On 
June 15, Simon Kapwepe mediated a meeting between 900 Chinsali’s UNIP 
activists and 400 Lumpa members. At the meeting, Lenshina allegedly agreed to 
discipline any member calling for or burning UNIP party cards. In exchange 
UNIP militants would not burn Lumpa churches or insult Lumpa members. 
Nevertheless, in Chinsali three Lumpa Churches were destroyed by fire and 37 
Lumpa members were arrested and convicted of arson following burning of 
seven UNIP houses.22  
The destruction of party cards was a potent act of rebellion against UNIP. 
The burning of the colonial identity documents, the fitupa, had been one of the 
most significant acts of UNIP resistance. Instead of fitupa people had to buy 
UNIP party cards; instead of colonial poll tax, UNIP membership fees were 
paid. Party cards not only signified membership of a political party; they were 
an alternate form of identity that expressed and broadcast the authority of UNIP 
in place of the colonial administration. ‘We paid membership fees – that was the 
tax that remained after the white left’, according to Shame Mulenga, the 
treasurer of the UNIP branch in Bright Village, adjacent to Lenshina’s Sione 
                                               
5/1/2/1/4. For demanding of party cards, also see Mulanga Mission Diary, 26 Aug. 
1963, WFA, Lusaka, 5/WF/MD/59. 
20
 Priestley to Chapoloko, 18 June 1963; Chapoloko to Priestley, 29 June 1963, 
UNIPA 5/1/2/1/4 
21
  As claimed in the oral testimony of Jennifer Ngandu and many others. This 
accusation has become a type of church orthodoxy. Interviews with Jennifer 
Ngandu, Lusaka, 25 March 2005; Helena Mulenga, Leonard Mutonga, Lusaka, 12 
March, 2005; Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 3 July 2005; Felix Chimfwembwe Mumba, 
Choshi, 10 July 2005; Denise Chilufya, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Stephanie Nguni, 
Chiponya, 19 July 2005. 
22
 An account of the agreement is to be found in Chapoloko to ‘Mama Mulenga’, 29 
June 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/1/2/1/4. The meeting and some of the preceding events 
are covered in the report, 11. For the meeting and arson, see Central Intelligence 
Committee, Monthly Reports, June 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138. 
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headquarters. ‘We had surrendered fitupa and in their place we got cards. Cards 
became fitupa’.23 Burning this new form of identification was a radical rejection 
of UNIP authority. In their place, the Lumpa offered their own card, which they 
called ‘passports to heaven’.  
The agreement to halt hostilities between the Lumpas and UNIP did not last. 
Only two weeks later, Chapoloko, in a letter to Lenshina, complained that she 
had reneged on her agreement and that her followers had torn and burnt UNIP 
party cards. One Lumpa deacon had allegedly said, ‘There must be a distinct 
line between Lumpa Church and UNIP and the two must never unite in any-
thing’.24 Chapoloko could not tolerate UNIP’s authority being flouted, espe-
cially in the build up to the 1964 elections, which would determine the shape of 
the first post-colonial government and his own political future. One the one 
hand, he wrote to the national leadership, complaining of continued violence by 
Lumpa members against UNIP. He presented himself as a moderate, appealed 
for peace, and negotiated another agreement with Lenshina:  
In a desperate effort to try and make Lenshina see sense I have persuaded the Dis-
trict Commissioner Priestley to see if we can avoid blood-shed in the District […]. A 
wave of violence is increasingly getting worse on side of Lenshina and her followers 
more than three houses have been set on fire and assault are many on our leaders in 
Branches. Even though I have appealed for peace and Bwana Milner has done so 
[…] I doubt if this will still hold water, because there is a limit to which a human 
can endure.25 
On the same day that the letter was written, however, the White Fathers at 
Mulanga, hardly friends with the Lumpa, reported that ‘bands of gangsters […] 
required cards everywhere’.26 It seems that while Chapoloko preached peace to 
the national UNIP leadership, he told local UNIP activists that the Lumpa 
Church was no more than a ploy by the outgoing colonial administration to 
divide and manipulate Africans, and encouraged them to eradicate the Lumpa 
Church: 
At the transfer of power from a Colonialist to indigenous people the British Coloni-
alist do not simply depart peacefully, they usually sow seeds of misunderstandings 
and these eggs of bitterness hatch immediately after they leave, they linger at one 
side of the border with a view to come back and pretend to create peace, be alert 
Comrade […] Lenshina and her cult are a floating leave on an ocean through which 
                                               
23
 Interview with Shame Mulenga, Bright Village, 9 July 2005. 
24
  Chola to Lenshina Mulenga, 26 June 1963; Chapoloko to ‘Mama Mulenga’, 29 June 
1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/1/2/1/4. 
25
 Chapoloko to M.M. Chona, Lusaka, 28 Aug. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145.  
26
 Mulanga Mission Diary, 26 Aug. 1963.  
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the British Imperialists are holding their safety to the shores of Colonialism. Do not 
give them chance, let them be drown for ever […].27 
On 5 September 1963, Kenneth Kaunda visited Lenshina and persuaded her 
to sign another truce. An agreement between the DC, Priestley, Chapoloko, and 
Lenshina was reached on 9 September 1963.28 
With the national leadership abdicating responsibility for the growing vio-
lence to Chapoloko’s regional leadership and Chapoloko sending what can at 
best be interpreted as mixed signals to local militants, rumour, suspicion, vio-
lence, and terror spread. For UNIP activists, it became a known fact that 
Lenshina had had discussions with Roy Welensky when she visited Southern 
Rhodesia and that the Lumpa Church had become Welensky’s political arm in 
the Northern Province. Some claimed that the Katangese had armed and trained 
the Lumpa.29 Chapoloko complained to the provincial colonial administration 
that they were hampering the prosecution of Lumpa members and that 
‘Lenshina is in the pay of sinister interests in Salisbury’.30 Despite the numerous 
allegations that Lenshina may have been paid by the Federal government, or 
allied with the ANC, there is no concrete documentary evidence that this in fact 
occurred. If it did, it was without the knowledge of most Lumpa members. 
There was almost certainly no Federal or Katangese role in the arming of 
Lumpa members or in their training.31  
                                               
27
  Chapoloko to UNIP Constituency Secretaries (Mpichi Region), 29 Aug. 1963, 
UNIPA, UNIP 16/6/145.  
28
  Agreement between Lenshina, Chapoloko and Priestely, n.d., UNIPA, UNIP 
16/6/145. The agreement is reported in Mulanga Mission Diary, 9 Sept. 1963, WFA, 
5/WF/MD/59 and Central Intelligence Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept. 1963, 
NAUK, DO 183/138. 
29
  All ten UNIP activists interviewed in different villages in Chinsali District insisted 
on this fact. There is no other evidence for this claim. No Lumpa members indicated 
an alliance with Welensky or the ANC. There is no documentary evidence to sup-
port this claim, although a few Lumpa-ANC meetings probably took place, probably 
on matters of security. See for example, the letter written by Lenshina to the ANC 
cited in Mulenga, Blood on their hands, 49. I have been unable to find this letter in 
its cited location, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. After 1964, certain members of the Lumpa 
Church had discussions with Moise Tshombe, which facilitated their move to the 
Congo. Interview with Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 15 July 2005. 
30
  DC (Isoka) to PC (Northern Province), 6 Oct. 1963, NAZ, NP 3/12/1. 
31
  Fergus Macpherson has claimed that the Lumpa Church was funded by Welensky 
and trained by Federal or Kantangan armed forces. The evidence he presents is an 
interview with Robert Kaunda, a one-time Lumpa member, but in the UNIP camp 
by the early 1960s. I have viewed the transcript of Macpherson’s interview with 
Kaunda, in which the latter claims that Lenshina received ₤8,000 from Welensky 
which was paid through the Boma. The evidence of payments from Salisbury is still 
based on rumour and conjecture. Moreover, Robert Kaunda explicitly states that the 
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Lumpa members also found themselves in direct confrontation with most of 
the chiefs in Chinsali and Lundazi districts. In Chitumukulu’s area all of the 
Lumpa churches had been burnt down, perhaps on the orders of Chitimukulu 
himself.32 Farther east in Lundazi District, in Chief Chikwa’s area, UNIP mem-
bers combined with the chief’s kapasus to prevent Lumpa members from taking 
a buffalo that they had killed. Fights ensued over the next several days, resulting 
in a number of deaths.33 According to the Lumpas, UNIP members and the 
henchmen of Chiefs Nkhweto and Nkula attacked them whenever they heard 
hymns that proclaimed that only God was the king of kings: 
 
Subileni bonse, umwine ale isa  Believe, all of you, the owner is  
 coming 
Iseeni mumwimbile  Come together and praise 
Tapali mfumu iyacila ine kamo ine neka  There is no king who surpasses me 
Iseeni mumwimbile  Come together and praise 
Uwashama eka, Uwashama eka  The unfortunate one 
Ewuka filwa kupalama kwi sano  Who fails to come to the Kingdom of  
 God 
Nelyo wa filwa, iwe  When you have failed 
Ukalola kwi  Where will you go?34 
 
In December 1963, after several Lumpa were killed, allegedly on the orders of 
Chief Nkhweto, young Lumpa men desecrated the burial grounds of the Bemba 
chiefs at Shimwalule by cutting down the sacred milemba trees.35 
By November 1963, many Lumpa had begun to leave UNIP-dominated 
villages and build their own villages without the consent of surrounding chiefs. 
They claim that this occurred after attacks on their members as they made 
pilgrimages to Sione or went to the Boma to buy supplies. According to surviv-
                                               
Lumpa who prepared weapons were not from elsewhere. Fergus Macpherson and 
Julius Chabala’s interview with Robert Kaunda, 26 Feb. 1969, Centre for the Study 
of Christianity in the Non-Western World (CSNWW), Edinburgh, 49, Macpherson 
Collection, Box 1.2. 
32
  Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 21 Aug. 1963, WFA, Calmettes Box 7. (The Mulilan-
solo diaries were not available at the WFA, but J.L. Calmettes had copied out all 
portions of the diary relevant to the Lumpa Church.) Intelligence reports claim that 
Chitimukulu ‘may have ordered the burning of the churches.’ Central Intelligence 
Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138. 
33
  Interview with Alfred Mvula, Lusaka, 13 Mar. 2005; Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to 
Central Africa Office, 8 Oct. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/134; Central Intelligence 
Committee, Monthly Reports, Sept., 1963, NAUK, DO 183/138. 
34
  This particular hymn is cited as a reason for the conflict by a number of Lumpa 
adherents. Interviews with Jennifer Ngandu and Stephanie Nguni.  
35
  Interview with Dixon Mulenga, Choshi, 7 July 2005; Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to 
Central Africa Office, 28 Dec. 1963, NAUK, DO 183/134. 
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ing adherents, the move to establish new villages was on the orders of Lenshina 
who called a meeting and instructed her followers to form misumba 
[missions/capitals].36 She gave each musumba 30 shillings so that they could 
establish shops and become self-reliant. Setting up separate misumba, however, 
perpetuated and heightened the tensions. Lumpa members had to travel even 
farther since the misumba were far from the farms and they had to regularly 
return to their old villages to collect food.  Several Lumpa members claim that 
they were attacked and beaten during their travels.37 Lumpa church members 
were severed from their old communities. ‘Lumpa members lived separately’, 
claimed the 1963 UNIP branch chairman in the UNIP stronghold of Matumbo 
Village, ‘so they did not regard others as related’.38 Old ties between communi-
ties had ruptured and would never be restored. In their insulated and besieged 
villages, the Lumpa formed their own communities and constructed their own 
versions of the war that had already beset them. 
Around the middle of December 1963, several battles between UNIP and 
Lumpa members broke out in Chinsali District. This was the most serious 
escalation of the conflict to date, with spears and guns used on both sides. In a 
letter to the national leadership, UNIP’s Regional Organizing Secretary claimed 
that Job Michello’s People’s Democratic Congress had instigated the conflict 
and called for the national leadership to act against the church.39 The colonial 
authorities, however, thought that ‘UNIP have been the aggressors, but Len-
shina have done more than just defend themselves […]’. They identified Robert 
Kapasa Makasa, the UNIP election candidate for Chinsali, as one of the key 
instigators of the trouble.40 At least 10 died and up to 100 were wounded.41 
Another conflict between the villagers of Kalikiti and the Chilanga Lumpa 
                                               
36
  A chief’s capital is referred to as a musumba. This was also the term the mission-
aries adopted to describe their missions. In adopting this phrase to refer to her 
villages, I tend to think that Lenshina was adopting the vocabulary of the mission 
stations rather than directly confronting the chiefs. Clearly, the chiefs could have 
viewed this as further provocation. 
37
  More than 20 Lumpa members who witnessed events made these claims. The most 
instructive and detailed interviews include: Dixon Mulenga, 7 July 2005; Felix 
Chimfwembwe Mumba; Mercy Mfula, Choshi, 10 July 2005; Paison Nkonde, 
Kapiri Mposhi, 20 July 2005. Some documentary evidence substantiates their testi-
mony of beatings and the burning of their churches. See for example attacks on 
Lumpa reported in Mulanga Mission Diary, 13 June 1963, 28 July 1963, 26 Aug. 
1963, 28 Aug. 1963. 
38
 Interview with Sebastian Chewe Filamba, Matumbo Village, 18 July 2005. 
39
  UNIP Regional Organizing Secretary to M.M. Chona, 24 Dec. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 
16/6/145. The Report, 12, does not provide or further clarify the background of the 
December incidents.  
40
  Telegram: Lusaka (Gov.) to Central Africa Office, 28 Dec. 63, NAUK, DO 183/134. 
41
  Report, 12. 
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musumba led to at least two deaths; 220 terrified villagers took refuge at 
Mulanga mission.42 UNIP activists, now in control of the newly-established 
Rural Councils, seized on these incidents to further their campaign against the 
Lumpa.43  
Even given the establishment of independent, stockaded villages and occa-
sional retaliatory attacks, the general demeanor of the Lumpa church prior to 
June 1964 was defensive, seeking to evade UNIP violence and isolate them-
selves – as they had with chiefs and colonial authorities. As evasion and isola-
tion increased, Lumpa adherents became separated from sources of established 
authority; they were seldom heard by the administration and their views and 
ideas became insular, convinced of the righteousness of their suffering. UNIP, 
by contrast, with its similar millenarian ideas, had become more extroverted, 
attached to the administration and to the new government. Several articulate and 
literate spokespersons communicated in writing with national leadership and 
with the press. Through these contacts and this extroversion, UNIP developed a 
veneer of moderation and defined to the world the violent character of the 
Lumpa church. 
Following the violence during December 1963, Kenneth Kaunda and Grey 
Zulu visited Chinsali in an effort to negotiate a truce. Although they instructed 
their own branches to be tolerant of the Lumpa, their efforts were directed at the 
Lumpa Church, which they viewed as truculent and antagonistic. Kaunda 
wanted the Lumpas to abandon their newly-established villages and return to 
their old villages.44 At first Lenshina agreed – although the Lumpas still refused 
to return to their villages, perhaps because Lenshina did not want to disperse her 
followers, or perhaps because of the effort in building their new villages and 
planting their nearby fields, but most probably because Lumpa members were 
terrified of becoming vulnerable minorities in UNIP-dominated villages in the 
face of continued UNIP harassment. Despite the rulings of Kaunda, UNIP youth 
planned attacks on Lumpa villages and ‘young men were […] pestering 
Lenshina people looking for UNIP cards and subscriptions’.45 Indeed, by early 
1964, UNIP was short of money; national headquarters pressured regional 
secretaries of the party to sell new sets of cards.46 In fact, the Lumpa Secretary 
General at Sione, A.G.H. Kapelekasubila, wrote a letter to the Provincial 
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 Mulanga Mission Diary, 16-29 Dec. 1963. 
43
  For example, at a meeting of Chinsali’s Rural Council, they compiled a list of 25 
violent acts in which the Lumpa church had been involved across the colony since 
1955. Minutes of Chinsali Rural Council, 12-14 Dec. 1963, NAZ, NP 3/12/10. 
44
  Report, 13. 
45
  Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 28 Dec. 1963. 
46
  Kapwepwe to UNIP Regional Secretaries, 17 March 1964, CSCNWW, Macpherson 
Collection, Box 9. 
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Commissioner complaining of several instances where church members had 
returned to their villages during May and June of 1964 and were attacked by 
UNIP.47  
The deadlock continued until June 26, 1964, when a new wave of violence 
between UNIP and Lumpa provided the government with justification for a 
more forceful intervention. Based on the security forces reports, the Commis-
sion claims the conflict began with a fight between an uncle and a nephew. 
Lumpa adherents from the youth’s village, Kameko, attacked Kasanta Village.  
A police patrol then arrested some of the alleged perpetrators from Kameko 
Village and detained them at Chief Mubanga – only to be released when a large 
number of Lumpa arrived at the Chief’s village. 48 An armed police patrol then 
went to Kameko Village to arrest those involved. They were allegedly attacked 
by 200 Lumpa. However, they sustained only minor wounds and killed five 
Lumpa supporters and wounded another five.49  
The perspective on these events from Lumpa villages is difficult to ascertain.  
Documentary evidence indicates that Lenshina and her deacons were most upset 
by the police attack on their supporters in Kameko Village. This incident, more 
than any other, convinced the church leaders that they needed to take decisive 
action to defend their church and their villages. For Lenshina and her deacons, it 
seemed that UNIP and the administration would now act in unison to crush her 
church. A UNIP spy who lived in Sione between August 1963 and July 1964 
and was accepted as a Lumpa member, testified that he had heard from both 
deacons and ordinary Lumpa members that the day after the attack on Kameko, 
Lenshina had addressed a gathering in her courtyard: 
She said that the Police had attacked her followers there and that the same thing 
would happen at other Lumpa villages. She said that they should prepare themselves 
with spears and other weapons to fight against the government and that she would 
send messengers to her other villages to warn them and to instruct them also to pre-
pare themselves. She said that men should arm themselves and leave the village if 
the Police came and then if Police attacked the village the men should attack them 
                                               
47
  Since this letter was addressed to the Provincial Commissioner personally, and he 
was transferred and returned to England, it followed him to England and only ap-
peared in the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in the middle of August. The 
letter also claims that the designate Minister of State for Defence, L. Changufu, had 
‘talked with confidence that Mama Lenshina and some of her church elders would 
soon be in custody.’ A.G.H. Kapelekasubila to PC (Northern province), 26 June 
1964, NAUK, DO 183/135. 
48
  Report, 20. Interview with the father of the boy reveals a slightly different and more 
detailed version with the uncle beating several boys before the Lumpas retaliated. 
Interview with Paison Nkonde. Cf. Mulenga, Blood on their hands, 51-2. Also see 
details recorded in Mulilansolo Mission Diary, 26 June 1964. 
49
  Report, 20. 
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from where they were hiding in the bush. She said that if you are fighting the Police 
you see some of your friends fall down – do not be afraid, keep attacking as those 
people who fall down will not die.50 
A few weeks later, he heard that Lenshina conducted a ceremony where 
incisions were made on the forehead and arms into which medicine that would 
offer protection against bullets was applied. Deacons from other villages took 
back the medicines and letters containing instructions from Lenshina to their 
villages.51 A note in Chibemba, found in the ruins of a Lumpa village, could 
have been one way that Lenshina’s instructions were distributed from Sione to 
several prominent Lumpa Villages: 
1.  The enemy is preparing to get hold of all deacons and Mama Lenshina and send 
them to Mwinilunga. This is the way they will do it. 
2.  They will come to the villages and ask for the deacons. Tell them that they went 
looking for work. 
3.  They may tell you to leave the village. Tell them that we will not return as we 
have suffered with them (UNIP) and now they hate us and have burnt our 
churches and tell us now that they will help rebuild them. 
4.  Give orders to the people, young and old, to stay in the cassava gardens with 
spears.52 
The Lumpa Church was preparing for the final battle, for the crescendo of 
violence about to descend on their villages.  
Apocalypse 
At the beginning of July 1964, the then Prime Minister Kaunda coordinated 
another round of negotiations. For Kaunda the destruction of Lumpa settlements 
and the return of the Lumpa to their original villages were non-negotiable. On 
13 July 1964, a statement that Kaunda made in Chinsali was published and 
made available to local government authorities: ‘Lenshina Villages which are 
not authorized must be destroyed within a week’.53 Despite the lack of legal 
                                               
50
  Appendix C: Statement of Anderson Chintankwa taken on 22 Sept. 1964, NAZ, 
MHA 1/3/10.  
51
  Ibid. 
52
  Appendix B: Translation of Bemba Note, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. 
53
  I have been unable to locate this statement in the archives, probably because before 
the Preservation of Public Security Act was promulgated fourteen days later, the 
government had no legal basis to make such an order. Evidence of it may have been 
removed from the files. However, the order was submitted to the Appeals Court as 
evidence in ‘Mutambo and Five Others v The People’, in Zambia Law Report 1965 
(Lusaka, 1972), 15-59, esp. 20, 43. In this case, the judge ruled that the order was 
legal since ‘one could regard the document as a circular of advice put out by the 
administration for the information of the local people.’ On 11 July, Chinsali DC 
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basis for this order, local government and police officers thought that after one 
week they were entitled and expected to use force to destroy the Lumpa 
misumba. The decision to forcefully remove the Lumpa made a peaceful resolu-
tion difficult; even moderate Lumpa adherents now knew that the outgoing 
colonial administration would side with UNIP activists. They barricaded them-
selves against the impending violent onslaught and prayed that God give them 
strength in their battle. On 15 July, about 60 heavily armed soldiers tried to 
‘convince’ Lumpa members at Chilanga musumba, near the Catholic Mulanga 
Mission, to return to their original villages. They refused.54 At Sione, Lenshina 
and her followers also refused, blaming UNIP for the violence.55 Rumours of 
Lumpa attacks spread. Hundreds of civilians from villages around Sione, fear-
ing a Lumpa attack, fled to the Chinsali Boma.56 Fleeing villagers claimed that 
women and children from two villages had been forced into their huts and burnt 
alive.57 Lumpa members from Siachepa Village in Chinsali District attacked 
three UNIP strongholds and killed four UNIP members on July 24. Two days 
later air reconnaissance reported that up to 30 villages had been burnt in the 
same area.58 About 25 miles north east of Chinsali Boma, in the remote Cha-
paula Village, Lumpas speared two policeman to death, including the first Euro-
pean policeman killed, Inspector Smith.59 In retaliation, in an effort to recover 
what was probably his badly mutilated body, three Mobile Police Units attacked 
the village, resulting in the death of 24 Lumpas and 13 wounded.60 At Chilanga 
musumba, Lumpa members torched two villages and killed their inhabitants 
after being taunted and nearly executed by a band of UNIP youth. The next day, 
on July 27, the Lumpa fought police forces who had been sent to arrest them 
                                               
John Hannah informed the White Fathers at Mulanga that the government intended 
to threaten the Lumpas to make them go back to their original villagers. Mulanga 
Mission Diary, 11 July 1964. 
54
  Mulanga Mission Diary, 13-16 July 1964. 
55
  Report, 21. 
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 Message no. 7 from Bond Disops to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. 
57
  Northern News, 30 July 1964. 
58
  Message no. 28 from Disops Chinsali to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10. 
59
  Six men were tried and sentenced to hang for the death of Inspector Smith. Their 
failed attempt to appeal, which contains much detail about the killing of Inspector 
Smith, can be found in ‘Mutambo and Five Others v The People’, Zambia Law 
Report 1965, 15-59. 
60
  Several interviewees claimed that Inspector Smith’s body was mutilated. The docu-
mentary evidence does not state this explicitly, although it does demonstrate that the 
Lumpa villagers resisted giving up the body. Message no. 28 from Disops Chinsali 
to Compol, 27 July 1964, NAZ, MHA 1/3/10; Telegrams: Troops Lusaka to 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), 27 July 1964; Lusaka (Gov.) to CRO, 27 July 1964, 
both in NAUK, DO 183/135. The Ccommission’s report only reports on 14 deaths 
and 15 wounded; Report, 22-23. 
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and destroy their settlement. They killed a second European policeman, Inspec-
tor Jordan.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4 Zambian soldiers survey the dead followers of Alice Lenshina, Chinsali  
 District, 1964. 
 
 
By then the Central Security Council had met and decided on a sustained 
military operation against the Lumpa. Two battalions of the Northern Rhodesian 
Regiment (NRR) were to go to Chinsali. On July 29, the Preservation of Public 
Security Act was gazetted and Governor Hone applied its provisions to the 
Northern Province and Lundazi District in the Eastern Province. The provisions 
of the act included the prohibition of assemblies and any gathering thought to 
incite or have potential to incite violence. The legal basis for banning church 
gatherings and forcefully ejecting Lumpa members (and other opponents of 
UNIP) was thereby established.62 Kaunda went to Chinsali to meet with the 
Provincial Operations Committee. They decided on a military operation against 
                                               
61
  Details from an interview with a Lumpa member who acknowledges the attacks on 
the two villages; interview with Felix Chimfwembe Mumba. For a UNIP perspec-
tive, see interview with Sebastian Chewe Filamba. The trial of youth involved in the 
Chilanga battle is reported in Northern News, 20 Oct. 1964, but no judgment is re-
corded. Trial records are unavailable. 
62
  Preservation of Public Security Act, Gazetted on 29 July 1964, Government Notice 
no. 375 of 1964, in NAZ, MHA 1/3/10.   
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Sione Village. Mobile police squads had proved ineffective in the face of the 
Lumpa, in part because they believed the Lumpa had powerful magic on their 
side (the Lumpa were not the only ones who believed in the efficacy of witch-
craft!).63 The decision to send in soldiers stemmed partly from the police failure. 
Two thousand soldiers were to be involved in the largest military operation ever 
on Zambian soil. The 1st NRR was instructed to prepare for battle.64  
At this point, it is worth reflecting on the course that the government and the 
administration had chosen – and the various motivations behind their decisions. 
They had decided to force the Lumpa to abandon their villages and ensure that 
they returned to their original village. This would destroy the unity of the 
church, which would be further undermined by the banning of church gather-
ings. Given the level of violence, something had to be done. Yet the decision to 
force the Lumpa from their villages instead of disarming them (and UNIP activ-
ists) and capturing and prosecuting those Lumpa and UNIP members guilty of 
violence was rejected in favour of the destruction of the church. The colonial 
administration justified this approach since the Lumpa villages were not al-
lowed by their chiefs – although since the advent of the UNIP government and 
the rural councils, the chiefs’ role in determining the legality of settlements was 
under question in any event. In fact, it seems that while most of the men on the 
ground supported such actions against the Lumpa, there was some disquiet in 
the administration about the degree of force used and the necessity of insisting 
on the disbandment of Lumpa villages.65 The Commonwealth Relations Office 
refrained from sending a telegram praising the action of the new government: ‘a 
very large part of the blame’, wrote the officer responsible for the Northern 
Rhodesia Department, G.W. Jamieson, ‘lay with the UNIP attitude that “We are 
the masters now”’.66 
The role that local UNIP branches played in fomenting the conflict during 
1962-3 is well known and was accepted by the Commission of Enquiry. How-
ever, the position taken by the Commission’s Report and subsequent accounts is 
that by 1964, UNIP cadres were under control and not responsible for further 
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aggression. This study has already cited some evidence – such as the letter that 
A.G.H. Kapelekasubila sent to the Provincial Commissioner and mission diary 
entries – that suggest that UNIP cadres continued to harass the Lumpa well into 
1964.67 The Northern Rhodesia Intelligence Report of February 1964 reported 
that: ‘the continued persecution by lower UNIP formations of the Lenshina and 
Watch Tower religions in Northern, Eastern and Luapula Provinces has created 
for Government an unnecessary security problem’.68 What also needs to be 
appreciated, however, is the role that UNIP activists played in pushing for more 
aggressive actions against the Lumpa. In this, we have to distinguish between 
the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, on the one hand, and Simon Kapwepwe and 
such provincial activists as Jameson Chapoloko, Kapasa Makasa, and Victor 
Ngandu. Evidence suggests that these latter pushed for harsher measures against 
the Lumpa through Simon Kapwepwe. Within UNIP, during 1962-3, Kaunda 
faced a challenge from non-Bemba leaders from the south and west, including 
Sipalo and the Wina brothers. Kaunda came to increasingly rely on a cohort of 
radical Bemba politicians, many of whom were close to activists on the ground 
that favoured a harsh and repressive response toward the Lumpa. While 
evidence suggests that Kaunda attempted to promote reconciliation in his 
several visits to Chinsali, he agreed to more forceful action. In fact, many of 
them thought Kaunda’s approach to the Lumpa was far too generous and forgiv-
ing. One cabinet minister, probably Simon Kapwepwe, complained to Fergus 
Macpherson that, ‘this is Kenneth all over […]. Some of us have said to him 
“this Lumpa thing should be smashed […] [but] he’s too compassionate.”’69 
Politics within UNIP, and especially the influence of this radical Bemba faction, 
underlay the decision to demand the disbandment, indeed the crushing, of the 
Lumpa Church. The action was executed by colonial troops under colonial 
authority; and the colonial administration was in charge of security in this 
transitional period. Yet the influence of this UNIP Bemba faction was para-
mount in determining the nature of the government’s and administration’s 
response to the Lumpa. Within the UNIP government, it was not Kenneth 
Kaunda primarily, but rather Simon Kapwepwe and his supporters who were 
most influential in determining this course of action. However, it must also be 
pointed out that the colonial administration on the ground supported the UNIP 
government’s position, even while many in London remained skeptical. 
By the end of July 1964, the Lumpa villagers of Sione had decided to defend 
their village and their magnificent church. ‘There will be no more talks’, a 
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reporter who visited Sione and spoke to Lumpa deacons the day before the 
battle was told, ‘the Government and the police have come ready to kill us, and 
we are ready to die […]. We are all happy to die for our God. It is not a bad 
thing to leave this earth.’70 They were armed with spears, bows and arrows, and 
a few home-made guns. At 8h40 am on 30 July, on their approach, the NRR 
paused, to allow the DC to address the villagers, calling on them to lay down 
their arms and to surrender those who were considered the Lumpa leaders. The 
army was attacked on both flanks. The soldiers returned fire with rifles and 
three machine guns. They entered the village and the church, firing on all who 
resisted. According to official reports, seventy-five Lumpa members and one 
soldier were killed and around 110 Lumpa members and five soldiers wounded. 
The battle was over by 10h05, although subsequent ‘mopping up’ activities 
lasted until 15h30.  
Mercy Mfula was 19 when she witnessed the attack on Sione. The soldiers 
arrived and demanded the surrender of Lenshina and several of the Church’s 
leaders. Then, after a short countdown:  
We heard the sound of guns. We ran into houses to hide. Our friends were being 
shot. We heard others calling: ‘Come and see your friends are dead’. We ran up and 
down; we saw people shout, some dying. The guns the soldiers used started from 
ground level and then rose to treetops. Chickens died, goats died, and trees lost their 
leaves. We ran up and down. Old people were crying. There was confusion. We kept 
on saying, ‘God, what has happened?’ 
Mopping up operations lasted into the afternoon. Afterwards, the soldiers 
loaded survivors into trucks and took them to the Chinsali Boma:  
As they brought us to the Boma, there was a large crowd holding branches which 
they were shaking and singing, ‘Well done Kaunda’. They were happy. They took us 
to a prison by the hill where they kept us. People came to tease us. ‘You Lumpa said 
guns would shoot water. Did you see water coming from the guns?’71  
The only documentary evidence we have of the details of the Sione attack 
comes from an agreed-upon Provincial Operations Committee release and a 
timeline of events during the military operation.72 These releases have to be 
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examined as carefully as the oral evidence: In all of their correspondence, the 
operations committees were under instruction to emphasize the ferocity of the 
Lumpa and any firearms used by them.73 For the Lumpa villagers, it was a few 
moments of bravery, confusion, death, and humiliation. The image presented by 
the Provincial Operations Committee in the agreed-upon release was one of law 
and order confronting savagery. 
Elements of the first battalion NRR and the Police Mobile Unit today moved in on 
Sione Village, HQ of the fanatical Lenshina religious sect […]. Some distance from 
the village the forces halted and Mr. John Hannah the DC addressed the adherents of 
the sect with a loud hailer he called upon them in the vernacular to lay down their 
arms come forward and surrender themselves. A time limit was set for them to do 
this and they failed to come forward. The forces then advanced in extended order 
and as they did so they were attacked on both flanks by frenzied villagers carrying 
bows and arrows, spears and an assortment of firearms. Troops beating off these 
attacks which were frenzied and pressed home with the utmost ferocity and disre-
gard for personal safety were obliged to use three automatic weapons and it was 
only at a later stage when it became obvious to the Force Commander that resistance 
was weakening that he could safely give instructions that no more use was to be 
made of these arms […] Throughout the whole operation constant appeals were 
made for the fanatics to see reasons but these had no effect and at all times the offi-
cers in charge kept the strictest control of the men’s fire.74 
This version of events would appear again in the Commission of Enquiry’s 
report, in a slightly toned-down version. Even to scholars somewhat sympa-
thetic to the Lumpa Church, it would become the official, published, and estab-
lished narration of events, the centerpiece of the so-called ‘rebellion’, when 
peasants armed with spears confronted soldiers armed with automatic weapons. 
The extent of and intensity of resistance is difficult to gauge. Some Lumpa 
certainly attacked the troops, but faced with rifle and automatic gunfire, most 
experienced the ‘battle’ as a massacre.  The above report emphasized the ‘feroc-
ity’ of the ‘fanatics’; that women, men, and children all attacked the security 
forces. Yet this is a partial description. The rapidity of the operation, which is 
not indicated in the agreed-upon release, belies the idea of sustained resistance 
by the Lumpas. Outside the village, where the army attacked at 8h40, fire from 
rifles and three automatic weapons lasted for approximately 15 minutes. Ac-
cording to a press report, 65 Lumpas were killed and 50 wounded in the first 
four minutes of fire.75 They then advanced into the village, using machine guns 
for another five minutes. After occasional pauses to allow for Lumpa surrender, 
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the troops resumed firing with single shot weapons.76 This lasted for another 20 
minutes. By 10h02, the army had occupied the church and cleared it with tear 
gas. Even if a few Lumpas still wielded spears in the church, the attack inside 
the church was experienced by most as a massacre. The physical evidence 
supports the oral testimony. One month later, the Special Branch offered a 
description of the Church, ‘with its walls and doors holed by bullets, and the 
floors blood stained […]’.77 The entire operation lasted less than 90 minutes.78 
The army took 436 prisoners, mostly women.79 Lenshina, however, escaped. 
The image presented of the actions of the soldiers and police was always one 
of restraint, order, and discipline. Yet there is at least circumstantial evidence 
that the soldiers were not all disciplined and may have continued firing after 
ordered to stop. For many, it was the first time that they saw actions against 
such a committed foe. A combination of inexperience, revenge, and the know-
ledge that government favored a harsh response, may have contributed to 
unnecessary massacres. The Northern Rhodesian Department of the Common-
wealth Relations Office heard of several cases when the ‘officers found it ex-
tremely difficult to get them [the soldiers] to stop firing and that consequently 
there were many more casualties than there should have been’.80 This was 
probably only true in a few cases and the majority of African soldiers performed 
admirably – these few cases, however, could have done much damage. In the 
end, the Northern Rhodesian colonial administration defended the soldiers, 
claiming that: ‘for most it was a baptism of fire against a fanatical foe. Certainly 
their expenditure of ammunition was high; perhaps much higher than more 
experienced troops would have used; but conversely more experienced troops 
might have inflicted higher casualties’.81 
As news reached the Lumpa villages of the attack on Sione, most Lumpas 
abandoned their settlements and went into hiding in the bush.82 On the occasion 
that Lumpa villagers resisted troops, they were described as ‘frenzied’ and 
‘fanatical’. In Lundazi District, about 100 miles to the east of Chinsali, the 
Lumpa reaction to the news of the attack on their prophet and their Church 
headquarters was rebellion. They attacked several villages, resulting in perhaps 
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150 deaths. In the most brazen attack, on the night of 3 August, about 200 
Lumpa from Chipoma Village attacked the Lundazi Boma, seized arms and 
ammunition from the police station, nearly killed a detective, and did kill his 
wife and child, together with a number of women and adolescents in the police 
camp and an Indian trader, a total of 22 deaths and 28 injured.83  This attack was 
seized upon as typical and made into a sign of the Lumpa ‘savagery’. The 
Northern News reported that ‘300 revenge-maddened Lumpa followers raged 
through the Lundazi District, sacking 18 villagers and killing at least 150 
people’.84 Although Kaunda advised against retaliation, he might have encour-
aged it by condemning the Lumpas for ‘bloodthirsty and ungodly brutalities. 
Lenshina and her followers stand condemned for their madness […]. [She] 
taught her followers to do dirty things, to smear themselves in filth to make 
themselves bullet-proof […]. Lenshina attackers went to villages while the men 
were away and locked the women and children in houses which they then set on 
fire. These are the actions of madmen. They roamed the country killing teachers 
and children. They stand condemned by their own activities, these mad 
people’.85 He called for the capture of Lenshina, dead or alive. 
UNIP and military retaliation in Lundazi District was ruthless. Kaunda told 
the Cabinet and Security Council that to prevent local retaliation the govern-
ment had to take a firm stance against the Lumpa Church. He suggested a 
combination of ‘positive action’ and a ‘temporary banning of the church for a 
limited period of one month’.86 The next day Governor Hone banned the 
church: Any person ‘managing or assisting […] the Lumpa church or who acts 
as a member or attends any meeting of the Lumpa church’ would be found 
guilty of an offence and liable to conviction for up to seven years.87  The ban 
was never rescinded. What had begun four days earlier as an operation to arrest 
the Lumpa involved in the Chinsali disturbances became an all-out assault on 
the Church. The 1st NRR was sent to Lundazi District and soldiers attacked 
Chipoma Village, thought responsible for the attack on the Lundazi Boma. They 
killed 81 people, at least 23 of whom were women.88 A few prisoners were 
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taken, but most fled. At Paison Village, 16 were killed and most fled, westward 
into the bush.89 As the bodies piled up, the Office of Prime Minister gave 
permission to the Resident Magistrate to allow villagers to bury the dead with-
out a coroner’s investigation – although an effort was made to record their 
identity, age, and sex.90 Following complaints of excessive violence used by the 
army, the Governor delayed an operation against Paishuko Village while the 
army discussed alternative tactics.91 When the military arrived, two days after 
the initial scheduled date, UNIP had already attacked the village. They found 46 
dead inhabitants, 36 of whom were women and children. Many showed signs of 
being raped and tortured before being killed, with grain mortars and stakes 
thrust into their anuses or vaginas.92 
On 16 August 1964, a group of UNIP leaders, including Chapoloko, 
Sinagwe, the MP for Abercorn, Victor Ngandu, the parliamentary secretary, and 
Minister of Home Affairs, Simon Kapwepwe, addressed a crowd of frightened 
villagers at Mulanga Mission. Some were victims of Lumpa violence; only a 
day before a small group of them had briefly returned to their villages to bury 
the dead. Kapwepwe asked the crowd, ‘Who has inflicted all of this upon you?’ 
He told them: 
‘Lenshina, and her adherents […] People who eat their dung, washed their bodies 
with their own urine […] change into a devil, even 5 times worse than a devil, they 
actually would be wild beasts. When you find a wild beast easting in your gardens or 
trying to kill you: What would you do? You would come together and start to follow 
it till it is dead. And even after death, you would break its legs, spit on it and roast it 
above the fire till nothing is left anymore. Our government is determined to destroy 
this wild beast’.93 
The same evening Kapwepwe returned to Lusaka to report to Kaunda.94 The 
purge of the Lumpa was underway and UNIP’s victory over their most serious 
rival in northern Zambia assured.  
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The aftermath 
In the weeks that followed the attack on Sione, operations were launched 
against Lumpa villages and roaming Lumpa refugees, leading to hundreds of 
deaths. Many Lumpa died from starvation after they had abandoned their 
villages and fled into the bush. For the military, first priority were the villages in 
Chinsali, Lundazi and Mpika Districts followed by Isoka, Chama, and Kasama 
Districts. Many of these villages, especially in Kasama District, coexisted 
peacefully with surrounding areas – yet the government approach was a com-
prehensive ban on the Lumpa Church and an insistence that the villages be 
abandoned. Despite some attempts to limit casualties after the Chipoma opera-
tion in Lundazi, strategies remained similar. A combination of soldiers and 
police marched to the settlements, demanded that the Lumpas capitulate and 
accept relocation to their old villages or to resettlement centers. Many Lumpa 
members had already fled into the bush, abandoning their villages. A few 
Lumpa adherents would respond with a show of force, with men in the front 
brandishing spears and goaded on from behind by women who sang Lumpa 
hymns; others agreed to negotiate and surrendered. If they refused to surrender, 
troops opened fire until they fled into the bush or surrendered. In general, resis-
tance was greatest in the villages of Chinsali and Lundazi Districts, where the 
most vicious battles had been fought with UNIP and where the villages were 
most heavily fortified. In Kasama and Isoka Districts, by contrast, the Lumpa 
surrendered and were taken into detention without the use of force. Whether 
villages were abandoned or surrender was negotiated or forced, the troops set 
out to destroy all physical remnants of the villages and churches. The last 
villages were destroyed in the week of 23 to 29 of August. The last military 
operations took place on 10 October 1964, when an encounter between the 2nd 
NRR and a group of roaming Lumpa led to death of 60 Lumpa and one soldier, 
and the arrest of 95 Lumpa.95 The NRR had to expedite operations if they were 
to evacuate most of their forces by September 10, in time to prepare for the 
independence celebrations of October 24.96  
By the beginning of September, thousands of Lumpa were roaming in the 
bush or imprisoned in the ‘cages’ next to the District Offices. Lenshina had sur-
rendered on 11 August 1964 in exchange for a guarantee of her personal safety 
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that did not safeguard her from criminal prosecution.97 While she never faced 
prosecution regarding the conflict of 1963-4, Lenshina would be detained for 
the next 11 years. Upon her capture, the government distributed a pamphlet, 
allegedly dictated by Lenshina, calling on her followers to surrender.98 The task 
of resettlement and ‘rehabilitation’ now began. UNIP officials like Robert 
Kapasa Makasa, the newly-appointed Under-Minister for Northern Province, 
and Chinsali’s member of parliament Jameson Chapoloko played a decisive role 
in the ‘rehabilitation committees’ which were set up. The emphasis would be on 
‘rehabilitating’ the Lumpa rather than reconciliation. 
Senior UNIP members and the departing colonial administration still favored 
the return of Lumpa members to their original villages and some effort was 
made in trying to persuade antagonistic villages to accept Lumpa. This option 
was unrealistic, however. Lumpa members were afraid and with good reason. 
Chiefs and UNIP activists did not favor reintegration of Lumpa members into 
their villages. At an emergency meeting held at Chinsali Boma on 26 August 
1964, Chief Muyombe insisted that all Lumpa members should be arrested: the 
Government ‘should not mix mad dogs with normal ones […]’. Even Chapo-
loko asked ‘why those spear throwers who in a real sense are criminals should 
be called refugees’.99 Most Lumpa remained hidden in the bush or detained in 
the ‘cages’ next to the district boma: In Chinsali alone 750 Lumpa members 
were in kept in the Boma ‘cage’. 
By October 1964, the legal status of the Lumpas detained at the district 
‘cages’ was thrown into doubt. Even under the Preservation of Public Security 
Act, it was illegal to detain someone for more than 28 days. This led to new 
legislation which allowed the government to establish prescribed areas where 
detention centers could be set up.100 Following the failure of village reinte-
gration, some UNIP members like Kapasa Makasa felt that the only way to 
‘break up the Lenshina cult’ was to split its members into single family groups 
that would be settled in different parts of Zambia, far from their original 
villages. Makasa’s suggestion was not acted upon in the short term (but would 
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be several years later).101 Instead, the cabinet decided to establish two large 
detention centers near Mbala and Luwingu, in the north of the country, and 
Makali camp, north of Petauke in the Eastern Province. By March 1965, around 
4,000 Lumpa were detained at the Katito and Lunzuwa camps and several 
hundred more at Makali camp.102  
At the same time, Lumpa who were not detained had made their way to the 
Congo. Through intermediaries, especially contacts with Congolese Prime 
Minister Moise Tshombe such as Bulala Wina, who in turn worked closely with 
Alfred Kapele, Lenshina’s son-in-law, the Congolese government invited the 
Lumpa to settle in Mokambo, near the Zambian border.103 When Lenshina, then 
detained at Mumbwa, heard that her followers had been permitted to settle in 
the Congo, she instructed her followers who remained in the bush or in the 
camps to make their way to the Congo.104 Lumpa members at Katito and 
Lunzuwa camps informed the authorities that they were returning to their 
villagers or to relatives on the Copperbelt; however, their intention was to go 
the Congo.105 By June 1965, the settlement at Mokambo had grown to about 
1,000.106 The Lumpa intended to build a new Zion at Mokambo and from across 
northern Zambia they made their way to the Congo through Copperbelt safe-
houses.107 It seems that the Zambian authorities gave tacit approval to the 
movement of the Lumpa to Mokambo: In December 1965, when the Zambian 
government feared a Lumpa ‘invasion’ from the Congo, the Congolese under-
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took to ensure that the Lumpa would not be allowed to return to Zambia and 
that they would continue to accept Lumpa refugees in the Congo.108  
By early 1966, the detention camps in Zambia had been closed and the 
settlement at Mokambo grew to between 15,000 and 20,000.109 At first the 
Lumpa resided in one large village, but were soon allocated land to cultivate. 
Different villages or village sections were named after the misumba they had 
established in Zambia.110 Lenshina’s daughter, Elizabeth Ngandu, and Eliza-
beth’s husband, Alfred Kapele, joined a few other prominent deacons to lead the 
church. Far from disintegrating, exile strengthened the corporate nature of the 
church and solidified Lumpa identity.  
On 24 October 1967, the anniversary of Zambian independence in 1964 – 
and a day after the alleged anniversary of Lenshina’s resurrection in 1953 
according to the Lumpa calendar – Alice Lenshina and her immediate family 
escaped from her detention camp in Kalabo in the west of Zambia and fled 
towards Angola. The Zambian government, fearing an invasion by the Lumpa at 
Mokambo, embarked on ‘Operation Stallion’ to recapture Lenshina and contain 
a potential Lumpa invasion from the Congo.111 Angolan rebels captured Len-
shina and handed her over to the Zambian government. The feared Lumpa 
invasion never materialized. However, Kaunda’s government felt threatened by 
a pan-Bemba Lenshina-Kapwepwe alliance (however unlikely that alliance 
seemed). In an alarming report, Grey Zulu, the then Minister of Home Affairs, 
claimed that from 12,000 to 20,000 Lumpa at Mokambo were armed with 100 
muzzle-loading guns and 12 automatic weapons. While he thought it unlikely 
that they would attack Zambia, he felt they were a threat as long as they 
remained at Mokambo.112 Zambia formally requested that the Congo authorities 
force the Lumpa to return to Zambia or relocate them further in the interior, as 
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  Lusaka MOD to CRO, 22 Dec. 65, NAUK, DO 209/77. 
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  A.S. Masiye (Office of the President), ‘Operation Stallion’, 27 Oct. 1967, NAZ, FA 
1/222. 
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well as giving consideration to banning the church.113 In a letter to Mobutu, 
President Kaunda called for cooperation in ensuring repatriation and noted that 
the banning of the church was ‘entirely your sovereign right which I note with 
favour’.114 A committee composed of Zambian and Congolese security agents 
collaborated to ensure repatriation. In Zambia, Kaunda offered amnesty to all 
Lumpa members but still insisted that all persons returning to Zambia ‘refrain 
from engaging in any activity or practice which may be detrimental, or which 
has proved in the past to be detrimental, the peace, order, and government of 
Zambia’.115 Both the Zambian security services and Lumpa Church members 
interpreted Kaunda’s orders as a ban on Lumpa worship and the singing of 
Lumpa hymns. 
The Congolese government told the Lumpa that they either had to relocate to 
the interior of the Congo, away from the border with Zambia, or return to 
Zambia. For many Lumpa, who frequently crossed into Zambia undetected, the 
prospect of relocating far into the interior was uninviting. But they did not want 
to return to Zambia where their church was still banned and they could not pray. 
Alfred Kapele was most opposed to returning to Zambia and relocated with 
several thousand followers to Kanyama in the Congolese interior. The faction 
that remained at Mokambo was eventually forced back to Zambia in 1971 after 
a skirmish with Congolese authorities that resulted in the shooting of several 
Lumpa and the death of three.116  
In 1971, when the Lumpa exiles returned to Zambia en masse, the Zambian 
police established detention or transit camps at Ndola, Kitwe, and Luanshya that 
accommodated between 8,000 and 10,000 Lumpa.117 A few weeks later, the 
Zambian authorities divided the Lumpa into small groups and sent them to 
villages across Northern and Eastern Provinces.118 The government hoped that 
this would finally destroy the unity of the Lumpa church. They were unsuc-
cessful. Lumpa deacons collected people from the farthest reaches of Zambia 
and returned with them to urban or peri-urban areas, like Kapiri Mposhi, Mpika, 
Ndola Rural, and the outskirts of Lusaka, where the Lumpa settled and 
continued to organize and to pray.119 In 1978, soon after the death of Alice 
Lenshina on 7 December 1978, many of the Lumpa previously under the 
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direction of Alfred Kapele returned to Zambia and joined the urban congre-
gations.120 With Lenshina’s apparent blessing, Obed Chileshe (Muchinga) 
organized these new arrivals and those who had returned in 1971 in a new 
church, the Jerusalem in Christ (later, New Jerusalem) Church.  He also sought 
to gain legal recognition for the church and greater acceptance by introducing a 
more conventional liturgy that incorporated the Bible.  
With the end of UNIP rule in 1991, the Lumpa formally re-constituted their 
movement in the Jerusalem, New Jerusalem, and Uluse Kamutola (Praise the 
Temple) Churches. Leadership disputes and diverse peregrinations led to several 
church bodies that claimed to be the true inheritors of the Lumpa Church. Alfred 
Kapele and Elizabeth Ngandu returned to Zambia with their group of loyal 
followers in 1993-4.121 Obed Chileshe died in 1992; his wife, Theresa Nkweto 
Chileshe, claimed to inherit the Jerusalem in Christ Church from him. Mean-
while, Jennifer Ngandu, another daughter of Lenshina, claimed to be the church 
overseer after Theresa Nkweto Chileshe allegedly took advantage of her office. 
By the mid-1990s there were at least three major churches: Theresa Nkweto 
Chileshe headed the Uluse Kamutola Church; Jennifer Ngandu led the Jerusa-
lem Church; and Alfred Kapele and Elizabeth Ngandu organized their followers 
into the New Jerusalem Church. Since 2005, however, the majority of former 
Lumpa members agreed to the join the Jerusalem Church under the joint 
direction of Lenshina’s two daughters, Jennifer Ngandu and Elizabeth Ngandu. 
Several independent branches of the Uluse Kamutola Church remain. 
The legacy of the church and the conflict between the church, UNIP, and the 
Zambian state is however much broader, more deeply and widely felt and 
experienced. Lumpa influences reverberate across the spectrum of Zambian 
Christian churches. The Manichean opposition of the good and faithful versus 
the evils of witchcraft, and the role that Christianity plays in combating evil, can 
be attributed to the spread of Lumpa Christian doctrines. Lumpa hymns and 
music have influenced United Church of Zambia and even Roman Catholic 
services. The social and ideological forces behind the Lumpa-UNIP war conti-
nue to be a feature of Zambian political life. Frederick Chiluba’s declaration of 
Zambia as a Christian nation after the defeat of UNIP in the 1991 elections, the 
popularity of evangelical Christianity among Zambia’s political class, and the 
wattle-and-daub churches that provide the most prominent organizational 
counter to political party structures in many of Zambia’s villages, all demon-
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strate that the politicization of religion and the theocratic nature of politics 
remain a feature of the Zambian socio-political landscape. 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
‘You can’t fight guns with knives’:  
National security and Zambian  
responses to UDI, 1965-19731 
 
Andrew J. DeRoche 
Introduction 
What was the underlying principle motivating Zambian foreign relation during 
the First Republic? Studies by Elijah Mudenda and other participants tend to 
highlight such aspects of nationalist ideology as the struggle for racial equality.2 
Early scholars such as Tim Shaw emphasized economic factors and employed 
dependency theory to analyze events.3 In his insightful work Stephen Chan 
                                               
1
  Most of the research for this chapter was conducted during a year in Zambia funded 
by a Fulbright grant from the United States government, for which I am very thank-
ful. It would not have been such a productive experience without the assistance of 
Dr. Marja Hinfelaar and Dr. Giacomo Macola. Encouragement from friends and col-
leagues such as Gabriel Banda and Dr. Webby Kalikiti was also crucial to the pro-
cess. Most important was the support from my wife, Heather Choonya. 
2
  A fine example of this nationalist school is Elijah Mudenda, Zambia: A generation 
of struggle (Harare, 1999). Kenneth Kaunda’s memoirs have yet to be written, but 
he has offered some of his recollections in the Zambian Sunday Post column entitled 
‘KK’s Diary’, which began appearing late in 2004. These columns heavily empha-
size nationalism and race as the driving forces behind Zambia’s foreign policies. 
Kaunda also commented on some relevant issues in his Kaunda on violence (Lon-
don, 1980). The most useful memoir in terms of relevant details remains Vernon 
Mwaanga, An extraordinary life (Lusaka, 1982), in which Mwaanga leans toward 
ideology as the key factor.  
3
  Timothy Shaw, Dependence and underdevelopment: The development and foreign 
policies of Zambia (Athens, 1976); and also Shaw’s contributions to Douglas Anglin 
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acknowledged the contributions of Shaw and the value of dependency theory, 
but also contended that an exclusive focus on economics only told part of the 
story. Chan argued that Kenneth Kaunda’s foreign relations from 1965 to 1973 
were complex: Both ‘diplomatically active’ and ‘very pragmatic’. Chan correct-
ly pointed out that single factors like economics or ideology do not sufficiently 
explain Zambian foreign relations. Furthermore, he criticized his academic 
predecessors for not using archival sources and called on future scholars to 
present the evidence ‘properly’.4 The first attempt to answer Chan’s call was 
completed by Douglas Anglin.5 Anglin’s book does present original materiPal, 
particularly from Canada, but was published long before the archives of the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) were open.  
My work here, which draws heavily on material from Zambian and Ameri-
can archives not utilized previously by other scholars, brings new evidence to 
light. Furthermore, my essay includes crucial examples from the entire span of 
the First Republic, whereas Anglin only covered 1965-66. More importantly, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 5 Students of Evelyn Hone College in Lusaka protesting against minority rule  
 and the government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia 
                                               
and Timothy Shaw, Zambia’s foreign policy: Studies in diplomacy and dependence 
(Boulder, 1979). 
4
  Stephen Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and reality in foreign policy 
(London, 1992), 67-8, 117. 
5
  Douglas Anglin, Zambian crisis behavior: Confronting Rhodesia’s Uunilateral 
Declaration of Independence, 1965-1966 (Montreal, 1994). 
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my piece offers a more satisfying explanation than earlier authors for the under-
lying motives of the First Republic’s foreign relations. As we trace some of the 
key Zambian reactions to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) through the years, it becomes clearer that economics or ideology alone 
cannot explain the attitudes of Kaunda and other key figures. Both nationalist 
writers, who emphasize ideology, and dependency theorists, who emphasize 
economics, have made important contributions, but what we need to better 
understand Zambian foreign relations is an interpretive framework that can in-
corporate both factors (and others if need be). A more appropriate lens through 
which to view the stance of Kaunda and his colleagues is national security 
theory, which ‘encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to 
protect domestic core values from external threats’.6 
All of the crucial components of Zambia’s response to UDI – the call for 
military intervention and assistance, the search for economic support, and even 
opposition challenges to UNIP policies – can be logically explained through 
national security theory. In each case, the individuals involved believed that the 
policy they supported would help protect Zambia’s national security as they 
defined it. Various officials advocated closer ties with the Eastern Bloc or 
China; some espoused stronger bonds to the United States and England, while 
yet others championed cooperation with the white rulers of Rhodesia and South 
Africa. At various points Kaunda himself trod each of these separate paths. 
There is a reasonable explanation for such disparate positions being taken by 
Zambians. Responding to the challenges of UDI during the First Republic, 
Zambian policymakers primarily sought to protect their country’s national 
security. 
Use of force 
Kaunda and other top officials in the Zambian government made it very clear in 
the first two months after UDI that they wanted the British to intervene mili-
tarily to end the rebellion.7 The president explained his view to the National 
Assembly on 9 December 1965. He stated that ‘the British Government should 
have moved in with a force possible to stop the rebellious Government in 
Rhodesia from continuing. It is most doubtful that the British Government 
would have met considerable resistance’. Kaunda then criticized the UK’s ef-
                                               
6
  See Melvyn Leffler, ‘National security’, in: Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, 
eds, Explaining the history of American foreign relations (Cambridge, 2004), 123-
136, quotation on 123. 
7
  For an analysis of the British debate over using force see Carl Watts, ‘Killing kith 
and kin: The viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5’, Twen-
tieth Century British History, 16 (2005), 382-415. 
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forts to negotiate with Ian Smith. He wondered: ‘What manner of dealing with 
such a serious problem is this? Today, you brand someone as a rebel – a chap 
who has committed treason – and tomorrow, you declare publicly you will em-
brace him. A rebel, according to us here, is arrested, tried by a military court and 
shot dead’.8  
Kaunda sent his Vice President, Reuben Kamanga, to a special meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Nigeria a few weeks later to present 
Zambia’s case. Kamanga distributed a memo that criticized economic sanctions, 
because they would end the rebellion too slowly. Zambian leaders firmly 
believed that ‘force by Britain alone can ultimately be used at minimum cost’.9 
In a lengthy speech, Kamanga elaborated on the justifications for a British 
intervention. He pointed out that force had been used in British Guiana, Cyprus, 
and Kenya. ‘Rebels are rebels’, he added, ‘wherever they are, even in Rhodesia, 
and if their existence threatens the peace and progress of societies elsewhere, 
they must be brought down’.10  
The British had promised to send troops if law and order broke down, and 
according to Kamanga that is exactly what had happened in Rhodesia. Why did 
the British refuse to keep their word? Zambia’s Vice President suggested that 
racism was a factor. If blacks had risen up against the whites in Salisbury, 
British troops would have come to their rescue. He argued, ‘as long as it is 
white citizens threatening violence and carrying it out, it matters little’. 
Kamanga then sketched a picture of what would result from ongoing British 
refusal to intervene. First of all, it would bring ‘untold hardship to the innocent 
millions, white and black, in Rhodesia’. It would also be costly for the Zambian 
people, and President Kaunda and his colleagues reserved the right ‘to call upon 
any other friendly nation or group of nations to our aid’.11 
Zambian leaders, of course, opted to seek such support because UDI was not 
crushed quickly. Instead of capturing Smith and ending the revolt, the UK sent a 
squadron of ten Javelin jets to protect Zambian airspace.12 Foreign Minister 
                                               
8
  Kenneth Kaunda, in: Zambia Hansard No. 5: Official verbatim report of the debates 
of the second session of the first national assembly 7th December – 16th December 
1965, 94-95. 
9
  ‘Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Lagos, 1966: Zambia’s views on the 
Rhodesian situation’, secret memorandum, 11 Jan. 1966, United National Independ-
ence Party’s Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, UNIP, Box 140, File 5. My research at the 
UNIP archives was facilitated by Andrew Nyambe, Wilson Nyirenda, and Petwell 
Munshya, who were always friendly and helpful. 
10
  Speech by Reuben Kamanga at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on 
Rhodesia, Lagos, Jan. 1966, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 140, File 5.  
11
  Ibid. 
12
  Thanks to Dr. Jan-Bart Gewald for encouraging me to examine the issues surround-
ing the Javelin jets more carefully. 
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Simon Kapwepwe expressed concern about what he saw as an attempt by 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to take control of Zambia’s airfields and 
thus prohibit other nations from sending planes. Kapwepwe had accurately 
interpreted Wilson’s motives, and the Javelin pilots had neither the capability 
nor intention to attack Rhodesia.13 To add insult to injury, the British personnel 
stationed in Livingstone frequently fraternized with Smith’s forces across the 
Zambezi.14 In at least two instances, moreover, RAF technicians defected from 
their base in Ndola.15 A pilot may also have deserted, but the evidence is 
inconclusive.16 Whether or not any British pilots actually joined the Rhodesians, 
there is no doubt that many of them were reluctant to fight their ‘kith and kin’. 
President Kaunda described the British as ‘clearly not serious in their defense 
role’.17  
Zambian views regarding the British willingness to use force went from bad 
to worse. In 1969 when the British threatened to intervene in the Caribbean to 
prevent Anguilla’s secession from Nevis and St. Kitts, Foreign Minister Elijah 
Mudenda blasted them for considering such a move while refusing it in 
Rhodesia. It must have been because the rebels in the Caribbean were black, but 
                                               
13
  The decision to accept the offer of Javelins is thoroughly analyzed in: Anglin, Zam-
bian crisis behavior, 135-139. Anglin discusses British motives and makes a strong 
case that this policy was much more beneficial to the British than the Zambians. The 
Javelins departed in August 1966. Their nine-month stay cost the British $7.4 
million. 
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  The contact between RAF pilots and their Rhodesian counterparts is described by 
Ian Smith, The great betrayal: The memoirs of Africa’s most controversial leader 
(London, 1997), 111-112, 119-120. 
15
 Douglas Anglin referred to the uproar that resulted whenever members of the RAF 
‘defected to Rhodesia’, citing the Daily Telegraph, 24 Jan. 1966, and Zambia News, 
22 May 1966. See Anglin, Zambian crisis behavior, 139. Anglin elaborated on these 
incidents in an email to the author on 12 Mar. 2006. In January 1966 three RAF 
technicians went AWOL from Ndola and were thought to have crossed into Rho-
desia. In May 1966, two more technicians defected on the eve of returning home, 
crossed into Rhodesia on a freight train, and became firemen with Rhodesia 
Railways in Bulawayo.  
16
  Kaunda and some of his top advisors insist that a pilot did defect. See ‘KK’s Diary’, 
Sunday Post, 4 Dec. 2005; Mudenda, Zambia, 49. Kaunda also referred to pilots 
joining forces with the rebels in a lecture at the University of Zambia on 24 Nov. 
2005. In a 22 July 2005 interview with the author, Grey Zulu recalled that, after one 
week in Zambia, a RAF pilot not only defected, but also took his plane with him. On 
the other hand, Ian Smith mentions no defections in his memoirs. Historian Richard 
Wood informed me in an email on 1 Mar. 2006 that he is ‘pretty sure’ that no RAF 
pilots defected, and is certain that none did while stationed in Zambia. Regarding 
pilot desertions, Anglin emailed me on 12 Mar. 2006 that he has ‘no proof one way 
or the other.’  
17
  Kenneth Kaunda to Jimmy Carter, 15 Feb. 1980, UNIPA, UNIP, Box 79, File 19. 
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those in Rhodesia were white, he reasoned, and then exclaimed: ‘Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson is a ruthless racialist’.18 For Mudenda, Kapwepwe, Kamanga, 
and Kaunda, the British failure to use military force to crush UDI and their 
subsequent deployment of the relatively worthless Javelin squadron posed grave 
threats to Zambia’s national security. 
International assistance? 
During the first year of independence Kaunda’s government remained com-
pletely dependent on Rhodesia for energy and trade. Zambia got all of its coal 
from the Wankie mines and all of its oil from a pipeline through Rhodesia. The 
Kariba power station, located on the southern side of the river, provided seventy 
percent of Zambia’s electricity. All of the copper exports and ninety-five percent 
of imports crossed the Victoria Falls Bridge via Rhodesia Railways.19 In the 
immediate aftermath of UDI, the British announced their intention to enforce 
sanctions against Rhodesia. Kaunda pledged to participate fully in the effort to 
end Smith’s rebellion, which in turn meant Zambia was vulnerable to retali-
ation. Most importantly, if an oil embargo was imposed on Smith’s regime, he 
could terminate the flow of oil and coal into Zambia, which would paralyze the 
mines. This was not only a major concern for Kaunda’s government, but also 
for the United States, who depended heavily on Zambian copper. Lyndon John-
son administration officials, such as Undersecretary of State George Ball, 
worked with their British counterparts to organize an airlift to maintain access 
to Zambian copper.20  
Kaunda expressed his gratitude to Johnson for the American efforts to plan 
the airlift.21 Though thankful for US help on the airlift, Kaunda was becoming 
increasingly concerned that British leadership of the western response was not 
strong enough to guarantee his nation’s security. Zambia’s Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, Vernon Mwaanga, proposed that a senior minister visit Moscow 
to discuss the ‘role the Soviet Union is going to play in assisting Zambia during 
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  Elijah Mudenda, in: Zambia Hansard No. 17: Official verbatim report of the debates 
of the first session of the second national assembly 21st January – 23rd April 1969, 
2033. 
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  Robert Good, U.D.I.: The international politics of the Rhodesian rebellion (Prince-
ton, 1973). Good was the first US ambassador to Zambia, and his book remains very 
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  The American response to UDI and concern for copper is thoroughly analyzed in: 
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1953-1998 (Trenton, 2001), 112-127. 
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  Kenneth Kaunda to Lyndon Johnson, 15 Dec. 1965, Lyndon Johnson Library (LJL), 
Austin, Special Head of State Correspondence, National Security File, Box 61. 
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the crucial period that lies ahead’.22 Kaunda approved the suggestion, and also 
decided to send a delegation simultaneously to Washington.23 
Arthur Wina, Minister of Finance, and Elijah Mudenda, then Minister of 
Agriculture, led the delegation to Moscow. Ambassador Mwaanga arranged a 
meeting at the Kremlin with Head of State Nikolai Podgorny. Mwaanga had 
high hopes that the Soviets ‘would see this as a clear case requiring urgent 
assistance’.24 Mudenda was also hopeful, but that soon changed. Upon arrival in 
the Soviet Union he started to be discouraged, first by the brutal cold and 
second by his host’s attempt to warm him with cognac (he was a teetotaler like 
Kaunda). The meeting with Podgorny was no better. Mudenda and Wina 
explained that Zambia desperately needed fuel and trucks, but ‘no positive 
response was forthcoming. It became clear that they were not willing to help’. 
Soviet reasoning escaped Mudenda, who later recalled: ‘I don’t know whether I 
understood those people’.25 The Russian Bear’s behavior bewildered Mwaanga 
as well, who discovered soon thereafter that the USSR had been purchasing 
Rhodesian tobacco for several years.26 
Zambia’s delegation to the USA was led by Foreign Minister Simon Kap-
wepwe and Mines Minister Grey Zulu. Zulu has pointed out the humor in 
Kaunda’s choices, as Zulu and Kapwepwe had a reputation of favoring the 
Eastern Bloc but went to the Washington, while Wina and Mudenda supposedly 
leaned towards the West and found themselves in Moscow. The Soviets had 
evidently not gotten the joke, or at least not thought that it was funny, and the 
Americans’ response was not much better.27 On 22 December Kapwepwe talked 
with Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, who reiterated the 
American intention to assist with the airlift and repair the highway to Tanzania, 
earlier proposals which had already been accepted. Kapwepwe summed up his 
meeting with Williams by saying ‘we were treated like fools’. A few days later 
he met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a session he deemed ‘not fruitful at 
all’. Back in Zambia on New Year’s Day, he gloomily assessed the mission to 
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  Vernon Mwaanga to Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 10 Dec. 
1965, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, FA 1/98. 
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  The decision to send the missions and the missions themselves are insightfully 
analyzed in Anglin, Zambian crisis behavior, 147-51. 
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  Mwaanga, An extraordinary life, 110. Preparations described in Mwaanga to Perma-
nent Secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 31 Dec. 1965, NAZ, FA 1/98. 
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  Mudenda, Zambia, 50-51; interview with Elijah Mudenda, Lusaka, 13 July 2005. 
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the USA as ‘the most hopeless of all trips I made to any government in the 
world’.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6 American President Lyndon Johnson meets with Zambian President  
 Kenneth Kaunda in the Oval Office on 2 December 1964. Zambian  
 officials seated next to Kaunda are Peter Matoka and Valentine  
 Musokanya. Standing in the background is G. Mennen Williams,  
 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
 
 
American participation in the airlift, which was obviously much less than 
Kapwepwe had hoped for, began in early January 1966. By the end of April the 
American planes had provided over 3.6 million gallons of fuel to keep the 
Copperbelt running. Kaunda thanked Johnson for ‘this great contribution to the 
Zambian economy’, and would later characterize the airlift as ‘helpful’.29 The 
fact remains, however, that Kaunda did not think that sanctions would end the 
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crisis. Participating in the sanctions, moreover, severely strained Zambia’s 
transportation system, and repairing the Great North Road was not enough to 
ease the burden. In August 1966 during a visit to Moscow by Kapwepwe and 
Kamanga, the Soviets agreed to provide cultural and educational support, a 
helpful gesture but not sufficient to solve the problems caused by UDI.30 
National security remained a serious concern. 
August of 1966 also saw the departure from Zambia of the RAF Javelin 
squadron. Zambia had not been satisfied with British efforts to prevent bombing 
raids by the Rhodesian airforce. Grey Zulu suggested that Zambian commercial 
pilots be trained to fly fighters, but the British commander predicted that it 
would take over ten years before Zambians would be ready. Italy provided a 
helping hand, and their trainers produced Zambian fighter pilots in less than 
three years. Italy delivered planes, which were eventually replaced by ‘other 
models of military aircraft supplied by Yugoslavia’.31 
The Zambian president wanted a new railroad running to Dar es Salaam, but 
the British, American, and Soviet governments refused to fund the project.32 
Kaunda consulted with Julius Nyerere and decided to request help from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), whose leaders had provided crucial support 
and even offered military assistance in the early 1960s.33 In July 1967 he spent 
five days in China, and the government there agreed to build the railroad. On 5 
September 1967 officials from Zambia, Tanzania, and the PRC signed a formal 
plan for construction in Peking.34 During a banquet in Peking, Kaunda had 
praised the Chinese for their successful testing of a hydrogen bomb. At a press 
conference upon his return to Lusaka, he elaborated on the topic. In his view, 
there should be no monopoly on atomic weapons. The more nations that had 
                                               
30
  Goodwill mission to the USSR (15-31 Aug.) discussed in a confidential report from 
Ambassador Hosea Soko to Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe, NAZ, FA 1/98.  
31
 Interview with Grey Zulu, 18 July 2005; Kaunda to Carter. Zambia purchased Soviet 
MIG fighters in 1980, an action which drew criticism from Carter that in turn 
resulted in Kaunda’s lengthy letter of 15 February.  
32
  Gabriel Banda, Zambia against apartheid: A case on apartheid – caused debt 
(Lusaka, 2000), 15. 
33
  Zambia gratefully accepted non-military aid from the PRC in the early 1960s but 
decided weapons were unnecessary as independence neared, according to Vernon 
Mwaanga in an interview with the author, 7 Dec. 2005, Lusaka. Mwelwa Musam-
bachime, history professor and former ambassador to the United Nations, also em-
phasized the significance of this early aid from the PRC in his comments after the 
author’s Fulbright lecture on ‘Zambia and the Big Powers, 1965-1970’, University 
of Zambia, 30 Nov. 2005.  
34
  Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: 
An analysis of Zambia’s decision making in transportation (Lawrenceville, 1990), 
53. 
86 DEROCHE 
 
them, the less likely it was that anyone would use them. He did not include 
South Africa as one of the nations that should possess such weapons, however, 
because in his view it was likely that they would use them for further racial 
oppression.35  
On the other hand, Zambian leaders believed that they themselves were 
leaders of a progressive nation state who could be trusted with the newest 
technology, so Kaunda pursued it. He made two written requests to President 
Johnson in September 1967. First he asked for the USA to construct a factory in 
Zambia that would produce anti-aircraft weapons. In the second letter he 
expanded his wish list to include ballistic missiles and even ‘missiles with 
nuclear warheads’. The American ambassador in Lusaka, Robert Good, in-
formed Kaunda that nuclear weapons were ‘simply not on’.36 Johnson in fact 
denied the requests for military assistance entirely but pledged to keep Zambia’s 
security needs under review.37 In January 1968 Kaunda sent Foreign Minister 
Reuben Kamanga to Washington to ask in person for weapons. Dean Rusk 
discussed the issues thoroughly with Kamanga, but at the end of the day offered 
nothing.38 
Zambia’s opposition to nuclear monopolies soon strained relations with the 
USA and the USSR, specifically regarding a non-proliferation treaty that the 
rival superpowers presented to the UN General Assembly in June.39 Zambia’s 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hosea Soko, had weighed in strongly against 
the treaty. He correctly contended that South Africa was working to develop 
atomic weapons and thus concluded that ‘the nuclear bomb may ensure our very 
survival’.40 Vernon Mwaanga, then Zambia’s Permanent Representative to the 
UN, also opposed the treaty. In particular he did not like the idea of the USA 
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and Soviet Union deciding the issue for the whole world. He met with Kaunda 
in Kenya for special consultations before the vote, and they agreed that the 
treaty was flawed.41 Zambia was one of only four (with Tanzania, Cuba, Alba-
nia) in the General Assembly to vote no, resisting diplomatic pressure from the 
Americans and Soviets.42  
Zambia’s opposition to the treaty, Kaunda’s request for weapons, and Soko’s 
dire warning about needing nuclear weapons to survive reflected the profound 
impact that UDI had on Zambia in the context of the Cold War. For one thing, 
these three examples all represented a complete about-face from the very strong 
stance against the spread of nuclear weapons that Zambia had taken through 
1966. In the early 1960s leaders of the crusade for nuclear disarmament such as 
Michael Scott and Bill Sutherland worked closely with Kaunda, considering 
him a pacifist with good Ghandian credentials.43 In June 1965 Zambia actively 
sponsored UN resolutions banning all nuclear testing and calling for a world 
disarmament conference.44 In September 1965 Kapwepwe told the UN general 
assembly that ‘Zambia also believes it is a matter of urgency that the United 
Nations should consider the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons’.45 In November Zambia voted in favor of a reso-
lution to consider just such a treaty. A year later Zambia’s permanent represent-
ative in New York gave an eloquent statement in favor of the treaty, and added 
that his country actually wanted a ‘complete ban on nuclear weapons’.46 At the 
UN in mid-November of 1966 Kaunda declared that Zambia was not satisfied 
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with the ‘progress being made in the field of control of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons’.47 
Why had Zambia gone from making such statements and casting such votes 
in 1965 and 1966 to asking for weapons and opposing the treaty in 1967 and 
1968? The Central Intelligence Agency speculated at the time that the vote 
reflected Chinese influence over Kaunda.48 It is more likely that the explanation 
boils down to rising concerns for national security as the UDI crisis escalated. 
The war for Zimbabwe began, attacks from Angola and Portugal increased, and 
fears regarding South Africa multiplied. Kaunda’s single most important foreign 
relations advisor, Mark Chona, later explained the situation.  
We had information that the South Africans were working with Israeli technicians 
and using German technology to develop atomic weapons. We had that info and 
knew it was credible. There is no doubt that we did think of how to respond […]. 
We did consider all options. The nuclear response was not excluded […]. If South 
Africa was developing these weapons, then what should the rest of the region do – 
just accept it? You can’t fight guns with knives […]. It was not ridiculous. The 
situation was real and considering that option was logical. It is not surprising that 
KK would consider nuclear weapons.49 
During the difficult days following UDI Zambian officials frantically pur-
sued a wide range of projects to improve the nation’s security situation, includ-
ing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In Chona’s view this was a logical 
choice given the fact that South Africa was pursuing nukes as well. From the 
Zambian perspective Chona’s analysis makes sense. After all, against whom 
would Pretoria have used nuclear missiles in the late 1960s if not Lusaka? They 
obviously would not have used them against white ruled Rhodesia, Angola, or 
Mozambique. Malawi was cooperating and Namibia was still under their con-
trol. Zambia was the most logical target. Knowing that South Africa could soon 
have nuclear weapons, it was reasonable for Zambian officials to feel threat-
ened.  
While Kaunda never succeeded in getting nuclear weapons (unlike South 
Africa), other projects proved more successful. In addition to the tremendous 
support from the PRC, Zambia benefited from the benevolence of the Italians 
and the Yugoslavians. For example, Kaunda wanted an oil pipeline stretching 
from Ndola to Dar es Salaam. Andrew Sardanis, one of Kaunda’s key economic 
advisors, initially recommended accepting a bid by the colorful British tycoon 
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Tiny Rowland.50 A few months later Sardanis infuriated Rowland by instead 
signing a contract with Snam Progetti, a subsidiary of the Italian state oil com-
pany. The Italians completed the project four months ahead of schedule, and 
Kaunda and Nyerere officially opened the pipeline in September 1968.51 At 
least one key component of national security – a reliable oil supply – had been 
solidified. 
Opposition critiques  
From 1965 to 1969, Zambia’s responses to UDI included advocating a military 
intervention by the UK, participating in the economic sanctions against Rho-
desia, and seeking succor from nations around the globe for defense and trans-
portation. During those four years, opposition members of the National Assem-
bly criticized all of these policies and contended that they endangered national 
security. Harry Nkumbula, National President of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the MP for Monze, responded to Kaunda’s December 1965 call for 
British intervention by warning: ‘If a war was staged here and the British troops 
started fighting Smith, we will be the people who will suffer most […] it is a 
very unwise policy to quarrel with your neighbors’.52 In August 1966 Edward 
Mungoni Liso (ANC – Namwala) opined: ‘Britain has plainly said that she will 
not fight Rhodesia, but we go on crying like babies […]. We are just disgracing 
ourselves’.53 
During the mid-1966 debates, several MPs expressed concern that their 
country was going it alone in opposing UDI. Cecil Burney (Ind. – Ndola) 
worried that in the stand against Smith ‘no one else is taking an open-ended risk 
[…] at this stage in our development we cannot afford to, either’. Nkumbula 
chimed in, arguing that Zambia was ‘the only country in the world that has 
thrown its strength in the liberation movement of the Rhodesian Africans’. He 
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feared that ‘in the shortest possible time Zambia would be left alone in the 
struggle’. In conclusion he asked, ‘Who is going to pay? Zambians again!’54 
Members of the opposition also criticized some of the government’s strate-
gies regarding Zambia’s defenses and transportation. In December 1965 Liso 
doubted the wisdom of simultaneously sending missions to the USA and the 
USSR, because ‘America will not work for the same purpose as Russia at the 
same time in one place’.55 In 1966 Burney questioned the feasibility of the 
proposed railroad to Tanzania. A year later, his colleague Richard Farmer (Ind. – 
Copperbelt Central) ridiculed the railroad as ‘a wanton extravagance and waste 
of public money’.56 Farmer, Liso, and their colleagues did not believe that the 
foreign relations of the Zambian government were improving the country’s 
national security. 
In December 1967 Hugh Mitchley (Ind. – Midlands) lamented UNIP’s cessa-
tion of commercial flights from Lusaka to Salisbury, and hoped that another 
carrier such as Air Congo would service the route. Mitchley, one of the first 
whites to become a Zambian citizen, would be the only white still serving in 
parliament at the end of the decade.57 During October 1968 debates, Nkumbula 
derided the frequent overseas trips by government ministers as expensive and 
bad for Zambia’s reputation. Samuel Malcomson (Ind. – Copperbelt South) 
speculated that the National Assembly was adjourning because Vice President 
Kapwepwe was visiting schoolchildren in Canada, and condemned the adjourn-
ment as unnecessary and inefficient. He hoped, however, that Kapwepwe had ‘a 
begging bowl tucked under his toga’, and would return with ‘a few million 
Canadian dollars’.58 
Perhaps the harshest criticism of Zambia’s policies toward Rhodesia came 
from Nkumbula in October 1967, when he accused the Kaunda Government of 
being hypocritical. He pointed to the case of Alice Lenshina, describing her as 
‘a religious woman’, and ‘the poor woman suffering’. She and her followers in 
the Lumpa Church were being punished for wanting to practice their faith, and 
over 10,000 of them were refugees who had ‘run away from the terror of our 
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government’. Zambian officials loudly criticized the oppression in Rhodesia, 
but in Nkumbula’s view they were oppressing their own people. He emphasized 
that Zambia’s first priority at Independence should have been assuring that all 
Zambian’s were free. Harry hammered home his accusation of hypocrisy by 
saying that before someone can ‘teach people how to cook, one must be able to 
cook well for himself’.59 Opposition MPs excoriated UNIP policies on the 
grounds that they were undermining Zambia’s national security by weakening 
the country’s economy, constitution, and international reputation. 
Into the 1970s 
In spite of such criticism, the Kaunda government continued its policy of 
combating racial injustice in the neighboring countries. The situation in Rho-
desia would soon get worse, and Zambia would need more external support just 
to stay afloat. The chances of receiving major assistance from the USA de-
creased drastically, though, with the November 1968 election of Richard Nixon. 
Prospects would have been much better for Zambia if Hubert Humphrey had 
won, but that was not to be.60  Tricky Dick’s ‘jackassery’ left little room for 
Africa in general, and virtually none for Zambia.61 The Nixon administration 
refused to accommodate Kaunda’s request for a meeting in October 1970 when 
the Zambian leader was in the USA addressing the United Nations. Kaunda was 
furious about what he characterized as Nixon’s ‘discourtesy to Africa’. He 
commented to a group of African delegations in New York that the American 
president ‘did not want to see our ugly faces’.62  Nixon’s indifference toward 
southern Africa also opened the door for Senator Harry Byrd Jr. to blast a 
gaping hole in the economic sanctions, with his 1971 amendment that allowed 
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American companies to resume importing Rhodesian chrome.63 This turn of 
events dismayed Zambian officials, and at the time they correctly noted a 
‘softening of American attitudes toward’ the white regimes in South Africa and 
Rhodesia. 64  
During the tragic year 1968, the odds of Zambia getting significant support 
from the Soviet Union also worsened. In November the ambassador in Moscow, 
Paul Lusaka, reported: ‘the relations between the two countries could NOT be 
called cordial. As a matter of fact they might be described as cool’.65 He 
believed that the Soviet frostiness reflected two recent events: 1) Zambia’s 
criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; and 2) Zambia’s vote 
against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Grey Zulu, who became Minister 
of Defense in 1970, attributed Soviet ambivalence to another factor as well: 
‘they considered us a stooge of the UK’.66 President Kaunda placed the blame 
on the Russians and stated that he ‘feared their behavior’. He complained of 
Soviet interference in Zambia’s internal affairs, most notably their ‘covert 
dealings with Mr. Kapwepwe who subsequently broke away from UNIP’.67 
As relations with the Americans and the Soviets declined, the significance of 
Chinese friendship increased. In January 1969, Philemon Ngoma took up the 
post in Peking as Zambia’s first ambassador to China. Foreign Minister Elijah 
Mudenda characterized the move as ‘a further strengthening of relations be-
tween Red China and Zambia’.68 When Ngoma departed from Lusaka, the 
Times of Zambia hoped he would inform PRC officials that Zambians appre-
ciated ‘the humanistic approach of the Chinese in helping others without 
expecting anything in return’.69 On May Day the Zambian ambassador met Mao 
Zedong, who shocked Ngoma by stating in English: ‘we thank you for estab-
lishing excellent relations with us’. Ngoma heaped his highest praise on the 
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‘brilliant and intelligent’ Chou En-Lai for demonstrating incredible knowledge 
of world affairs.70  
While hosting a Chinese delegation in November 1969, Kaunda thanked 
them for their help on the railroad, stating that: ‘a friend in need is a friend 
indeed’. He praised the PRC for not interfering in Zambia’s internal affairs and 
promised to advocate China’s admission to the UN.71 Elijah Mudenda first 
visited Peking in 1965, and as foreign minister in the early 1970s he dealt 
regularly with the Chinese and enjoyed the experience.72 In July 1970 he led a 
Zambian delegation for additional talks in Peking regarding the railroad. He was 
greeted by Chairman Mao and met at length with Chou En-Lai, who impressed 
him as ‘very brilliant’. The sessions were fruitful and a groundbreaking cere-
mony for the construction of Tazara took place in Zambia in October. When 
asked later why the Chinese had been so helpful to Zambia over the years, 
Mudenda simply replied, ‘I think the Chinese are very human’.73 
Why did the PRC emerge as Zambia’s strongest ally among the super-
powers? Was it, as Mudenda proposes, because they were more humane than 
the others? They certainly treated Zambian officials with more respect and 
dignity than other foreign powers did. From a real politik perspective, perhaps 
the PRC saw in Zambia an opportunity to construct a sphere of influence in an 
area which the USA and the USSR neglected. Building Tazara boosted China’s 
image and leverage in the Non-Aligned movement.74 It begs the question – 
which came first, Zambia’s firm commitment to non-alignment, or Zambia’s 
friendship with the PRC? Along these lines, Zambia’s desire to practice inde-
pendent diplomacy tilted it naturally toward China rather than the USA or the 
USSR. Zambia for its part desired assistance for development to bolster its 
national security. The PRC responded very favorably and Zambia appreciated 
the help.  
Race also possibly played a role, as both the USSR and the USA were 
governed by mostly white Euro-males. Both nations were perceived as imperi-
alists, were in the developed world, and showed little interest in Africa. The 
Chinese were people of color, and the PRC was a developing country not seen 
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by Zambia as imperialist. But at the same time, perhaps there was a more 
ominous side to all of this. The PRC exemplified a one-party state run by a 
tightly disciplined central government that allowed no dissent or opposition. As 
UNIP consolidated its control, the PRC would have been a very fitting model. 
(To be fair on this point, however, the administrations of Brezhnev and Nixon 
were also good models for a strong central government that quelled any dis-
sent.) 
What is our answer, then? Ultimately we may never know why the PRC and 
Zambia became such close friends, but national security theory offers perhaps 
the most convincing explanation. Zambia’s relations with China and the other 
big powers from 1965 to 1973 represent a very ambitious approach to foreign 
affairs that reflected concerns for development, independence, non-alignment, 
political stability, and racial equality. All of these goals can be construed as part 
of the overarching aim, which was to strengthen Zambian national security. 
Additional assistance? 
There was no end in sight for the Rhodesian crisis in early 1973, and Ian Smith 
exacerbated the problem by closing the borders with Zambia on 9 January. 
Three weeks later he offered to re-open them, but Kaunda refused. Why exactly 
he decided to do so at that point is unclear. Stephen Chan has suggested that 
perhaps it reflected Kaunda’s fondness for drama. Chan based his speculation 
on an interview with a former top advisor who said the president ‘cannot work 
without a crisis’.75 Alternatively, Kaunda’s opting to take a stand over the border 
issue may have been an effort to justify controversial internal measures as 
Zambia moved into the era of the one-party state. Kaunda’s intransigence after 
Smith’s border closing may also have been calculated to generate international 
sympathy for Zambia’s financial plight. The writing was already on the wall 
indicating that Zambia would require considerable economic assistance, and 
blaming a new crisis on Smith could justify renewed requests for aid.76  
In the aftermath of the closing, Mark Chona and Lishomwa Lishomwa 
embarked on a two-month world tour to seek additional support from 18 coun-
tries. They started in the USA, where they met with Assistant Secretary of State 
David Newsom and representatives from the Agency for International Develop-
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ment. Zambia wanted money, trucks, and locomotives. The American officials 
admitted that ‘the United States did not know much about Zambia’s needs’. 
Economic relations were negligible, in part because there was ‘no resident AID 
staff in Zambia’. These facts demonstrated the very low priority that the Nixon 
administration placed on southern Africa. The Zambian delegation did sub-
sequently secure a loan from the Export/Import Bank for locomotives.77 This 
period marked the beginning of a rapid escalation in Zambia’s borrowing from 
international financial agencies.78 
In Washington, Chona and Lishomwa talked only with mid-level bureaucrats 
and received lukewarm support in the form of loans. Similarly in Moscow they 
met with a mid-level official, Deputy Foreign Minister Kozrev, but the results 
were even worse. They requested cargo aircraft, trucks, and money. The res-
ponse from Kozrev was ‘generally cold’. In a jab at Kaunda for not being 
enough of a socialist, the Soviet official ‘wondered why the Zambian govern-
ment does not seek assistance from the 49% shareholders in the mining com-
panies and other industries’. The British only offered a loan to purchase some 
trucks. This greatly disappointed Chona and Lishomwa, who suggested that in 
the future Kaunda’s government ‘make no unilateral approach to Her Majesty’s 
Government for any assistance’. 79  
Not surprisingly, the reception was much warmer in China, where they had a 
three-hour meeting with Premier Chou En Lai. The Chinese showed ‘tremen-
dous understanding’ of Zambia’s needs and offered ‘full support’, specifically to 
see that Tazara was speedily completed. Several other nations also responded 
favorably, most notably Rumania, Sweden, West Germany, and Japan.80 As the 
First Republic drew to a close the Chona and Lishomwa mission sought support 
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from governments spanning the entire spectrum of global politics, once again 
demonstrating that national security was the highest priority for Zambian 
foreign relations. 
Conclusions 
Leffler defined national security as the ‘protection of core values from external 
threats’. He characterized core values as ‘the objectives that merge ideological 
precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race 
consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials 
and the defense of territory’.81 Applying this interpretation of national security 
theory allows us to understand Zambian foreign relations during the First 
Republic more clearly. First and foremost, the general decision by Kaunda and 
his colleagues to aggressively oppose Rhodesia’s UDI constituted the defense of 
Zambian core values as they perceived them – i.e., the fight for racial equality. 
Rather than only a policy based on principle, Zambia’s response to Smith’s 
rebellion represented an effort to defend the security of the type of nation which 
the UNIP government wanted to create. 
Moreover, all of the specific examples considered in this essay fit within the 
framework of national security. Kaunda believed that British military inter-
vention in Rhodesia could end the crisis quickly, thereby protecting Zambia’s 
ideology and territory. When this option was ruled out and a long and costly 
struggle loomed, he and his top advisors such as Kapwepwe and Kamanga 
sought support worldwide. Security concerns dictated that assistance could 
come from virtually anywhere (e.g. Yugoslavia or Italy) and include virtually 
anything (even nuclear weapons). Opposition MPs criticized many aspects of 
Kaunda’s diplomacy as harmful to the country’s economy or reputation. The 
reaffirmation of the PRC as Zambia’s best friend in the early 1970s reflected the 
need to defend core values, as did the Chona and Lishomwa mission as the First 
Republic drew to a close. 
Zambian policymakers in the first years after independence conducted 
foreign relations with creativity and flexibility in order to defend national 
security. They achieved some admirable successes, to be sure, and their country 
celebrated its tenth birthday with high hopes for a bright future. As Zambia 
approaches its fiftieth birthday, however, the security of the nation in its most 
basic form is in peril. Poverty and disease threaten the core values, even the 
very existence, of the people of Zambia. Once again the leaders must make 
national security the top priority; but, the enemies are no longer UDI or 
apartheid, they are illness and hunger. As their predecessors fought racism, 
                                               
81
 Leffler, ‘National security’, 124, 126-27. 
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Zambians in the twenty-first century must battle HIV/AIDS. They must again 
call upon the world for support in the form of training and antiretroviral drugs. 
As Mark Chona said, ‘you can’t fight guns with knives’. 
 
 
  
5 
Enemies within?  
Opposition to the Zambian  
one-party state, 1972–1980 
 
Miles Larmer 
Introduction  
With the establishment of Zambia’s ‘one-party participatory democracy’ in 
December 1972, political opposition disappeared from public view into a 
shadowy world of rumour, paranoia, detention and denunciation. This chapter 
explores the trajectories of leaders, members and sympathisers of the United 
Progressive Party (UPP), following its breakaway from the ruling United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) in August 1971, its banning in February 
1972 and the subsequent declaration of the UNIP one-party state. It surveys the 
varying political ideas and tactical approaches of former UPP leaders and 
activists and the ways in which these differences reflected the heterogeneous 
basis of the UPP itself. Whilst some sought to further their political objectives 
within UNIP, others maintained underground opposition, particularly on the 
Zambian Copperbelt. In the late 1970s, UPP activists were divided over the 
return of their leader, Simon Kapwepwe, to UNIP. Debates subsequently took 
place regarding the former party’s relationship with leaders of the trade union 
movement; whilst Kapwepwe identified the increasingly oppositional Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as an important ally in defeating UNIP, 
others found ZCTU National Chairman Frederick Chiluba to be an unreliable 
partner, unprepared to make the sacrifices necessary to overthrow the one-party 
state.  
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Photo 7 UNIP supporters protesting against the formation of the UPP. The  
 placards read: ‘UNIP Amozone army and the powerful youth brigade  
 will fight UPP to the last man’; ‘Dr. K.D. Kaunda is a God given leader  
 away with  Kapwepwe’; ‘Kapwepwe and his fellow henchmen should be  
 arrested now’. 
 
 
The chapter also explores the changing political perspectives of Kapwepwe, 
primarily through interviews with many of his leading supporters in the UPP. 
Perceived in the 1960s as a militant anti-western and pro-Chinese nationalist, 
Kapwepwe’s leadership of the UPP rested in practice on a political ambiguity 
that generated support from conservative small businessmen, socialist students, 
and peasants in Northern Province, for whom his attraction was primarily as an 
ethnic Bemba aristocrat. In the late 1970s, he appears not only to have accepted 
the ideas of right-wing business-oriented critics of UNIP’s state-led nationalism, 
but also the initiation of a project to remove Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda from power that culminated, after Kapwepwe’s death, in the coup plot 
of 1980. The chapter reveals new evidence regarding the political ideas and 
practical actions behind the coup attempt, based on interviews with some of the 
participants.  
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In demonstrating the range of political ideas and tactics adopted by the 
opponents of UNIP, the chapter aims to illustrate major themes informing 
political contestation and debate in post-colonial Zambia. It also seeks to show 
that political opposition during Zambia’s First and Second Republics was of a 
greater range and extent than has hitherto been understood. There was, however, 
no natural unity amongst UNIP’s opponents. Just as Zambia’s first ruling party 
was itself an uneasy nationalist coalition whose political, economic and ethno-
regional divisions were expressed as both overt schisms and covert conflicts, so 
those who lost out in this conflict and sought to oppose UNIP were themselves 
driven by conflicting visions of the Zambia they would wish to see. This served 
to limit the labour movement’s overt support for the coup attempt of 1980. In 
such faultlines can also be seen the roots of subsequent divisions in the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) government in the mid-1990s, 
that were only briefly masked during its successful campaign for political libe-
ralisation of 1990-91.  
Reinterpreting the First Republic 
In the years after Independence in 1964, historical research played an important 
role in the self-conscious construction of a Zambian identity, shaped around a 
nationalist meta-narrative of injustice, exploitation and struggle, culminating in 
the achievement of self-rule under the ruling United National Independence 
Party and its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda.1 Kaunda’s own writings, and 
those published by the Foundation that bore his name, utilised a particular 
interpretation of pre-colonial and colonial history to support UNIP’s approach 
to post-colonial governance.2 In ‘Humanism’, for example, Kaunda claimed that 
the enduring importance of chiefly authority was representative of an authen-
tically African model of consensual and communitarian decision-making that 
made competing political parties not only inappropriate, but also potentially 
destabilising bases for tribally-based conflict. The logical conclusion of such 
arguments was the declaration of a one-party state in 1972, presented as the  
 
 
                                               
1
  See for example, R. Hall, Zambia, 1890-1964: The colonial period (London 1965, 
1976); D.C. Mulford, Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964 (Oxford, 
1967); A.D. Roberts, A history of Zambia (London, 1976); H.S. Meebelo, Reaction 
to colonialism: A prelude to the politics of independence in Northern Zambia, 1893-
1939 (Manchester, 1971).  
2
  K.D. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its implementation (Lusaka, 
1968); and Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its implementation Part II (Lusaka, 
1974); H.S. Meebelo, African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism (Lusaka, 1986). 
 OPPOSITION TO THE ZAMBIAN ONE-PARY STATE 101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Following the establishment of the UPP in August 1971,  
 the Times of Zambia provides its view of events in  
 September 1971 
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ultimate expression of popular will, but in fact UNIP’s only response to rising 
political opposition and its failure to meet popular expectations of social and 
economic change.  
In seeking to contribute to the construction of a unified Zambian nation, the 
post-colonial historical project glossed over the grossly uneven nature of Zam-
bia’s liberation struggle. This unevenness left a profound legacy for political 
conflict that is only now being fully comprehended. Whilst northern Zambia, 
the Copperbelt, and to a lesser extent the Kabwe area, were in 1961-2 consumed 
in the direct action of chachacha, other parts of Northern Rhodesia were largely 
untouched by the struggle on the ground. In Southern and parts of Central Pro-
vince, ethnic differences and the significant development of African commercial 
farming generated a different, more conservative nationalist tradition that was 
subsequently rendered illegitimate by the UNIP-dominated nationalist histori-
city, but which is evidently worthy of historical attention.3 Such differences, 
themselves reflective of Zambia’s pre-colonial and colonial economic, social 
and environmental history, were neglected and in some respects wished away by 
politicians and academics, who confidently expected such variation to be ironed 
out by post-Independence state formation and the social and economic develop-
ment that the state was expected to achieve. The demonstrable persistence of 
these divisions in Zambian politics, economy and culture behoves observers to 
take them seriously.  
The largely unproblematic dominance of UNIP rule during the First Repub-
lic remains part of a historiographical ‘common sense’ that is only now begin-
ning to be challenged. The undoubted effectiveness of UNIP’s first government 
in delivering the first stage of development, in the form of schools, hospitals 
and other social infrastructure, is widely assumed to have met the expectations 
of the Zambian people for post-colonial change. Where it is accepted that such 
efforts fell short of popular expectations, these tend to be dismissed as un-
realistic, given the limited capacity of post-colonial states. More germane to 
historical analysis is that such expectations, rooted in the promises made by 
nationalist politicians seeking to mobilise anti-colonial activity in the early 
1960s, shaped the hostile response of sections of Zambian society to the post-
colonial state and led, in some degree, to the social and ethno-regional conflict 
that presaged the declaration of the one-party state in 1972. Many Zambians 
were not only dissatisfied with the extent of this delivery, but sought to act on it 
politically in ways which profoundly disturbed the apparently dominant ruling 
                                               
3
  See G. Macola, ‘Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism 
in nationalist Zambia’, in this volume.  
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party.4 There was, evidently, no clear relationship between the state’s develop-
mental achievements and electoral support for UNIP which, in 1968, declined 
substantially, despite UNIP’s utilisation of state resources to reinforce its advan-
tage in inter-party violence, a neglected aspect of Zambian political culture that 
continues to affect electoral outcomes. Macola’s recent study of such discontent 
in the Luapula Province has reinforced Bates’ pioneering work which pointed to 
the extent of early regional disaffection with the capacity of the centralised state 
to deliver on such expectations.5 Contrary to the positive portrayal of the First 
Republic in much of the earlier literature, it is now evident that the divisions 
and problems experienced by Zambia during its Second Republic had their 
origins in the significant social, ethnic and regional conflicts experienced in the 
supposed honeymoon period of the late 1960s.  
Towards the UPP, 1967–1971 
The formal establishment of the United Progressive Party in August 1971 was 
the culmination of five years’ intense competition for control of UNIP. As UNIP 
failed to meet the expectations of many Zambians for post-colonial economic 
and social change, this discontent was expressed in part through demands made 
on senior UNIP politicians to deliver both state resources to their provincial 
bases and the appointment of political allies to positions in the growing state-
parastatal bureaucracy. At the 1967 UNIP Mulungushi Conference, an effective 
alliance of Bemba-speaking (with origins in Northern and Copperbelt Provin-
ces) and Tonga (Southern Province) politicians defeated those from Eastern 
(primarily Nyanja-speaking) and Barotseland (later Western) Provinces. Simon 
Kapwepwe was elected UNIP (and, consequently, Zambia’s) Vice President, 
defeating the incumbent Reuben Kamanga. Although President Kenneth Ka-
unda sought to paper over the party’s divisions with the use of ‘tribal balancing’ 
in appointments to senior positions, this tended in practice to reinforce the 
ethnic basis of intra-UNIP competition.6 However, the grouping that subse-
                                               
4
  The UNIP archives, opened in 2004, provide significant evidence to this effect. See 
G. Macola, ‘“It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom”: Thwarted 
expectations of independence in the Luapula Province of Zambia, 1964-1966’, Jour-
nal of African History, 47 (2006); M. Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a volcano”: The 
United Progressive Party and resistance to one-party rule in Zambia, 1964-1980’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 39 (2006). 
5
  Macola, ‘“It means as if we are excluded from the good freedom”’; R.H. Bates, 
Rural responses to industrialisation: A study of village Zambia (New Haven and 
London, 1976). 
6
  W. Tordoff, ed., Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1974), 29; interview with Sikota 
Wina, Lusaka, 7 Apr. 2006. Wina was Minister of Local Government in the first 
UNIP government and later Minister of Information in 1969-73, remaining a mem-
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quently established the UPP did not see themselves simply as an ethnic or 
linguistic construct. They were also representative of those who saw themselves 
as Zambia’s ‘freedom fighters’, who believed that they were being marginalised 
in the post-colonial state in favour of more educated Zambians (including 
Bemba speakers) who, in their view, had not been willing to sacrifice their 
education and employment prospects for the liberation of Zambia.7 Variegated 
and contradictory postcolonial discontents found temporary common cause 
against a ruling party perceived to be excluding these constituencies from post-
colonial advancement on a variety of ethnic, regional, and class grounds that 
were nevertheless experienced by Kapwepwe’s supporters as a singular sense of 
injustice. 
Eastern Province politicians successfully re-established their influence in the 
ruling party by about 1969; Kaunda’s decision to ethnically balance the Central 
Committee was perceived by Bembas as unfairly marginalising their dispropor-
tionately high membership in the party. From this time, many UNIP members 
with origins on the Copperbelt and Northern Province believed they were syste-
matically discriminated against in appointments to positions in the government, 
party and growing state-dominated economy. Secret meetings to organise what 
was initially a faction within UNIP began at this time.8 In August 1969, Kap-
wepwe quit as Zambian Vice President after threats of a vote of no-confidence 
led by Eastern leaders. Although Kapwepwe was publicly persuaded by Kaunda 
to stay on for another year, his authority was not recognised by his opponents. 
UNIP introduced a new Party Constitution in November 1970, giving each 
Province equal representation in the General Conference, further marginalising 
the representation of the large Bemba-speaking membership and increasing the 
potential for a breakaway party.9  
Kapwepwe was however reluctant to leave UNIP. Whilst some respondents 
claim that his friendship with Kaunda made it difficult for him to challenge the 
UNIP leader, others argue that he had properly gauged the extent of repression 
                                               
ber of UNIP’s Central Committee until 1976. He was subsequently Chairman of the 
Zambia Publishing Company until 1979. In the 1980s, Wina was an internal critic of 
the UNIP leadership, calling for a return to multi-party rule in 1990. 
7
  For a fuller explanation of the creation of the UPP, see Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a 
volcano”’.  
8
  For example, interview with Stanley Sinkamba, Kitwe, 25 Apr. 2005. A hospital 
medical assistant in Mufulira, Sinkamba was detained for his activities as a UNIP 
youth in 1959-61. Later UNIP Regional Secretary in Mufulira, Sinkamba was re-
moved from his post in 1969 and was a hotel manager when he was detained in 
1971-3. Sinkamba was MMD Constituency Chairman in Kamfinsa, Kitwe, in 1991. 
9
  C. Gertzel, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘Introduction: The making of the one-party 
state’, in C. Gertzel, ed., The dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia, (Man-
chester, 1984), 14. 
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that a breakaway party would face and therefore urged adequate preparation 
before such an action was taken. This preparation took place during 1971, in 
secret meetings to mobilise support for the new party amongst Copperbelt union 
activists, Bemba chiefs and headmen and others in all parts of Zambia.10 
Kapwepwe had long had a reputation as a fiery militant nationalist with pro-
Chinese sympathies. However, his closest supporters, for example Jonas Mu-
kumbi, found that, by the time of the UPP at least, Kapwepwe had adopted a 
more ambiguous philosophy:  
He called himself an African socialist. He was interested in sharing the national 
cake. First of all, create the national cake. Then the lion’s share should […] go to the 
majority of the people. That’s what he saw as African socialism. Create the wealth, 
but also share it out. It shouldn’t be in the hands of a few people […]. So, an African 
business entrepreneur was welcome, and encouraged. But whatever he produced 
goes to the national wealth. And the national wealth must be shared amongst the 
people.11 
It was precisely this ambiguity in message which enabled Kapwepwe to 
appeal both to radical leftist students at the University of Zambia (UNZA) like 
Jonas Mukumbi himself, and to conservative business figures in Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt.12 
The UPP was publicly launched in August 1971. Kapwepwe, flanked by 
supporters from all parts of Zambia, declared that ‘Independence is good, but is 
meaningless and useless if it does not bring fruits to the masses’.13 He criticised 
financial indiscipline in Government and declared that UNIP was undemocratic 
and stagnant. UNIP’s response was decisive: In September, all senior UPP 
leaders (except Kapwepwe) in Lusaka, the Copperbelt and Northern Province 
were arrested and detained. Kaunda claimed they had been engaged in military 
training abroad and subsequently alleged that the UPP was receiving support 
from Zambia’s neighbouring enemies, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese-
                                               
10
  Interview with Lasford Nkonde, Lusaka, 13 Apr. 2005. Nkonde, a veteran of the 
nationalist movement, was present at the founding congress of UNIP in 1959 and 
was detained by the colonial authorities during the chachacha in 1961. Nkonde was 
active in the union movement in Kabwe until 1969, when he was briefly transferred 
to the Ministry of Local Government. Detained in 1971-72, Nkonde worked as a 
driver and bodyguard for Kapwepwe in the 1970s, before being briefly re-arrested in 
1978.  
11
  Interview with Jonas Mukumbi, Kitwe, 7 Aug. 2005. A Copperbelt UNIP Youth 
leader in the 1960s, Mukumbi studied at the University of Zambia from 1970 and 
was part of the student leadership expelled the following year. He finally obtained a 
law degree from UNZA in the late 1970s, and today practices as a lawyer in Kitwe.  
12
  Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a volcano”’. 
13
  Times of Zambia (TZ), 23 Aug. 1971. 
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ruled Mozambique and Angola.14 The UPP was denied permits to hold public 
meetings, and instead campaigned by word of mouth, organising secret house 
meetings at night. Despite this, Kapwepwe won the Mufulira West by-election 
of December 1971. From the founding of the UPP, violent clashes took place 
between UNIP and UPP supporters, particularly on the Copperbelt. Meanwhile, 
state and parastatal employees suspected of being members of the UPP were 
sacked. Businessmen identified as UPP supporters had their businesses attacked 
and their operating licences revoked. Kapwepwe returned to Parliament in 
January 1972 as the UPP’s sole MP. Days later, he was violently attacked in 
Lusaka.15 On 4 February, the UPP was banned and 123 leaders, including 
Kapwepwe, were detained. Kaunda claimed that the party was ‘bent on violence 
and destruction’.16 Weeks later, Kaunda confirmed widespread rumours that 
Zambia would shortly become a one-party state.17  
After the UPP: Underground opposition to the one-party state, 
1973-75  
Following the ban of the UPP and the detention of Kapwepwe, its younger 
leaders initially attempted to establish an alternative party, the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP). Although positioned as a direct replacement for the UPP, 
the DPP had a distinct alternative identity, rooted in the radical student move-
ment that had, in May 1971, confronted Kaunda over his approach to South 
Africa. The exposure of the President’s correspondence with South African 
Prime Minister Vorster was a severe embarrassment to Kaunda, at a time when 
students were violently beaten by police for demonstrating against French arms 
sales to South Africa in ostensible support of UNIP’s declared policy of isolat-
ing Apartheid. A group of ten former UNZA student leaders, including Faustino 
Lombe and Boniface Kawimbe, had previously taken up the administration of 
the UPP following the detention of party leaders in September 1971.18 Lombe 
was now the President of the DPP, and the new organisation issued leaflets 
criticising what it saw as UNIP’s accommodation with international capital.19 
                                               
14
  TZ, 1 Sept. 1971. 
15
  TZ, 13-15 Jan. 1972. 
16
  TZ, 4 Feb. 1972. 
17
  TZ, 26 Feb. 1972. 
18
  TZ, 24 Sept. 1972. 
19
  Interview with Faustino Lombe, Lusaka, 11 Dec. 2003. Lombe trained and worked 
as a teacher in Ndola. Denied a UNIP appointment in 1970, he worked for the UPP 
before his detention in 1972-3. Resident in Mufulira and a leading organiser of the 
underground UPP, Lombe was detained under Presidential Order in 1978-81 and 
then again from 1981 to 1987. Following his release, he lived in exile in Canada.  
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The DPP also highlighted the contrast between the low wages of most workers 
and the high salaries of senior politicians.20  
The DPP leaders were themselves detained in mid-1972. A second post-UPP 
party, the United People’s Party, was briefly established by UPP leaders Justin 
Chimba and Musonda Chambeshi following their release from detention in 
September 1972. Although it was also quickly banned, its pamphlets showed a 
distinct ideological direction that was at odds with the radical position of the 
DPP.21 For example, Chimba criticised Zambia’s increasing economic links with 
China, symbolised by the proposed construction of the TAZARA railway.22 
These contradictory political positions were also noted by UPP detainees, such 
as Davies Mwaba:  
[…] there were tensions, even in detention. The students would say, ‘Is this what 
we’re here for, this type of leadership?’ Pointing at [the older leaders] Chapolokos, 
Chambeshis and that, they couldn’t get on. ‘What is the economic policy?’ They 
wouldn’t understand what the students were talking about. It was terrible. ‘What 
does UPP stand for?’ One would say ‘The UPP stands for respect for traditional 
leaders’. ‘What?! We are detained for that sort rubbish?’ So there were continuous 
tensions between the members.23  
Differences over tactics and perspectives were also influenced by the 
economic and social position of the different factions. Many student activists 
had been prepared to sacrifice their future livelihoods to the political cause, but 
were persuaded by their elders to return to their studies. However, they 
remained under close scrutiny during their remaining years at UNZA, which 
was not a centre for further student unrest until 1975. Meanwhile, relatively 
wealthy and influential UPP sympathisers remained within UNIP, generally not 
publicly expressing their criticisms of the ruling party. It is widely suggested 
that Kapwepwe directed them to stay in UNIP, on the basis that it was pre-
ferable for as yet unidentified UPP sympathisers to remain at large rather than 
                                               
20
  A.B. Mwansa to ‘All Zambian youths’, 19 Mar. 1972, United National Independ-
ence Party’s Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, ANC 7/113. Mwansa was the DPP’s Vice 
National Secretary for Youth. 
21
  See for example, J.M. Chimba, ‘How long is this country going to be ruled by 
political maniacs?’, United Peoples’ Party circular no. 3, 14 Oct. 1972, UNIPA, 
ANC 9/15. 
22
  J.M. Chimba, United Peoples’ Party circular no. 2, 13 Oct. 1972, UNIPA, ANC 
7/113. 
23
 Interview with Davies Mwaba, Lusaka, 6 Dec. 2003. A UNIP and union organiser in 
the early 1960s, Mwaba trained as a doctor in Italy from 1963. Returning to Zambia 
in 1970, he worked at the University Teaching Hospital, before being detained in 
1972-3 for his participation in UPP. He continues to work as a doctor in Lusaka. 
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suffer the repression that the party’s public members experienced.24 Most UPP 
supporters lost employment as a result of their political activity and continued 
to suffer intelligence surveillance and police harassment throughout the 1970s.25 
In 1974, many former UPP members received state compensation for their 
detention and torture. Most were represented in court by Kapwepwe’s lawyer, 
Pierce Annfield, who would play an increasingly important role in his political 
circle.26  
It is noteworthy that many of those business figures who shared Kapwepwe’s 
critique of UNIP’s economic management had significantly more to lose than 
many UPP activists in both Northern Province and amongst the student group. It 
appears that, at this time, they were more interested in retaining their compa-
rative wealth and influence, hoping to gain in the long run by promoting a more 
liberal economic policy within UNIP. Amongst their number were Emmanuel 
Kasonde, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, and Valentine Musa-
kanya, who was removed from his position as Governor of the Bank of Zambia 
in 1972. Musakanya was a major secret financier of the UPP who continued to 
support many party activists throughout the 1970s, for example paying Jonas 
Mukumbi’s university fees.27  
UNIP had survived, but the ruling party never fully recovered from the 
traumatic conflict which destroyed much of its support in what had been its 
strongest base since the nationalist struggle. Throughout the 1970s, the party in 
the Copperbelt and Northern Provinces was riven by suspicion and accusation. 
Senior UNIP officials suggested the party’s weakness in these areas resulted 
from the continuing organisation of the UPP in secret underground form.28 
Those Bemba-speaking leaders who had remained loyal to the ruling party, for 
                                               
24
  This is confirmed by virtually all interviewees, who point to examples of the assist-
ance they subsequently received from prominent business figures with UPP sympa-
thies. See, in particular, interview with John Chisata, Mufulira, 26-27 Nov. 2003. 
Chisata was a mineworker and President of the African Mineworkers’ Union in 
1962-4. Elected MP for Mufulira in 1964, Chisata served as a Deputy Minister in 
UNIP Governments until 1969. An outspoken parliamentary critic of UNIP, Chisata 
was detained in 1971-2. Chisata became a businessman in Mufulira, from where he 
organised the underground UPP before his second detention in 1978-81. See also 
interview with Davies Mwaba. 
25
  Interview with Lasford Nkonde; and Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a volcano”’. 
26
  One of those represented by Annfield was Dennis Sikazwe, who received K6,500 in 
compensation; interview with Dennis Sikazwe, Lusaka, 26 Apr. 2005. Sikazwe 
studied teacher training at UNZA from 1969 before his expulsion in 1971. Detained 
in 1972-3, he later moved to Luanshya, where he ran Adult Education services for 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines until 1993. 
27
  Interview with Jonas Mukumbi. Musakanya is identified as an important supporter 
of the UPP by a number of interviewees. 
28
  Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a volcano”’.  
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example Andrew Mutemba and Minister for Home Affairs Lewis Changufu, 
were suspected of being secret supporters of Kapwepwe, an experience that, in 
Changufu’s view, served to alienate him from the party leadership and its ruth-
less use of the state intelligence services for the preservation of the Presidency 
rather than for the good of the nation.29 
Debates and tactics, 1975-77 
During the mid-1970s, the majority of former UPP detainees did not re-involve 
themselves in organised politics. A significant number rejoined UNIP and, from 
their perspective, argued for what they believed were progressive policies 
within the sole legal party, albeit often surrounded by the suspicion of other 
UNIP members.30 However, a significant number remained outside UNIP and 
maintained contact with Kapwepwe. In the Copperbelt town of Mufulira, in 
particular, John Chisata, Faustino Lombe and others committed themselves to 
the organisation of an underground UPP. Because of constant surveillance from 
state intelligence, they were unable to hold formal political meetings.31 Instead, 
they would use Church gatherings, weddings and funerals, and cultural events 
as venues for organisation.32 In this way, significant UPP cells were maintained 
in each Copperbelt town. Presidential elections, in which (under the One-Party 
State constitution) the electorate voted ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for the single Presidential 
candidate, were targeted by UPP activists, who sought to encourage as high as 
                                               
29
  Interview with Lewis Changufu, Lusaka, 12 Apr. 2006. Changufu was Minister of 
Home Affairs at the time of the initial UPP detentions, serving in this role from 
1969-1973. He subsequently went into private business. 
30
  For example, interview with Marcellino Bwembya, Chingola, 23 Apr. 2005. Mayor 
of Chingola in 1964-68, Bwembya was Assistant Minister for North-Western 
Province and then District Governor for Mwinilunga to 1970. Detained in 1971-72, 
Bwembya rejoined UNIP and served on the Chingola Council. Bwembya joined the 
MMD in 1990 and was again Mayor of Chingola from 1994 to 1998. 
31
  Examples of such Zambian intelligence surveillance can be found in intercepted 
form in the South African Foreign Affairs’ Archives (SAFA), Pretoria. See, e.g., 
Directorate General Military Intelligence to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 11 Apr. 
1974, SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 44, which provides transcripts of intercepted Zambian 
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possible a ‘No’ vote.33 Kapwepwe would periodically travel to meet this group 
from his home in Chinsali, whilst former UPP leaders, including Chisata, 
Chimba, Chambeshi, Peter Chanda and Robinson Puta, would travel to Chinsali 
every two months, to pay respects and discuss the future of the party with him.34 
There was an ongoing debate amongst former UPP supporters regarding both 
the political positions they should adopt and the tactics they should use.  
As Zambia entered a period of dramatic and prolonged economic decline in 
the mid-1970s, Kapwepwe’s earlier warnings regarding UNIP’s unsustainable 
economic policies seemed to be proven in practice. If the policies of the legal 
UPP had been politically ambiguous, there was now a more coherent critique of 
both economic nationalisation and the Government’s focus on regional 
liberation movements, which former UPP supporters believed led to the neglect 
of Zambia’s domestic problems. This analysis was supported by Zambia’s small 
business-oriented elite, many of whom occupied positions in the state and/or 
parastatal senior management. In the 1970s, this group became increasingly 
critical of UNIP’s model of state economic intervention and its inability to 
arrest sharp economic decline. This criticism was most visibly expressed by the 
1977 report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Economy, chaired by 
Minister of Finance, John Mwanakatwe. The Committee, whose members 
included such prominent politicians as Alexander Chikwanda and Arthur Wina, 
recommended reductions of public spending and the removal of subsidies on 
basic foodstuffs. Other prominent business-oriented and politically influential 
figures were increasingly prepared to criticise economic policy and call for 
reform. Amongst their number was Elias Chipimo, Chairman of Standard Bank, 
who in September 1976 launched a public attack on the political ‘indoctrination’ 
that he claimed would result from a new education policy.35 Andrew Kashita, 
former Managing Director of the parastatal holding corporation, INDECO, and 
Minister of Mines from 1973 to 1975, was close friends with Musakanya and 
leading lawyer Edward Shamwana. With them, Kashita opposed the practical 
impact of the one-party state on Zambia’s society and economy.  
At the same time, the growing criticism of economic policies by the trade 
union movement, following the election to the ZCTU leadership of Newstead 
Zimba (in 1971) and Frederick Chiluba (1974), led the former UPP leadership 
to identify, perhaps belatedly, the potential of organised labour to effectively 
challenge UNIP position. Jonas Mukumbi claims that, soon after his release 
from detention in 1974, the former UPP approached Chiluba, offering to help 
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prepare his public statements and provide support for him.36 He claims that 
Kapwepwe secretly met Chiluba at Chambeshi’s farm in Mkushi as early as 
1975:  
So we took Mr Chiluba to the farm, to meet Mr Kapwepwe. He was very happy to 
see him, at night. And then he said ‘OK comrades, I’m going to have a discussion 
with Mr Chiluba, two of us’. Off they went in the night, on the farm. I think they 
were there for almost two hours. When they came back, Chiluba was crying, he was 
in tears. What they discussed, I don’t know. But after that, he [Chiluba] was fiery [in 
his public statements]. And we kept on going to Chinsali to see the old man 
[Kapwepwe] […] he kept on saying, ‘Even if I’m not there […] we do it through the 
labour movement’.37  
Kapwepwe reportedly urged Chiluba never to accept an appointment from 
Kaunda to government or any other institution, an advice that Chiluba appeared 
to take on board, thus enhancing his reputation as one of the few national 
leaders untainted by close association with UNIP.38 However, it is difficult to 
know the extent to which Chiluba’s increasing political profile in the late 1970s 
was a result of his covert association with Kapwepwe and the UPP. As is further 
explored below, the extent to which this represented a genuine partnership, or 
simply a marriage of convenience amongst UNIP’s enemies, remains open to 
interpretation.  
Meanwhile, some former UPP leaders, particularly Justin Chimba and Peter 
Chanda, sought to persuade Kapwepwe to lead his supporters back into UNIP. 
This argument met fierce opposition from some of the UPP’s younger members, 
particularly from the former UNZA student group. Chimba and Chanda’s desire 
to rejoin the ruling party seems to have been based less on a tactical argument 
and more on their own parlous economic position.39 Significant opposition to 
this decision was expressed at a gathering of about forty UPP activists held on a 
farm near Lusaka, in a meeting apparently held with the tacit permission of the 
government.40  
Financial overtures were made to former UPP supporters, many of whom 
had been prevented from obtaining gainful employment, to return to UNIP.41 
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The ruling party, irretrievably weakened in the UPP’s core areas, made frequent 
overtures to the UPP leaders. Lewis Changufu, who, as Minister of Home 
Affairs, had played a leading role in the detention and release of the UPP 
detainees in 1971-73, was amongst those who now successfully persuaded 
Kapwepwe to lead his supporters back into UNIP in September 1977.42 Many 
younger UPP supporters strongly opposed the decision, refusing to rejoin.43 
Kapwepwe, however, appears to have been convinced that it was possible for 
him to offer opposition to Kaunda within UNIP structures that, if not directly 
successful, would at least provide a challenge to his hegemony over Zambian 
political life.  
The return to UNIP, 1977-78 
Many UNIP leaders remained (rightly) suspicious of the extent to which the 
UPP’s prodigal sons had repented. The election of Musonda Chambeshi as a 
UNIP MP in Luanshya in January 1978 was marred by accusations that he and 
former UPP supporters were organising secretly to undermine UNIP.44 For their 
part, UPP activists discussed the potential for ousting Kaunda by a direct 
challenge for the Presidential candidature of UNIP. In August 1978, Kapwepwe 
publicly announced that he would challenge Kaunda for the leadership of UNIP 
at the conference due to be held at Mulungushi that November. In putting 
forward his candidature, Kapwepwe declared that he would make government 
and administration more efficient, make appointments on merit and encourage 
private investors. He would act against corruption and put national interests 
before international commitments.45 If the UPP’s 1971 manifesto had been 
carefully balanced to appeal to both right and left, here was a clear rightward 
shift appealing to those discontented with both UNIP’s statist orientation and 
with Kaunda’s support to the regional liberation movements. The latter was 
widely regarded as being at the price of national development, for example in 
the economically damaging closure of the Rhodesian railway trading route since 
1973, a policy Kapwepwe specifically pledged to reverse.46  
There were (and remain) significant divisions amongst former UPP activists 
regarding the decision to stand against Kaunda, coupled with criticism of 
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Kapwepwe’s unnecessarily secretive leadership style.47 Whilst Stanley Sinkam-
ba claims that Kapwepwe could have won an open contest for the UNIP leader-
ship, he believes that some way would have been found of removing him.48 
Others, like Lasford Nkonde, believed it was important to offer some form of 
public challenge to Kaunda, even if it had no chance of succeeding.49 Lewis 
Changufu, previously a loyal UNIP leader, personally supported Kapwepwe’s 
challenge to Kaunda. He also believes Kapwepwe had sufficient support 
amongst those present at Mulungushi to win an open election against Kaunda.50  
The UNIP leadership was apparently sufficiently concerned about these 
challenges to Kaunda (not only from Kapwepwe, but also from former African 
National Congress leader, Harry Nkumbula, and businessman Robert Chiluwe) 
to change the party constitution in September, banning those who had been 
UNIP members for less than five years from standing for the leadership.51 In 
addition, state forces were mobilised to physically prevent Kapwepwe and his 
supporters from attending the Mulungushi conference. Goodwin Mumba:  
[…] on the day that the Conference was opening, the gates were closed to the two 
leaders [Kapwepwe and Nkumbula]. I was with Kapwepwe at that time. So we were 
turned back at the gate. So we went over to some farm outside Kabwe. So we were 
just there waiting. And as we were there waiting, waiting for the ex-UPP cadres, 
because they were all UNIP, to come over, and take Kapwepwe physically, with 
force, through the gate.52 
Many of these cadres were stopped by armed police in Kabwe town. The 
vast majority of Kapwepwe’s open supporters were prevented from attending 
the Conference, where Kaunda was endorsed as UNIP’s candidate for the 
Presidency by popular acclaim.  
Nevertheless, the UNIP leadership was profoundly disturbed by the chal-
lenge.53 During the conference, a fire at a Chililabombwe nightclub was 
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reported to have been caused by a petrol bomb.54 John Chisata, Faustino Lombe 
and the leadership of the Mufulira UPP group were detained on suspicion of 
involvement in the ‘bombing’.55 No evidence was ever presented to the de-
tainees, whilst in detention or in court, of their involvement in the incident; 
although the detainees were violently tortured, they were not interrogated about 
the fire itself.56  
Meanwhile, Kapwepwe and Nkumbula took their appeal against their 
exclusion from the Mulungushi elections to the courts, the case running into 
November before it was thrown out.57 The Supreme Court upheld the court’s 
decision in July 1979. Meanwhile, Kapwepwe was himself arrested, appearing 
in court on charges including managing a banned party and possession of 
seditious material, an unlicensed firearm and pornography.58 During this period, 
in April 1979, Justin Chimba and Peter Chanda were appointed as Political 
Secretaries, the first significant former UPP leaders to accept such positions.59 
Their decision caused significant bitterness amongst some of their former com-
rades.  
The 1980 coup attempt 
In October 1980, Zambia’s first attempted coup was pre-empted, days before its 
implementation, by the arrest of the coup plotters and their armed supporters on 
a farm in Chilanga, south of Lusaka.60 Dozens of leading Zambians were 
detained and, after a lengthy legal process that was completed only in January 
1983, some were convicted of treason for attempting to overthrow the govern-
ment. The coup plot, initiated by businessmen, including Valentine Musakanya, 
and lawyers Edward Shamwana and Pierce Annfield, was supported by 
prominent Zairean dissidents led by Deogratias Symba. Symba worked with the 
French-speaking Annfield and his legal colleague Mundia Sikatana to bring 
fifty to sixty men (some Katangese, some Zambian ethnic Lundas) from North-
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Western Province to the Chilanga farm recently purchased by Annfield. Another 
140 Katangese were kept in reserve on a farm near Kalulushi on the Copper-
belt.61 Symba, however, warned the plotters that the military lead had to be 
taken by Zambian, not Zairean, military forces, if it was to be perceived as an 
internal Zambian initiative and not the overthrow of the government by hostile 
outside forces.62 Army Brigadier Godfrey Miyanda, as well as bringing in 
sections of the Zambian Army to the coup attempt, worked with army head of 
logistics Patrick Mkandawire to smuggle weapons to the Chilanga farm.63  
To my knowledge (and despite the significant circumstantial evidence), 
Kapwepwe has not previously been publicly linked to the initiation of the 1980 
coup attempt, even by the UNIP government. Since he was already dead by the 
time the coup plot was uncovered, and since evidence of his involvement is 
largely provided by the plotters themselves, it must be treated with caution. 
Certainly, respondents confirm that, following the defeat of his Supreme Court 
appeal in mid-1979, a frustrated Kapwepwe believed it was necessary to seek 
other ways to achieve political change.64  At this time, Musakanya and Annfield 
appear to have played a pivotal role in persuading Kapwepwe and others of the 
need to achieve political change by more direct means.  
Many former UPP supporters, for example Jonas Mukumbi, are however 
convinced that Kapwepwe would never have endorsed any sort of violent action 
to remove Kaunda:  
[…] he was against violence. He said violence is counter-productive. He said we 
need to fight peacefully, so we establish a government peacefully, and we govern 
this country in the interests of the people. […]. In any case, if violence comes, even 
the ordinary people will die. He was against, but there were forces on him.65 
One of the coup plotters, Deogratias Symba, claims that he met Kapwepwe 
before his death in January 1980, and that Kapwepwe effectively endorsed the 
project.66 Symba is supported in this claim by another of the coup leaders, 
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Goodwin Mumba.67 The most likely conclusion is that Kapwepwe was con-
vinced by Musakanya and others that Kaunda would be removed peacefully, 
primarily by the pressure of a general strike that, by halting the generation of 
foreign exchange earnings from Zambia’s copper mines, would bring the 
government to its knees. Subsequent military action would be secondary to this. 
Kaunda would be abducted and persuaded to abdicate, thereby avoiding blood-
shed.  
The effectiveness and peaceful nature of the project, in the eyes of those 
involved, hinged therefore on the UPP’s ties with the labour movement. Three 
months before his death, Stanley Sinkamba reports Kapwepwe telling him, ‘“the 
only one who can defeat Kaunda is Chiluba. If we used Chiluba, Kaunda will 
fall […] we can use this fool […] He has got the workers. And if the workers 
revolt, then Kaunda will go this time. Because he’s very unpopular. If only the 
workers turn against Kaunda, then he’s gone.”’68 One of the coup plotters, 
Goodwin Mumba, describes meetings with the ZCTU leaders:  
So he asked me, ‘OK, can you go and call Chiluba and his friends?’ That’s how I 
left, went and called Chiluba [and ZCTU Deputy National Chairman Chitalu] Sampa 
[…] So the two of them came and joined us two days later. And had a discussion of 
how to topple Kaunda […] they said, first, they would call for a general strike in the 
country, country-wide. If Kaunda doesn’t succumb to that, then, in the process, the 
army should be asked to take over […] So, now, which military personnel would do 
this? You’d have to be very careful to pick […] We’ve got to consult our friends, 
and that is Musakanya, and those in private business […] So, Musakanya, Annfield 
and Shamwana met at Shamwana’s office. And Kapwepwe. We told them what we 
had discussed with the trade unions, and that we were in agreement. And soon we 
were going to see some action, so don’t be surprised.69  
Kapwepwe was to be kept out of direct involvement in the plot; plans were 
made to take him to in France during the run-up to the attempt to take power. 
Annfield had close connections in France with former white Zambians who he 
had known in Chingola; these were, according to Symba and Mumba, the main 
funders of the coup attempt.70  
However, in the midst of preparations for his removal from the country in 
January 1980, Kapwepwe died. An entire chapter could be devoted to theories 
explaining the cause of Kapwepwe’s death, which are instructive not because of 
their literal truth, but because of the way the discourses surrounding his demise 
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express grievances and perspectives on the wider political situation in Zambia. 
Most former UPP supporters are convinced that he was murdered by the state, 
whether through a gradual process of poisoning, or specifically at a secret State 
House meeting days before his death.71 Even those who believe his death was 
the result of natural causes assign some blame to the harassment and intimi-
dation he was subjected to in the period before his death.72  
Whatever the cause, there was certainly widespread anger, expressed in par-
ticular at Kapwepwe’s funeral, during which President Kaunda was prevented 
from speaking at the grave and nearly physically attacked by Kapwepwe’s 
followers.73 At the funeral, covert discussions with Chitalu Sampa revealed that 
the ZCTU leaders had retreated from direct involvement in the plan to remove 
Kaunda.74 This might have acted as a deterrent to the coup plot, but in fact the 
loss of their leader accelerated the efforts of his lieutenants to remove Kaunda. 
For Mukumbi, Kapwepwe had been a restraint on Musakyanya: ‘[…] after he 
died, there was nobody to stop them […] Mr Musakanya was militant […]. And 
by that coup, Musakanya fell in the trap of Kaunda’.75 The other plotters 
resolved to go ahead with the attempt to seize power. Discussions took place at 
Lusaka’s Flying Club involving Musakanya, Shamwana, Miyanda, Annfield and 
Lt Gen Christopher Kabwe, head of the Zambian Air Force. Kabwe was to 
organise the diversion of Kaunda’s plane to a base where he would be persu-
aded to publicly step down. It was now envisaged that Shamwana, a widely 
respected legal figure who Kaunda was about to appoint Chief Justice, would 
head the subsequent interim government.76  
Following the funeral, Musakanya and Mumba travelled to Paris to collect 
$2 million raised for the plot by Annfield’s French connections. Concerned that 
they would be discovered bringing the funds into the country, Musakanya asked 
Andrew Sardanis, an old business contact and personal friend then in London, 
to take the dollars in exchange for Kwacha he had in a Zambian bank account. 
However, Mumba claims Musakanya drunkenly revealed what the funds were 
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to be used for to Sardanis, who then (according to Mumba) revealed the plot to 
Kaunda.77  
As plans for the coup were put into practice, there was increasing tension 
between the UNIP government and many of the elite business group. The 
achievement of Zimbabwean independence in April 1980 appeared to remove 
much of the external threat against Zambia, thereby providing space for 
increased criticism of UNIP. Three days after Zimbabwe officially came into 
being, Elias Chipimo suggested that one-party states in the ‘third world’ should 
introduce flexible arrangements to enable the change of leaders; otherwise, he 
asserted, there was a danger of encouraging coups d’etat.78 In response, Kaunda 
accused Chipimo of participating in plot to overthrow his government, naming 
Musakanya, Andrew Kashita and even John Mwanakatwe as part of a group 
meeting at the Lusaka Flying Club to remove him from power.79 Chipimo was 
forced to resign as Chairman of Standard Bank. It is striking in retrospect that, 
in the midst of Kaunda’s public identification of some of the coup plotters and 
even the location of their main activities, the plot nevertheless went ahead.  
The military capacity for the coup attempt was provided in the first instance 
by Katangese military forces. Following the defeat of the Shaba I (1977) and 
Shaba II (1978) invasions of Zaire by the Angolan-based forces of the Front 
pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC), the loss of political support 
from the Angolan government led some FLNC leaders, resident in Zambia after 
their retreat from Zaire, to seek an alternative route to oust Zairean President 
Mobutu.80 Deogratias Symba, the political head of the FLNC and at that time 
resident in Kitwe, was in contact with FLNC soldiers living inconspicuously 
amongst their Lunda kin in the Mwinilunga area.81 Symba met Kapwepwe, 
Annfield and Musakanya and agreed to recruit former FLNC fighters to support 
the coup attempt. Once Kapwepwe was in power, Zambia would provide a rear 
base for a renewed FLNC attack against Mobutu.82  
Plans were well advanced when the plot was publicly revealed and arrests 
made. Mumba claims they planned to seize power on 17 October; the day 
before, government forces launched a dawn raid on the Chilanga farm, killing 
one and wounding four.83 In May 1981, 13 people (four of them Zaireans) were 
publicly charged with involvement in the October 1980 coup attempt.84 
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Christopher Kabwe gave evidence against his co-plotters in exchange for his 
release.85 Four of the plotters, including Musakanya, were acquitted in August 
1982, partly because evidence extracted during interrogation was ruled 
inadmissible by the use of torture.86 Seven of the accused (including Shamwana 
and Symba) were found guilty in January 1983 and sentenced to death. They 
were subsequently pardoned by Kaunda in 1990. 
In the aftermath of the arrests, a major conflict did take place between the 
UNIP government and the trade union movement, centred on the proposed 
‘decentralisation’ of local government in the Copperbelt’s mine townships. In 
January 1981, 17 leaders of the ZCTU and the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia 
(MUZ) were expelled from UNIP; Kaunda publicly stated that ‘“it is now clear 
that the present MUZ is operating as cover for the UPP.”’87 This prompted the 
first national mineworkers’ strike for 15 years, an event subsequently linked by 
a UNIP Central Committee statement to the October 1980 coup plot.88 Further 
suggestions of a link between the industrial disputes and the coup attempt were 
denied by the ZCTU leadership, which demanded that the government sub-
stantiate such claims.89 Observers could be forgiven for assuming this was 
simply a characteristic attempt by UNIP to de-legitimise its enemies, but as the 
evidence above suggests, there were indeed significant links between the post-
UPP leadership group that initiated the coup attempt and the ZCTU leadership. 
The reasons for the ZCTU leaders’ reluctance to organise mass action in support 
of the coup attempt remain to be dicovered. For Mumba, this was evidence of 
Chiluba’s cowardice and duplicity; it could, however, equally be concluded that 
Chiluba believed the plot was hasty and ill-conceived, and chose instead to bide 
his time until a more effective challenge to UNIP could be mounted.  
South African connections, 1980-81 
It remains unclear whether the initial funding for the coup attempt originated in 
South Africa. Given Kaunda’s propensity for accusing his opponents of external 
support, it seems certain that if any definitive evidence of such support had been 
available to the Zambian authorities, it would have been highlighted at the trial. 
Witnesses did testify that Pierce Annfield received a shipment of guns from 
South Africa with the connivance of companies owned by Shamwana and 
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Mumba.90 However, it is clear that the vast majority of guns in the possession of 
the plotters were obtained from the Zambian Army. 
In the wake of the arrests, South African diplomats’ secret correspondence 
suggests no prior knowledge of the coup attempt, but rather the fear that the 
major Western powers would suspect them of involvement. Feedback from their 
diplomatic counterparts indicated that the intelligence services of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France did not believe South Africa was 
involved.91 There is no indication of South African involvement at the top level 
of government, but it has not yet been possible to rule out the involvement of 
elements of South African intelligence operatives, in a form that enabled 
politicians to deny any prior knowledge of such activities. 
During this period, some former UPP activists did make contact with South 
African authorities, seeking to mobilise outside support for opposition within 
Zambia. Elias Kaenga, one of those detained for the Chililabombwe fire, visited 
the South African Diplomatic Mission in Salisbury in March 1980. Kaenga 
claimed that, with the death of Kapwepwe, he was now accepted as the leader of 
the UPP.92 Kaenga was in ‘Rhodesia-Zimbabwe’ at a time when, South Africa 
believed, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation under the Muzorewa 
government was conducting operations “aimed at contributing to the general 
unrest in Zambia”.93 He claimed that he was building a resistance movement 
against Kaunda with support amongst the security forces and the mineworkers, 
which would eventually overthrow Kaunda. Kaenga sought South African 
support for the printing of propaganda and the payment of organisers’ expenses. 
Kaenga made a ‘favourable impression’ on the Diplomatic Representative, but it 
is not known if any support was provided. After the coup attempt, in October 
1981, Chama Chakomboka, a UPP activist in the Copperbelt and previously an 
important liaison between Kapwepwe and Chiluba, turned up at the South 
African embassy in Belgium, conveying information about and requesting 
assistance for a plan to create an ethnically-based federation of states com-
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  Witness Statements of Enos Sibanda (1 Apr. 1981), Jennifer Corlett (22 Jun. 1981), 
M.F. Solanki (23 Jun. 1981), Birger Carr (3 Jun. 1981): In possession of Musakanya 
family.  
91
  See ‘Zambia assessment’, SA Embassy Paris to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 1980; Washington 
to Pretoria, 6 Nov. 1980; London to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 1980; Bonn to Pretoria, 7 Nov. 
1980, all in SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 48.  
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  ‘Zambie: optrede deur opposisie van President Kaunda’, South African Diplomatic 
Mission Salisbury to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 3 Mar. 1980, SAFA 1/157/3, vol. 
18.  
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 ‘Attempted overthrow of President Kaunda of Zambia’, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
R.F. Botha to unknown, 2 Dec. 1980, SAFA 1/157/1, vol. 40.  
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prising Zambia, Zaire and Angola.94 The South African authorities were under-
standably sceptical about such proposals and characteristically cautious about 
all such approaches, believing they might be a Zambian Government entrap-
ment exercise enabling it to expose South African support to dissidents.95  
Whilst it cannot be proven whether South Africa funded the original coup 
plot, there is little doubt of that country’s involvement in an unsuccessful 
attempt to free the plotters and fly them out of the country in 1981. Pierce 
Annfield, having fled to South Africa to escape arrest, appears to have initiated 
contact with South African intelligence agents. Meanwhile, Faustino Lombe 
was freed in March 1981, after being held for 2½ years after the Chililabombwe 
fire. Having been held in the same prison as Musakanya and Shamwana, Lombe 
agreed to help organise military forces to spring the plotters from detention.96 
Initial contacts were made with senior officers in the Zambia Air Force and in 
May one of the defence lawyers, Geoffrey Haamaundu, flew to Pretoria to meet 
with Annfield and, it appears, a number of South African military intelligence 
agents.97 Lombe argues that the involvement of South African military intelli-
gence took place without the knowledge of the South African Government.98 
Unnerved by the victory of radical African nationalism in the Zimbabwean 
elections and the coming to power of President Mugabe, the hitherto cautious 
line regarding the unseating of Kaunda appears to have been abandoned by the 
most right-wing elements of the South African military establishment, who 
feared the expansion of the front line states’ support for South African nation-
alist movements.99 Whereas Haamaundu’s statement suggests that the rescue 
attempt would be completed by the escape of the plotters from Zambia, Lom-
be’s understanding was that the rescue would be followed by a renewed attempt 
to remove Kaunda from power.100 In late May, Haamaundu travelled to Geneva 
to collect South African money to fund the operation. Lombe subsequently 
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  Ibid.  
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travelled to South Africa to confirm various details of the plan.101 However, 
following numerous delays and a final agreement to implement the rescue 
operation in late June, ten men involved in the attempt, including Lombe and 
Haamaundu, were themselves detained.102  
Towards the MMD, 1980–1991 
Following Kapwepwe’s death and the failure of the coup attempt, most UPP 
members remained outside active politics. A younger generation of activists, 
including John Sakulanda and Chisanga Nkaka-Puta (the son of UPP leader 
Robinson Puta) were detained for organising a ‘UPP’ on the Copperbelt in the 
mid-1980s.103 Sinkamba and others subsequently met regularly with Chiluba, 
whose own brief period in detention after mineworkers struck in 1981 left him 
more cautious about directly opposing the one-party state. During the early 
1980s, Chiluba was periodically taken to Mkushi to meet Musonda Chambeshi 
in great secrecy. Chambeshi, the most senior former UPP leader then still alive 
and at liberty, seems to have regarded Chiluba as lacking in bravery and un-
worthy of Kapwepwe’s legacy, despite obvious attempts by Chiluba and his 
supporters to position himself as his political successor.104  
With the re-emergence of active political opposition in 1990, many former 
UPP supporters joined the MMD, initially as a pro-democracy movement and 
later as a political party. However, Chambeshi and Elias Kaenga warned that 
Chiluba could not be trusted, and instead played a leading role in the small 
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  Sunday Times of Zambia, 30 Aug. 1981. 
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  Interview with John Sakulanda, Lusaka, 9 Apr. 2005. Sakulanda’s father was a 
north-westerner detained in 1976-79 for alleged sympathies with the rebel Adamson 
Mushala. Sakulanda sought to organise a new UPP on the Copperbelt and made 
links with the Angolan rebel group UNITA. Sakulanda was detained for 12 months 
in 1987-8. He is now a Human Rights Commissioner.  
104
 Interviews with Jonas Mukumbi and Stanley Sinkamba. It is widely believed that, on 
his deathbed, Kapwepwe handed Chiluba his walking stick, representing a symbolic 
statement of succession of leadership to the younger man. This story is vehemently 
denied by Chiluba’s opponents (see, e.g. interview with Goodwin Mumba) and 
supported by his allies. See, for example, interview with Daniel Kapapa, Kasama, 
19-22 Apr. 2005. Kapapa, the son of a successful businessman, was an unusual 
Northern Province supporter of the ANC, before becoming an important leader of 
the UPP in Kasama in 1971. In the 1980s, Kapapa’s close relationship to the Bemba 
senior Chief Chitimikulu enabled him to join UNIP and be elected as an MP in 
1989. He joined the MMD on its inception and was elected MMD MP for Kasama. 
An important ally of Chiluba in the Northern Province, he was the MMD’s Pro-
vincial Chairman and Minister for Northern Province until 2001.  
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National Democratic Alliance (NADA), together with Lasford Nkonde.105 Jonas 
Mukumbi, who had been a close ally of Chiluba’s during the 1980s, supported 
his candidacy for the MMD leadership in 1991, but later became disillusioned 
by the marginalisation of UPP supporters in the MMD administration and what 
they saw as a betrayal of the UPP.106 However, the very ambiguity of the UPP’s 
own political position makes it impossible to summarise their specific disagree-
ments with the MMD politics – rather, criticism focuses on the lack of 
principled leadership by Chiluba and his acolytes in the MMD government, in 
comparison to the sacrifices made by UPP leaders in the ‘national interest’.107 
Many UPP supporters did take up local positions in the MMD: Stanley 
Sinkamba became MMD Constituency Chairman in Kamnfinsa, Kitwe, whilst 
Josiah Chisala formed a local branch in Kabwata, Lusaka.108 Daniel Kapapa, 
MMD MP for Kasama and a key Chiluba loyalist, was Deputy Minister for 
Northern Province in the 1990s. Boniface Kawimbe was the only significant 
UPP figure to reach senior office under the MMD, serving as Minister of Health 
from 1999-2001. After Chiluba left office, Kawimbe was National Chairman of 
MMD until 2005.109 He, Faustino Lombe and other former UPP leaders remain 
influential figures in the contemporary politics of Northern Province.  
Conclusion 
By its very nature, opposition to an authoritarian one-party state, as well as the 
study of it, is an activity prone to disinformation, rumour, accusation and 
counter-accusation. Little written evidence exists to support the claims made by 
oral sources and much of the evidence presented in this chapter invites further 
questions that are yet unanswered. Insight into the evolving political philosophy 
of Simon Kapwepwe is largely dependent on the perspectives of his lieutenants, 
rather than the direct views of the man himself. The specific relationship 
between Kapwepwe and Chiluba is largely interpreted in relation to the latter’s 
subsequent actions as President of Zambia and his ongoing trial on corruption 
charges. A complete understanding of the role of elements of South Africa’s 
defence and intelligence forces in Zambian opposition during the 1970s and 
1980s will require access to as yet inaccessible military files.  
Nevertheless, sufficient evidence is presented here to show that the leaders 
and activists of the UPP refused to accept that the declaration of the one-party 
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state would necessarily mean the end of opposition to UNIP. In the limited 
public and private spaces available to then, they met to organise informal forms 
of opposition and to discuss the most effective ways to remove UNIP and/or 
President Kaunda from power. Whilst some former activists believed this would 
best be achieved by finding ways to work within the ruling party, others were 
convinced such an approach effectively represented the tacit acceptance of the 
one-party state and instead advocated continued underground opposition. 
Beyond the removal of Kaunda, there was also little unanimity regarding the 
policies that a ‘UPP’ government would pursue in power. Former UNZA 
students initially supported economic and social policies to the left of Kaunda’s 
moderate African socialism, whilst business-oriented UPP supporters such as 
Valentine Musakanya were consistently opposed to significant state intervention 
in the economy. Kapwepwe, viewed by all his supporters as an advocate of 
principled policies, appears in fact to have moved steadily rightwards; once a 
radical nationalist influenced by Maoism in the 1960s, the political ambiguity of 
his UPP leadership gave way by the end of the decade to the influence of pro-
market thinkers. At the same time, Kapwepwe’s refusal to countenance non-
democratic forms of opposition to the repressive tactics of the one-party state 
seems to have at least weakened, if not fallen away entirely.  
In many respects, such debates and divisions pre-figure the problems that 
beset the MMD as it grappled with the transition from opposition movement to 
ruling political party. The initial disquiet regarding the election of Chiluba as 
MMD leader and Zambian President strengthened rapidly until the breakaway 
of the National Party in 1993. Further divisions occurred in 1996 over Chiluba’s 
use of constitutional manipulation to prevent Kaunda from standing for the 
Presidency, remarkably similar to the latter’s manipulation of the UNIP con-
stitution in 1978. With the defeat of Chiluba’s ‘Third Term’ campaign in 2001, 
former UPP activists played an important role in securing votes for his chosen 
successor, Levy Mwanawasa, in the Copperbelt and Northern Provinces, which 
remain strategic areas for any political party seeking to govern Zambia. Most 
are now disillusioned with the failure of Mwanawasa’s government to deliver 
developmental resources and governmental positions to these areas. In the run-
up to the 2006 elections, former UPP leaders are again aiming to reclaim the 
contested legacy of Kapwepwe, in the hopes that this will gain them political 
power. Some are members of the new National Democratic Front, whilst others 
will mobilise support for Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front, whose new National 
Chairman is former ZCTU Deputy National Chairman Chitalu Sampa; both the 
NDF and the PF are seeking their support primarily in the UPP’s former strong-
holds.110 Others are seeking to build support for new and existing political 
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platforms based on a conscious appeal to the memory of forgotten ‘freedom 
fighters’, an ambiguous term that at times encompasses those who fought 
against colonialism and those who were detained for their opposition to the one-
party state.111 In a radically altered political context, the debates over tactics and 
political ideas that informed the underground opposition of the 1970s are being 
re-enacted in new forms in contemporary Zambian political discourse. 
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Legitimizing powers:  
The political role of the Roman  
Catholic church, 1972-1991 
 
Marja Hinfelaar  
In which year would you place the following quotation: ‘[…] I wish to reaffirm 
Zambia’s commitment to Christianity […] The Party and the government were 
committed to make Zambia a Christian country’? Not in 1991, the year in which 
Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian Nation. In fact, these were the words used 
by Andrew Mutemba, a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), in a speech on behalf of President Kaunda 
in the year 1975.1 
Scholars of recent Zambian politics have not always resisted the lure of the 
simplistic binary between Kaunda’s socialism and Chiluba’s Christianity.2 This 
paper argues instead that a history of Zambia’s First and Second Republics 
cannot be deemed to be complete without a comprehensive description of reli-
gious beliefs and institutions.3 The secular, socialist rhetoric utilized in political 
circles in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s complied with modernist expectations 
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  A. Mutemba, speech delivered on the occasion of Fr. Mung’andu’s installation as 
bishop of Livingstone, National Mirror (NM), Apr. 1975. 
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  Others, like Phiri, create an opposition between Kaunda’s adherence to Eastern reli-
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Elphick and R. Davenport, ‘Introduction’, in: Id., eds, Christianity in South Africa: 
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to the effect that religious institutions and beliefs would slowly retreat with the 
demise of colonialism: ‘Christian doctrine was regarded as irrelevant by those 
who espoused new political ideologies, some based on Marxist Socialism and 
some on a simplified vision of African “authenticity”’.4 Kaunda formulated his 
own philosophy, ‘Humanism’, which, according to Vaughan, was a mixture of 
‘Fabian socialism, nineteenth-century liberalism, Christian morality and ideali-
sation of the communal values of Zambia’s pre-capitalist past’.5 But when, in 
the 1990s, the question was posed of the extent to which humanist ideology had 
actually shaped Zambian society, it was convincingly concluded that ‘the struc-
tural features which […] characterised the politics of the First Republic (1964-
1972), and the “one-party participatory democracy” of the Second Republic, 
had nothing to do with “Humanism” or socialism, except when represented 
rhetorically by the leadership’.6 Indeed, what is most striking about Kaunda’s 
rhetoric is its opportunistic pliability. Attending to the expectations of his own 
constituents, he never ignored their religiosity. 
[Christianity] played a large part in conferring legitimacy on Zambia’s first govern-
ment, and Kaunda clearly used this to this end. He made great play of the fact that 
his father was a pioneer missionary and often referred to his Christian roots. He used 
Christian rhetoric to project an image of compassion, uprightness and integrity, and 
made political capital from his image as a Christian gentleman.7  
Studies of the public role of religion in Zambia have largely concentrated on 
the history of Christianity in the Third Republic, when political expressions of 
religious beliefs became more apparent. But Christianity was firmly embedded 
in Zambian society at the time of Independence, and its mission-educated 
leaders fully understood the importance of the consent and blessings of the 
churches.8  
One important reason why Christianity never left the public sphere after 
Independence was the growing authoritarianism of the Zambian political sys-
tem. As elsewhere in Africa, the ‘outlawing of potential opposition groups and 
organizations, or their incorporation into the government system’, meant ‘it was 
not unusual for Christian churches to be left virtually the only formal organi-
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zation with the capacity to mobilize large sections of the population without 
recourse to government resources or control’.9 In this paper I will study the role 
of the Roman Catholic Church within the context of the Zambian one-party 
state, with special reference to the activities of its two prominent archbishops, 
Elias Mutale and Emmanuel Milingo. I will also show that the development of 
relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the state was shaped by two 
particular episodes: The amendment of the Abortion Act in 1972 and UNIP’s 
attempt at introducing Scientific Socialism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Most church leader eagerly supported the independent state, with the result 
that ‘they were inclined to downplay the Church’s role as the conscience of the 
Nation’.10 Instead, church leaders were bent on forging a new status in society 
for the institution they represented. Except for some minor clashes with local 
UNIP officials, clergy were generally attributed high respect, as could be wit-
nessed during events of national importance, when ‘representatives of both 
realms, spiritual and temporal, would sit side by side in the official celebration, 
always accompanied by a thanksgiving service’.11 
The church’s quest for status was mirrored by UNIP’s desire to involve the 
church in national affairs. This ideological penchant expressed itself in the 
tendency to promote clergy to high public office. As shown by the following 
examples, this was true of both Catholics and Protestants: Rev. Jalabafwa 
Chipeso, of the United Church of Zambia (UCZ), became Lusaka Rural District 
Governor; Rev. Merfyn Temple, also of the UCZ, worked in the Land Resettle-
ment Office, while his colleague, Rev. Mwape, sat on the National Commission 
on One-Party State in 1972; Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo (member of 
Cultural and Social Sub-Committee of the UNIP’s CC and of the Mufulira 
Disaster Fund Committee of 1973); Archbishop Mutale (member of the Rural 
Development Sub-Committee of the UNIP’s CC and of the National Sub-
Commission on the One-Party State in 1972); Fr. C.I. Riordan (member of the 
Electoral Commission in the first one-party elections of 1973); Fr. S. Mwansa 
(District Governor of Kaputa District); Fr. Protea Mwela (MP, Kawambwa). At 
the local level, meanwhile, clergy were encouraged to become members of 
Village Productivity Committees and other UNIP-initiated projects. Having 
control over 610 primary schools and 32 secondary schools, many hospitals and 
clinics, and the capacity to kick-start numerous development projects, it is easy 
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to see why the Catholic Church was regarded by UNIP as an important ‘partner 
in development’. 
Kaunda also engaged a number of clergymen as his personal advisors, not 
the least prominent of whom was the Jesuit, Fr. Patrick Walsh. Other church 
leaders, including religious sisters, were invited to working lunches or suppers 
at State House on a regular basis. Additionally, Kaunda was always represented 
at major church events, such as the installations of bishops or the celebrations of 
jubilees. At a church congress held in the remote Malole mission in 1972 one 
would find such diverse group of guests as Kenneth Kaunda, Paramount Chief 
Chitimukulu and the Apostolic Nuncio, the Vatican’s ambassador. On this 
particular occasion, Kaunda’s speech included words he would repeat many 
times in future: ‘we have allowed the Church and Judiciary to act as a mirror to 
the nation so that the Government and the Party might see what sins they are 
committing’.12 Some years earlier, Rev. Colin Morris, another influential ad-
visor of Kaunda, had already defined the watchdog role of religious leader vis-
à-vis the state: ‘Though we submit ourselves gladly to the authority of our law-
ful rulers, we must remain ever vigilant, to ensure that the State does not over-
step the bounds of its God-given functions […] It is our prophetic task to draw 
this attention to the State to the manner of God’s dealing with us all […]’.13  
It was in this context of close church-state interdependence that two Zam-
bian priests were appointed to the Catholic hierarchy within a short period of 
time. Emmanuel Milingo, ordained in 1958, became Archbishop of Lusaka in 
1969, following a demand to ‘localise’ the church with a view to meeting the 
challenge of becoming a ‘truly Zambian Church’.14 Elias Mutale, ordained in 
1964, was raised to Bishop in Mansa Diocese in 1971, before being appointed 
Archbishop of Kasama Archdiocese in 1973.15  
The fact that they were indigenous bishops enabled them to participate in the 
new political era.16 But while both men occupied similar positions, they held 
divergent views on and towards state authority. Archbishop Mutale’s insistence 
on etiquette shows keen awareness of his newly obtained status. In 1971, for 
instance, he saw fit to remind a regional UNIP official that ‘[…] normally the 
mention of the Archbishop should come immediately after that of the highest 
civil authority in the Province’.17 Despite the fact that Mutale came from a 
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commoner background, he closely associated himself with Bemba royalty. At 
his consecration ceremony as Archbishop, the royal drummers of Chief Makasa 
were summoned, while the White Fathers handed him the relics of Bishop 
‘Moto Moto’ Dupont. Mutale proudly announced himself as the successor of 
‘Moto Moto’, who in 1898 appeared to have briefly succeeded the Bemba 
Chief, Mwamba Chipoya.18 The Bemba chiefs acknowledged his standing and 
on several occasions Mutale was asked to intervene in succession disputes. As a 
prominent religious leader he was invited to major Bemba ceremonies to bless 
the occasion.19 Considering his aspirations, it is not surprising that Mutale felt 
honoured to serve on the One-Party Commission in 1972.  
Archbishop Milingo, on the other hand, strongly associated himself with the 
‘grass-roots’, which, as we will see in the course of the paper, informed his 
opinions. He saw no conflict of interest between his religious position and his 
public role, as ‘he ascribed full responsibility to the national leaders of both 
Church and state to safeguard the fundamental rights of all the people in their 
country individually’.20 His particular behaviour and outspokenness earned him 
animosity from the ruling class, with the exception of President Kaunda. 
Milingo’s standing in society as an Archbishop granted him direct access to 
Kaunda, but their relationship was anything but formal. In 1973, when Milingo 
came under pressure from church authorities because of his healing activities, 
Kaunda invited him to stay with his family at Mfuwe lodge. Kaunda, it 
appeared, strongly believed in Milingo’s healing capacities, which he publicly 
defended until the late 1970s. Until his departure in 1982, Milingo always 
believed Kaunda to be a man of integrity, untainted by the corrupt people 
surrounding him.21  
The explanation for the two bishops’ ability to play a prominent political role 
in Zambia must be sought in the fact that in the African public’s perception, a 
‘religious leader not only commands a degree of secular influence but is also 
perceived of being endowed with power stemming directly from the spirit 
world’.22 These alleged spiritual powers raised high expectations within society. 
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Bishops were construed as the guardians of the nation’s morality and so posi-
tioned as to legitimize, or reject, political processes. This is aptly brought out by 
the response of UNIP’s opponents to Archbishop Mutale’s appointment to the 
National Commission on the One-Party State in 1972. United Progressive Party 
(UPP) detainee John Chisata insisted that: ‘Exergerated [sic] nationalism has 
parted us from our religious traditions. We have also parted with our moral and 
administrative traditions […] [I] trust that Your Grace will not forget to work for 
the good of people as you have always done’.23 Another political prisoner, 
Faustinus Lombe, wrote: ‘The whole country is looking up to you, to defend 
your recommendations from these scrupulous, selfish, desperate political mal-
contents who will stop at nothing even if it means crucifying the masses’.24 
Archbishop Mutale was accused by a group of ‘concerned Catholics’ in a 
number of letters of legitimizing an undemocratic exercise: ‘Is the President 
giving you a duty to which he does not expect you to contribute? In this 
Commission what would one contribute when a decision has been made?’25 And 
more heatedly: ‘you have sanctioned this evils going in UNIP and which will 
continue until God redeems us’.26 Mutale responded to his critiques with a 
religious defence: ‘it is by divine Providence that the Commission was set up to 
save our Nation’.27 However, in a personal letter to Kenneth Kaunda, Mutale 
expressed his concern for the treatment of UPP detainees, explaining that ‘it is 
completely wrong for us Christians to sit and watch a situation where we are 
doubtful of the Government’s attitude in the exercise of its duty of carrying our 
justice […]’.28 
Archbishop Mutale was genuinely convinced of the relevance of the One-
Party Commission and thought his findings would be implemented. Recom-
mendations by the Commission included a limit to the President’s tenure of 
office, a restriction of presidential powers, a review of the one-party state after 
10 years and the lifting of the state of emergency that had been in place since 
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the Lenshina troubles of 1964.29 With the benefit of hindsight, and given that the 
commission’s advices were studiously ignored when the one-party legislation 
was finally formulated and approved by parliament, it is easy to call Archbishop 
Mutale politically naïve.  
An important consequence of the introduction of the one-party state and the 
consequent clampdown on all opposition movements in the country was the 
need for an independent voice. One important reason why the Catholic Church 
could fulfil this task was its ownership of independent media. This autonomy 
gained more urgency as a result of the nationalisation of the daily newspapers, 
which thereafter became the mouthpiece of the government. In 1972, the three 
major church bodies, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), the Chris-
tian Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), 
had launched the monthly newspaper, National Mirror. It is therefore not sur-
prising that Sikota Wina, the then Minister of Information, Broadcasting and 
Tourism, should here emphasized that ‘it was agreed that the Churches’ superior 
network of information and distribution should be put at the disposal at the 
government’.30 
The first public confrontation between the Catholic Church and the govern-
ment came as a result of the enactment of the Termination of Pregnancy Act of 
1972 and serves as an example of how a traditional, moral stand of the Catholic 
Church was translated into an act of subservience to the state. The Catholic 
leaders, who fervently opposed abortion, accused government of hastily rushing 
the act through parliament without showing any willingness to initiate a public 
debate. In their representation, the ZEC stated: ‘we hope that Christians of other 
Churches and indeed all those who treasure the African traditional respect for 
human life will consider [these words of objection] with the seriousness this 
grave problem demands in modern times’.31 The Catholic Women’s League 
complained of a deliberate parliamentary delay in dealing with inheritance and 
succession issues (eventually enacted in 1989) and called the amended abortion 
act the law of balumendo (boys) and apamwamba (elite). Milingo’s frequent 
emotional outbursts on this matter became embarrassing as he confused ‘ante-
natal’ with ‘anti-natal’. He even forced Kaunda to personally visit him at his 
residence to discuss the matter.  
After having received an official representation from the Catholic Church, 
Kaunda consulted the Speaker of Parliament, Robinson Nabulyato. Nabulyato 
stated that the act ‘has nothing to do with any doctor terminating any pregnancy 
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[…] the Bill is based on the already existing ambiguous law which required 
tidying up’ and therefore suggested that the Catholic representation must have 
had a hidden agenda: 
I want, Sir, to state that there could be a political motive behind the representation 
from Catholic Fathers aiming at causing unnecessary confusion just because they 
know we are all Christians [my emphasis]; but in this case, Sir, our duty is to the 
State and the welfare of its inhabitants […] Further, Sir, I am also entitled to suspect 
some alliance with various political factions who might have expressed support to 
out-bursts of Catholic Church leaders on this issue for different motives which con-
verged on what amounts to damaging effects to the State or even to you, personally, 
Sir.32 
Following Nabulyato’s advice, and having ‘carefully considered the repre-
sentations from the Catholic Fathers’, Kaunda signed the Bill in October 1972.33 
At this stage the Catholic Church’s hierarchy reprimanded Milingo for his 
‘undiplomatic approach’.34 Having failed to mobilize the nation against the 
proposed legislative change, the Catholic Church backtracked and began to treat 
the abortion issue as a mere matter of personal conscience. The pastoral letter 
that followed the enactment was directed towards the Catholic community in 
Zambia ‘to remind [them] of the unchanging doctrine of the Catholic Church on 
abortion’.35  
The second confrontation ensued from UNIP’s attempt to introduce Scien-
tific Socialism and resulted in the first large-scale ecumenical cooperation in 
state affairs. In 1976 the churches learnt about the imminent introduction of a 
syllabus for ‘political education’ in primary and secondary schools. It was 
rumoured to include the discussion of ‘the missionaries and the Church as fore-
runners of imperialism and colonialism in Zambia’.36 In fact, with the establish-
ment of UNIP’s Research Bureau in 1974, Dr. Henry Meebelo and others 
planned to introduce political education in schools with a view to instructing 
children in different types of socialism, comparing Ujamaa with Maoism and 
Marxist-Leninism.37 A group of selected teachers was trained at the President 
Citizenship College for this purpose, preparing them to disseminate their know-
ledge at the various teacher-training colleges. The churches complained that 
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religious education was left out of the draft statement on educational reforms.38 
In 1978, UNIP initiated the Union of Working Class, one of whose purposes 
was to acquaint the youth with scientific socialism or, in the words of its leader, 
Njekwa Anamela, ‘to arm the working class youths with revolutionary theory 
founded on the basis of scientific socialism’.39  
UNIP’s flirtation with scientific socialism has yet to receive detailed aca-
demic scrutiny, but it must surely be placed within the context of the strength-
ening of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. 
Given the severe economic decline the country was experiencing, UNIP might 
have been looking for a model that could provide them with a quick remedy. 
Kaunda himself once remarked that ‘scientific socialism might well have 
matched the scientific and technological achievements of capitalism […] look at 
the USSR’s accomplishments in the relatively short period since 1917’.40 Some 
contemporary observers, on the other hand, interpreted the proposed ideological 
shift as being designed merely to serve the imperative of political survival: ‘in 
the absence of practical policies, because of UNIP’s paralysis, it is clearly 
designed (like the less explicit Humanism ethos) as a political cohesive’.41 
In 1979, as a response to these events, the three main church bodies, ZEC 
(which included archbishops Milingo and Mutale), CCZ and EFZ published a 
statement entitled ‘Marxism, Humanism and Christianity: A letter from the 
leaders of the Christian Churches in Zambia to all their members about Scien-
tific Socialism’. The church leaders stated they did not dismiss socialism as 
such, but were forced ‘to reject those forms of socialism which did not respect 
the dignity and religious dimension of man and which, therefore, can never lead 
to real humanism. Scientific Socialism is one of these’.42 One could easily 
accuse the churches of overreacting – as a number of commentators did43 – as it 
was never likely that UNIP would have gone as far as suppressing religious 
expression or become a totalitarian Marxist state. The churches’ strong reaction, 
however, must be viewed as a response to the increasingly repressive nature of 
UNIP’s regime. They were concerned with UNIP’s move from a so-called 
‘participatory democracy’ to a state run by a vanguard party ‘that claims to 
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know what is good for the people and proceed to give it to them whether they 
like it or not’. The churches’ call was therefore meant to protect ‘our present 
liberties’.44 It also coincided with UNIP’s plans to introduce a restrictive Press 
Bill, which was seen as a direct threat to the church media. The frustration of 
church leaders, moreover, was compounded by the fact that they felt sidelined 
by Kaunda, who had abolished his meetings with religious leaders at State 
House. As Rev. John Mambo observed at the time: ‘the church in Zambia has 
long been left because there is no longer a religious advisor to the President 
[…]’.45 Kaunda’s earlier Christian advisors, in fact, had been replaced by Indian 
‘guru’, Dr. M.A. Ranganathan, in 1976. Archbishop Milingo, however, blamed 
Zambians for this development stating that ‘if Christians failed to uplift the 
poor, one could hardly complain if communists came and took their place.46 
Faced with such a powerful lobby, Zambian political leaders put up a strong 
defence, elaborated in a series of articles and debates in national newspapers.47 
When Mainza Chona, the then Prime Minister and a staunch Catholic, was 
asked why Scientific Socialism should be introduced, he replied: ‘This is like 
asking why we should have Christianity in the country. It is the way to 
heaven’.48 He commented that the only difference between Christianity and 
Scientific Socialism was the ‘denial of the existence of God’.49 While accusing 
the church of being used as ‘an instrument for reaction’,50 it was obvious that 
the Party felt threatened by the antagonism this debate had created, and a series 
of meetings ensued. On 18-19 March 1982, a two-day seminar was organised at 
Mulungushi Hall entitled ‘Humanism for religious leaders in Zambia’. Addres-
sing 200 church leaders, President Kaunda insisted that Scientific Socialism was 
not going to replace religious education at primary and secondary schools and 
that the Party had yet to decide whether or not it would follow the ‘Marxist 
ideology’.51 Plainly, UNIP was not prepared fully to alienate the churches; many 
more meetings followed suit.52 During an encounter with the National Council 
of Catholic Women, the director of UNIP’s Research Bureau sought to defend 
the party’s ideological stance by pointing out that the teaching of the syllabus 
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was not presently well coordinated and, as a result, one would find teachers 
denying the existence of God.53 From the early stages, the trade unions stepped 
into the debate and used it as a means to voice their discontent with the 
government. Frederick Chiluba, the prominent leader of the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU), signalled its opposition to Scientific Socialism by 
making it a point of ‘going to church almost every day’.54 As Hayes rightly 
points out, this coalition in extremis between the labour movement and main-
stream churches was to have profound effects over the next decade.55 
Kenneth Kaunda played a large role in appeasing the churches. In a public 
speech in 1980, amidst the Scientific Socialism controversy, he stressed the 
importance of cooperation between the churches and the state, stating that ‘it 
was never true that the missionary offered us the Bible with his left hand while 
he used his right hand to steal freedom and resources from us’.56 He repeatedly 
praised the missionaries, stating that ‘in the missionary days the sight of one 
missionary in the remotest village, was the strongest hope for good health, 
education and an approaching bright future for men and women’ and that 
‘without missionaries we could not have waged the liberation struggle of our 
country’.57 He called the church one of the five special pillars of the nation, 
along with the press, judiciary, the legislature and the executive, and hoped that 
it would remain ‘as unshaken and firmly in position as it was during the 
liberation struggle and through the first and second republics’58 By 1982, and 
despite the party’s earlier commitment to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism at 
university level, Scientific Socialism seemed to have been ‘shelved’.59  
Having won the battle against the introduction of Scientific Socialism, the 
churches continued to assess Zambian public affairs. In 1982 the Catholic 
Church published a pamphlet entitled ‘Christian reflection and talks about 
Justice and its alleged abuses in the Party and Government,’ followed in 1984 
                                               
53
  Notes on address to the National Council of Catholic Women Annual General 
Meeting at Natural Resources Development College, Lusaka, Saturday 14th of 
August 1982, by Mr. K. Nsingo, Director of the Research Bureau and Principal 
Advisor to the Secretary General of UNIP at Freedom House, KAA, R01.00, Church 
and State Controversies. 
54
  Africa Confidential, 12 May 1980. 
55
  Hayes suggests that the reason why trade unions resisted a socialist state was their 
fear of a complete erosion of their bargaining powers, real wage levels and ability to 
protest; Hayes, Religion and politics in Africa, 97. 
56
  Daily Mail, 5 May 1980. 
57
  Daily Mail, 5 May 1980, and NM, 20 Apr.-3 May, 1984. 
58
  Gifford, African Christianity, 194. 
59
  NM, 29 Oct. 1989. The issue briefly raised its head again in 1989, when it was said 
by ZEC and EFZ that UNIP had introduced a political education syllabus at schools 
which included Scientific Socialism  
140 HINFELAAR 
 
by a new pastoral letter on state-church relationships. Co-published by the CCZ 
and EFZ and entitled ‘Christian Liberation, Justice and Development’, the letter 
openly charged that ‘in some instances the State [was] becoming an instrument 
of oppression’.60  
Whilst the debate was raging on between the churches and government, 
Archbishop Milingo had become a thorn in the flesh of the state. As a result of 
his outspokenness, charisma and well-known healing powers, Milingo became 
increasingly popular with Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Ter Haar observes 
that with the death of Simon Kapwepwe in 1980, ‘the mantle of charismatic 
leadership was on Milingo’s shoulders’, as his popular healing sessions of 
personal ills were taken as a critique of those who had created conditions for the 
suffering of the poor. He used the independent church media to declare that ‘the 
nation is facing shameless corruption among some of our public servants […] 
the Zambian people are particularly disturbed by the decline in honesty in some 
of their leaders […] the inordinate desire for personal enrichment by wrong 
means […]’.61 His attacks were not only directed at political leaders, but 
showed his exasperation with Zambia’s ‘effortless’ society: ‘there are no people 
with the guts to pinpoint the corruption and injustice in society. This country has 
no heroes […] but idlers and people who were satisfied with so little’.62 It was 
rumoured that Milingo’s widespread popularity and the challenge it posed to 
political leaders prompted Kaunda not to intervene when the Archbishop was 
controversially recalled to Rome in 1982. This perception was fed by the fact 
that Kaunda distanced himself from the controversy, whilst previously he had 
always lent Milingo his support.63 Milingo’s absence neither lessened his popu-
larity nor weakened the idea that he could be a political rival; rumours persisted 
well into the 1990s that the Archbishop would make a comeback to Zambia and 
enter politics.64  
Archbishop Mutale, on the other hand, remained a UNIP party member and, 
on 11 November 1983, readily accepted the appointment as advisor to the Social 
and Cultural Sub-Committee of the party’s CC to replace Archbishop Milingo.65 
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Mutale was also appointed as the Apostolic Administrator of Lusaka amidst 
protests from the newly established Christian Action Group and the parishi-
oners. The internal strife in the Roman Catholic Church that followed Milingo’s 
recall to Rome was manipulated by the state-owned newspapers, which pub-
lished a series of letters and statements of priests exposing racism within the 
Church. A very bitter exchange followed between Archbishop Mutale and the 
Times of Zambia concerning the authenticity of the letters. The Times of Zambia 
eventually admitted to having published forged letters, but said they were 
merely acting as the ‘conveyor belt’ and defending ‘democratic principles’. In 
the ensuing pastoral statement Mutale spat back at this statement by asking 
‘who has ever seen a conveyor belt that spits venom as it carries its load 
along?’66  
From the mid 1980s, the Archbishop became increasingly outspoken and 
began to have ‘doubts about the veracity of this whole experiment [of the one-
party ideology and participatory democracy]’.67 His anti-UNIP consciousness 
was undoubtedly heightened by the newly introduced Justice and Peace move-
ment.68 Mutale headed the newly introduced Department of Social Education 
and Research at the Catholic Secretariat, which organised seminars nationwide 
in order to ‘animate the response of the church to Scientific Socialism’.69 Justice 
and Peace became an intrinsic part of the Department of Social Education; it 
dealt with ‘the removal of injustices’, including: Nepotism, corruption, misuse 
of funds, grabbing of deceased’s property by relatives, inefficiency, low wages 
and high cost of living.70 The movement’s messages were relayed through 
magazines like Icengelo, a publication of the Franciscan Mission Press, which 
had started out as a quiet, traditional Catholic paper in 1970, but which, from 
1981 onwards, took the Justice and Peace issues aboard. As Fr. Umberto Davoli, 
the former director of Mission Press and editor of Icengelo, explained: ‘the 
needs of the time suggested and requested that as a Christian magazine the 
publication should undertake new and more demanding tasks, seen as an 
essential part of evangelisation and the Christian message of liberation of the 
“total man”’. In the late 1980s, the monthly magazine had a circulation of 
69,000 copies and, as a result, had Frederick Chiluba begging for space.71 Such 
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magazines and newspapers as Icengelo, Workers’ Challenge,72 and the already 
mentioned National Mirror played an important role in articulating opposition 
to UNIP.73 Their idiom became more and more confrontational, as did their 
deeds. The successful action of Icengelo against the forced eviction of the 
people from MacKenzie compound in the Copperbelt was one such example. 
Despite the increasing incidence of intimidation, the churches felt sufficiently 
powerful to continue their attacks.74  
Considering his profile and association with these outspoken publications, it 
is not surprising that Archbishop Mutale’s death in a car crash in Lusaka in 
February 1989 was viewed as suspicious and rumoured to be a plot carried out 
at Kaunda’s instigation.75 In August 1989 Kaunda appeared on national tele-
vision, expressing his suspicion that the Catholic Church was fuelling these 
accusations to undermine his authority. To ease the tension, and also in the 
belief that Kaunda was innocent of the charge, Bishop de Jong, in his capacity 
as ZEC chairperson, refuted Kaunda’s allegations and called the death of Mutale 
‘a tragic accident’.76 Despite this statement, rumours still persist. 
The Daily Mail’s prediction in 1982 that ‘many people would not shed a tear 
if the Party and its Government scrapped religion off the syllabus of our 
schools’ is, with the benefit of hindsight, a serious miscalculation of people’s 
convictions.77 One important reason why the churches successfully challenged 
the government over the introduction of Scientific Socialism was the fact that 
they were able to give expression to the public’s dissatisfaction with UNIP’s 
authoritarianism. The persistent rumours about Kaunda’s role in the removal of 
Milingo and the death of Archbishop Mutale, reminiscent of stories surrounding 
Kapwepwe’s death, prove that in Zambian society religious leaders are more 
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often than not viewed as being in direct competition with the nation’s political 
leaders. Because of this, the government sought explicitly to minimize the 
potential for open confrontation: Practically, by incorporating church leaders in 
government positions and national events; rhetorically, by praising the churches’ 
past and present activities in public speeches. This call for cooperation was not 
left unanswered by Zambian church leaders, partly as a result of personal ambi-
tion and partly because of the expectations of a society by whom the Christian 
churches were viewed as indispensable moral forces. As demonstrated by the 
Scientific Socialism debacle, Kaunda was more attuned to the significance of 
the churches’ public role than many academic observers have been. 
  
7 
Towards a history of the  
Charismatic churches in 
post-colonial Zambia 
 
Austin M. Cheyeka 
Introduction 
Most scholars of new Christian movements suggest that Charismatic Christian-
ity is rapidly becoming a dominant expression of the Christian religious heritage 
in sub-Saharan African countries.1 This article aims to stimulate scholarship on 
the development of the Charismatic movement in Zambia and is organised 
around two particular issues, namely, the reasons that are contributing to the 
growth of Charismatic churches and the moot question of their leaders’ involve-
ment in the political affairs of the country.  
This chapter is based on the assumption that the period from the 1970s to the 
present forms a distinct phase in Zambia’s religious history. The central theme 
of the period is the widespread formation of Charismatic churches or ‘born-
again’ churches, as they are popularly known in Zambia, and the breakdown, to 
some degree, of the Christian and religious unity. My study is designed to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the development of the Charismatic move-
ment in Zambia. Essentially I will be historicising the ‘born-again’ discourse in 
the country.  
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While there is a wealth of scholarly literature on the major mainline or 
classical churches in Zambia,2 there has hardly been a satisfactory historical 
treatment of the Charismatic movement. To be sure, one is able to find some 
scattered data about Charismatic churches in a number of seminal works on 
politics and religion in Zambia from the 1990s. But anyone interested in the 
historical development of these new churches will search the relevant literature 
in vain. The pioneering works of Paul Gifford have become classics on the 
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subject, but concern themselves with ‘Africa’, rather than Zambia in particular.3 
On the other hand, most of the country-specific articles and dissertations that 
have appeared in the last decade or so have adopted a narrow ‘presentist’ 
perspective and taken their cue almost solely from the declaration of Zambia as 
a ‘Christian Nation’ by President Frederick Chiluba in 1991.4 As a result, this 
declaration itself has been taken as the principal reason for the proliferation of 
Charismatic churches in the country. Instead, as Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter 
Haar have recently pointed out, ‘Africa has a long history of dynamic religious 
movements, many of which have had a great impact on government. Insofar as 
commentators have attempted to advance explanations for Africa’s religious 
revival, they have made little allowance for this element of historical depth’.5 
Though this article does not claim to present a comprehensive picture, it does 
attempt to offer a historically informed analysis of the Charismatic movement 
and churches that will indeed enrich the existing data on religion and politics in 
Zambia. 
The Charismatic movement: A new player on the religious scene 
According to the 2000 nation-wide census, Protestants account for about 65 
percent of the Zambian population, followed by Catholics with 22 percent. Thus 
87 percent of the population in 2000 was Christian. It is incontestable that 
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5
  Ellis and ter Haar, Worlds of power, 178. 
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alongside the various denominations in Christianity and the major world faiths, 
specifically Islam, Zambia has witnessed a rapid growth of charismatic Chris-
tianity. Although numerically they are still relatively few, the followers of 
Charismatic churches add to the variety of organised Christian churches, there-
by contributing a vibrant dimension to Zambia’s Christianity.6  
Zambia’s Christianity has been described in terms of the three ‘mother 
bodies’ which are deemed to represent ordinary Christians in public matters of 
the country.7 Sometimes referred to as ‘umbrella bodies’, these are the Zambia 
Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the 
Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ). The Zambia Episcopal Conference 
was officially instituted in 1963 at the Dominican Convent in Lusaka and is the 
main administrative body of all Roman Catholic dioceses. The CCZ was estab-
lished in 1945. It acts as the link between the World Council of Churches and 
the various churches and organisations under its umbrella. The core member 
churches of CCZ are the Reformed Church in Zambia, Anglican Church, 
Salvation Army, Lutheran Church, United Church of Zambia (UCZ) and African 
Methodist Episcopal Church. On 8 April 1964, the Evangelical Fellowship of 
Zambia was formed as a coordinating agency for the numerous Evangelical 
local churches, denominations, missions and para-church organisations which 
were scattered throughout the country.  
The 1980s witnessed a significant growth of Charismatic churches in the 
country, sixteen of which joined the EFZ at the turn of the 21st century.8 On 12 
November 2001, the Independent Churches Organisation of Zambia (ICOZ) 
was officially launched as an umbrella body of Charismatic churches. It is 
presided over by Reverend David Masupa. It is worth pointing out that these 
churches or ministries form a rich variety of Christianity. Speaking on Radio 
Phoenix on 30 November 2001, a representative of ICOZ said that the organi-
sation had between 800 and 1000 registered member churches. Thus another 
umbrella body was instituted to bring together small Charismatic or ‘born-
again’ churches. It is now reasonable to speak of four, and no longer three, 
‘church mother bodies’ in Zambia.  
                                               
6
  Charismatics were counted as Protestants in the 2000 census, which they are indeed, 
but there has not been a specific census to determine the number of Protestants who 
belong to Charismatic churches.  
7
  Gifford, African Christianity, 188. 
8
  According to the 1998 ‘Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Handbook’. 
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The origins and meaning of the Charismatic movement 
The term ‘Charismatic’ derives from the Greek word charis, which means 
supernatural gifts of the spirit – gifts that are most often considered as being 
those listed in 1 Corinthians 12–14 (Love, Wisdom, Knowledge, Faith, Power 
of Healing, Power to perform miracles, Power to proclaim God’s message, 
Ability to tell the difference between gifts that come from the Spirit and those 
that do not, Ability to speak in strange tongues and the Ability to explain what is 
said). So, a Charismatic Christian may be one who has received the baptism of 
the Holy Spirit, evidenced by the ability to speak in tongues (glossolalia, which 
is abnormal utterance under religious emotion), but has chosen to stay within 
his/her own church of mainline denomination, or alternatively has found 
fellowship in non-denominational Charismatic groupings, which may or may 
not transform into full-fledged churches.9 Charismatics who left their denomi-
nations in the formative years, 1960s-1970s, have been referred to as ‘the 
restoration movement’, while those who remained in their denominations have 
generally been known as ‘the renewal movement’. From the 1980s, Charis-
matics have emphasised signs and wonders. Some Charismatics, especially the 
member of the so-called ‘Third Wave’, have come to highlight the role of 
healing and exorcism in a particularly explicit and visible way. These have 
received enthusiastic acceptance, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
but they have also come under critical questioning.10 According to Cor Jonker: 
The stress on personal conversion, on being ‘born-again’, and the idea that sinful 
behaviour is the cause of personal suffering and low social position marks this 
movement as politically conservative in Western terminology, even though they 
stand for changes in life style which are quite radical in the African context.11 
The Charismatic movement can be usefully placed in a world-wide context 
of Christian revivals, such as the 1734 Great Awakening, the Holiness Revival 
of 1859, the 1906 Pentecostal Revival and many others. The Charismatic 
Revival of 1960 in the United States of America was a response to the wave of 
secularisation that characterised the late 1950s and the 1960s. The revival 
                                               
9
  I am here drawing on Samuel Berberian, Two decade of renewal: A study of the 
Charismatic renewal movement in Latin America, 1960 –1990 (Guatemala City, 
1980), 38. 
10
  Veli-Matti Karkkainen, ‘Mission, spirit and eschatology: An outline of a 
Pentecostal-Charismatic theology of mission’, Mission Studies, 15 (1999), 78. 
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  Cor Jonker, ‘The politics of the therapeutic Ngoma: The Zionist Churches in urban 
Zambia’, in: Rijk van Dijk, Ria Reis and Marja Spiereburg, eds, The quest for 
fruition through Ngoma: The political aspects of healing in Southern Africa 
(Oxford, 2000), 127. 
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started as a renewal movement in the large mainline churches of America.12 It is 
especially linked to Rev. Dennis Bennett, pastor of St. Mark’s Episcopal Church 
in Van Nuys, California. The growth of the movement is said to owe much to 
the activities of men like T. L. Osborn and Oral Roberts, and such organisations 
as the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship, founded by Demos Shakarian.13 
Not all Christians, including Charismatics themselves, are familiar with the 
term ‘Charismatic movement’ and its origins. Much confusion exists as to what 
exactly the term referst. Charismatic churches in Zambia call themselves 
‘Pentecostal’. In fact, the only Zambian Charismatic church with the adjective 
‘Charismatic’ is Calvary Charismatic Centre in Lusaka.  
Introduction of the Charismatic movement in Zambia 
How did the Charismatic movement enter Africa is still a matter of debate. 
Matthew Ojo, scholar of the Charismatic movement in Nigeria, believes that the 
movement came to Africa via Nigeria. He explains that the movement surfaced 
in January 1970, when some members of the Christian Union in the country’s 
premier university, the University of Ibadan, proclaimed to their fellow students 
that they had been baptised in the Holy Spirit and were speaking in tongues. 
This, according to Ojo, began a substantial Christian awakening in Africa.14  He 
argues that by the mid-1980s, the growth of the Charismatic movement across 
Africa had been greatly helped by Nigerians as they interacted with other 
Africans in some of the regional and international activities of the Student 
Christian Movement, Christian Union and Scripture Union.15 Ojo also argues 
that although the Charismatic movement drew its initial inspiration from 
external models, it eventually became a vehicle for the expression of indigenous 
spirituality, as shown by its strong emphasis on healing, wealth and power.16 
When exactly did the Charismatic movement emerge in Zambia is not pre-
cisely known. However, it is incontestable that the seed of the movement was 
sown in as early as 1967 in Kitwe, where Billy Graham, an American Pente-
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  See e.g., Klaus Fiedler, The story of the faith missions (Oxford, 1994); David E. 
Harrell, All things are possible (Bloomington, 1975); Richard Quebedeaux, The new 
charismatics II (New York, 1983) and Russell P. Spittler, ed., Perspectives on the 
new Pentecostalism (Grand Rapids, 1976).  
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  H.I. Lerdele, Treasures old and new: Interpretations of ‘Spirit-Baptism’ in the 
Charismatic Renewal Movement (Peabody, 1988), 38. 
14
  Mathew A. Ojo ‘The dynamics of indigenous Charismatic missionary enterprise in 
West Africa’, unpublished paper, 1988, 4. 
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  Ibid., 3. 
16
  Mathew A. Ojo, ‘The contextualisation and significance of the Charismatic move-
ment in independent Nigeria’, Africa, 58 (1988), 175-190.  
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costal Televangelist, staged the ‘7-day Crusade’, which attracted as many as 
28,000 people.17 From that time, Zambian Charismatics adopted practices which 
would characterise the movement in the 1990s. Even a cursory observation 
reveals that the Charismatic movement in Zambia has gone through identifiable 
phases, each of which marked by a specific discourse within the context of an 
unchanged exegesis. The ‘born-again’ followers discern the following phases: 
1960-1970: Jesus is Lord and Saviour. We belong to Jesus. I am a believer. 
1970-1980: Ninsanga18 (I have found Christ). I am saved. I am a child of God.  
  God is my father. 
1980-1990: I am ‘born-again’. I am a child of God. I belong to Jesus. 
1990-2000: I am anointed. I am delivered. I have been blessed. I have been  
  ministered to. I am ‘born-again’. He (Jesus) has released the finances.  
  I have prospered. I am a man of God. I am a child of God.19 
We can point out that between 1960 and 1970, the Scripture Union laid a 
definite foundation for the Charismatic movement in Zambia. This foundation 
was strengthened by Billy Graham's visit in 1967. Starting as a seaside mission 
to children in 1867 in England, the Scripture Union came to Zambia in 1963. 
The Union first arrived and preached on the Copperbelt before spreading to the 
rest of the country. Three leading Charismatic leaders, Rev. Dr. Dan Pule, 
founder of DUNAMIS Ministries, Bishop Joshua Banda, of Northmead Assem-
blies of God, and Pastor Dr. Nevers Mumba, of Victory Bible Church and 
                                               
17
  David Barrett, ed., World Christian encyclopedia: A comparative study of churches 
and religions in the modern world, AD 1900 – 2000 (Nairobi, Oxford and New 
York, 1982), 765. 
18
  This is a word from icibemba, a language widely spoken in Zambia. The word 
literally means ‘I have found’.  
19
  During my research I interviewed several Christians from Charismatic and other 
churches. Most of them, especially the older ones, were able to describe the ‘born-
again’ discourse in the phases I have constructed and presented. Some of my 
informants vividly remembered the 1980s, when Reinhard Bonnke would come to 
Zambia with white T-shirts on which was written ‘I Belong to Jesus.’ To construct 
the above chronology, I have also used personal observations stemming from my 
secondary school days, when the Scripture Union was at its height in Zambia. From 
1976 to 1980 Ninsanga was the vogue in my former school among Scripture Union 
members. These ‘born-again’ went to the extent of ‘isolating’ themselves. They 
dined on separate tables and called one another ‘brother’. One of their number, 
Kamulile Phiri is now the owner of Isakar Love Centre Church. In the 1960s, I was 
told, Zambians were influenced by rock gospel. One song my informers remem-
bered was ‘I am a believer’ by The Monkees. 
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Ministries, are products of the Scripture Union meetings while at Hillcrest Tech-
nical Secondary School. 20 
The period from 1970 to 1980 was a decade of Christian growth in the 
country. By 1980, Zambian Christians constituted 72% of the country’s popula-
tion. It was a much higher percentage than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole, for which the average was 53%.21 A number of Charismatic churches, 
ministries or fellowships were formed during this period. For example, Bread of 
Life Church International traces its beginnings to 21 September 1975, when it 
began to hold services at Emmasdale Primary School. On 25 June 1978 the 
fellowship became a church under the name of Emmasdale Baptist Church, 
Lusaka; it had 28 members. On 13 September 1992 the church changed the 
name to Bread of Life Church International. In 1980, Joseph B. Lilema and 
Gideon Tembo founded Word of Life Church. This was after Lilema left the 
Apostolic Faith Mission on 16 December 1978. On 2 November 1980, Pastor 
Dr Nevers Mumba founded what eventually became known as the Victory Bible 
Church.22  He embarked on what he called ‘Zambia Shall be Saved’ crusades.  
Through the Archbishop of Lusaka, Emmanuel Milingo, the Charismatic 
movement also influenced Roman Catholicism. Many Zambians suggest that 
their society has been subject to a considerable spiritual revival since the early 
or mid-1970s, a phenomenon that they themselves ascribe to – or associate 
closely with – poverty.23 When Archbishop Milingo discovered his charismatic 
gift of healing, his clientele consisted mainly of people, especially women, who 
had become convinced of being possessed by the evil spirits.24 Milingo did not 
start a separate church, but in 1978 initiated a prayer group called ‘Divine Pro-
vidence Community’. Father Mbilima Chonde, who had been a parish priest of 
St. Mary’s parish in Kabwe, later transformed the Divine Providence Commu-
nity (DPC) into a Ministry/church when he left the priesthood. The DPC is still 
active and draws its adherents from both members of Milingo’s original praying 
group and other disaffected Catholics. 
It was during this period that the Charismatic movement began to face 
opposition from established churches, which feared its spread and which began 
presenting themselves as ‘national churches’. The UCZ was in the forefront of a 
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  ‘Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia Handbook’, 8. 
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Zambia (London, 1992), 223.  
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campaign intended to persuade the state to stop registering ‘born-again’ 
churches.25 Generally, the arguments against the Charismatic Christians in this 
decade centred on their claim of baptism in the Holy Spirit, the gift of speaking 
in tongues and their belief in God’s miracles. 
Between 1980 and 1990 the Charismatic movement grew rapidly. The 
founding of new churches and organisations went hand in hand with successive 
open-air evangelising campaigns or crusades. Many Zambians ‘gave their lives 
to Jesus’ at many of these crusades, which were mostly staged by such inter-
national Pentecostal or Charismatic evangelists as Reinhard Bonnke. Bonnke’s 
crusades were dubbed ‘Christ for all Nations’ (CfaN). Zambians played the role 
of organising and publicising the crusades, securing space and permission from 
the police, interpreting, and so on. The best remembered crusades are those held 
by Bonnke at Matero Stadium, Lusaka, from 10 to 25 August 1985. It is worth 
pointing out that it was Bonnke who sponsored Nevers Mumba’s studies at a 
Bible College in Dallas, Texas; Bonnke had been greatly impressed by Mum-
ba’s oratory and interpreting skills.26     
International crusades encouraged local Zambian pastors in the Charismatic 
movement to begin open-air evangelising. They bought public address systems 
or hired the equipment from the Zambia Information Services. But open-air 
evangelising needed livening up, and so gospel music accompanied by guitars, 
drums, pianos and other modern instruments was introduced during crusades 
and, later, ordinary worship. One band, with no prior affiliation to a church, 
ministry or fellowship, transformed itself into a church known as Jesus Army 
Church. It had started out as a gospel band called ‘Singing Evangelical Jesus 
Army’. It was founded by Flemings M’tonga in 1986. M’tonga was a member 
of the Catholic church in Mtendere, Lusaka. In 1981 he had ‘given his life to the 
Lord’ at Libala Secondary School during one of Bonnke’s crusades.27  
From the 1980s, the messages of the Charismatic movement shifted from 
personal evangelism and baptism of the Holy Spirit to miracles, healing, and 
prosperity. To a large extent, these changes reflected socio-economic changes in 
the broader society.28  In the 1980s, food and other basic needs became very 
expensive due to high inflation rates. Inefficiency, corruption and mismanage-
ment of the resources of the country worsened this situation. In this context of 
daily struggles for survival, many people began to construct their lives around 
the discourse of miracles, healing and prosperity. 
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  See Austin M. Cheyeka, ‘The impact of the Charismatic churches on mainline 
churches in Zambia’, Journal of Humanities (Lusaka), forthcoming. 
26
  Gifford, African Christianity, 233. 
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  For a useful parallel, see Mathew A. Ojo, ‘Deeper Life Bible Church of Nigeria’, in 
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The Charismatic movement in Zambia is largely concentrated along the line 
of rail, from Livingstone to Mufulira. Its spread has not been even. The most 
fertile grounds seem to be the heavily urbanised areas, although it is by no 
means a shanty or slum phenomenon, for it is largely patronised by the working 
and middle classes. Pastor Nevers Mumba, no doubt the first recognised nation-
al exponent of the Charismatic movement and the ‘born-again’ consciousness, 
identified the potential of a revival on the Copperbelt and gave impetus to the 
movement there. In the mid 1980s, however, it began to spread to the midlands: 
Kapiri Mposhi, Kabwe, Lusaka and their outlying areas. By 1988 the arguments 
against the Charismatic movement became less centered on their claims in the 
Holy Spirit and more concerned with the question of whether Charismatic 
Christians should leave or stay in their own churches, a discussion which is still 
alive in the UCZ. Those who elected to remain in the Anglican and Roman 
Catholic churches called themselves the ‘Charismatic Renewal Movement’.  
A major development during the last decade of the twentieth century was the 
rise of vast conventions, conferences, and crusades of several days’ duration, 
which were now entirely organised by Zambians themselves. Alongside mass 
conversions went the contestation of the spiritual hegemony of the post-classi-
cal churches; Charismatics now claimed the land and the right to evangelise 
their own people. Whereas for a long time ZNBC television had been domi-
nated by such foreign Pentecostal televangelists as Jimmy Swaggart, Ernest 
Angley, and many more, Zambian Charismatic televangelists rose to the chal-
lenge of evangelising through the electronic media. Some local pastors openly 
expressed the view that Zambians must be evangelised by local Zambian 
pastors. Pastor Mumba argued: 
Zambians, the blacksmiths themselves, must do the evangelisation of Zambia. We 
are not copycats of whites. I know I am dealing with sensitive issues here, but we 
must be original. We must rediscover our identity. If we do not learn to be original 
we shall surrender ourselves to others. Yes! I am rebelling. Yes, Zambia must be 
evangelised by the blacksmiths.29 
On 9 August 1998, Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) – Zambia was offi-
cially launched by President Frederick Chiluba. Although the television network 
is owned by Pentecostals in the United States of America, Rev. Dan Pule of 
DUNAMIS Ministry is the Chairman or Chief Executive Officer of the network 
in Zambia. His televangelising comes through TBN – Zambia as well as ZNBC 
television channels. 
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Reasons for the growth of the Charismatic movement 
Different scholars, depending on their academic disciplines, have advanced 
different explanations for the growth of the Charismatic movement in Africa. 
Fiedler divides the interpretations of the phenomenal growth of the Charismatic 
movement into non-religious interpretations, religious interpretations (his pre-
ferred model) and socio-cultural interpretations.30  In what follows, I am going 
to unpack the salient features of these interpretations, giving my own perception 
of each of them. 
In a nutshell, Gifford’s thesis is that the Charismatic movement is the work 
of Western rightwing, capitalist or neo-colonialist, forces encroaching on an 
unsuspecting Africa.31 To some extent this is true in the Zambian context. It is 
undeniable that the owners of Zambian Charismatic churches are heavily 
influenced by the US fundamentalist televangelists and to a large extent mimic 
them. It is also true that there are some US fundamentalist churches, such as the 
Potters House of T.D. Jakes and Joyce Meyer’s Ministry of Joyce Meyer, that 
have offices in Zambia to facilitate their evangelisation programmes. Converse-
ly, however, hundreds of Charismatic churches have been founded by local 
Zambians without any connection with the US fundamentalists. 
What can be observed in Zambia is that Charismatic crusades, conferences, 
seminars and meetings are sources of great spiritual inspiration for many 
thousands of Christians. They have brought about a spiritual awakening of 
many people and have no doubt challenged the mainline churches to intensify 
their evangelistic and missionary concerns. It is also my observation that the 
names of religious groupings and churches in the Charismatic movement 
suggest the continuing significance of the perennial quest for deeper Christian 
life. Names like Deeper Life Bible Church, Bread of Life Church International, 
New Life Christian Centre, Firm Foundation Centre, Full Gospel Ministry, 
Healing Word Ministries, Christian Faith in Christ Church, True Way Salvation 
Church attest to my observation. As noted by ter Haar, the name of a Church 
reveals much about its original vision.32 And I might add that due to fierce 
competition in the Charismatic fraternity, it is important for a founder to look 
for a most appealing name, such as Reaching Higher Ministries, Christ is the 
Answer Ministries or Last Call Centre. But the most appealing qualification – 
and one that is usually added to the Churches’ names – is undoubtedly ‘Inter-
national’, an adjective that expresses and reinforces the Zambians’ cosmopolitan 
aspirations. 
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  Ter Haar, Halfway to Paradise, 95. 
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Far from being solely the product of outside propaganda, or being instigated 
by alien forces to serve their own game of religious, political and economic 
domination, Charismatic Christianity has found a home in Zambia because it 
fits the African world-view. Ter Haar states: 
Charismatic churches derive specific features from African culture. These include 
the use of prayers and consultations often through visions and prophecy, the follow-
ing of ritual practices often linked with prayer and fasting, the importance of reading 
from the Bible, and the importance of the ritual use of water, such as through bap-
tism by immersion.33 
This is why ter Haar suggests that ‘it is more accurate to refer to it [Charis-
matic movement] as the outcome of a creative process of independent church 
formation which fits with traditional social patterns and is considered by be-
lievers to be the result of the guidance of the Holy Spirit’.34  
Most of the people who become Charismatic Christians used to take for 
granted the central propositions of the belief system of their original classical 
churches. Why do people switch churches and religious alliances is a complex 
issue. There is a feeling that the Charismatic movement is much more prohibit-
ing in many aspects of human behaviour than most mainline churches. Some 
Charismatics also told me that they believe that nobody has infallible, unambi-
guous or privileged access to the divine truth, which comes to all people when 
they open up to the Holy Spirit.35 
On the issue of the socio-cultural aspects of the Charismatic movement, 
notably its urban connotations, Ojo contends: 
The Charismatic organisations are finding ways of giving ultimate meaning to city 
life by transforming the problems of the cities into bases for their sustenance. Thus, 
in the areas of healing and miracles, the Charismatic organisations often promise 
success in any undertaking – in securing employment or accommodation in the 
banishment of fear, among other things. The restlessness accompanying city life and 
the need to find ‘salvation’ out of its tensions invariably swell the congregations at 
the programmes put on by the Charismatic organisations. Moreover, city life offers 
all the vital contrast between good and evil, which the organisations use as 
illustrations to keep their message in focus.36 
Scholars of various ideological backgrounds have advanced sociological, 
economic and political explanations of the new religious phenomena. A frequent 
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paradigm is the deprivation model, which states that when a group in society is 
economically disadvantaged, it turns to a new religious movement.37 Such 
scholars seem to be saying that Charismatic Christianity is growing among the 
poor people of the world.  
In his book The Rise of the Charismatic Movement, Rev. Abamfo O. 
Atienmo postulates that severe economic and political upheaval contributed to 
the rise and growth of the Charismatic movement. Atienmo said that in a society 
which is fast jettisoning all her sense of communal belonging, and in which the 
individual finds himself/herself swamped up by the sophisticated systems and 
structures of a ‘civilised society’, the deep sense of Christian fellowship that is 
found among Charismatics can be a powerful incentive to joining Charismatic 
churches.38 Atienmo’s study was based on Ghana, but his findings can be 
applied to Zambia in a similar fashion.  
Religion and religious movements neither originate nor survive in a social 
vacuum, and economic factors are seldom irrelevant to their emergence and 
subsequent development. The prosperity message – a message that states that 
Jesus came to banish poverty so that if people believe in him He shall bless 
them with riches – has inspired many people. Indeed, Charismatic churches 
have provided a response to the problems of modern urban society in Africa, 
where it is difficult to obtain or complete education, find paid employment and 
pay for health services. Founding a church is not a lucrative business, but it 
does bring the founder an income, which can increase substantially as the 
church and the popularity of the founder grows.  
It is important to point out, as ter Haar does, that throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, Zambians suffered from moral and spiritual degradation. Many people 
felt weighed down by the burdens of life and sought an explanation in the 
metaphysical sphere by attributing their problems to the workings of evil 
spirits.39 The ravages of the Structural Adjustment Programme have further 
contributed to the proliferation of Charismatic churches. Then came the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, which has led some people to become ‘born-again’ as a way 
of protecting themselves from the disease. Many of these new converts are 
attracted by what they deem to be the Charismatic churches’ strict and 
conservative ethic. 
Most of the names of these churches are so designed as to appeal to those in 
distress or afflicted by poverty and AIDS. Here are some examples: My God is 
Able Ministries (founded in 1995), Hope for Africa Ministries (1994), Lusaka 
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Back to God Intercessory Ministries (1994), Jesus Cares Ministries (1996), 
Miracle Family Church (1999), Flames of Hope Ministries (1998), Power of 
Christ Ministries (1991), Better Life Christian Church (1997), Jesus Cares 
Ministries (1996), Come to Jesus Church and Ministries (1995), New Life Bible 
Church (1998), Holy Life Ministries and Church (1996) Jesus is the Way and 
the Truth and the Life Ministry (1997). The list is endless. 
By way of conclusion, we can support Jonker, who argues that ‘various seg-
ments of [a] population may have diverse motives for joining religious move-
ments, depending on social class, the political context of the movement and 
changing social relations in general’.40 No doubt, the coming to power of a 
‘born-again’ president, Frederick Chiluba, also advanced the cause of the 
Charismatic churches. 
The current status of the Charismatic churches  
and their influence on Zambian politics  
In the 1990s, some Charismatic church leaders abandoned their erstwhile apoli-
tical stance and became more involved in Zambian political affairs. In the 
turbulent and dramatic days of late 1989, all churches in Zambia were widely 
seen as having played an important role in the overthrow of UNIP and Kaunda. 
The churches’ stand against political excesses and misuse of power was hailed 
as a significant factor in undermining the credibility of the UNIP regime. The 
actions of the churches were valiant demonstrations of the popular demand for 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression and for liberation from the op-
presssive structures that had for so long characterised Kaunda’s rule. Thus, 
churches received widespread acknowledgement and approbation in the coun-
try.  
When it became clear that Chiluba would be the next President of the 
Republic of Zambia, major Charismatic leaders publicly supported him.41 Many 
of them landed ministerial jobs in the MMD government. For example, Pastor 
Dan Pule, Reverend Peter Chintala, Reverend Stan Kristafor, Reverend Anosh 
Chipawa and Bishop Kaunda Lembalemba. Having supported a Charismatic 
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Christian for the highest office in the land, influential Charismatic leaders, es-
pecially Pastor Nevers Mumba and Bishop Joe Imakando, further persuaded 
President Chiluba to declare Zambia a ‘Christian Nation’. They, with others, 
also persuaded him to create a Ministry of Christian Affairs (later Religious 
Affairs Desk).  
In 1991 Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian Nation, seemingly out of a 
feeling that he was leading the ‘deliverance’ of his people. This was reinforced 
by his conviction that he had a special destiny in Zambia. The Deputy Minister 
for Religious Affairs later acknowledged that ‘the Declaration of Zambia as a 
“Christian Nation” has contributed to the increase in the number of churches’.42 
Overall, most charismatic leaders looked for some kind of benefit from 
Chiluba’s ‘Christian Nation’. The Director of Charity Christian Ministries in 
Luanshya wrote a lengthy letter in the Times of Zambia of 14 January 1995 to 
ask Chiluba to help her financially to begin a television programme to evan-
gelize Zambia. State House became something of a pilgrimage centre for charis-
matic Christians, who, among the other things, came to pray for the President, 
to lay their hands on him and to have fellowship (to pray with him as a fellow 
Charismatic). This necessitated Godfrey Miyanda, Minister without Portfolio, to 
regulate these visits. On 4 January 1992, he wrote a letter to EFZ, ZEC and 
CCZ entitled ‘Circular No. 1: Presidential Appointments for Religious Affairs’; 
point number two read: 
It has become necessary for us to address an issue of great concern to the Christian 
community and the government. The influx of Christians to government house in 
order to pray for the President has raised many questions. Whilst it is of great im-
portance to pray or advise the President, it must be borne in mind that he has 
numerous national responsibilities to attend to. Surely there must be some kind of 
coordination in the visits by Christians to State House to accord respect to the Office 
of the President.  
This circular created tensions with Bishop John Mambo of the Church of 
God, Reformed Church of Zambia’s moderator, Rev. Fauston Sakala, and Pastor 
Sexton Chiluba of Healing Word Ministries. Mambo argued: ‘President Chiluba 
and his fellow leaders should bear in mind that there is no wise person in the 
country who should claim that he defeated the previous UNIP government. It is 
God who came to the rescue of the oppressed Zambian people’.43 Sakala had 
this to say: ‘The new arrangement is not acceptable to us because any church 
leader in this country has the right to see the President directly on any urgent 
problem’.44 Paradoxically, the MMD government was now accused of ‘not 
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cooperating with the church and […] ignoring the power of God. Politicians are 
trying to solve things without turning to God for guidance. If this state of things 
is not changed immediately, it will contradict President Chiluba’s declaration of 
Zambia as a Christian state’.45 
The hope that President Chiluba would co-opt some of the high profile ‘men 
of God’ into his government is worth examining further. Pastors assumed that 
their prayers and supplications had influenced God to act in favour of the MMD 
during the 1991 elections and, as a result, some kind of theocracy was proposed. 
A spokesperson for the David Livingstone Memorial Presbyterian Church of 
Southern Africa said: ‘Zambia can only be a Christian nation if religious leaders 
take up active positions in the running of the country’s affairs. The Presbyterian 
Church wants to show the world that Zambia is for sure a Christian nation and 
in practical terms, the solution is to have church leaders elected to decision 
making bodies of the government’.46 Bishop Mambo endorsed this suggestion, 
and added that it would be useful for the EFZ, CCZ and ZEC to nominate a 
clergy man or woman who would in turn be nominated by the President as 
Member of Parliament. According to Mambo’s plan, this same clergy man or 
woman would serve as the chaplain to the State House and adviser to the 
President.47 Again, from Livingstone came the voice of Pastor Kabila, of 
Livingstone Future Hope Church, who said: ‘government should among other 
things see to it that church leaders are seconded [i.e. nominated] to Parliament 
specially to represent the Church’.48 During the first five years of MMD’s rule, 
1991-1996, Mambo insisted on the idea of having a ‘Christian National Assem-
bly’. To him ‘no pagans’ deserved to be voted for or nominated as Members of 
Parliament. He believed that churches must run the affairs of the country, and he 
made his motives public when he said: ‘although I am not ready for a political 
position, I would not hesitate to go for one when need arose’.49 From among 
other things, Mambo drew inspiration from the British House of Lords, in 
which the Archbishop of Canterbury holds a seat.50 
Why have Charismatic leaders become involved in Zambian politics? Paul 
Gifford argues that ‘their precise forms of political involvement are yet to be-
come clear but the “Muslim threat” seems likely to be the most potent. Funda-
mentalists want political and economic liberalism, and are opposed to commu-
nism (or pseudo philosophies within Africa, such as Zambian Humanism which 
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  National Mirror, 22 June 1992. 
46
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  National Mirror, 18-24 Dec. 1994; 27 Aug.- 2 Sept. 1995. 
50
  Sunday Times of Zambia, 19 Feb. 1995. 
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in their eclecticism draw on the ideas of Communism)’.51  Pastor Nevers 
Mumba was the principal exponent of the ‘Muslim threat’ factor. Nine months 
before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 1991, Pastor Mumba 
preached ‘the conspiracy by some Muslims to take over some African countries 
including Zambia’.52 
As everywhere else in Africa, Zambian Charismatic leaders  
refuse to challenge government authorities on their record, or to engage in any social 
analysis of political structures. Because it diverts attention from their deficiencies, 
governments use this Christianity for the support it offers them in their attempts to 
stay in power.53   
Indeed, there are several examples in Zambia to illustrate that the avowed 
non-political stance of Charismatic churches coincides, on closer inspection, 
with one of unquestioning support for the state, provided there is the freedom to 
evangelise. Pastor Mwewa of Reach Out Bible Ministries, for example, argued 
on the main news on ZNBC television on the evening of 22 November 1996 
that ‘leadership is God given. The church in Zambia is going to recognize a God 
fearing government and, as church, whether Pentecostal or not, we will support 
President Chiluba’.54 In any case, Chiluba himself had made it clear that ‘God 
never creates presidents, but only men and women whom he appoints and 
removes’  
This type of support emerged most clearly in 2001, during the debate and 
popular protests that accompanied Chiluba’s attempt to bend the Zambian con-
stitution with a view to securing the right to run for a third consecutive presi-
dential term.55 Most Charismatic churches came out in favour of Chiluba, while 
mainstream churches actively opposed the unconstitutional move. Pauline 
theology provided the basis for the view that secular power is derivative of 
divine power and that secular rulers are thus representatives of supernatural 
authority. Charismatic churches interpret Romans 13:1-2 in a literal and narrow 
manner. The two verses are words of Paul the Apostle to the Romans: ‘Every-
one must obey the state authorities, because no authority exists without God’s 
permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by God. Whoever 
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  Gifford, ‘Christian fundamentalism’, 204. 
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  For details, see Austin Cheyeka, ‘Challenging the state: Catholic clergymen as poli-
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opposes the existing authority opposes what God has ordered: Anyone who does 
so will bring judgement on himself’. Scholars of scripture argue that Paul was 
aware of the fact that Christians perceived themselves as citizens of another 
world and that they were enjoying a new freedom in Christ. As such, it is 
argued, he knew that these Christians would begin to question civil authority, 
especially because the latter was in the hands of non-Christians. He therefore 
wanted to remove such potential attitude and save Christians from uncalled for 
persecution. Charismatics in Zambia seem not to understand the context of 
Paul’s statement. Thus Pastor Charles Mwape of Ransom Church of God ap-
pealed to all pastors in the country to rally behind the President so that Christian 
morals in the country may be upheld. While the debate was going on, the police 
ensured that there was no ‘illegal’ (against the third term) protest. Chiluba 
remained silent, but promised to comment on the matter once the debate had 
been exhausted. In the meantime, he unleashed the public electronic and print 
media, the police, secret police, party cadres, the police service, Christian 
Charismatic churches, chiefs and some ‘NGOs’ to ensure the triumph of the 
‘third term’ plan.  
On 28 February 2001, ninety-two pastors, deacons and elders from the 
Assemblies of God, New Hope Church, Church of Christ and Church of God 
from the Copperbelt went to give their support for the third term campaign at 
State House. During the ZNBC television news, they told Chiluba they were 
behind his leadership and that he had been chosen and anointed to be president. 
Rev. Nelson Mwelwa of the Assemblies of God said:  
We cannot rule out God’s role in any national debate and as the nation debates the 
third term, we have to support the man who has been anointed as our leader. We are 
undaunted, we are principled and we stand to support you. We identify ourselves 
with you as our President because we know you have been called by God. When 
God calls a person, he calls them by name. So, have no fear because God will 
protect you as He promised.56  
And Pastor Tumelo Kunda of New Hope Church argued: ‘God raised you 
[Chiluba] when the nation was collapsing spiritually and economically. Things 
were now looking up’. A pastor Abel Chomba argued: ‘We do not see the next 
leader yet and therefore we will support you and pray for you because you are 
the one in authority. God has not revealed to us who will be the next President 
after you’. When Chiluba spoke, he condemned the Oasis Forum57 in the fol-
lowing terms: 
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That the Christian Church must be yoked with unbelievers to make decisions is quite 
something. When the Church is meeting with unbelievers to make a decision in the 
name of God, it becomes dangerous. The act of the Declaration drew us into a cove-
nant. I cannot see nothing but peace, progress, development in the country. My Lord 
and my God is my only judge. We should continue to be on our knees to seek the 
will of God. 
Not taking religious motivation at face value, Chishimba Nkosha, a Uni-
versity of Zambia lecturer, responded thus to the pastors’ support of Chiluba’s 
third term: 
He [Chiluba] has failed to win support from the mainstream, long established 
churches. Now he has to count on the backing of some non-discrete, hysterical self-
proclaimed bishops, pastors and reverends of small, kindergarten-like churches, who 
are actually beneficiaries of the Presidential slush funds. When bishops, pastors and 
reverends of mainstream churches spoke the same language the MMD leaders used 
in 1990/91 and sat at the same table with them that was a holy alliance. However, 
now that what the same men and women of God are saying is congruent with what 
LAZ, NGOs, UPND and other opposition parties are espousing, they are accused of 
yoking themselves to unbelievers.58 
After the failure of the third term bid, Reverend Masupa, chairman of ICOZ, 
declared ICOZ’s support for Mr Levy Mwanawasa, of the MMD, as the only 
credible presidential candidate in the 2001 election. Rev. Masupa has since 
remained loyal to the new powers, dismissing arguments for a constituent 
assembly to adopt the next republican constitution and denouncing any church 
that disagrees with the state president.  
Conclusion 
This narrative has showed that the Charismatic churches are growing and that 
this growth in postcolonial Zambia is a consequence of many factors, including 
the poor economic climate and the HIV/AIDS crisis in the country. Into the void 
created by rapid social change and economic decline have flowed Charismatic 
Christianity and its stress on the role of the Holy Spirit in providing such gifts 
as prophecy, healing, prosperity and speaking in tongues. The article has also 
tried to analyse the positioning of charismatic politicians in the public domain. 
One point that has come out of this analysis is that during President Chiluba’s 
tenure of office, some Charismatics became highly politicised and have re-
mained so even after his departure. Their uncritical loyalty to government 
                                               
Co-ordinating Committee, and the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ). For more 
details, see J. Gould, ‘Subsidiary sovereignty and the constitution of political space 
in Zambia’, in this volume. 
58
  The Post, 27 Mar. 2001. 
 TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE CHARISMATIC CHURCHES   163 
 
 
 
authority has led to a break in the traditional church cooperation which always 
took a critical stand in public affairs 
.  
  
8 
Islam in post-colonial Zambia 
 
Felix J. Phiri 
Introduction 
The revival of a more fervent practice of Islam among already existing Muslims 
and the ever-increasing number of indigenous converts to Islam in Zambia can 
be better understood against the background of local Muslim associations. The 
current efflorescence in Islam has not been solely enhanced by the da‘wa acti-
vities (diffusion of Islamic literature, classes for Islamic religious instructions 
both for children and adults, i.e. the madrasas, invitation of non-Muslims to 
enter the fold of Islam, etc.) of the Muslims themselves. If the efforts that the 
Muslims have so far deployed to bring about religious change in favour of Islam 
seem to yield some fruits, it is also because of several other factors within the 
history of Zambia that have facilitated the organization of the Muslims into 
socially and politically viable entities. The organization of the Muslim com-
munity into government-recognised and socially engaged local associations has 
helped Islam to find a voice in the public sphere and encouraged an ever-grow-
ing number of Zambians, most of whom come from a Christian background, to 
overcome their prejudices and to see in Islam a possible religious alternative to 
both Christianity and Traditional Religions. The main objective of this paper is 
to offer an analysis of some of the salient socio-political elements of Zambia’s 
post-colonial history that have favoured the resurgence and the propagation of 
Islam, chiefly through local Muslim associations. 
Long considered to be a religion exclusively for the Indians, charichi wa ci 
Mwenye (the Indian church)1 and the Yao, the initial physiognomy of the Mus-
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lim community has changed remarkably over the past three and half decades 
and has come to include an ever-increasing number of autochthonous converts 
and migrant communities from other countries, especially from West Africa and 
Somalia. Apart from unpublished statistics of the National Census, giving any 
estimate of the Muslim population, and indeed of any other religion in Zambia, 
is bold speculation. As Mahdi desperately pointed out: ‘Any study of religious 
affiliation in Zambia must necessarily start with a blank as far as the number 
and composition of particular adherents are concerned’.2 Nonetheless, it is pos-
sible to establish reasonably satisfactory estimates either with the help of sur-
veys conducted by the Central Statistics Office or through reliable informants. 
Already in the 1960s, Mahmud was advancing the figure of ‘no less’ than 
50,000 Muslims in Zambia.3 According to the National Census of 1980, there 
were 15,000 Sunni Muslims, out of a total population of 5,679,808 in Zambia.4 
At about the same time, Mahdi’s unnamed informal sources pegged their esti-
mates at no more than 30,000, still twice the official findings.5 The National 
Census of 2000 pegged the Muslim population in Zambia at 41,932 out of a 
total population of 9.4 million inhabitants.6 Mr Gool Muhammad Gool, an 
Indian Muslim and a resident of Lusaka since 1938, estimates the number of 
Muslims in Zambia to be around 300,000, a figure equally suggested by Mr 
Gulham Hussein Patel, founder of the Islamic Education Trust of Zambia 
(IETZ), who has also been in Zambia for nearly sixty years.7 My own obser-
vations during fieldwork would seem to lend credit to the figures advanced by 
Mr Gool and Mr Patel. 
The question of Islam in Zambia has been scantly documented. Nonetheless, 
the meagre material that exists does provide an idea of some aspects of the 
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  A.A. Mahdi, ‘Secular education of Muslim children in Zambia’, Journal of the 
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Islamic presence in the country. The occasional paper composed by Stephenson 
(he opened a Boma at Ndola in 1904) offers interesting insights into the pre-
colonial activities and the organization of the Chiwala Muslim community, one 
of the oldest in Zambia.8 Mahdi’s article on secular education of Muslim 
children in Zambia also gives interesting statistical information, as well as 
elaborating on the origins and some characteristics of the Muslim community.9 
Constantin’s study of the Muslim communities of East Africa, in which Zambia 
was accorded a chapter, is also useful.10 Cheyeka’s two articles on the decla-
ration of Zambia as a Christian nation offer an interesting analysis of the 
Islamic background to the question.11 The article of Fakir Mulla, one of the key 
Asian contributors to the expansion of Islam in Lundazi district, in the Eastern 
Province of Zambia, gives interesting information on the Tumbuka.12 The study 
carried out on behalf of the Islamic Council of Zambia by a group of Zambian 
Muslims is a valuable source of information on the process of structural 
organization of Islam in Zambia.13 In May 1989, Clive Dillon-Malone compiled 
a four-page report on Islam in Zambia for the Zambia Episcopal Conference 
(ZEC), tracing its historical development chiefly through the formation of local 
associations. Mention must be made also of the unpublished survey on Islam in 
Eastern Province by Benjamin Phiri.14 
Insofar as particular ethnic groups could be associated with Islam, material 
pertaining to their history provides valuable information for the general recon-
struction of the reality of Islam in Zambia. Thus, for the reconstruction of the 
identity and the history of Muslim coastal traders (Arab and Swahili) who 
traded with the indigenous people as early as the eighteenth century and even-
tually settled in some parts of the country, Livingstone’s Journals and the letters 
of travellers like Gamitto give sparse information out of which emerges an 
instructive account of their historical presence in the country. Similarly, con-
sidering that the early Swahili shared not only in the culture of the Arabs but 
also in their religion, specific studies of Swahili presence in certain parts of 
Zambia, by Langworthy, Wright and Lary, have been another source of valuable 
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information.15 Historical accounts dealing mainly with the northern and eastern 
parts of the country equally give valuable information about the interaction of 
coastal traders, missionaries, and early colonialists with the indigenous popula-
tion. The general history of the Indians of Zambia received full scholarly atten-
tion from the Dotsons.16 Their comprehensive study covered both Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia as well Nyasaland (present day Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Malawi, respectively). Together with Phiri’s studies, these works provide inte-
resting historical material on the Indian community in Zambia.17 Although Mus-
lims among the early Indian settlers were proportionally fewer than the Hindus, 
general accounts of the Indians’ coming to Zambia and their activities in the 
country are a valuable contribution to the reconstruction of the Asian Muslim 
identity. 
The overall paucity of published and unpublished material directly related to 
Islam in Zambia has been largely compensated by information gathered by the 
author during successive periods of fieldwork (January and February 2003; 
January to October 2004; March and April 2005).18 The Registrar of Societies, 
central to the legal recognition of all the associations in the country, proved a 
valuable source of information. The two hundred files on registered Muslim and 
Hindu associations, under one and the same rubric, contain information about 
the evolution of each association over the past years, through annual reports, 
conflict reports, applications for amendments, change of name of associations, 
affiliation with other associations, renewal of the committee members, nation-
alities of the committee members, objectives of the association, copies of their 
constitutions, number of members, etc. About 140 of the files pertain to Muslim 
associations.19 Thanks to respondents identified through resourceful informants 
and media material, ‘snow-ball sampling’ and systematic targeting of potential 
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interviewees (mwalimus, chairpersons of local Muslim associations and other 
knowledgeable personalities within the neighbourhood of any existing mosque) 
was made possible. 
Socio-political elements relevant to understanding  
the development of Islam in post-colonial Zambia 
Different socio-political factors help contextualise the relative expansion of 
Islam during the post-colonial period. The accentuated urbanization and the 
heightened influx of the rural population into towns lead to a sharp diversifi-
cation of the population, not only on the cultural level but also on the religious 
level. The degrading conditions of social services called for the participation of 
non-governmental institutions. Religious organizations were solicited to make 
their contribution to the development of the country. Thus, Islam became a 
visible presence, not only through the construction of mosques, but also, and 
more especially, through its remarkable intervention in the social sector. 
In terms of political and economic relationships with the Muslim world, 
Zambia evolved in the same way as other sub-Saharan countries, which had 
remained attracted to the West in the years following their independence and 
only progressively came to include the Arab and Asian Muslim world in their 
foreign policy. At the time of Zambia’s independence in 1964, most of the Arab 
and Asian countries were hardly two decades old as sovereign modern states. 
But the oil boom of the1970s profoundly transformed the geopolitical landscape 
of the Arab world and its African policy. 
Zambia’s relationship with the Muslim world can be subdivided into two 
main phases, each of which corresponding to the different policies adopted by 
the country’s two first republican presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick 
Chiluba. Kaunda represents the period when Zambia’s relationship with the 
Arab world was growing in strength and intensity.20 In an article written for his 
Sunday Post column, Kaunda re-examined, not without regretting some inci-
dents, his friendship with the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.21 His article 
gave one major insight into Afro-Arab relationships. In a statement made ‘off 
the cuff’ at the 1979 Non-Aligned summit in Cuba, he remonstrated with his 
Arab counterparts about their tendency to deposit ‘petrol-dollars’ in American 
or European banks, instead of reinvesting them in their own countries or in 
Africa. His statement provoked a reaction of disapproval from the Kuwaiti 
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prime minister and earned him a ‘come and see for yourself’ invitation from 
Saddam Hussein, an invitation which marked the beginning of a long friendship 
between the two men. Kaunda’s passing comment was representative of how the 
rich Arab world was perceived by developing countries in Africa, that is, as 
potential donors or investors injudiciously placing their resources in the West.  
Although mainly of a political and economic nature, growing relationships 
between Zambia and the Arab world from ca. 1980 were not without religious 
significance. Some Muslim leaders from oil-rich countries seized on their 
economic influence to contribute to the propagation of Islam in Africa. The 
Jami‘at ad-da‘wa al-islamiyya (association for the call to Islam) and Kulliyat 
ad-da‘wa al-islamiyya (faculty of the call to Islam), founded in 1971 and 1974, 
respectively, in collaboration with Libyan universities offering courses of 
Islamic law, history and Arabic language, have been instrumental to the Libyan 
project of Arabization and Islamization in sub-Saharan Africa.22 Some African 
leaders converted to Islam following their intensified interaction with the 
Arabo-Muslim world. For instance, after six years of being in power, President 
Bongo of Gabon converted to Islam in 1973 and changed his given name, 
Albert Bernard, to Omar. In 1980 the president of Benin, Kérékou, also con-
verted to Islam. 
The second phase in Zambia’s relationship with Muslim countries, which 
coincided with the Chiluba era, was marked by an attitude of caution, if not 
outright rejection, towards such ambivalent contacts as had taken place in the 
past decade or so. Kaunda’s policy of repprochement towards the Muslim world 
was perceived with some misgiving by sectors of the Zambian society marked 
by the growing influence of American-inspired evangelical movements. Good-
win Mwangilwa, director of Multi-media Zambia, a Catholic-Protestant-owned 
Christian communications organization, reacted to Kaunda’s invitation to Chris-
tian churches in Zambia to work together with other faiths like Islam by calling 
upon Christians to accept Muslims with caution.23 Although Islam was not 
explicitly targeted, the abrupt closure of the Iranian embassy in Lusaka and the 
severing of diplomatic relations with Iraq by the Chiluba regime manifestly 
indicated an attempt, on the part of government, to fend off growing Islamic 
influence in Zambia. 
The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation, made on 30 December 1991 
by Chiluba, was not only controversial in its own terms, but had also discon-
                                               
22
  The project received unreserved ideological backing from Gadaffi himself through 
his Third Universal Theory and his Green Book. See H. Mattes, ‘La da’wa Libyenne 
entre le Coran et le Livre Vert’, in R. Otayek (ed.), LeRadicalisme Islamique au Sud 
du Sahara, Da’wa, Arabisation et Critique de l’Occident  (Paris, 1993), 38. 
23
  National Mirror, 17 Nov. – 30 Nov. 1985. 
170  PHIRI 
 
certing implications for religious freedom.24 As to why Chiluba made such a 
declaration, no real substantive explanation has been given, least of all by its 
author. As Banda deplores: ‘Unfortunately, after making the […] declaration at 
an inauspicious ceremony, Chiluba has failed to give form and substance to the 
declaration […], other than forcing it into law when it was included in the Pre-
amble to the 1996 Constitution’.25 
Remarkably, the declaration provoked relatively measured reactions from 
non-Christians, as a whole, and from the Muslim community, in particular.26 
Critics of the declaration, Christians and non-Christians alike, feared it would 
inaugurate an era of religious intolerance and inequality. ‘The declaration of 
Zambia as a “Christian nation” and its inclusion in the Constitution makes 
Christianity a privileged religion, a privilege not enjoyed by other religions such 
as Muslim [sic] Hinduism and African Traditional Religions’.27 Cheyeka’s 
analysis of the events leading to the declaration and of the declaration itself 
suggests that shielding the nation against the growing influence of Islam – an 
influence encouraged by the policies of the previous regime – was among the 
major motivations for it. ‘By 1991 Islam in Zambia had become a real threat to 
the long established religion of Christianity. The Charismatic took the lead in 
expressing the threat of Islam by going as far as asking the state to declare 
Zambia a Christian Nation’.28  
This controversial declaration, which has kept the Zambian society on its 
toes to date, as attested by the debate surrounding the redrafting of the country’s 
constitution in 2005-06, was not free from an element of political instrument-
ality on the part of the newly-elected government, independent of the Muslim 
question. It gave it an ideology around which to rally the majority of the 
                                               
24
  Alick Banda briefly discusses the controversy by highlighting the immediate 
questions provoked by the declaration. Was the declaration Chiluba’s personal faith 
conviction that was being extended to the nation?, he wondered in Church-state 
relations in Zambia: A policy proposal (Berlin, 2003), 99. 
25
  Ibid. 
26
  The Muslim response to the declaration was rather cautious. It was not until Septem-
ber 1998 that the Islamic Council of Zambia officially endorsed the declaration 
(Times of Zambia, 19 Sept. 1998). Sheikh Zumani, Chizola, Rafiq Ahmad alludes to 
Indian Muslim ‘anger’ directed against the declaration: ‘A Third Letter to the Re-
publican President of Zambia from Chinunda Muslim Association’ (Minga Islamic 
Society of Zambia 1994), 2. Most likely such sentiments were privately expressed, 
without them reaching the public media. 
27
  Banda, Church-State Relations in Zambia, 100.  
28
  Cheyeka, ‘The Islamic presence in Zambia’, 133. Cheyeka develops his arguments 
not only by examining the political circumstances surrounding the declaration, but 
also by having recourse to theories that explain the motivation of fundamentalist 
churches to combat through politics what they see as the threat of Islam. 
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Zambians and also strengthened the country’s ties with the United States 
through the proliferating American-inspired evangelical movements. However, 
for want of concrete form and content, the declaration has not thus far ushered 
in the feared discrimination against non-Christian religions in Zambia. In fact, 
the formulation of the declaration in the preamble of the 1996 Constitution 
guarantees religious freedom for all: ‘Declare the Republic a Christian nation 
while upholding the right of every person to enjoy that person’s freedom of 
conscience or religion’.29 The debate continues just the same. 
Under the rule of President Mwanawasa, Zambia’s relationships with Mus-
lim countries continued along much the same lines as those set out by his 
predecessor. Either by way of pre-empting possible dangers of terrorism in 
Zambia or as a way of identifying with the international discourse on the fight 
against terrorism, Mwanawasa time and again vowed zero tolerance against 
perpetrators of religious violence. The administrative glitch that shook Fa’iz al-
Abrar of Chaisa, north of Lusaka, in 2003, immediately sparked off allegations 
of links with al-Qa‘ida.30 By 2003, the Trust had assembled nearly four hundred 
boys aged between four and twenty years, mainly from the Luapula, Northern 
and Eastern provinces, with the aim of offering them free education, mainly 
Islamic.31 ‘A school aide, Musa Mazombora […] was sent to get young boys 
from Northern, Eastern and Luapula provinces so that they could be enrolled at 
the school.’32 Although the children were being taught secular subjects such as 
English, Zambian Languages, Social Studies and Mathematics, there was also a 
great emphasis on Qur’anic studies – a fact ignored by most of the parents who 
had sent their children to this school. After completing their studies, most of the 
pupils returned to their villages, where they became potential agents of Islami-
zation as mwalimus of local mosques. 
When president Mwanawasa responded favourably to the invitation offered 
him by the Makeni Islamic Society Trust (MIST) to attend the ‘id al-fitr of 
February 2003, he made a speech in which he exhorted the Muslim community 
to participate actively in national development. His gesture was widely ac-
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  The Zambian Constitutional Amendment Act of May 28, 1996, § 5. 
30
  Following allegations of abuse of the children, the school was raided by government 
officials and accused of being a potential breeding ground for future terrorists. As a 
result, stricter control was imposed on all the other Muslim boarding schools in the 
country. Although the maltreatment of the children could be attested to by some 
people who worked for the school, no evidence of connection with any terrorist 
network was found. 
31
 Times of Zambia, These figures were revealed during the raids on the Chaisa and 
Nachiteta Centres. The Makeni Centre, which was not directly involved in the 
scandal, had about the same number of boys as Nachiteta.  
32
  Ibid. 
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claimed by the Muslim community as a sign of official recognition and appre-
ciation of its contribution to the country’s development. Although the president 
unwarily invited the Muslims to be politically involved in the current affairs of 
the country during his visit in Makeni, the Muslim community has thus far 
judiciously refrained from attracting unnecessary political attention and has 
privileged social engagement over direct political involvement. An attempt to 
form and register an Islamic political party was rejected by the Chiluba govern-
ment in the early-1990s.33 In fact, the attempt to form a political party was 
initially attributed to Muslim youth in general.34 Upon realizing that the move 
was actually spearheaded by a Zambian who had converted to Shia Islam, Iran 
became suspected of interfering with the nation’s political affairs. 
The gateways of Islam into Zambia and its development 
in the post-colonial period 
Since the 1970s, a socially engaged Muslim community, rendered more conspi-
cuous by the construction of mosques, schools (religious and secular), orphan-
ages, Islamic development projects and the propagation of Islamic literature, has 
emerged in Zambia, indicating both the resurgence of pre-existing Muslim com-
munities and its expansion through new converts. Muslim traders from Mpoane 
(Swahili: Pwani – coast) and their indigenous allies (Yao) had penetrated the 
heartlands of south-central Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century.35 
Their activities have left traces in the accounts of early missionaries, explorers 
and colonialists, who had encountered some of them in the northern and western 
parts of Zambia. The same coastal traders are known to have extended their 
sphere of influence to present-day Zimbabwe, Congo D.R. and Angola.36 Their 
presence in Zambia has been prolonged until today by remnant communities of 
their earlier settlements in places like Chiwala (17 km east of Ndola), Kabuta 
and Nsumbu (60 km and 100 km from Mporokoso, respectively) and Karonga 
(50 km west of Petauke), each of which has become a conglomerate of small 
villages counting approximately seventy families each on average. Although 
coastal traders easily intermarried with indigenous women right from the 
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  The founder of the party was Mr. Abdulaziz, born Jacob Mulenga Khosa, in chief 
Nkula’s area of Chinsali, to a Jehovah’s Witness father and a Catholic mother. 
Abdulaziz, who had converted to Islam in 1981, was also the director of an 
ephemeral Islamic Research Centre in Mufulira. Times of Zambia, 9 May 1993, 5 
June 1993. 
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  Cheyeka, ‘The Islamic presence’, 134. 
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  Insoll suggests possible earlier dates for the contact of coastal traders with the 
interior of southern Africa, supported by archaeological facts; T. Insoll, The archae-
ology of Islam in sub-saharan Africa. (Cambridge and New York, 2003), 263. 
36
 Ibid. 
  ISLAM IN POST-COLONIAL ZAMBIA 173 
 
beginning, their communities have significantly preserved their religious and 
cultural identity. 
This first wave of Muslim settlers in Zambia was succeeded by the arrival of 
Asians, mainly Indians from the western part of the sub-continent, at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century.37 The coming of the Asians to central and 
southern Africa was directly related to the European colonial expansion in 
Africa. The British colonial experience in India and the effects of capitalism in 
the colonies encouraged the enlistment of Indians either as civil servants or as 
indentured plantation labourers, especially in South Africa.38 More Asians fol-
lowed in the footsteps of these early settlers and contributed to the formation of 
trading communities that have continued to flourish and to play a dominant role 
in the economy of the region to date.39  
Chipata and Livingstone, the two colonial administrative headquarters prior 
to the unification of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia in 1911, were 
the main points of entry for early Asian settlers, who comprised both Muslims 
and Hindus. Progressively, the distinction between Muslims and Hindus became 
polarized between the two towns, with Asian Muslims dominating the whole of 
the Eastern Province, while their Hindu counterparts dominated Southern 
Province and enjoyed a comfortable majority in the towns along the line of rail 
and in the Copperbelt. This settlement pattern was motivated by cultural and 
religious affinity. The Asians became more numerous and their influence more 
profound than that of earlier Muslim coastal traders, due to their close 
association with the European colonial powers and the marginalization of 
coastal influences after the abolition of the slave-trade.  
With the advent of the Europeans and the Asians, the Yao, as most other 
autochthonous ethnic groups, became a source of cheap labour for the mining 
and agricultural industry, as well as for the Asians (as domestic servants or as 
assistant shopkeepers). The Yao of Mozambique and southern Malawi had 
converted en masse to Islam towards the end of the nineteenth century and had 
served as middlemen and porters for the coastal traders.40 They did not found 
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  Dotsons, The Indian minority of Zambia. E.C. Mandivenga, ‘Islam in Zimbabwe: A 
study of religious developments from the 16th to the 20th century’, PhD thesis, 
University of Aberdeen, 1986; Mulla, ‘Islamization of Africa’. 
38
  E. Moosa, ‘Worlds “apart”: Tablīghī Jamā‘at in South Africa under apartheid, 1963-
1993’, in M.K. Masud, ed., Travellers in faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama‘at as a 
transnational Islamic movement for faith renewal (Leiden, 2000), 207. 
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  B. J.Phiri, ‘Zambians of Indian Origin.’  
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  E.A. Alpers, ‘Towards a history of the expansion of Islam in Africa’, in T.O. Ranger 
and I.N. Kimambo (eds.), The historical study of African religion (London, 1972), 
182; G. Shepperson, ‘The Jumbe of Nkhota Kota and some aspects of the history of 
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174  PHIRI 
 
permanent communities in Zambia until the colonial era. Their identification 
with Islam, and the practice of traditions related to Islam such as jando (male 
circumcision) and the use of religious terminologies (swalat for salat, twalika 
for tariqa), survived long years of isolation.41 
Within the past three and half decades communities of indigenous converts 
have emerged partly as a result of the da‘wa efforts of the pre-existing Muslim 
communities and partly because of other da‘wa movements from abroad, such 
as the Tablighi Jama‘at, and other brands of Islam such as the Ahmadiyya and 
the Shia. Muslim migrants from West Africa usually identify themselves with 
particular mosques that they frequent for religious purposes as much as for 
business networking. In the eighties migrant communities of West Africans – 
mainly Senegalese and Malians – and Somalis were chiefly concentrated on the 
Copperbelt. Following the collapse of the Copperbelt’s economic strength in the 
1990s and the closure of some mines, some of them moved to Lusaka, where 
they frequented mainly the Kuomboka Mosque, near Chawama township. 
Up until twenty years ago, Islam was almost an unknown religious pheno-
menon in the Western and North-Western Provinces. In accord with the colonial 
government, Lozi chiefs forbade the settlement of Asian traders on their land. 
Up to today, in spite of the economic growth resulting from the relative political 
stability of Angola and the proximity of Namibia and Botswana, no Asians have 
directly ventured to expand their business into the Western Province. Islam has 
been slow to penetrate the North-Western and Luapula Provinces, chiefly be-
cause the two regions have had little contact with major agents of Islamization, 
the Yao and the Asians. Apart from the ancient Muslim communities of Kabuta 
and Nsumbu, in the area between Mporokoso and Mpulungu, and the constantly 
changing communities of the Somali transporters along the Great-North Road, 
the Northern Province has equally come to know an upsurge in Islamic practice 
only within the past two decades.42 The current influx of refugees from Congo 
D.R. has brought with it Muslims refugees, some of whom are to be found in 
the Munkonge refugee camp, 60km south-west of Mporokoso, and other tempo-
rary refugee settlements around Kaputa. The fishing industry and the cross-
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  Insoll, The archaeology of Islam, 394. A. Thorold, ‘Metamorphoses of the Yao 
Muslims’, in L. Brenner (ed.), Muslim identity and social change in sub-saharan 
Africa (London, 1993), 83. 
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  The Great North Road (also known as Hell Run in the 1970s because of its bad 
state) was the main artery for the transportation of imported goods before the 
construction of the Tanzania Zambia Mafuta oil pipeline (TAZAMA) in 1968 and 
the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) in 1975. Remarkably, a lot of 
Somalis were employed as drivers for the transportation of crude oil from Dar-es-
Salaam to Ndola. Up to date haulage has retained its significance as the major 
employment generating activity among the Somalis of Zambia. 
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border business in Mpulungu, on the south-eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika, 
have regularly attracted businessmen from eastern Congo and southwestern 
Tanzania as well as a few Somalis and Sudanese involved in retailing business. 
It is not unusual to hear Swahili spoken in the streets of Mpulungu. 
The Southern and the Central Provinces have had a significant Muslim 
presence boosted mainly by the Yao.43 Choma, Monze and Mazabuka comprise 
about three quarters of the Muslims in the Southern Province. Most of them 
have been self-employed tailors or traders, while others worked on commercial 
farms or were engaged in fishing activities along the Kafue River and in 
Namwala district. With the growth of the towns, they have become more 
concentrated in townships, known locally as ‘compounds’. A number of retirees 
from the mine towns of the Copperbelt later joined these communities, by 
ethnic affinity. The Asian factor, though not as important as in Lusaka and the 
Eastern Province, has also made a substantial contribution to the development 
of Islam in these regions. 
Although Sunni Islam accounts for nearly 98% percent of the total Muslim 
population in Zambia, the Ahmadiyya and the Shi‘a Muslim communities, have 
also succeeded in introducing their forms of Islam into the country. The 
Ahmadiyya community was introduced into the country in the late sixties 
through Pakistani expatriates. Until the end of the last century, the constantly 
changing small community, residing mainly in Lusaka, did very little to 
propagate Islam among the indigenous people. The daring character of a 
missionary-in-charge sent to Zambia in 2000 saw the foundation of 9 new 
Ahmadiyya mosques in Petauke district, a Sunni dominated area, in less than 
two years.44 All the activities are locally organized through the Ahmadiyya 
Muslim Mission in Zambia whose leader is directly answerable to the 
Ahmadiyya headquarters in London. Shi‘a Islam, like the Ahmadiyya, was also 
introduced into the country through immigrant families, chiefly from Iran. 
Before its closure in 1992, the Iranian embassy indirectly sustained the religious 
activities of the Shi‘a community through the Islamic Centre of Zambia, the 
only Shi‘a association in the country which was also seen as the cultural wing 
of the embassy. The Shi‘a community has managed to gain a few followers 
among indigenous people mainly through such activities as ritual prayers, 
thematic discussions, library services, etc., organised at its centre opposite the 
University of Zambia. 
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 The term missionary, employed by the ahmadis themselves, designates a person in 
charge of a specific geographical territory. The Ahmadiyya is an overtly missionary 
oriented community with an elaborate hierarchical organization. 
176  PHIRI 
 
The earlier Muslim communities founded by the coastal traders, the Asians 
and the African migrant communities were only incidentally interested in the 
communal practice of Islam, let alone in its propagation among the indigenous 
people. Various factors account for the transformation of Islam, a faith commu-
nity that was on the verge of becoming religiously dormant, into an active 
vector of remarkable social and religious change in post-colonial Zambia. One 
of the most important factors in the expansion of Islam in Zambia has been the 
proliferation of local Muslim associations. Since the 1970s, around 150 asso-
ciations have been created and registered with the Registrar of Societies to 
spearhead the organization of various activities within the Muslim community.45 
Although the organization of the community into associations run by chairmen, 
secretaries and treasurers, often with little formal religious qualification, does 
not reflect traditional Islamic religious leadership, it has proved extremely 
efficacious in conferring formal political recognition to the activities of the 
Muslim communities and, by the same token, has largely facilitated the prac-
tical organization of religious leadership.46 Thanks to this state-regulated form 
of organization, the Muslims have been able to train and support the work of the 
imams, officially apply for land and build mosques, schools, and run projects 
for orphans. In the same way, they have also been able to apply for monetary 
foreign aid and to give a concrete Muslim response to social and moral prob-
lems 
But if Muslim associations have been an important agent of Islamization, 
their existence itself is closely related to the dire economic condition of Zambia 
throughout much of its post-colonial history. Overwhelmed by ever-increasing 
economic challenges, successive Zambian governments have appealed to faith 
communities to make their contribution to the country’s development, mainly in 
the health, education and social sectors. As all other faith communities, the 
Muslims’ response to socio-economic needs has seen the construction of rela-
tively high standard private schools, such as LICEF (Lusaka Islamic Cultural 
and Education Fundation), Makeni and Dar ul-‘Ulumu, in Lusaka, IWCTZ 
(Islamic Welfare Centre Trust Zambia), in Lundazi, Chingololo, in Chipata, and 
Anusa, in Petauke. The MIST’s investment in the health sector through its 
private clinic in Makeni has had a great impact, especially among the poor 
families from the neighbouring townships of Kanyama, John Leing and 
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  Only one existed before then, the Chipata Muslim Association, founded in 1948. In 
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other faith communities in the country – Catholics, Protestants, Evangelicals, Inde-
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Chawama that cannot afford general costs exacted by other private clinics. Dar 
er-Rahman (House of Mercy), one of the success stories of the LMWT (Lusaka 
Muslim Women Trust), is a project that was launched in 2001 with the idea of 
providing home-based-care to old people in the various townships of Lusaka. 
The following year, doors were opened to orphans and vulnerable children. 
Although the majority of the children are Muslims, the orphanage is also open 
to non-Muslim orphaned children. ZICEDA (Zambia Islamic Child Care Edu-
cation and Da‛wa Association) runs a similar home-based-care program for the 
vulnerable, especially those affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Besides 
running an orphanage for boys in Chipata township, AMA (Africa Muslim 
Agency), a Kuwait-based Islamic NGO, supports development projects mainly 
through the sinking of boreholes. Such projects have rendered visible the 
intervention of the Muslim community in socio-economic matters and have 
indirectly attracted new converts. 
But the exacerbating living conditions and widespread poverty levels both in 
the urban and rural areas have impacted on the Zambians’ religious choices in 
more direct ways, too. The legitimate religious and pious practice of zakat and 
sadaqa has often been tainted by its ambiguous application in certain circum-
stances and its misinterpretation on the side of the beneficiaries and the non-
Muslim faith communities. Being one of the most affluent communities, Asian 
Muslims easily find themselves with material resources coming from the man-
datory zakat contributions made by the local community, as well as by Muslims 
abroad, for the benefit of the needy Muslims (zakat) or any needy person 
regardless of their religion (sadaqa). When needy indigenous Muslim are 
offered assistance of any kind by their Asian coreligionists, some non-Muslims 
who would happily welcome such an assistance feel segregated against and may 
eventually enter the fold of Islam with the hope of benefiting from such genero-
sities. Such a practice contributed substantially to the exceptional success of 
Islam in rural Lundazi and Petauke districts. 
Although nearly all contemporary Muslim associations are male-dominated 
Muslim women have also tried to forge their own identity through collective 
activities. In 2004 there was only one association that had both male and female 
membership at the executive level, the ZICEDA, and only one formally 
registered association that was exclusively feminine in membership, the 
LMWT. Women’s efforts to participate, on a higher level, in male dominated 
associations often meet with discouragement and have been at times branded 
un-Islamic. But, as remarked by Rahman, ‘a woman may engage in her normal 
activities inside or outside the house as required by her circumstances in the 
Muslim society, provided she observes the hijab commandment and does not 
freely mix and intermingle with other people except when it is necessitated by 
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circumstances or by the requirements of her work.’47 Thus, more and more 
women have come out to create space for themselves so as to contribute not 
only to the promotion of Islam but also to the development of society at large, 
be it among themselves (LMWT) or in collaboration with men (ZICEDA). In 
general, women residing in a particular circumscription covered by one or the 
other local Muslim association would be considered de facto members of that 
association. But, since most of the collective activities organized by such asso-
ciations are often male-centred, female membership, though taken for granted, 
is rarely given due consideration. Thus, in Lusaka, women from neighbouring 
townships would regularly meet among themselves on a rotating basis 
irrespective of the association they are supposed to belong to. The majority of 
the women participate actively in regular activities, such as Islamic days and 
women’s madrasa, without necessarily being affiliated to the association 
organizing such activities.48 The women madrasas, held twice a week in the 
mosque, have the same significance as the nadwāt in Clark’s study of the Islah 
Charitable Society in Yemen, where, she notes, ‘[nadwāt] play an important role 
in the creation of networks of trust and solidarity and, potentially, an Islamist 
worldview, because they are held on a regular, often weekly, basis and many of 
them bring together a greater number of different social networks’.49 
To stress the role of Muslim associations and, more in general, of socio-
economic factors in the propagation of Islam in post-colonial Zambia is not akin 
to downplaying the religious appeal that Islam has genuinely exerted on the new 
converts. Undeniably, spiritual motivations have played a significant role in the 
conversion of Zambians to Islam. Previous affiliations to other faith commu-
nities underline the awareness of spiritual quests probably not fully addressed in 
the other religions. Successive religious affiliations cannot be reduced solely to 
material motivations. In fact, in some cases, overt material enticement may 
provoke derision and scorn. The material lure as an initial motivation for con-
version has often been purified and has given way to long-term spiritual aspira-
tions and religious convictions. After all, even the most spiritually motivated 
conversion needs a concrete material context within which to thrive.  
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Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004), 132. 
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External influence on the development of Islam in Zambia 
The lead taken by Muslim associations in organizing the Muslim community of 
Zambia has to be evaluated against the background of Islamic networks outside 
the country, such as the Tablighi Jama‘at, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, the 
Africa Muslim Agency (AMA), Iran (through a network of Islamic university 
graduates, particularly from Razavi University) and Islamic universities in Arab 
and Asian countries, which have helped to give a more global orientation to 
local Islam. Muslim networks outside the country have been able to exert 
influence on the development of Islam in Zambia through close collaboration 
with local associations and the endowment of spiritual and material resources to 
local Muslims. In spite of their modest character, projects and modes of 
existence adopted by the emerging Zambian Muslim communities largely share 
in the pre-occupations and aspirations of their coreligionists in other parts of the 
world. 
The Tablīghī Jamā‘at 
A practice within Sunni Islam inspired by the Deobandi school of thought that 
invites Muslims to take an active part in Islamic propagation through a Sufi 
inspired method, the Tablīghī Jamā‘at (TJ) has played an important role in the 
re-awakening of a particular form of religious piety meant to be the authentic 
basis of an Islamic society.50 ‘The immediate concern of [TJ] is not the capture 
of state power and the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather, the moral 
reform of individuals, often described as making Muslims true Muslims’.51 In 
the words of Simons: ‘[TJ is] a missionary organization that focuses (almost) 
entirely on reshaping of individual lives, on cultivating personal piety and right 
conduct’.52 Its transnational missionary zeal has brought its members into 
contact with the most remote corners of the world, where it has made a re-
markable impact on the local practice of Islam.53 
The da‘wa enterprise of TJ has seen the feet of its members literally tread the 
soils of different parts of Zambia. The benefit of their contact with the local 
communities has been more spiritual than material. Although local Muslim 
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  See the book compiled by S.A. Kayum, The Jamaat Tableegh and the deobandis: A 
critical analysis of their beliefs, books and dawah (Ahya Multi-Media, 2001). This 
can be consulted on http://www.ahya.org.tjonline/index/html (accessed on 1 Sept. 
2006). 
51
  Y. Sikand, The origins and development of the Tablighi Jama`at (1920-2000): A 
cross-country comparative study (Hyderabad, 2002), 2. 
52
  T.W. Simons, Islam in a globalizing world (Stanford, 2003), 57.  
53
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associations hold the key to understanding the current revival of Islam in 
Zambia and its propagation, TJ has had the merit of enhancing the religious 
enthusiasm that has seen the re-emergence of Islamic religious practice in 
Zambia. Certainly, TJ-inspired religious practices such as ziyāra (Muslims 
visiting Muslims), ta‘līm (teaching one another matters of religion at the 
mosque and in homes) and jamā‘at (going away from home for a given number 
of days in a group, practicing and propagating Islam) have given a solid 
spiritual content to the day-to-day religious practice of the local Muslim 
communities, in addition to the other regular Islamic practices.54  
The role played by the Asians, particularly Indians, in the formal organi-
zation and material support of the emerging Muslim community in Zambia has 
had much to do with the success of the type of Islamic practice promulgated by 
TJ. As noted by Moosa concerning the influence of TJ in South Africa: ‘The 
common group identity and ethnicity which a section of the converts to [TJ] 
share with the geographical roots of the movement, namely India, provide a 
natural religious “home” in a “symbolic” diaspora’.55 No wonder, then, that TJ 
has elected Burma Mosque in Lusaka as its headquarters in Zambia. Vigil is 
held at Burma Mosque on Thursdays and it is from here that groups are 
dispatched for jamā‘at within the country.56 
TJ’s influence on the local Muslims does not limit itself to the changes it has 
helped to bring about within the local Muslim community; it has also rendered 
it possible for autochthonous Muslims to identify with Muslims beyond their 
borders and to have a sense of belonging to the transnational umma. Unfortu-
nately, due to lack of material means, the desire to travel far and wide for the 
sake of religion – like the need to go on pilgrimage to Mecca – remains a dream 
for the majority of poor Zambian Muslims. Nonetheless, the visiting coreligi-
onists bring with them enticing stories of how Islam is practiced in their part of 
the world or in the regions they have visited. 
The Africa Muslim Agency 
The Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) is a Kuwait-based non-governmental orga-
nization that has been operational in forty African countries since its foundation 
in 1981. The main objective underlying its foundation was the strengthening of 
cultural and human relationships between African countries and Arab states, 
mainly in the domain of social and economic development. Its major area of 
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  According to Moosa, followers of TJ ‘experience a new kind of religiosity in 
Tablīghī work’; ibid., 212. 
55
  Ibid., 210. 
56
  Ishmail Nadat to author, 12 Apr. 2005. Ismail was once chairman of the Lusaka 
Muslim Society and was personally an adept of TJ. 
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operation is the building and running of schools and health centres, especially in 
rural areas. It has also been involved with providing potable water through the 
digging and sinking of boreholes. AMA has also consecrated a lot of its re-
sources to the building and running of orphanages, professional and vocational 
training centres and food relief projects in times of famine.57 
In line with its declared objectives of 2004, the major recent realization of 
AMA in Zambia has been the orphanage in Chipata compound, sheltering 
around 50 male orphans, 88 others being sponsored whilst living with relatives 
or adopted families. The orphanage, situated within the same compound as the 
Tauba Masjid served both as residence as well as a school for the orphans. The 
Agency affirmed having sponsored 4 Zambian students to Kuwait for studies, 
presumably Islamic. In order to lessen the costs of running the orphanage and to 
raise funds for other projects, the agency had a farm project in Makeni, about 
15km farther beyond the head office. The farm specialized mainly in poultry. 
The project to put up a clinic within the farm had not taken off, whilst the 
proposed community school was modestly making its way forward. In 2004 
there was only one teacher teaching 25 pupils in the first four primary school 
grades. Another clinic was envisaged to be set up in Chipata compound, in the 
same area where the orphanage was, but due to shortage of personnel, this 
seemed to be taking longer than foreseen. AMA also organized a vocational 
training centre for women within the same locality. 
The Agency has consecrated a major part of its resources to the supply of 
potable water. Up to 150 wells had been dug both in towns and in the rural areas 
to alleviate the problem of water supply. In times of food crisis, as was the case 
in 2002-2003, when many parts of the country were stricken by drought, AMA 
distributed rice, to the benefit of 10,850 individuals in the Eastern Province. The 
general official scope of AMA Zambia Office, was inscribed in the statement it 
made about its future projects: ‘AMA has plans to expand the area of its projects 
and programs to cover all the regions of the country. It also looks forward to 
increase its cooperation with government agencies and NGOs in Zambia for 
better performance and fair distribution’.58 
AMA built more mosques throughout the country than any other local 
Muslim association. In Chipata district alone, AMA built about a third of eleven 
existing mosques and yet there was no official acknowledgement, neither in the 
general outline of its objectives nor in its report of 2004, of this remarkable 
realization. This makes it difficult to gauge AMA’s religious contribution to the 
propagation of Islam in Zambia, not least because the Kuwaitis limit themselves 
                                               
57
  See profile of AMA in http://www.friendsofgovi.org.uk/links.html (accessed on 8 
Feb. 2005). 
58
  Report of AMA programs in Zambia, 2003, 2. 
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to supplying the funds without directly getting involved in fieldwork. The 
projects are usually run by Sudanese or North Africans. Nonetheless, in the 
minds of local people, these realizations are not attributed to the NGO aspect of 
the AMA, but are hailed as Arab Muslim projects and have therefore played an 
important role not only in building places of worship but also in providing a 
concrete demonstration of Islamic social engagement. Some of the Islamic 
literature circulated among the potential converts originated from Kuwait or was 
published by AMA national offices in the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe 
and Malawi. 
AMA’s direct support of the needs of the local Muslim community through 
the construction of mosques and propagation of Islamic literature has created an 
international link between Zambian Muslims and the Arab world. The young 
Zambians who benefited from the scholarships offered by the AMA to study in 
Kuwait were exposed to an Arab type of Islam, somewhat different from the 
Asian and the Yao-dominated one they had always known at home. The late 
Chief Mshawa, who had played a key role in allowing AMA to construct 
mosques in Nkhande, Nthera, Mgombe and Chinunda, north of Chipata, was 
rewarded with a visit to Kuwait in 2002. As AMA realized its religious projects 
by proxy, it has not been able to do more than give material assistance to the 
communities that asked for it. Hence, if not taken over by other associations, 
most of the mosques it built gradually fell into disuse due to lack of regular 
follow-up. Plans to build a local religious institute in Chipata that would 
eventually supply the mosque-based-communities with the necessary personnel 
were underway in 2004.59 
Foreign Islamic institutions 
Literacy occupies an important place in the transmission of Islamic knowledge 
and in the formation of the Muslim community. Islamic institutions abroad play 
an important role in the relationship between local and global Islam. On the one 
hand, as converging points for international Muslim students, they are a signi-
ficant representation of the global aspect of Islam, an international outlet for 
sub-Saharan scholars. On the other hand, through international students return-
ing to their homelands after their graduation and through the sponsorship of 
other Islamic institutions abroad, these institutions have spread their influence 
far and wide. For instance: ‘Nigerian students in Islamic countries sometimes 
                                               
59
 Interview with Mutalika Banda, 20 Sept. 2004. Banda is the mwalimu of Ndembela 
mosque, off Musolo Road, in Chipata. He was one of the three AMA-sponsored 
mwalimus in the district. In a meeting held in September 2004 with the visiting 
AMA Kuwaiti officials, the need for such an institution was felt and promises were 
made for the realization of the project in the near future. 
  ISLAM IN POST-COLONIAL ZAMBIA 183 
 
changed their religious perceptions of Islam, and when they returned home they 
were dismayed by the lack of orthodoxy in the Islam of their own commu-
nities’.60 
Well before the nineties scores of young Zambians benefited from scholar-
ships, mainly for religious studies, offered through such local Muslim associa-
tions as the Lundazi IWCTZ and MIST in Makeni and some embassies of Arab 
countries. The Shia community, through its Islamic Centre of Zambia, has 
granted similar opportunities for young converts to do studies in institutions of 
higher learning in Iran, probably with the support of the Iranian Ministry of 
Education and the munazzama al-‘ilm islāmi, known for its attribution of 
bursaries or financial aid to secondary school establishments in Africa.61 The 
major destinations for such students were Islamic universities in Pakistan, the 
Al-Azhar University in Egypt, Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia and 
the African Islamic University in Sudan. The variety of the universities attended 
by young Zambian Muslim scholars has produced a diversified academic 
formation whose impact on the future of Islam in Zambia is still fully to be 
appreciated. 
Most of the graduates of these universities came back to the country and, in 
spite of the limited outlets for their religious careers, they have started 
contributing substantially to the development of Islam in Zambia. The majority 
of them have been absorbed as members of staff at MIST. Some of them are 
involved in the organization of radio programs such as Focus on Islam in 
connection with the Zambia National Broadcasting Cooperation (ZNBC), while 
others have been enrolled as teachers in local Islamic institutions such as the 
Jami‘a Islamiyya in Thorn Park, Lusaka. Scores of other graduates have gone to 
look for job opportunities in South Africa.62 The development of Islam in South 
Africa has in various ways started to exert some influence on Islam in Zambia.63 
                                               
60
  C. Steed and D. Westerlund, ‘Nigeria’, in: D. Westerlund and I. Svanberg, eds, 
Islam outside the Arab world (Richmond, 1999), 63. 
61
  Mattes, ‘La da’wa Libyenne’, 37. 
62
  Due to political and socio-economical tribulations engendered by apartheid the 
Muslim community of South Africa was late in forming its own religious leaders. 
Young Muslim graduates from such institutions as Lundazi Islamic Welfare Trust 
and Mahadur-Rashidu were, in this respect, providential.  
63
  Currently South Africa boasts of better higher institutes of Islamic education than 
any other country in the region. Controversial figures such as Daudi Timangale 
Mbewa pride themselves on having been introduced to Comparative Da‘wa in South 
Africa. Most of the regionally produced Islamic literature stems at present from 
South Africa. In his article ‘Islamic “Jihad” on Africa exposed’, Remmy Kabali 
dwelt on allegations that the Muslims from more than 80 countries who assembled 
in Tripoli at the beginning of Oct. 1995 were planning to embark on a revolutionary 
Islamization of Africa and to use South Africa as their springboard. A similar 
184  PHIRI 
 
The comparative da‘wa approach, locally championed by South African trained 
individuals like Daudi Mbewa of Lundazi, owes its origin to South African 
scholars such as Ahmed Dedaat.  
The preceding paragraphs on the relation between local and global Islam 
help to identify some key influences on contemporary Muslim identity in 
Zambia. They show that the coming of Islam into the country and its later 
development have been the results of both endogenous and exogamous factors. 
Diversity within the Zambian Muslim community makes it difficult to isolate a 
clearly defined form of ‘local Islam’. Even Zambian-born Asians still maintain 
strong cultural ties with their countries of origin. In spite of having been in the 
country for so long and having married local women, the Yao still identify with 
Malawi and Mozambique and claim to practice a kind of Islam that distin-
guishes itself, albeit secondarily, from that practised by their Asian and Somali 
coreligionists. Whilst bringing with them certain traits of their Christian or 
traditional religious background, more recent Zambian converts add another 
element of diversity to the already existing Muslim communities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the most significant moment in the development of 
Islam in Zambia has coincided with the country’s post-colonial period. Firstly, 
the communal practice of Islam in community mosques, encouraged by visiting 
members of the TJ, exposed the lost sense of collective religiosity. In spite of 
having existed for decades prior to that, the early settler Muslim communities – 
the Indians and the Yao – were only incidentally preoccupied with the collective 
practice of Islam. Their main reasons for coming to Zambia were economic and 
had very little to do with the propagation of Islam. Secondly, the possibility to 
form government-recognized associations proved instrumental in providing 
organi-zational structures through which the needs of the community, ranging 
from social to religious, could be satisfied. And this took place in a context of 
profound economic crisis that created space for religious intervention. The call 
upon faith communities to supplement government efforts to solve socio-
economic problems has cleared the way for Muslims to give social expression 
to their religious endeavour.  
 
                                               
gathering was alleged to have taken place in Abuja in 1989. Times of Zambia, 16 
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‘The devil you know’:  
The impact of the Mulungushi  
economic reforms on retail trade in  
rural Zambia, with special reference  
to Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn,  
1968-80 
 
Hugh Macmillan 
A personal introduction 
I have been aware for a long time of the disintegration of old-established rural 
trading networks that resulted from the Mulungushi Economic Reforms, which 
were announced by President Kenneth Kaunda in April 1968. I saw some of the 
consequences of the reforms when, travelling between Lusaka and Livingstone 
in January 1969, I passed many locked and shuttered Indian shops in the small 
towns such as Mazabuka, Monze, Pemba and Kalomo, though probably not in 
Choma, which was one of the ten towns in Zambia which were exempted from 
the new trade licensing arrangements that came into effect on the first day of 
that year. I passed similarly locked and shuttered shops in the small towns of 
Malawi in the same year. Both Zambia and Malawi were following the example 
of Kenya’s Trade Licensing Act, which was passed in 1967. This excluded  
‘resident expatriates’ – a euphemism for Indian traders who had retained British 
or Indian citizenship – from rural areas, and confined them to the centres of 
large towns. 
I became more acutely aware of the commercial ‘vacuum’ that had then been 
created, and never really filled, in the Western Province, formerly Barotseland, 
188  MACMILLAN 
 
during a visit that I made in January 1984 to Senanga West.1 I discovered that 
retail trade and distribution, and the buying of produce, had virtually ceased in 
the area. At Mutomena, about half way between the Angolan border and the 
Zambezi, we met a man with an ox-drawn sledge who was making a six-day 
trek to Sioma in the hope of buying maize meal. Things were not much better 
along the main Senanga-Sesheke road. We came across a NIEC shop, which had 
only one commodity for sale, salt, of which it had received a truckload some 
time previously.  
An old and wise schoolteacher at Sipuma on the Angolan border road 
assured me that things had not always been as bad as this. In a mini-lecture on 
postcolonial economic decline and rural underdevelopment, he recalled the days 
of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which had made the road to 
facilitate the recruitment of labour for the South African gold mines, and of 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, which had run well-stocked stores in remote 
places, including several on the west bank of the Zambezi in the Kalabo, 
Senanga and Sesheke districts.2 I also heard of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn at 
about this time from Simon Zukas, who became chairman of Zambesi Ranching 
and Cropping in 1983. He explained that this was a surviving investment of 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, whose retail trading business had been taken 
over by the Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco) in consequence of the 
Mulungushi Reforms in 1968-9. I had myself encountered a part of the Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn trading network when, as a seventeen-year old youth, I 
visited Balovale, now Zambezi, in the North-Western Province, in 1962-3. I was 
then impressed, as other visitors were, by A.F. Serrano’s remarkably well-
stocked shop. I have a vague recollection of meeting Serrano himself, but it was 
nearly forty years later that I discovered that this was a subsidiary of Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn. 
I acquired some knowledge of retail trade in the eastern half of Zambia when 
I was working on a dissertation on the history of the African Lakes Corporation 
in the late 1960s, but I only came back to the subject in the mid-1990s when 
Simon Zukas, and other members of the Council for Zambia Jewry, invited me 
to take over a history project which they had started. In the course of research 
for a book, which appeared in 1999 as Zion in Africa: The Jews of Zambia, I 
encountered the fascinating story of the Susman brothers. I also met David 
Susman and Edwin Wulfsohn and began to think that it would be interesting to 
work on the history of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn. Somewhat to my surprise, 
                                               
1
  Anthony Martin uses the word ‘vacuum’ in this context in Minding their own busi-
ness: Zambia’s struggle against western control (Harmondsworth, 1975, first pub-
lished 1972). 
2
  Interview with Mr. Sakwale, Sipuma, Jan. 1984.  
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my repeated enquiries to David Susman about family and business records 
resulted in an invitation from him, and his partners, Edwin Wulfsohn, John 
Rabb and Simon Zukas, to write a history of the business. I began work on this 
in April 2001 and the resulting book, An African Trading Empire: The Story of 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, 1901–2005, was published in May 2005. The 
book includes a brief account of the effects of the Mulungushi Economic Re-
forms on the retail-trading network, though this was a subject about which the 
family and company archives, as well as the Zambian National Archives, ap-
peared to be reticent. I had to rely largely on oral sources as I had not then 
discovered, and have still not discovered, any documents relating to the negotia-
tions about the takeover of the stores network, though I did find information on 
the terms of the deal that was eventually done.3 
The purpose of this paper is to look in more detail than was possible in An 
African Trading Empirc at the background to the Mulungushi Economic Re-
forms and to the decisions that were then made about retail trade. The starting 
point of the paper is Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, but the central thesis of this 
essay has a wider application. I suggest that the dismantling of established 
trading networks, including those of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, which was 
strongest in the Western and Southern Provinces, though it also had a presence 
in the North-Western, Luapula and Northern provinces; of CBC (Zambia) Ltd, 
which was more thinly spread all over the country; and of family-based Indian 
trading networks, which were strongest in the Eastern, Central and Southern 
Provinces of the country, all contributed significantly to the economic decline of 
rural Zambia from the late 1960s onwards. This made it more difficult for these 
areas to withstand the pressures that were an inevitable consequence of the oil 
price crisis and the downturn in the global economy that began in 1973 and hit 
Zambia forcefully in 1975. The same argument may apply to other sectors of 
the economy including the copper mines. The loss of management skills, and 
international links, made it more difficult for Zambia as a whole to respond to 
                                               
3
  There are no papers relating to these negotiations in the Susman or Wulfsohn papers, 
though there are references to the conclusion of the negotiations and the terms of the 
takeover, and subsequent payments, in the minutes of Stores Holdings Ltd, Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn Ltd, and Concorde Investments Ltd. There appear to be no 
relevant Indeco papers in the Zambian National Archives, nor do the copies of 
personal papers deposited in the archives by Andrew Sardanis shed any light on 
these negotiations. It is possible that there are references to these negotiations, or to 
the local impact of the reforms, in documents relating to the implementation of the 
Economic Reforms in the Barotse and North Western Provinces, but I did not see 
them in 2001, and recent enquiries on my behalf by Marja Hinfelaar suggest that, if 
they exist, they have not yet been catalogued.  
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the recession of the mid 1970s, which was to last much longer in tropical Africa 
than in most other parts of the world.4   
The Mulungushi economic reforms 
In introducing the Mulungushi Economic Reforms, President Kenneth Kaunda 
distinguished between ‘State Enterprise; Zambian Private Enterprise; Foreign 
Controlled Enterprise; and Resident Expatriate Enterprise’. He chose to deal 
with the last of these first: 
Economic activity in Zambia is dominated by European and Asian business commu-
nities whose members have been residents of this country for many years. Since 
Independence my Ministers and I have been making repeated appeals to members of 
these communities, calling upon them to identify with the nation and urging them to 
Zambianise their businesses as soon as possible. I am very pleased to say that many 
of them have responded to our pleas by taking up Zambian nationality and by 
making sincere efforts to train Zambians to skilled and executive positions. There is, 
however, an appreciably large number of others who have chosen to remain outside 
the national family. They have kept only one foot in Zambia in order to take ad-
vantage of the economic boom created by the Transitional and the First National 
Development Plans. The other foot they have kept outside Zambia in South Africa, 
Britain, Europe, India, or wherever they come from, ready to jump when they have 
made enough money, or when they think that the country no longer suits them. I am 
afraid the period of grace is over. These people must now make a final choice. We 
do not wish to keep them here against their will. We are a proud nation. At the same 
time it is not fair that we should allow them to make off with the jam and the butter 
and leave crumbs of dry bread for our people.5 
He went on to outline the steps that he intended to take in order to place 
‘resident expatriate businesses’ on the same restricted basis as foreign busi-
nesses in terms of their access to credit from Zambian banks and other financial 
institutions. He stated that these businesses would not be allowed to operate 
outside the centres of ten named towns, Chingola, Mufulira, Kitwe, Luanshya, 
Ndola, Kabwe, Lusaka, Mazabuka, Choma and Livingstone, and that no new 
                                               
4
  The impact on rural livelihoods of the undermining of ‘resident expatriate’ trading 
networks in Zambia and Malawi is a sadly neglected topic. It is remarkable for 
example that Megan Vaughan, in her chapter, ‘Exploitation and neglect: rural pro-
ducers and the state in Malawi and Zambia’, in: David Birmingham and Phyllis 
Martin, eds, History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960 (Harlow, 
1997), makes no reference at all to this topic. 
5
  K.D. Kaunda, ‘Zambia Towards Economic Independence’, in: B. de Gaay Fortman, 
ed., After Mulungushi: The economics of Zambian humanism (Nairobi, 1969), 50-
51.  
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licences would be issued for such businesses within the centres of the ten 
towns.6  
It is clear that the latter sections of Kaunda’s speech were primarily aimed at 
Indian traders in rural areas. He then turned his attention to the listing of the 
twenty-six companies that he was ‘inviting’ to ‘offer’ fifty-one per cent of their 
shares to the state. Many of the firms listed were the Zambian branches of 
British or Southern African multi-nationals, which were involved in the supply 
of building materials and timber, in transport, and manufacturing. There were, 
however, some that were engaged in retail trade.  
Now that I have confined the field of retail trading in many areas and the expansion 
of retail trading in all places to Zambians, I want to have a retail State organisation 
operating alongside them so that we have some measure of control over their 
activities and a check on retail price inflation. For this reason I am asking certain 
large retail groups to offer at least 51 per cent of their shares to Government. These 
are CBC stores and shops, O.K. Bazaars, Standard Trading, Solanki Brothers Ltd, 
and Mwaiseni Stores Ltd. When the state has taken control of these businesses we 
shall find ways of rationalising their activities so that we will save wasteful 
duplication where possible.7 
Earlier in his speech he had claimed that while he was encouraging Zambian 
private enterprise and creating space for the emergence of Zambian entrepre-
neurs through the removal of ‘resident expatriate’ or foreign competition, he 
was not encouraging the development of Zambian capitalists. He said in a sen-
tence that was italicised for emphasis: ‘I do not want to create capitalism here’.8 
When Zambian private companies reached a certain size, they would be 
expected to offer their shares for sale to the public through a stock exchange, 
and when public companies reached a certain unspecified size, they would be 
expected to offer themselves for state participation. He singled out Andrew 
Sardanis’s Mwaiseni Stores as an example of a Zambian-owned company that 
had reached the latter stage and was offering a share of itself to the state. 
Sardanis was a Greek Cypriot trader who had been in competition in a small 
way with Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC in the North-Western 
                                               
6
  Ibid., 51-3. 
7
  Ibid., 62-3. The number of companies listed for takeover is often put as twenty-five. 
That is as a result of confusion between the number listed and the number actually 
taken over by Indeco. Two companies listed were not taken over by Indeco. Stan-
dard Trading Ltd was taken over by CBC Ltd and Solanki Bros. Ltd declined the 
invitation to offer its shares to Indeco. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn was not origin-
ally listed, but its subsidiary, Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn (Stores) Ltd, which was 
held through Stores Holdings Ltd, was compelled to offer itself for takeover. As a 
result twenty-five companies were eventually taken over. 
8
  Ibid., 59. He had on the previous page of his speech said: ‘But, for goodness sake, I 
do not want to create Zambian capitalism here.’ 
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Province. He had thrown in his lot with UNIP and had become chairman of 
Indeco and was soon to acquire another hat as permanent secretary of the 
ministry of commerce and industry. Kaunda also indicated that another un-
named company had agreed to offer shares to the state. It soon became known 
that this company was CBC (Zambia) Ltd and that the initiative for the takeover 
of this company had come from its British parent company, Booker Brothers, 
McConnell Ltd.9 
President Kaunda’s perspective on the implementation  
of the Mulungushi reforms 
Rather less than eighteen months later, while announcing the Matero Reforms, 
which included the fifty-one per cent takeover of the mining companies, Presi-
dent Kaunda gave a progress report on the Mulungushi reforms and their impact 
on retail trade.  
I am pleased to report that the operation has gone off very well indeed. As from the 
beginning of the year an increasingly large number of shops has changed hands and, 
despite the prediction of the Jonases [sic but ‘Jonahs’], not a single area of the 
country has suffered from lack of goods. Despite the predictions of those who do not 
wish the country to succeed there have been no shortages of goods. In general I am 
very pleased that the operation has gone so smoothly and, indeed, I am extremely 
pleased with the results. Out of the 850 or so shops previously owned by expatriates 
outside the prescribed areas already 300 have changed hands […].  
Of course there are many shops that still remain closed today, and there are others 
that have been granted wholesale licences or licences to sell prescribed goods. I am 
not perturbed by the number of shops that are still closed. I did not expect that on 
31st December, 1968, all shops outside the prescribed areas would be closed by their 
expatriate owners, in order to open again on 2nd January, 1969, by their new 
Zambian owners. Such miracles do not happen. 
What has been achieved in the very short time of six months is formidable and I 
know that time is on our side. The longer the shops remain closed the cheaper they 
will eventually sell.10 
Noting that there were too many expatriate-owned shops with wholesale 
licences outside the prescribed areas, he announced that as from 1 January 1970 
these would be confined to the ten urban centres and to the provincial capitals.11 
He then listed the four state trading businesses, the Consumer Buying Corpo-
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  Ibid., 63. It has to be said that the stock exchange did not take off at this stage. A 
stock exchange was founded, or re-founded, with the move towards privatisation in 
the mid 1990s.  
10
  K.D. Kaunda, Towards complete economic independence: Address by His Excel-
lency the President Dr K.D. Kaunda to the UNIP National Council Held at Matero 
Hall, Lusaka, 11 August, 1969 (Lusaka, 1969), 8-9.  
11
  Ibid., 9. 
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ration of Zambia Ltd (previously CBC (Zambia) Ltd and later known as ZCBC 
Ltd), Mwaiseni Stores Ltd., ZOK Ltd., and the Zambesi Trading Company, 
which had come into existence as a result of the reforms. Zambesi Trading was 
a newcomer to the list. Kaunda explained that this was the former Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn. He commended ‘this organisation for voluntarily coming 
forward and offering 51 per cent of its shares to INDECO’.12 
Just over a year later, in November 1970, Kaunda announced a further twist 
in the screw in so far as ‘resident expatriate’ traders were concerned.  
Despite prophesies [sic] of doom, despite threats of cancellations of orders, despite 
fears that the country would run out of supplies, we forged ahead with the reforms. 
And we have been very successful. Not a single one of these ills happened and in-
stead we have built up a very efficient Zambian business nucleus in the trading field. 
As I said, I want this nucleus to grow and therefore, as from the 1st January 1972, no 
expatriate, under any circumstances, will be allowed to obtain a retail trading 
licence. Comrades, as from the 1st January 1972 all retail trade throughout Zambia 
will be done by Zambians, i.e. Co-operatives, State companies, and Zambian public 
and private companies.13 
He went on to announce that this would apply also to wholesale trade, and 
that expatriates would no longer be allowed to trade in a list of ten specified 
commodities that had previously been exempted.14 Six months later he made 
one more public comment on the impact of the Economic Reforms on the retail 
sector, showing for the first time a hint of disappointment at the failure of 
Zambian businessmen, or women, to fill the ‘vacuum’ that he had created on 
their behalf, as well as some frustration at the demand of traders that the state 
should provide them with capital.   
I have heard of the gaps that have been created as a result of giving Zambians 
priority access to certain business opportunities.  There are districts and towns in the 
country where even after three years of Economic Reforms very few local people 
have taken initiative, individually, in partnerships, or as co-operative societies, to 
organise themselves and take over or set up small-scale businesses.15 
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  Ibid., 14.  
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  ‘Take Up The Challenge…’ Speeches Made by His Excellency the President Dr K.D. 
Kaunda to the United National Independence Party National Council, Mulungushi 
Hall, Lusaka, 7-10 November 1970 (Lusaka, 1970), Closing speech, 10 Nov. 1970, 
59. 
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  Ibid., 60.  
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  K.D. Kaunda, A path for the future: Address by His Excellency the President Dr 
K.D. Kaunda, as Secretary-General of the United National Independence Party on 
the Occasion of the Opening of the Sixth General Conference of the United National 
Independence Party, Mulungushi Hall, 8th May 1971 (Lusaka, 1971), 33.  
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Economic nationalism and the rationale behind  
Mulungushi and Matero 
Kaunda’s Mulungushi and Matero speeches seem now to present a strange 
amalgam of economic nationalism, naivete, complacency and disingenuousness. 
The drive towards economic nationalism and economic independence was a 
direct response to Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) and the failure of the United Kingdom to mount an adequate response to 
it. It has also to be seen in the context of the increasing tension between Kaunda 
and his vice-president, Simon Kapwepwe, and of competition between them for 
the leadership of UNIP. Similar measures were, of course, being adopted in 
other countries such as Kenya, Malawi, and in Tanzania, where the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 involved a more radical attack on foreign-controlled busi-
nesses.  
The main contemporary justification for the retail trading reforms was the 
argument that indigenous Zambian shopkeepers found it difficult to compete 
with networks such as those of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC, or with 
Indian networks, which sometimes had their own lines of credit and sources of 
supply. Underlying the Mulungushi Reforms was the view that as rural shops 
were small, retail trade was ‘easy’, and if this sector were left to Zambian 
businessmen, entrepreneurs would emerge from it. Kaunda claimed, incorrectly, 
that the colonial authorities, wishing to encourage class divisions, had excluded 
white and Indian businesses from the urban townships or ‘compounds’, and 
allowed the emergence of African entrepreneurs there. He also claimed that the 
exclusion of ‘resident expatriate’ traders from rural areas would have similar 
results. This argument was fallacious, and was used simultaneously in apartheid 
South Africa to justify the exclusion of ‘white’ traders from the Bantustans – a 
move that, in an area like the Transkei, had similarly depressing consequences 
for retail trade and production.  
A business like Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn was only profitable because it 
was highly efficient, and had mastered the logistics of supply by truck and boat 
in difficult terrain. It had exceptional links with Woolworths in South Africa and 
Marks & Spencer in the United Kingdom, allied chain stores that were at the 
cutting edge of retailing in those countries, and was using merchandising sys-
tems that were a slimmed-down version of the ones that they used. CBC was 
probably not as efficient or as profitable as Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, but it 
had done more to train Zambian managers, and was also part of an international 
network. The Zambian traders who did survive as village shopkeepers and 
hawkers in remote rural areas had not only a dependent, but also, to some 
extent, a symbiotic relationship with the larger trading networks, which did a 
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large wholesale trade, and also bought produce, sometimes using independent 
Zambian traders as buying agents.16  
The government’s initial strategy may have been to target Indian traders. The 
‘large’ retail sector only came into the reforms as an after-thought and as a result 
of an initiative from Bookers. It then decided that it would be useful to have a 
state shops sector to provide services to the hopefully emergent Zambian re-
tailers. It was, however, economically naive to think that there was a fixed fund 
of credit and that denying access to it to ‘resident expatriate’ businesses would 
result in more credit being available to Zambian traders. In reality banks and 
wholesalers were reluctant to lend to untried traders with minimal security, and 
the post-Mulungushi denial of credit to ‘resident expatriates’ simply had the 
effect of creating a credit squeeze, which was soon felt in rural areas. It was 
equally naive to think that removing ‘resident expatriate’ businesses would, 
through the creation of a commercial ‘vacuum’, automatically benefit existing 
Zambian traders, and that it was possible to encourage free enterprise, and 
entrepreneurs, without encouraging capitalists, or capitalism. The only para-
graph on retail and wholesale trade in Kaunda’s philosophical treatise, Human-
ism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation Part II, gave instructions to 
District Governors on how to ensure that private businesses in their districts did 
not grow beyond ‘the bounds of a small family business’, and how to avoid the 
emergence of ‘local over-mighty commercial barons’.17  
Kaunda’s argument that the time had come for ‘resident expatriate’ business-
men to decide whether or not they wanted to throw in their lot with the Nation 
can only be described as disingenuous. While some Indians had been able to 
choose between British, Indian or Zambian citizenship at independence, very 
few Indian, or other expatriates, had been able to get Zambian citizenship since 
independence. A large number of Indians applied for citizenship immediately 
before and after the Mulungushi speech, but few if any of them obtained it. 
There was, in reality, no ‘choice’. 18 Kaunda’s argument that the prevailing 
boom in the country was the result of the development plans was also disinge-
nuous. The main cause of the boom was the high price of copper, which was the 
result of the Vietnam War. Zambian revenues had also benefited from the end of 
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 See, for example, Macmillan, An African trading empire, 205. 
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  K.D. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its implementation Part II 
(Lusaka, 1974), 59.  
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  Abe Galaun stated in December 1968 that people who had applied for citizenship 
before the announcement of the Mulungushi reforms had not yet received responses 
to their applications – he had previously stated that there had been no grants of 
citizenship since 1966. Abe Galaun, presidential address to annual general meeting 
of ZINCOM, 17 Dec. 1968, copy in Galaun papers, by courtesy of the late Vera 
Galaun.  
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transfer payments to Southern Rhodesia and of royalty payments to the British 
South Africa Company, but no one, except Kaunda, seriously suggested that the 
boom had anything to do with economic planning.19  
His response to the closure of rural shops was dangerously complacent. If, as 
he suggested in August 1969, only 300 out of 850 shops outside the prescribed 
areas had been transferred to Zambian owners, then 550 had either remained 
closed or had found a way of remaining open under ‘resident expatriate’ owner-
ship – some certainly did this by obtaining wholesale licences. Of the 300 shops 
that were transferred about 200 must have belonged to Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn and CBC. Only 100 can have been transferred to smaller businesses 
or individual traders. B.J. Phiri provides an example from the Eastern Province, 
where there were 176 ‘resident expatriate’ shops scheduled for take over by 
Zambian citizens or companies in October 1968. In Katete District only nine out 
of thirty-seven shops had been transferred by May 1969 while twenty-eight 
remained closed.20 It is likely, therefore, that more than 120 shops remained 
closed in the province as a whole, and this was a pattern that was replicated in 
several other provinces. Kaunda’s suggestion that the longer the shops remained 
closed, the cheaper they would eventually become, showed a complete mis-
understanding of the value of these shops, which were usually built of Kimber-
ley brick with corrugated iron roofs. Their value did not lie in their buildings, 
but in the knowledge, experience, creditworthiness, and commercial links of 
their proprietors.  
The Mulungushi Reforms appear to have been influenced by a number of 
misconceptions and prejudices that were widespread amongst economists and 
had colonial roots. A prejudice against rural traders had been a feature of the 
provincial administration, some of whose members combined anti-Semitic and 
anti-Indian attitudes with a snobbish approach to commerce. While postcolonial 
economists may not have been as racially or socially prejudiced as colonial civil 
servants, they laboured under a similar misconception – that agriculture and 
industry were productive, while commerce was not. There was widespread 
ignorance of the links between retail trade in rural areas and agricultural pro-
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  Not even Michael Faber suggested that the boom was the result of the plans, though 
he did, in his chapter on ‘The manufacturing sector’ in: Charles Elliott, ed., Con-
straints on Zambia’s economic development (Nairobi, 1971), suggest that the growth 
in manufacturing could be attributed, among many other factors, including copper 
prices, to changes in industrial policy and a change in the role and chairmanship of 
Indeco. 
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  B.J. Phiri, A history of Indians in the Eastern Province of Zambia (Lusaka, 2000), 
58-9. It is not clear whether the nine shops that were transferred in Katete district 
would or would not have included the three shops in the district, which, according to 
the Zambia Government Gazette, 1968, belonged to CBC Ltd.  
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duction. Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had had to create a market for goods by 
providing a market for produce. They had been prepared to buy almost anything 
saleable from local producers in order to build a market, and had at one time or 
another been the main buyers in Barotseland and the North-Western Province, 
and major buyers in the Southern Province, of cattle, hides, cassava, maize, rice, 
millet, beans, beeswax, ivory, and other products.21 Kaunda demonstrated this 
denial of the productivity of commerce in his Matero speech when he appealed 
to ‘resident expatriates’ to enter into joint ventures with Zambians in the agri-
cultural, industrial ‘and other productive business fields’. He asked them to 
‘forget the distribution field and assist the national effort by engaging in direct 
production’.22  
It is surprising that Kaunda’s speeches, which were largely drafted by An-
drew Sardanis, should have underestimated the contribution made by efficient 
retail traders to the rural economy. Sardanis himself seems to have concluded 
that the role of the rural trader as produce buyer was no longer important. This 
may have been true of his own small chain of shops, but Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn, which had lost its role as cattle buyer to the Cold Storage Commis-
sion/Board, and as maize trader to the cooperatives, continued to be involved in 
the purchase of other kinds of produce. Sardanis himself was clearly drawn 
towards urban trade. He had opened a shop in Chingola in 1957, and his 
company, Mwaiseni, opened a large shop in Lusaka’s Cairo Road soon after its 
takeover by Indeco.23  
Sardanis had the benefit not only of his own experience, but also of advice 
from a distinguished academic economist, Michael Faber, later director of the 
Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, who had worked 
on the Transitional National Development Plan. He was involved in the plan-
ning, though not the implementation of the Mulungushi Reforms, and provided 
the blueprint for the Matero Reforms. Sardanis also had the assistance of a 
young Cambridge University graduate in economics, Andrew Turnbull, who 
was later to become Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the civil service in the 
United Kingdom, but there is no evidence that either of these experts had much 
knowledge or understanding of rural trade.  
Contemporary commentary by academics and others 
It is probably not insignificant that a collection of essays by economists, Con-
straints on the Economic Development of Zambia, which was published at this 
time, had virtually nothing to say about retail trade. In his chapter on ‘The 
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  Macmillan, An African trading empire, passim, esp. chapters 11 and 14. 
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  Kaunda, Towards complete independence, 12. 
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  Interview with Andrew Sardanis, reported in An African trading empire, 254. 
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manufacturing sector’, Faber referred to the nervousness in the business com-
munity that had followed the ‘Mulungushi Declaration’, and acknowledged that 
this had resulted in some falling off of investment in stocks, particularly by 
Indian traders. He thought that this was not a bad thing as the economy was 
over-heated and the level of imports was rising too strongly at the time.24   
The best contemporary account of the background to – and implementation 
of – the Mulungushi Reforms comes from Anthony Martin’s book, Minding 
Their Own Business, Zambia’s struggle against Western control, which was 
written in the middle months of 1971 and first published in 1972. Martin was a 
journalist and the editor of a short-lived monthly review, Business and Economy 
of Central and East Africa, which was published in Lusaka from 1967 to 1968. 
He was close to Andrew Sardanis and was a good friend of Faber. He also 
records that Turnbull read and commented on several drafts of the book. Martin 
had a somewhat rose-tinted view of Indeco, and of Sardanis, whom the press 
had dubbed ‘Mr Fifty-One Per Cent’, but his book is well informed about the 
reforms, and also contains some contemporary criticisms of them. It places 
them in the context of the debate about ‘state capitalism’ and socialism – a word 
that is conspicuously absent from Kaunda’s Mulungushi and Matero speeches. 
Martin’s summary of the impact of the Mulungushi Reforms on retail trade 
reflects Indeco’s view that the only victims of the reforms were ‘a few hundred 
Indian shopkeepers’; their customers were not given much consideration. He 
wrote:  
The Government thus abandoned its previous policy of assisting emerging Zambian 
businessmen by loans and other means to compete with established commerce, 
which was overwhelmingly non-African, and instead set out to eliminate the compe-
tition in selected areas and create a vacuum in which Zambians could hardly fail to 
make faster progress. The chief losers under the new policy were a few hundred 
Indian shopkeepers who dominated the rural and peri-urban retail trade in certain 
parts of the country, particularly the Eastern, Central and Copperbelt provinces.25  
In what is clearly an attempt to provide a balanced assessment, a hard-hitting 
reference to the destruction of ‘established sectors of economic life’, which I 
have italicised below, is sandwiched between two passages that suggest that the 
Reforms did not go far enough.  
To many attracted by the moral force and intellectual consistency of socialism on 
the model offered by Nyerere, the Zambian compromise would seem half-hearted 
and feeble. For these purists Kaunda would be ‘51% socialist’, a patronizing term of 
semi-affectionate reproach. Regarded as a hard-nosed programme for maximising 
G.N.P., on the other hand, Mulungushi fell equally short of the theoretical ideal. It 
set out to destroy large sectors of established economic life (such as the Indian-
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owned retail trade) for the sake of hypothetical entrepreneurs who had failed to 
make the grade in free competition, and in general it tended to weaken such com-
petitive forces as there were in the economy in pursuit of notional advantages which 
were mainly of the ideological variety. For others on the left wing the very term 
‘state capitalism’ was one of abuse, implying (if it implied anything) that the privi-
leges formerly enjoyed by the private capitalist exploiters would now be transferred 
to a new and even more reprehensible class of black bourgeois bureaucratic ex-
ploiters.26 
A later view – Andrew Sardanis’s Another Side of the Coin 
Thirty-five years later Andrew Sardanis provided his own account of these 
events in his memoir, Africa: Another Side of the Coin. He makes a number of 
points about the Mulungushi Reforms, which both echo and confirm the views 
of Martin, but he also adds one or two of his own. His views can be summarised 
as follows: that the reforms were an example of economic nationalism rather 
than African socialism; that they were aimed at ‘reserving areas of business to 
Zambians and devising methods to assist them to grow without insurmountable 
competitive pressures from expatriate businessmen who had superior resources 
and expertise’; that they were part of a response to UDI, to the business com-
munity’s ridiculing of Zambia’s attempts to reduce dependence on the south, 
and its failure to promote Zambianisation of managerial posts; that they were a 
response to the tension and competition between Kaunda and  Kapwepwe who 
was largely responsible for insisting on the fifty-one per cent takeovers; and that 
Bookers was ‘entirely responsible for the inclusion of the retail sector in the 
reforms’.27 
Sardanis describes how he was called to State House during the preparation 
of the Mulungushi Reforms in the early months of 1968 to meet Kaunda and 
Michael Caine, a director of Bookers. He found that a deal had already been 
done under which Bookers would sell fifty-one per cent of its trading business 
to Indeco and retain the management. Sardanis notes that Bookers had experi-
ence in Guyana, where it had played a part in the political demise of the radical 
nationalist Cheddi Jagan and the victory of Forbes Burnham, who led Guyana to 
independence in 1966. Bookers, under the leadership of Sir Jock Campbell 
(who became Lord Campbell of Eskan in 1966), had done well out of the 
nationalisation of its sugar interests in Guyana and had been able to reinvest the 
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proceeds in the United Kingdom. The company clearly intended to do the same 
thing with its retail trading interests in Zambia and Malawi.28  
Sardanis does not, however, recall the links between Bookers and his econo-
mic advisor, Michael Faber. In 1963, Faber had written a paper for Campbell, 
who was also chairman of the Africa Bureau, a left-of-centre pressure group, 
entitled ‘Corporate Policy on the Copperbelt’. This was a response to a paper by 
an American professor, Alvin Wolfe, who had suggested that the break-up of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the independence of Zambia and 
other countries in the region, would increase the power of ‘supra-national’ 
mining companies with interlocking interests and directorates, such as Anglo 
American, Rhodesian Selection Trust, and Union Minière. Faber had suggested 
that the opposite was the case. He argued that ‘Very Big Business is Timid’ and 
would be anxious to come to terms with new African nationalist governments. 
He suggested, furthermore, that ‘as well as paying higher taxes and higher 
royalties, the companies may find themselves threatened into giving some part 
of their shares to local governments and may even decide that it is to their 
advantage to encourage the local taking up of share issues’.29 It appears that 
Bookers, following Faber’s analysis, chose to pre-empt ‘threatening’ moves or 
invitations by the government, and offered itself for takeover. Faber does not 
now recall any contact between himself, Campbell or Caine in the months lead-
ing up to the Mulungushi Reforms, though he does recall his association and 
friendship with them.30  
There are one or two other points of interest that emerge from Sardanis’s ac-
count. One is his extraordinary retrospective justification for the exclusion of 
‘resident expatriate’ businesses from urban townships and rural areas. Echoing 
Kaunda’s Mulungushi speech, which he had drafted, he claimed: 
During the colonial era, only blacks were permitted to run business in the African 
townships. Similarly, in the rural areas there was little competition from whites or 
Indians, except maybe in the Eastern Province where Indian communities were well 
established over a couple of generations. Starting from the premiss that in these 
areas there were many successful Zambian businesses, in trading, contracting, and 
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transport, the Mulungushi Reforms attempted to extend similar conditions for Zam-
bians to most parts of the country.31   
These assertions are historically incorrect. On the Copperbelt all the big 
trading companies with shops in the first-class trading areas in the centre of 
towns, such as Kitwe, also had shops in the townships. Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn had attempted to penetrate the Copperbelt market in the early 1950s, 
but had withdrawn because its expertise lay with rural trade, but Werners, an 
associated butchery business, ran shops in second-class trading areas and 
townships on the Copperbelt. During the depression of the late 1950s some of 
its butcheries were sub-divided with groceries, which were run by Kaldis and 
Company, a Greek trader. In the Copperbelt towns, with the exceptions of 
Luanshya and Ndola, Indian traders were excluded from the centres of the 
towns, as was also the case in Lusaka, until the late 1950s. Indian traders may 
have also been excluded from the townships, but ‘resident expatriate’ businesses 
were not. The confusion of both Kaunda and Sardanis on this point may stem 
from the equation in their minds between ‘Indian trader’ and ‘resident expatriate 
trader’.32 
It is also absurd for Sardanis, whose own business experience lay in the 
North Western Province, where he had been in competition with both Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC, as well as with independent white traders, such 
as B. P. Rudge in Balovale, to suggest that African traders only experienced real 
competition from whites or Indians in the Eastern Province. Some Zambian 
businessmen did emerge in urban townships and rural areas, but they did not do 
so because they were operating in a commercial ‘vacuum’. Emergent traders 
invariably had a close relationship with ‘expatriate’ businesses.  
Sardanis’s book does shed some useful light on the process of granting 
licences in terms of the Mulungushi Reforms. Sardanis, as permanent secretary 
in the ministry of commerce and industry, entrusted the drafting of the new 
Trade Licensing Act, and the licensing regulations that were issued in terms of 
the act, to John Finch, a former member of the provincial administration.33 
President Kaunda then asked the district development committees to ‘assist’ the 
licensing authorities to implement the new measures. These were political 
committees and were chaired by the district governors whom Kaunda appointed 
in November 1968 as part of ‘decentralisation’ – this was, paradoxically, a 
                                               
31
  Sardanis, Another Side of the Coin, 215.  
32
  Mamillan, An African trading empire, 295. See also Hugh Macmillan and Frank 
Shapiro, Zion in Africa: The Jews of Zambia (London, 1999), 146, 173. 
33
  Sardanis may have got the name wrong, as there was no John Finch in the Northern 
Rhodesian Government Staff List for September 1963. There was an F. C. Finch, 
MBE, chairman of committees, born 1916. Information by courtesy of Jeremy Col-
lingwood. 
202  MACMILLAN 
 
scheme for greater presidential control. According to Sardanis these committees 
‘usurped the powers of the licensing authority and took it upon themselves to 
decide who was entitled to a licence, which was against the law’. There were 
complaints from the rural areas, and also from John Finch, who prepared a 
circular for distribution to the district licensing authorities ‘reminding them that 
trade licensing was their sole responsibility and that the role of the district 
development committees was purely advisory’. Sardanis acknowledges that the 
district governors ignored it and continued to interfere in licensing matters.34 
Sardanis also provides his own gloss on the situation of Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn, expressing surprise that although they had been in the country since 
1901,  
they did not want any members of their families to get Zambian nationality to 
overcome the licensing constraints. Nor, after so many years, could they find any 
long-serving Zambian employees to sell their shops to and help them set up in 
business. Instead, even though they were not called upon to do so, they voluntarily 
offered [a] controlling interest to Indeco and retained the management for a few 
years, which they obviously considered the most profitable course.35 
This is, to say the least, a misleading interpretation. The Mulungushi speech, 
and the new licensing regulations, defined a Zambian company in extremely 
narrow terms – all shareholders had to be Zambian citizens. Although it was a 
private company, and a Zambian company, ownership of Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn, with its various subsidiary holding companies, was split between at 
least six families, and twenty beneficiaries, living in at least three countries, 
Zambia, Rhodesia and South Africa. Many of the shares were held by family 
trusts, and there was no way that ownership could have been transferred to one 
or two representatives of the various families, even if it had been possible for 
them to acquire citizenship. Nor was it the case that the company made no effort 
to sell its rural shops to their managers. They did make an attempt to do this, but 
their attempt was, as we shall see later, thwarted. The decision of Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn to offer shares to Indeco was far from being voluntary, but 
was forced upon it. The owners of the business did not see their offer as the 
most profitable course, but as the only one open to them. Edwin Wulfsohn, who, 
with Maurice Rabb, negotiated the terms of the sale, has always been very 
critical of the way in which the business was valued. He objected strongly at the 
time to valuation in terms of book value with no allowance for goodwill or 
profitability, and he has never ceased to describe the terms of the takeover as 
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‘confiscatory’, saying that the company was valued at a ‘miserly multiple of 
less than one year’s profit – nine months’.36  
The case of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn  
There is some evidence that Sardanis’s later interpretation differs from his 
originnal view. Anthony Martin, who was, as we have seen, very close to 
Sardanis and Indeco, published a leading article in Business and Economy, the 
magazine that he edited, in June 1968.  His paper was a not wholly uncritical 
conduit for the views of Sardanis and Indeco, and he was almost certainly the 
author of this unsigned article, which acknowledged that the reforms might 
cause some distress to the owners of general stores outside the ‘expatriate’ 
areas, but suggested that the area from which they were to be excluded was 
smaller than had been feared. It acknowledged that ‘most of the store-owners 
who will be affected are, obviously, Indians with one or two shops to their 
name’, but suggested that they had a number of lines of action open to them. 
They could apply for Zambian citizenship – the article acknowledged that 
applications were ‘being processed very slowly in order to prevent too many 
employing this loophole and conducting business as before’. They could move 
out of general trade into specialised trade, for which there were some exemp-
tions under the regulations – the article acknowledged that there were few 
openings for this in rural areas. They could sell their shops to Zambians, and 
continue as managers of their old businesses, but that had its risks. They could 
also sell their general stores and move into wholesale business. The article 
concluded that the retailing reforms ‘may encourage the Indian community to 
go into more sophisticated forms of business than general trading’ as had 
happened in East Africa, where the community had moved into the manufac-
turing and service sectors in recent years. The article noted that an Indeco team 
was currently doing a survey of businesses likely to be affected, and that ‘the 
areas in which the danger seems greatest are the Eastern Province and the 
Southern Province – where neither Zambian business nor large-scale corporate 
business exists on an adequate scale to serve the consumer if the Indian general 
stores should close down’.37  
It also suggested that the wholesaling option was the one that ‘Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn, a trading concern based in Livingstone [which] owns 
over 100 stores in the rural areas […] seems likely to apply on the grand scale’. 
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It pointed out that ‘all their shops have African managers who are quite capable 
of running them efficiently as owners, provided they are served by a good 
wholesaler’. It maintained that wholesale trade had been disappearing in Zam-
bia in recent years as retailers increasingly did their own importing, and that this 
had made it difficult for Zambian traders to start up on their own in many areas. 
‘If Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn become wholesalers they will doubtless be 
able to find additional business to compensate them for the loss of the retail 
margin. This, once again, would be to everyone’s good’.38 Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn had almost always done its own importing, and had never ceased to 
be involved in wholesaling, which was an important part of its business. This 
analysis was, therefore, incorrect, but it was almost certainly the Indeco view on 
the line that the company should adopt.39  
The new licensing regulations were not issued until early October 1968. 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn made its applications for licences in terms of 
these regulations on 22 November 1968. It made 107 licence applications for 
approximately 123 shops – it was the company’s practice to subdivide shops 
and so one licence could cover as many as four shops on the same site. Fourteen 
applications related to wholesale licences and were made in the name of Sus-
man Brothers & Wulfsohn (Stores) Ltd and of various subsidiary companies 
such as the Kawambwa Trading Company and Chawama Stores. The applica-
tions for retail licences were made in the names of five new companies, Mongu, 
Balovale, Livingstone, Batoka, and Mansa Retailers Ltd. According to Maurice 
Rabb and Job Haloba, these were cooperative companies in which the managers 
of the various retail shops were shareholders. The plan was that Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn would finance these companies and administer them until 
the managers had paid for the stores and the goods in them. Maurice Rabb and 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn Ltd had presumably received an assurance from 
Indeco and the ministry of commerce and industry that this arrangement was 
legal and compliant with the new regulations. The shareholders in these com-
panies were Zambian citizens and licences should have been issued to them. 
There should also have been no problem with the wholesale licences for which 
there were exemptions for ‘resident expatriate’ businesses under the new law.  It 
seems, however, that the licensing authorities, or as now seems probable in view 
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of Sardanis’s comments, the district development committees at Balovale and 
elsewhere, challenged the arrangement and licences were refused. According to 
Rabb, the refusal at Balovale ‘set up a chain reaction and all our licences were 
refused’.40  
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn had, therefore, no option but to ‘offer’ fifty-
one per cent of its retailing subsidiary to Indeco. The interpretation given here 
differs slightly from that given in An African Trading Empire, which was al-
ready in proof when I first saw Sardanis’s Another Side of the Coin. In writing 
the book I had found it hard to explain why Rabb appeared not to have sought 
an accommodation with Indeco, but had apparently chosen to evade the 
reforms. I had not realised that he had almost certainly been given a green light 
to go ahead with this scheme, which would have involved the company staying 
in business as a wholesaler while transferring the retail stores to their managers.  
This new interpretation does, however, confirm the view that I reached in the 
concluding chapter of An African Trading Empire – that the takeover of Susman 
Brothers & Wulfsohn’s retail trading network came about as much by accident 
as by design. I had not realised that the probable cause of this accident was the 
unexpected intervention of the district development committee in Balovale, 
which acted in a way that was contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the 
law.41  
 
                                               
40
  Zambia Government Gazette, 4 Oct., 22 Nov. 1968; Maurice Rabb, ‘Recollections’, 
copy in author’s possession; interview with Job Haloba, 23 Apr. 2001. It is difficult 
to pin down the precise number of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn stores. Maurice 
Rabb, who should probably have known best, gives the figure of 123 shops. My own 
count of the separate shops listed in the Zambia Government Gazette advertisement 
in November 1968 suggests 121 shops, and Carolyn Baylies in her dissertation 
mentioned 111 shops. CBC Ltd made more licence applications, but it did not sub-
divide its shops and had many more urban shops than Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn.  
41
  Macmillan, An African trading empire, 418. According to Job Haloba, a senior 
Zambian employee of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, it was Willie Chinyama, a 
store manager at Balovale, who provoked this crisis. He said: ‘The whites are 
cheating us. This is not our store. It is theirs.’ (Ibid., 249.) There was, of course, 
some nationalist opposition to Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn in Barotseland where it 
had been criticised for its alliance with the Litunga, Sir Mwanawina III, and the 
association of some of its leaders, including Maurice Rabb, with Welensky and the 
United Federal Party. (Ibid., 238-45) Such considerations may have influenced the 
district development committees, but there is no evidence that they had any in-
fluence on the formulation of the Mulungushi Reforms which were not primarily 
aimed at businesses such as Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn. As is indicated above, 
the initiative for the takeover of the larger chains came from Booker, Brothers, 
McConnell, and was related to its own desire to repatriate capital from Zambia.  
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The longer-term consequences for retail trade 
As we have seen, as many as 500 shops in rural areas and urban townships were 
denied licences and may have remained closed at the beginning of 1969. There 
is no doubt that the bulk of these were Indian shops, though a number of Indian 
traders were able to remain open in rural areas as wholesalers. Others closed 
their shops with the intention of applying for licences in the names of their 
Zambian-born children when they came of age. Some shops remained open with 
nominal Zambian owners who were fronts for the real owners who remained out 
of sight. What happened may have varied from district to district according to 
the views of the licensing authorities and the district development committees. 
Phiri points out that these committees were able to frustrate the intention of the 
reforms in a number of ways: these included denying licences, and the transfer 
of shops, to Zambian citizens on the grounds that the applicants, though 
Zambians, were not from the district, but were outsiders. Although there has 
been no detailed study of this topic outside of the Eastern Province, it has to be 
concluded that the economic reforms did result in a deterioration of the quality 
and extent of retail trade in other areas where Indian traders had been dominant. 
As Phiri notes, ‘[b]efore long, buildings left behind by expatriate Indian traders 
fell into a state of disrepair and eventually collapsed. The vibrant economic 
service centres became ghost service centres with virtually no economic activity 
taking place. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the dilapidated buildings re-
mained a constant reminder of the failure of the Economic Reforms in the rural 
areas of Zambia’.42 
In view of this, it is, perhaps, all the more surprising that Indeco set out from 
the early months of 1969 to close small and remote stores, and competing 
stores, within the newly established state shops network. As soon as it was set 
up in February 1969 the management of the Zambesi Trading Company (ZTC) 
received an instruction that they should close all stores with a turnover of less 
than K5,000 a month. They objected to this instruction, saying that the proper 
criterion for deciding whether or not a shop should stay open was profitability 
and not turnover. They were also well aware that Zambian traders would not 
have the capacity to transport goods and maintain stocks at reasonable prices in 
remote areas, but they had to implement the instruction. In a move that dis-
played the urban bias of Indeco, they were also told that they should open 
‘supermarkets’ in Livingstone and Choma. They objected to this instruction as 
they had no experience of this kind of business, and had no desire to enter into 
it, but they did as they were told and recruited a manager from the United 
                                               
42
  Phiri, History of Indians, 60-8. A. A. Beveridge and A. R. Obserschall, African 
businessmen and development in Zambia (Princeton, 1979) is singularly unhelpful 
on the consequences of the economic reforms.  
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Kingdom who set up successful supermarkets in the latter towns. They were 
also told that they should close their stores in the Luapula and Northern Pro-
vinces where they were in competition with ZCBC. This instruction is under-
standable as a rationalisation of the now state-controlled retailing sector, but the 
result was that customers were deprived of choice and competitive prices.43  
Within eighteen months of the takeover, ZTC had closed down forty-two 
shops. Approximately half of these shops were in the Northern and Luapula 
Provinces, while the remainder were small and remote shops in the Western, 
North Western and Southern Provinces. ZTC opened eighteen shops in the same 
period, including the two supermarkets, and new shops on, or close to, the Line 
of Rail at the Nakambala sugar estate and the new Maamba Colliery. This 
number seems also to have included seven shops in the Southern Province, 
which were taken over from ZCBC. The latter’s total network, which included 
urban shops on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka, had been reduced from 116 shops 
to 66 shops by August 1969. It is most improbable that it closed urban shops so 
it must have reduced its somewhat smaller rural network even more drastically 
than ZTC did.44 
When C.W. Catt, an Indeco executive, was sent out on a tour of inspection of 
ZTC, ZCBC and Mwaiseni outlets in the Western and Southern Provinces in 
July 1970, he was originally given instructions to find reasons for further 
closures. It was suggested that he should find arguments to justify the closure of 
all shops with a turnover of less than K10,000 a month. In the end his in-
structions were changed, and he was told to find ways of reducing ‘shrinkage’ in 
state shops – something that was a serious problem in the small Mwaiseni chain 
of shops, a less serious problem in the ZCBC shops, and not a problem at all in 
the ZTC shops – he saw the latter as the best run of the state chains.45 The 
continued closure of state shops in rural areas was, however, a feature of 
Indeco’s policy in these years. Beveridge and Oberschall, who did research on 
African businessmen in Zambia in 1970-1, but did no detailed work on the 
impact of the economic reforms, suggest that ‘[in] some rural towns nearly half 
the businesses were transferred to Africans as a result of these policies. At the 
same time the opportunities for African business increased, because Indeco 
                                               
43
 Macmillan, An African trading empire, 250-55. 
44
  C.W. Catt Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, including his report to Indeco 
Trading on ‘shrinkage’, July-Aug. 1970. Comparative data on the extent of the 
original Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn and CBC networks comes from Catt and 
from licence application in the Zambia Government Gazette, 1968. By Aug. 1969 
the ZCBC rural network seems to have been reduced from about 100 to little more 
than fifty shops. It also seems to be likely that ZCBC had already begun to close 
rural shops as soon as it was taken over by Indeco Trading in June-July 1968. 
45
  Catt Papers, ‘Memoirs of Zambia, 1970-2’. 
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Trading sharply decreased its rural trading activities shortly after it had bought 
many expatriate stores. Because of inefficiency, duplication of outlets, declining 
profits, and political pressure, 154 out of 273 Indeco stores and shops in Zambia 
were closed between 1968 and 1971, mostly in the rural towns and trade 
centres’.46 Their figures confirm that it was Indeco’s policy to close rural stores. 
In many cases stores were transferred to employees, but they did not always 
remain open for long under their new managers. Several former employees of 
Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn/Zambesi Trading were given shops as part of 
retirement or retrenchment packages in the early 1970s, but they all had dif-
ficulty in running the shops on their own. One of the reasons for their failure 
was Indeco’s decision, which was taken before the economic reforms, to close 
its commercial department and to withdraw from the provision of credit to 
Zambian traders. It transferred this obviously risky business to the Credit 
Organisation of Zambia (COZ), which soon collapsed under a mountain of 
political loans and bad debt. The Industrial Finance Company seems to have 
met a similar fate. Another reason for their failure was, of course, the break-
down of transport networks.47  
Beveridge and Oberschall’s list of reasons for the closure of state shops is 
not convincing. Inefficiency was not a valid reason for closure in relation to 
ZTC or ZCBC shops – certainly not in 1968-9 when the old management was 
still in place. It was generally agreed that the Mwaiseni shops were poorly run, 
but there were very few of them. Duplication could be a reason for closing 
shops, but only if it was agreed that competition between state shops was 
undesirable. Declining profits cannot really have been a factor in the early 
years. Zambesi Trading continued to pay dividends until 1972-3, and ZCBC 
probably did the same.  Political pressure was, of course, an issue. The takeover 
agreements left the managements of the old companies in place and they were 
supposed to be able to run their businesses profitably and without interference. 
They had a strong interest in doing so because a large proportion of the 
payments that they were to receive for the shares that they had sold were to be 
paid for out of future profits – in the case of ZTC over four years.  
                                               
46
  Beveridge and Oberschall, African businessmen, 164-65. These authors contradict 
themselves on page 248 of their book where they write that ‘to cut losses 154 of 272 
rural stores were sold to private businessmen’. The figure of 272 for rural stores 
cannot be correct – the figures 272 or 273 must refer to the total number of stores 
taken under the control of Indeco Trading, of which a small proportion were urban. 
They are, of course, also wrong to suggest that the reason for selling stores was to 
cut losses. Nor is it the case that all of these stores were sold: some were sold, some 
closed, and some transferred to employees. Their figures also take no account of the 
transfer of stores between companies or the opening of new stores.  
47
  On credit see Martin, Minding their own business, 96. 
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Price controls and other pressures 
It soon became clear, however, that Kaunda had no intention of abiding by these 
agreements. Although price controls had been re-introduced in 1967-8, and laid 
down limits on profit margins, he clearly saw the state shops as another means 
of controlling prices. In his Matero speech he explained that he was enlisting the 
state shops in the campaign against inflation in the prices of essential commo-
dities. He made it clear that he expected them to accept narrower than those that 
the Price Controller had prescribed.  
Comrades, I am determined to see a stop in the rise of the cost of living of the poorer 
income groups. I have, therefore, given directions to the four State trading organi-
sations – ZCBC, ZOK, Mwaiseni, and Zambezi (sic) Trading – to ensure that the 
prices of the following items will be reduced or will be held steady from now on. 
The items are: Maize Meal; Poultry; Kapenta (dried and frozen); Milk (condensed 
and powder); Cooking Oils and Fats; Butter; Margarine; Sugar; Candles; Toilet 
Soaps and Detergents; Cold Drinks; Bread and Flour Meal.48  
Another kind of political interference tended to occur at the district level 
where there was pressure on state shops from district governors to provide jobs 
to their political protégés and family members. Geoff Kates, who managed ZTC 
efficiently and profitably from 1969 to 1972, gave this as the reason for his 
resignation and departure from the country in the latter year. He had refused 
demands from the district governor and a minister that he employ unqualified 
staff and had told them that he had an obligation to the government to ensure 
the business was profitable. He resigned when his wife began to receive abusive 
phone calls. Sardanis says that he agreed to a number of political appointments 
to jobs in the Indeco group before his resignation in 1970.  The dismantling of 
the rural stores network, the inflation of the management structure, and the 
employment of unqualified staff, would soon have resulted in losses, even if 
there had not also been pressure on prices.49 By 1972 the management of Indeco 
was concerned about the effects of price controls on its own profitability. The 
meagre records of the ZTC, the most efficient and profitable of the Indeco 
subsidiaries, suggest that it had ceased to make profits by 1973-4.50  
Beveridge and Oberschall took a generally optimistic view of the economic 
reforms, which they did not examine in detail, but even they pointed to the 
problems that African traders encountered in establishing or taking over rural 
stores. These included the non-availability of credit, the difficulty of organising 
                                               
48
  Ibid., 56-7. 
49
  Interview with Geoff Kates, Virginia Water, Jan. 2001.  
50
 Macmillan, An African trading empire; B. Turok, Mixed economy in focus: Zambia 
(London, 1989), 127, quoting Andrew Kashita, Indeco Annual Report, 1972.  
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transport, lack of experience of retail trade and of bookkeeping.51 Geoff Kates 
pointed out that even store managers who had experience of working with 
trading companies had problems when they took over stores. He gave the 
example of a ZTC manager who was given his store for nothing and required to 
pay for the stock over five years. He was unable to distinguish between capital 
and income and spent K3,200 of his first takings on a second-hand car.52 It is 
hardly surprising that many, probably the majority, of those who moved enthu-
siastically into rural retail trade in 1969-71 failed to stay the course.  
The impact of the collapse of rural trading networks  
and the depression on rural production and livelihoods 
The consequences of the oil price rise, and the subsequent collapse of copper 
prices, did not hit Zambia with full intensity until 1975, but by that time old-
established rural trading networks, whether those of trading companies or 
smaller Indian businesses, had been largely dismantled, and many of the suc-
cessor businesses had already collapsed or were in difficulties. The weakening 
of rural trade networks made it more difficult for people in rural areas to with-
stand the depression. The collapse of produce buying removed the incentive for 
rural people to produce and shortages of commodities made their life even more 
difficult. In an astonishing reversal of the earlier economics of freight, parastatal 
and government trucks carrying goods into and out of the provinces were ac-
tually forbidden to carry back-loads in either direction.53  
The consequences of these failures do not seem to have been noticed offi-
cially until the end of the decade. Research done in rural areas in 1979-80 for an 
International Labour Office (ILO) report, which was published in 1981 as 
Zambia: Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure, provides the first evidence 
of the longer-term consequences of the economic reforms. The report stated:  
Over the past decade rural people have been progressively deprived of access to 
goods. In urban centres there have been shortages – for example, of soap, washing 
powder, salt, paraffin, sugar, cooking oil, candles, blankets – but in many rural areas 
such goods have often been non-existent. Urban people have to queue or buy on the 
black market; most rural people do not have a queue they can join. They either have 
to travel long distances in the hope of getting what they want, or do without. The 
clearest evidence of this trend is the closing of many rural shops and the emptiness 
of those that remain. In all areas visited by the Mission, it is easy to find shops that 
have shut down […].Many rural people if they wish to buy basic goods have to bear 
                                               
51
  Beveridge and Oberschall, African businessmen, 164-5. 
52
  Interview with Geoff Kates.  
53
  ILO, Zambia: Basic needs in an economy under pressure (Addis Ababa, 1981), 
volume 2, 135. See also ILO, Narrowing the gaps: Planning for basic needs and 
productive employment in Zambia (Addis Ababa, 1977), 326. 
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a high cost in time, energy, and cash to travel to district centres. But the district 
centres are themselves inadequately supplied. When goods do arrive they are quick-
ly bought by those on the spot. And some goods do not reach the districts at all 
[…].54 
After pointing to the damaging effects of controlled prices, and their in-
evitable consequence of shortages, and black market prices which rose to three 
or four times the official price at any distance from district centres, the report 
also pointed to the ill effects on agricultural production of fixed producer prices. 
It went on to point out that:  
Shortages and high prices have destroyed livelihoods. Shortages and high prices for 
nails, gas bottles, leather, wax, needles, cotton thread, and bicycle and other spare 
parts, have contributed to the decline in shop-front tailoring, watch and shoe 
repairing, welding and tinkering, bicycle repair, and other small-scale crafts in the 
rural areas. Local variations can be expected but the Mission is not aware of any 
rural areas outside a district centre where there has been an increase in shops, 
trading, and craft services over the past decade. The trend has been less economic 
activity, less employment, deteriorating terms of trade, and shrinking access to 
essential goods.55 
A detailed appendix, which contrasted the situation in the Luapula Province 
in 1975 with 1980, pointed to the damaging effects of the depression and the 
decline in retail trade. It noted that insufficient attention had been paid in an 
earlier report to the recession that began in 1975 because it was seen as a 
temporary setback following the economic upturn of 1974 and as similar to the 
earlier short-lived recession of 1971-2. By 1980 it was apparent that the 
depression was much more serious and deep-seated. So far as retail trade was 
concerned, the report noted a further concentration of trade in district centres 
and a decline of village shops and informal traders in remote rural areas. On the 
supply of essential commodities, it noted:  
Supply of basic commodities to the province continues to be erratic: Bread or flour, 
cooking oil, mealie meal, salt, washing powder, bathing soap, soft drinks, paraffin, 
candles, sugar, and blankets have each been absent from the shelves of district centre 
shops for considerable periods over the last 12 months though the situation seems to 
be improving somewhat with the resumption of trading with South Africa. Such 
shortages have three characteristics: the failure of national trading systems to 
provide regular and sufficient stocks wholesale; the failure of the wholesale system 
to feed the retail distribution in the district centres; the concentration of retail 
distribution in the district centres which leaves large numbers of people in the 
Province wholly unsupplied.56 
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  ILO, Zambia, vol. 1, 22.  
55
  Ibid., vol. 1, 23-4. 
56
  Ibid. vol. 2, 137.  
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Conclusions 
Although the ILO report makes it clear that there had by 1981 been a decade-
long decline in retail trade in rural areas, it could still be argued that the real 
cause of this decline was the depression and not the Economic Reforms. It could 
also be argued that it was price controls and not the denial of licences to 
‘resident expatriates’ that was the primary cause of shortages of essential 
commodities and black-markets. Clearly, the depression was increasingly severe 
from 1975 onwards and price controls did have a distorting effect on retail trade 
in both urban and rural areas. There is room for more detailed research on what 
happened to rural retail trade in the 1970s, but I would argue that the deliberate 
creation of a commercial ‘vacuum’ by the removal of Indian trading networks, 
the denial of licences to a company like Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, and then 
the systematic dismantling of the rural networks of what had become the state 
shops, was misguided and reckless. It demonstrated little understanding of the 
value and fragility of commercial networks, the difficulty of running small 
shops in remote places, and the relationships between retail trade, agricultural 
production, and local employment in crafts. It was an example of social en-
gineering that drew its ideological inspiration from a misunderstanding of the 
history of retail trade, and of the emergence of African entrepreneurship, in 
urban areas. Its main impact was on poor people who lived out of sight in rural 
areas. Its impact was greatest on the majority of them who lived at some 
distance from the district centres that were most frequently visited by politicians 
and civil servants. If the old-established retail trading networks, with their 
decades of managerial experience, and their international lines of credit, 
intelligence and supply, had been left in place, they might have enabled people 
to ride out the depression more effectively than they were able to do. This was 
especially true of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn because of its dense network of 
small rural stores and its exceptional links with prominent international retail 
chains. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Mulungushi Economic Re-
forms had disastrous results for most Zambians – especially those in rural areas. 
‘Resident expatriate businessmen’ were not angels, but when dealing with capi-
talists and capitalism, there is a good deal to be said for dealing with ‘the devil 
you know’.  
  
10 
The informalization of Lusaka’s  
economy: Regime change,  
ultra modern markets, and  
street vending, 1972-20041 
 
Karen Tranberg Hansen 
‘Street vending [is] an initiative of self-employment since there [are] no jobs left in 
the country […] We can’t eat the council’. (Street vendor, Julius Katongo, at a 
demonstration prior to a street clearance by the Lusaka city council, 12 Aug. 2002)2 
At the same time as free market policies have encouraged foreign investment in 
Zambia since the early 1990s, they have entailed restriction on the freedom to 
market on the part of a large part of Lusaka’s population as I demonstrate in this 
paper. Events involving confrontations between street vendors, market traders, 
and agents of the state over the use of space for vending in Lusaka touch the 
                                               
1
  While this paper is a product of long-term research in Zambia, it draws specifically 
on work I conducted in Lusaka markets in 1999 with support from Northwestern 
University’s Research Grant Committee and a research project on urban youth I 
carried out in Lusaka between 2001 and 2005 as part of a collaborative research 
project funded by the Council for Research on Developing Countries of DANIDA 
(Denmark). When in Zambia, I am a research affiliate of the Institute for Economic 
and Social Research at the University of Zambia. I am grateful to Chileshe Mulenga 
for his collaboration. I thank Ilse Mwanza for keeping me up-to-date on market de-
velopments and many other issues. Parts of the discussion about market develop-
ments through 2000 draw on Karen Tranberg Hansen, ‘Who rules the streets? The 
politics of vending space in Lusaka’, in: Id. and M. Vaa, eds, Reconsidering infor-
mality: Perspectives from urban Africa (Uppsala, 2004), 62-80. James Ferguson, 
Jeremy Gould, and Wilma Nchito offered critical comments on an earlier version. 
2
  Quoted in ‘Street vendors protest against re-location’, The Post, 13 Aug. 2002. 
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core of the changing interrelationship between local people, their state, and 
global forces that together constitute Zambia’s political economy. The global 
processes have to do with the current agenda of international development 
policy aimed to restructure the economy. The local dynamics concern the age 
and gender dimensions of informal economic activity and the social and cultural 
bonds that inform them. 
The ‘war’ between street vendors and local authority in Lusaka has conti-
nued on and off since the 1970s, if not earlier. Even then, the confrontations 
during the Third Republic (since 1991) are fuelled by new dynamics. They are 
set into motion by a widening economic gulf, carved out by recent politico-
economic shifts. To explain this, I first sketch the broader context that has both 
prompted the recurrence of confrontations on the street and changed them. I 
then relate these processes to the redevelopment of some of Lusaka’s large 
markets. Despite recent openings of ‘ultra modern’ market, the vendors’ per-
sistent return to Lusaka’s streets since a major street clearance in 1999 demon-
strates a phenomenon that was not evident in previous confrontations. In effect, 
the 1999 event marks an important turning point in the relationship between 
street vendors and their state. Today’s vendors are making new claims, just like 
Julius Katongo with whom I began, who appropriated the discourse of entrepre-
neurship and micro-enterprise when describing how he made a living. 
Globalization and urban socio-spatial structure 
With few exceptions, leading theorists on globalization have had little to say 
about international development cooperation and, in particular, its effects on 
urban space.3 Their chief focus has been on information technology, culture, and 
                                               
3
  Scholarship on globalization that connects the process to changing urban processes 
does not substantially engage with international development cooperation. See 
Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, 2001); James 
Holston, ed., Cities and citizenship (Durham and London, 1999); Teresa P. R. 
Caldeira, City of walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in Sao Paulo (Berkeley 
and London, 2000). Critical scholarship on development that approaches globali-
zation as an aspect of transnational governance has not been concerned with its 
specific effects on cities and their spatial organization. See Arturo Escobar, Encoun-
tering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, 
1995); James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization 
and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1990); James Ferguson and Akhil 
Gupta. ‘Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’, 
American Ethnologist, 29 (2002), 981-1002. South African scholarship on the post-
apartheid city comes perhaps closest to making some of the interconnections I am 
hinting at. See Christian M. Rogerson, ‘Local economic development in an era of 
globalization: the case of South African cities’, Journal of Economic and Social 
Geography, 91 (2000), 397-411; Richard Tomlinson, Robert A. Beauregard, 
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economy.4 Yet international development policy is an important form of globali-
zation that seeks to bring a country like Zambia into the global world of nations 
on it is terms. These terms include transparent democracies and neo-liberal 
economies promoting the free market as the global standard. As I demonstrate 
in this chapter, these processes have adverse ramifications for the access to 
commercial and residential space of the great majority of Lusaka’s population 
whose livelihoods depend on the informal economy.  
The specific context for this paper’s observations are the succession of 
structural adjustment programs (SAP) by a World Bank initiated Poverty 
Strategy Reduction Program (PSRP) in 2002, the compliance with which in 
April 2005 qualified Zambia for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative. PSRP stresses that poverty reduction must take 
place in a democratic society with open markets and a competitive business 
environment. With PRSP, the previous development agenda’s focus on growth 
and distribution has yielded to concerns with governance and capacity 
building.5 Spending policy under PRSP targets agriculture, tourism, and the 
social sector. Zambia’s PRSP document leaves out such major issues as urban 
growth, employment, housing, and markets, thus ignoring the livelihoods of the 
urban poor.6 
SAP and recent neo-liberal reforms have important ramifications across 
urban space, affecting the livelihoods of different population segments in unlike 
ways, sharpening social and spatial inequalities, and extending them in new 
                                               
Lindsay Bremner, and Xolela Mangcu, eds, Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives 
on the postapartheid city (New York, 2003); David A. McDonald and Laila Smith, 
‘Privatising Cape Town: from Apartheid to neo-liberalisms in the Mother City’, 
Urban Studies, 41 (2004), 1461-84. 
4
  Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 
(Minneapolis and London, 1996); Manuel Castells, The information age: Economy, 
society, and culture (Oxford, 1997); Frederick Jameson and M. Miyoshi, eds, The 
Cultures of Globalization (Durham and London, 1999); Roland Robertson, Globali-
zation: Social Theory and Global Culture (London, 1992).  
5
 Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojaneen’s analysis of Tanzania’s PRSP has many parallels 
to Zambia: ‘Merging the vircle’: The politics of Tanzania’s poverty reduction strate-
gy, Institute of Development Studies, Policy Papers 2 (Helsinki, 2003). 
6
  Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Zambia: Poverty reduction 
strategy paper (Lusaka, 2002). In its 2005 report, the Economic Commission for 
Africa notes tersely that ‘the employment content of PRSPs in Africa remains 
weak’. See Economic Commission for Africa, Economic report on Africa 2005: 
Meeting the challenges of unemployment and poverty in Africa (Addis Ababa, 
2005), 14. 
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ways.7 Two decades of SAP and neo-liberal reforms since the early 1990s have 
altered the nature and availability of space in Lusaka, including land and 
infrastructure, and access to markets.  In the wake of these reforms, changes in 
land values have adversely affected access to housing and its location as well as 
the place and nature of commercial activity.  Because housing markets have 
been privatized and no low-cost government housing constructed since the 
1970s, the vast majority of Lusaka’s population lives in informal housing in the 
peri-urban areas.8 Inadequate provision of electricity, water, and transport 
reduces the exploitation of service and small-scale manufacturing by residents 
in such areas. And due to adjacent commercial developments, the possibilities 
for expansion of most of Lusaka’s low-cost housing areas are limited.  
Above all, globally promoted development policy since 1991 has encour-
aged foreign investment which in Lusaka largely has been directed toward 
retail. One of the highly visible results is the capital’s first modern shopping 
mall, Manda Hill, that opened in October 1999, financed by British and South 
African capital, featuring several South African franchises. Not far from Manda 
Hill another upscale mall, the Arcades, opened in 2003, financed by local busi-
ness enterprises. Additional malls and upgrading of long-existing markets, some 
with Chinese financing, are underway. 
In popular representations in Zambia, ‘freeing the market’ comes close to 
mean opening it to external rather than local participation. Urban retail space in 
Lusaka has been reconfigured as foreign investments, especially by South Afri-
can and Chinese firms, have resulted in selective urban upgrading and new 
patterns of spatial segregation.  Exercises to remove vendors from public space 
have a lot to do with the introduction of ‘free market’ practices, as well as all 
the many other matters that also contribute to make street vendors a problem, 
among them, sanitation, public health, and safety.  
Zambia’s 2003 ranking on the Human Development Index slid to a low of 
164 (of 177 countries).9 The two decades of IMF/World Bank initiated SAP 
programs were marked by growing inequality, unemployment, deteriorating 
health including a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, declining access to edu-
cation, and an urban infrastructure that did not keep pace with population 
growth. Lusaka’s population is approaching two million, and close to half of 
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Zambia’s total population of 11 million is urban. Between 1992 and 1999, 
formal employment declined from 17 to 11 percent of the labor force, offset to 
some extent by increase in informal activities.10  
The mere reference to the enormous growth of the informal economy since 
the 1970s glosses over the many inequalities that are embedded within it, in 
terms of gender and age as well as of activity, location, and organization.  
Privatization of the economy has pushed many adults into the informal 
economy, limiting the entry of young people who perform low-level jobs with 
few prospects for upward mobility and the acquisition of higher qualifications.  
As a result, in today’s transformed urban space, young women and men from 
poor backgrounds have fewer economic options than their parents’ generation 
enjoyed. 
Informalization: Past and present  
The informalization of Zambia’s economy is part of the broader context in 
which confrontations over vending space take place. I use the term informal 
economy as a shorthand for unregulated production, distribution, and service 
provision.11 Defined neither by activity, size, nor location, this perspective 
views informality as a heterogeneous phenomenon identifiable in different types 
of economies, past and present.12 The informalization process can be discussed 
from several angles: As an empirical issue, a research topic, and a concept of 
development policy.13 
The informal economy as an empirical issue: From Lusaka’s earliest days, 
African residents developed work and housing initiatives to supply the goods 
and services the colonial government did not provide.14 Much like the way that 
colonial rulings guided the place and type of economic activity Africans could 
pursue in the city, post-colonial regulations of markets, trade licensing, town 
and country planning, and public health restricted trading and small-scale 
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manufacture to designated market places.15 Small-scale traders and marketeers 
throughout the city center and the townships widely ignored these regulations. 
Although they were chased away from city streets occasionally, traders usually 
returned. 
The informalization process gained considerable momentum from the 
restrictive import and currency regime during most of President Kaunda’s 
Second Republic between 1972-91 when the state controlled the food 
distribution system and fixed prices.16 With shortages of basic commodities a 
fact of everyday life in the late 1970s and early 1980s, street vending was 
referred to as ‘black marketing’.17 When IMF pressure in 1982 prompted the 
price decontrol on several essential commodities and removal of food subsidies, 
the term black marketing came into use for any illegal marketing activity, 
including vending in streets, yards, and homes.18 Police occasionally undertook 
sweeps of black marketeers, confiscated their goods, and imposed fines or 
prison sentences. Even then, the Second Republic might never have functioned 
without these activities because the command economy was unable to produce 
and distribute basic necessities.  
The change of regime in 1991 did not help to increase formal employment 
but fuelled the rapid expansion of informal activities across Zambia’s cities and 
into the countryside. The removal of controls on foreign exchange, imports, and 
prices attracted more people to trade than ever before, and vending became 
particularly visible and dynamic on the streets. The strained economy made 
state intervention in marketing and street vending a complicated matter. In 
president Chiluba’s first government in 1991, the minister of Local Government 
and Housing ordered city councils to allow street vending.19 This decision led 
many traders to desert designated markets for streets and sidewalks. When in 
1993 the Lusaka city council assisted by police and military undertook one of 
many sweeps of street vendors, it clashed with the vendors and a riot ensued. 
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An angry president Chiluba intervened strongly on the vendors’ behalf, blaming 
the city council for not finding alternate places before forcing them off the 
streets. 
Because of president Chiluba’s 1993 intervention, street vending became 
known colloquially as the ‘Office of the President’. Extending this vendor 
friendly atmosphere, the President in December 1996 established a Vendors’ 
Desk with a deputy minister at State House. This decision was subsequently 
interpreted to mean that anyone could trade and erect a stand anywhere. And 
that is precisely what occurred: traders, and aspiring vendors, leaving desig-
nated markets within the city and the townships, descending on the city center 
and setting up stands put together from wood, plastic sheeting, and cardboard. 
Exploiting the streets as an economic infrastructure, the vendors expanded their 
operational area across urban space from alleyways, corridors, and streets in the 
second class trading area, into the light industrial area, and onto the main streets 
of the capital. The term tuntemba came into use for these provisional structures, 
which in the Bemba language translates approximately as ‘area of operation’. 
This term graphically captured what in fact the traders were doing: Staking 
claims on space for their own activities.20 
Lusaka markets and informality as a research topic: We are fortunate to have 
studies of Lusaka markets from the late colonial period and on. When in 1954 
A.A. Nyirenda examined Matero and Luburma markets, small-scale trading was 
much a man’s world; only one fifth of the market traders were women. They 
were not full-time traders but mostly sold seasonal fruit, vegetables, and pre-
pared foodstuffs. Marvin Miracle’s restudy in 1959 showed that women’s 
participation had increased to one third.  The proportion of women traders grew 
after independence according to Anthony Oberschall’s 1970 study in Matero 
market, as did the variety of businesses and trade.21 By the late 1970s and early 
1980s those of us who conducted research into small-scale trade began talking 
about the informal economy. In our studies we observed an increase among 
middle-aged women traders whose earnings ensured household survival when 
the adverse effects of SAP on formal employment began to become evident.22 
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Past and present, trade and retail activities dominate Zambia’s informal 
economy, followed by services and small-scale manufacturing. A common 
finding from the 1980s and 1990s concerns the age and gender division of 
activities.23 In terms of overall numbers, women contributed a lot to the growth 
of the informal economy, especially in trade, but mostly at much lower returns 
than men. The majority of traders of both sexes tended to be middle aged (25-40 
years of age),24 and women continued to dominate in petty trading, older men in 
carpentry and tin-smithing, while younger men worked in auto repair, electrics, 
and mechanics.25 Already in the late 1970s, Wim Hoppers noted that young 
people were at a disadvantage, ‘[…] their better education has not prevented 
them from being forced into the margins of [the informal economy] […] which 
offer few prospects for escape’.26 Focusing on informal manufacturing enter-
prises in Lusaka and Ndola, a 2002 study found many more men (91 percent) 
than women (9 percent) operators with an average age of 36 years.27 
Research findings since the mid-1990s begin to reveal changes in the gender 
and age composition of the urban informal economy. An unpublished survey of 
450 vendors in Lusaka’s city centre and near Kamwala market paints a different 
profile.28 First, the majority of street vendors were male: Close to 90 percent 
male compared to 10 percent female; and second, the majority were young: 
three quarters were in the 20 to 30 age category. A 1997 study of tuntemba 
operators in Kanyama and Chelston in Lusaka, and Mongu and Livingstone 
confirms this profile: 88 percent were men, and 60 percent of them were 
between 15 and 25 years old. Because street vending entails more risks and 
dangers than vending in designated markets, this gender and age profile is not 
                                               
389-408; Karen Tranberg Hansen, ‘The urban informal sector as a development 
issue: poor women and work in Lusaka, Zambia’, Urban Anthropology, 9 (1980), 
199-225; id., ‘Lusaka’s squatters: past and present’, African Studies Review, 25 
(1982), 117-36; id., Keeping House. 
23
  Zambian Central Statistical Office, Women and men in Zambia: Facts and figures 
(Lusaka, 1991). 
24
  Hans C. Hahn, Some characteristics of informal sector businessmen in Lusaka and 
Kitwe, Zambia, World Employment Programme, Southern African Team for em-
ployment promotion, Working Paper (Lusaka, 1982), 6-9. 
25
  Peters-Berries, The urban informal sector, 3. 
26
  Wim H. M. L. Hoppers, Out-of-School Youth and the urban labour market: A case 
study of selected Lusaka industries, Urban Community Research Report 6 (Lusaka, 
1981). 
27
  Chileshe L. Mulenga, Potential growth sectors, skills endowment and gaps in the 
informal sector: Case study of Lusaka and Ndola, Report contracted by the Entre-
preneurship and Informal Sector Development Unit of TEVETA (Lusaka, 2002). 
28
 Report to the technical sub-committee of the inter-ministerial committee on street 
vending, unpublished report filed at the Research Unit of the Lusaka City Council, 
1995. 
221 
 
surprising. What is striking is that only a minority of the young male vendors 
were married.29 They earned so little that they were unable to establish their 
own household as I noted in my own research in city centre and township 
markets since 1992, when I met many more young unmarried male vendors than 
I did in the 1970s and 1980s.30 
The informal economy as a policy concern:  Neither the one-party state nor 
the state in the neo-liberal era has been keen on the informal economy. The 
general approach to urban growth and along with it, the informal economy, has 
been neglect if not outright hostility. Intermittently, mostly through external 
intervention, specific urban issues have been brought into focus. But only 
recently with World Bank endorsement of PRSP are pro-poor policies called on, 
including support for micro-enterprises and credit, in a way that recognizes 
informality as an asset rather than a problem that ought to go away.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 11 Vendor at his tuntemba on Indepence Avenue  
 before it was demolished in 1999. 
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Photo 12 Secondhand vendors on the ground of the construction  
 site of the new market at Soweto. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 13 Completed market at Soweto called the Lusaka  
 City Market. 
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Photo 14 Fruit vendor turned mobile after being chased away  
 from selling at the bus station and taxi rank in front 
 of the University Teaching Hospital in 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 15 Dried fish vendor inside Lusaka’s new City market. 
 Printed cloth at nearby stall in the background. 
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Figure 2 The Post, 3 May 1999 
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Photo 16 Unfinished market structures at Chilenje 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 17 Unfinished market structures at Chilenje 
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Photo 18 Unfunished market structures at Libala 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 19 Crowding at the old Soweto Market 
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Housing was probably the first aspect of the informal economy on which the 
state acted in Zambia. This was in 1974 when a World Bank loan supported an 
upgrading program in three of the capital’s largest squatter complexes. Far-flung 
changes in land laws and property ownership were undertaken, partly under 
World Bank pressure. Even then, when the project was handed over to the city 
council in 1980, more people lived in squatter areas than in any other type of 
housing, as they still do today in Lusaka.31 
A consistent policy on the informal economy has never developed, neither 
under the regime of Kaunda nor of Chiluba, the vendors’ desk notwithstanding, 
except by way of encouraging the growth of what today we call micro-
enterprise. This concern with micro-enterprise was in 1978 during Kaunda’s 
reign in the form of Village Industry Service, an NGO with close links to UNIP, 
and the Small Industry Development Organization, established by an act of 
parliament in 1981.32 Informal employment was first mentioned in a 1986 labor 
force survey that described it as subsistence farming, own account work, unpaid 
family work, and business in enterprises with five or less employees.33 It 
featured in development plans but was not allocated funds for program imple-
mentation. When the informal economy was mentioned at all, it was as a last 
resort constituting a residual category that might absorb people who had lost 
their jobs due to SAP.34  
Recently, an attempt at a more comprehensive policy has emerged, specific-
ally focused on so-called micro-enterprise with clearly targeted beneficiaries: 
young women and men out of school from Grades 7 through 12, for a demand 
driven culture of entrepreneurship. Pressed on in the last half of the 1990s by 
the World Bank and donors as sector program support to technical training 
(2001-2005), the new Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship 
Training (TEVET) policy was passed by an act of parliament in 1998. Control 
was moved from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training 
to the TEVET Authority (TEVETA) in an effort to decentralize implementation 
and disbursement of funds. 
As part of TEVET’s capacity building program, the dilapidated infrastruc-
ture, curricula, and teaching in training institutions are to be upgraded. The aim 
is to link training with demand which today is considered overwhelmingly to 
arise from the informal economy. While this policy shift recognizes that the 
formal economy has not absorbed much skilled labor for the last three decades, 
it does not acknowledge that Zambia’s urban informal economy is dominated by 
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retail rather than manufacturing activities and that the majority of these activi-
ties serve survival purposes that do not generate economic growth.35 And above 
all, the new policy does not reckon with the way in which the informal economy 
produces competence and business skills. The 2002 study to which I referred 
earlier found that 80 percent of the workers interviewed had obtained technical 
skills through informal apprenticeships.36 A 2003 survey involving interviews 
with 100 workers in several low-income areas of Lusaka found that 70 percent, 
average age 26 years, had acquired their skills through informal learning on the 
job.37 Detracting attention from the structural barriers of the formal labor market 
in the era of late capitalism, this policy shift raises difficult questions about 
whether the reinvigoration of technical and vocational training merely will 
promote survival activities or help balance the supply of skilled work with the 
demands of the economy by absorbing more young people into productive 
income generating activities that are capable of sustaining economic growth.  
Designated markets 
The term designated, or authorized, markets refers to areas where urban retail is 
permitted under the Market Act. Vending is illegal in the areas in between the 
designated markets in the city center. By 1980, Lusaka had 36 designated 
markets. The number grew in the late 1990s to 40 designated city markets and 
54 designated township markets.38 As these markets grew in number and size, 
they diversified their commodity base, service activities, and participants, in-
cluding from the 1980s on, more adult persons retrenched from formal employ-
ment and young people out of school, especially young men. 
Lusaka’s largest market, Soweto, developed informally and illegally in the 
late 1970s as a center of the produce trade for peri-urban farmers at the edge of 
the light industrial area on privately owned land. It soon featured the capital’s 
largest auto part section and numerous small-scale manufacturers, repair shops, 
and service providers. The name Soweto derives from the large African town-
ship outside of Johannesburg whose population was relegated to the periphery 
of the city, with few services provided.   
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The market grew rapidly. Toward the end of 1994, traders in Soweto 
market’s outside section and part of the built-up interior were relocated to yield 
space for the construction of a new market. Several months of trouble preceded 
the move before traders vacated their stands. In return, the city council promised 
them stands in the new market. Some traders went farther out on the open field, 
establishing stands underneath tall pylons carrying power cables. Others moved 
on to Kamwala where many set themselves up on the open field outside the 
built-up market, next to the railway tracks.  
Above all, traders spilled into the streets. The 1997 opening of the new 
Soweto market, now called City Market, did little to halt these processes. Many 
stand-holders who had fought to be allotted space in the new market soon 
vacated their stands, complaining of lack of customers and high fees. A few 
days after the market’s opening, the city council burned the tuntembas on its 
outskirts. And stand-holders continued to leave the new market for the streets in 
ongoing conflicts between inside and outside traders, police, the city council, 
management, and political cadres.  
By Christmas 1998 in Lusaka, street vending had achieved anarchic propor-
tions. Main streets, alleyways, and shop corridors in the city center, and many 
other places, had turned into one huge outdoor shopping mall with thousands of 
street vendors selling all manner of goods. The crowding in this the least capi-
talized and most labor intensive part of the economy caused traffic problems, 
posed public health dangers, and gave pickpockets and thieves a field day.  
In the pre-dawn hours of 28 April 1999, council workers, police, and 
paramilitary in riot gear razed the temporary market structures, the tuntembas, 
in Lusaka’s city center, extending the demolition the following night and weeks 
across the city, into the townships and, in June, to the Copperbelt and the towns 
along the line-of-rail. Like many others, Steven Daka, a 23-year-old paint 
vendor, expressed his disbelief when he found his tuntemba demolished. Moses 
Chishimba, also 23 years old, was shocked when his food stall, from which he 
had raised money to build a two-room house in a compound, was destroyed.39 
Unlike in 1993, the president, who must have approved this costly removal, 
kept quiet. The deputy minister of the Vendors Desk took the flak, arguing that 
the move to designated markets would place vendors in enabling environments 
and enhance their security. Steven Daka commented that the minister should be 
‘declared redundant’. For a while Lusaka’s main streets remained almost free 
from vendors who were such a common sight throughout the 1990s, yet they 
soon returned in a variety of disguises, among them car boot sales, sales from 
containers, and business conducted during rush hours. 
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Market management 
Markets in Zambia are state property. The Market Act empowers the minister of 
Local Government and Housing to delegate development and management of 
markets to local authorities (district, municipal, and city councils).40 In the past, 
councils or authorized co-operative societies managed markets. Stand holders 
paid levy to the council, rent to the co-operative society, and daily market fees. 
Many also paid fees to funeral societies, football associations, and security 
guards. In the open economy era, local authorities have begun to contract 
private firms to manage designated markets. Because markets are strategic 
places for recruitment, their management has been a target of political 
maneuver. During the Kaunda regime, the ruling party, UNIP (United National 
Independence Party), usurped power under the Market Act, often through the 
co-operative societies, in this way controlling, or taking control through its 
Youth Wing, of the allocation of stands in many markets.41 UNIP membership 
became a prerequisite for access to a stand. Stand-holders, especially women, 
were rounded up to line the streets, cheer, and dance in the airport on the occa-
sion of formal state visits.   
The party legacy is still evident today. The MMD (Movement for Multi-
party Democracy) has kept a visible presence with an office and staff in many 
markets as have some opposition parties. Politics in markets complicate the 
efforts of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing to implement donor 
required decentralization of the urban administration, an example of which is 
the market management by private firms.   
When it opened in August 1997, the new City Market was the first market to 
be managed by a private company. This arrangement did not last more than a 
couple of years. In 1999, when I conducted research there, the MMD main-
tained an office in the very center of the market’s inside section. Lusaka’s 
largest market, Soweto, has offices not only of the council, the MMD, and other 
parties, but also of the Soweto Marketeers Co-operative, and ZANAMA (Zam-
bia National Marketeers Association), an association involved in markets on the 
Copperbelt for some years. Within markets, different groups quarrel over who is 
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in charge in a process that pits marketeers’ associations, the city council, the 
ministry, and political party branches against one another.42 
The latest proposal concerning markets is a spectacular illustration of lack of 
coordination. In April 2005, president Mwanawasa instructed the minister of 
Local Government and Housing to establish boards to manage the affairs of 
markets and bus stations. Such an approach is expected to accelerate ‘develop-
ment in Local Authorities and helping them control street vending’.43 A similar 
idea had been introduced in the late 1990s in the management model that was 
part of the EU’s market rehabilitation project.44 In line with the externally 
mandated policy on decentralization, market boards are to represent marketeers, 
consumer associations, local government, commuters’ associations, and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.45 Perhaps such boards might serve to 
depoliticize the management of markets, lessening the persistent wrangles be-
tween councils, co-operatives and marketers associations, and political parties. 
But for this outcome to occur, party allegiance must not bias decisions about 
board membership. Last but not least, aside from mentioning vendors in pas-
sing, this new management approach appears to pertain to street vendors only 
by way of control rather than of assistance that might enhance the earnings 
potential and livelihoods of the thousands of people whom investment driven 
market liberalization is displacing from public space. 
Ultra modern markets 
The term ‘ultra modern’ market gained currency in 1994 when President Chi-
luba returned from an official trip to Israel and talked enthusiastically about 
public markets he had seen during his visit. All ultra modern market projects 
have included plans for most of the following: Car park, taxi rank, police post, 
council office, supermarket, restaurants, and (fee paying) toilets. The markets 
are electrified and have piped water access. I briefly describe the market pro-
jects that have been underway in Lusaka.  
The City Market: The Israeli-inspired market that was constructed on the 
grounds of Soweto market was controversial already before its opening. The 
source of the market’s funding was never revealed.46 Israeli consultants super-
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vised the construction by personnel from the Zambian Army and the National 
Service. Construction began in 1995 and reached completion in 1997. Vendors 
were slow to take up stands in the new market, which for a long time was 
referred to as a ‘white elephant’. 
Prior to and after the 1999 massive clearing of street vendors, the city 
council encouraged vendors to return to designated markets in the townships, 
apply for stands in the new City Market or set themselves up in Chibolya, a site 
west of the light industrial area that in 1997 had been slated for a market.  In 
1999 when these arguments were made, Chibolya market had not been com-
pleted. Only a perimeter wall had been built, while water tanks and ablution 
blocks still were under construction. A few vendors had put together temporary 
stalls while others displayed their goods on the ground.   
EU market upgrading: In the late 1990s, the European Union launched an 
urban market upgrading project in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. The project 
began with a pilot program in Lusaka targeting Chilenje market for upgrading 
and Libala and Nyumba Yanga for new markets. The markets were to be run 
according to a new management model that aimed to reduce bureaucracy and 
political interference, increase participation, and be cost effective. Revenue 
from the market was to go into a credit fund for disbursement to members. 
Market advisory committees, along the lines of what president Mwanawasa 
later on described as boards, with members from stand-holders, were to oversee 
the market manager, control the credit fund, and liaise with the city council, 
government, and donors.47 
When I first saw them in 2002, only one of the EU supported markets had 
been completed, the market in Nyumba Yanga, a middle-income residential area 
that did not had previously have a market. The construction of market structures 
in Chilenje and Libala almost reached completion. Parts of the existing markets 
had been demolished to yield space, and hundreds of vendors lost their stands. 
At Chilenje, this meant demolishing half of the old market. Idle for many years, 
the unfinished market structures are ruins, testifying to a breach between the 
city council and the building contractor. In 2003, some Zambia Police officers 
and their families squatted in the unfinished market structures at Chilenje, 
                                               
General’s Office queried the expenditures, it revealed irregularities in the handling 
of finances, record keeping, and contract allocation. Hansen, ‘Who rules the 
streets?’, 65. 
47
  Wilma S. Nchito, ‘New markets, new practices, does gender matter? A study of the 
management practices in the new markets of Lusaka, Zambia’, paper presented at 
the Nordic Africa Institute’s workshop on ‘Urban Governance, Gender, and Mar-
kets’, Bamako, 2002. 
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because they lacked housing.48 When construction of the Copperbelt part of the 
market project was about to begin in 2004, there were indications that the 
completion of the Chilenje market was to be included in the EU rehabilitation 
project.49 
The Luburma-Kamwala redevelopment:  Lusaka’s ‘second class trading area’ 
during the colonial period, Luburma-Kamwala, opened for African trade in the 
1950s.  After independence it developed into the capital’s liveliest trading area 
with Indian wholesale shops selling anything from groceries to hardware to 
chitenge (colorful printed fabric) to salaula (imported secondhand clothing). As 
the shopping area of choice for people with limited income, it grew rapidly. By 
the mid-1990s the space outside the market had filled, absorbing traders who 
were displaced by the development of the new market at Soweto and many 
others.  
When a Chinese-funded redevelopment project began at Kamwala in 2001, 
hundreds of traders were forced away. The project is a private investment by a 
firm, China Hainan, through a contract with the city council, allowing the firm 
to run the market for 65 years in order to recover capital investments.50 The 
redevelopment of parts of the old, dilapidated market appeared as a welcome 
solution to the oppressive crowding in the market. But the construction pro-
gressed slowly, stalling several times as marketeers, including container-based 
operators, refused to move.  Problems arose over rental fees.51 Politics entered 
as MMD cadres criticized the high rental fees, their pegging to the dollar, and 
the implied prioritizing of foreign investors.52 The project’s joint-venture aspect 
became suspect. The 65-year lease did not follow the rules of the Local Govern-
ment Act authorizing the city council to lease out land for 15 years only.53 
The new shops at Kamwala market were rented to traders of various back-
grounds, including Chinese, Lebanese, Indians, and Zambians. Rumor had it 
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  ‘23 Lusaka police officers squat at Chilenje market’, Sunday Times of Zambia, 22 
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  ‘EU releases K25bn for market repairs’, Times of Zambia, 31 July 2004. It is unclear 
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Mail, 29 July 2004. 
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that some Zambians sublet their shops to Chinese traders.54 The Chinese were 
alleged to bring in merchandize of cheap clothing, footwear, house-wares, and 
electrical gadgets from Hong Kong, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of 
China. Catering to higher-end traders by charging rents that pushed out less well 
capitalized traders, the redeveloped market forced small-scale traders who had 
operated from Kamwala for years to enter the already crowded informal eco-
nomy.55 
The Chachacha market redevelopment: In September 1999, the vendors in 
Lusaka’s Town Centre learned that their market was to be demolished to pro-
vide space for a ‘high-cost shopping complex’.56 The Town Centre Market had 
developed shortly after independence (in 1966) in the heart of the central busi-
ness district. It catered in the 1970s to expatriate needs. At the height of scarcity 
in the 1980s, the Town Centre Market was a hive of black marketing and also 
one of Lusaka’s busiest bus stations. In the 1990s, it functioned as a market of 
convenience for the city center’s workers, filled up by small restaurants, she-
beens (drinking places), and food stalls as well as retail and service activities.  
The new shopping complex developed as a joint enterprise between the city 
council and local businesses with Lebanese background, the United Engineering 
Group.57 The council negotiated a 65-year agreement with the investors. The 
plans included both small and large shops, altogether providing a smaller num-
ber of stands than the old market. The project experienced problems resembling 
those at Soweto and Kamwala, including construction delays caused by the 
unwillingness of marketeers to relocate, reports about substandard construction, 
complaints of excessive shop rental costs, and allegations of foreigners ‘taking 
over the market’. When some of the larger shops opened in December 2004, 
they included pharmacists, hardware dealers, and bakeries. The rental fees for 
the smaller shops, according to displaced traders, were ‘too high’.58 Many of 
these traders have been forced into street vending because of the limited number 
of stalls at the newly completed market. And already within a year of its 
opening, the Chachacha market experienced interference by ruling party mem-
bers in the running of the market advisory committee.59 
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Acts of displacement 
The processes I have described here have not produced any significant changes 
in how to deal with street vendors. The standard exhortation for street vendors 
to move to designated markets is reiterated over and over again. To be sure, 
moving street vendors to designated markets may have potential regulatory 
effects on supervision and revenue collection. After all, marketers might be 
charged tax, much like the presumptive tax that was imposed on buses and taxis 
when the bus stations were de-regulated.60 Similar practices have as yet to be 
applied to markets, perhaps because the construction of ‘ultra-modern’ markets 
since the late 1990s has been slow, has stalled, or does not appear effectively to 
contain the problem of street vending. 
Where did all the vendors go when they were displaced by new market 
developments? Some went to designated markets in the townships where others 
set up tuntembas along streets and in yards, and still others who were better 
capitalized developed home based enterprises.61 But many more pressed into the 
existing, already crowded, markets. After a cholera outbreak in February 2004, 
the area under the power pylons at Soweto market that had absorbed so many 
vendors in the past was razed and the entire market closed for a week for a 
clean-up exercise. The vendors quickly filled up the sides along nearby Los 
Angeles road and others established themselves at Chibolya, where by the 
summer of 2004 self-constructed stands filled in any remaining empty space. 
Without council or donor support, this market has developed into the center of 
the fish trade in Lusaka. When the Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
at the beginning of 2005 took over the operation of Soweto market from the 
council (alleging drop in revenue due to poor management), the minister 
announced that the evicted vendors would not be provided with alternative land 
‘because they had opted to trade on […] illegal land even after advice from the 
relevant authorities’.62 
No wonder that vendors keep turning to the streets and that the council’s 
admonitions that they leave the streets and return to designated markets have 
had, at most, temporary effects. Vendors have returned to the streets, in new 
disguises, with new sales strategies, at specific times of the day, and in strategic 
spots in the city, even though police and paramilitary have kept a visible 
presence in the city centre since the massive clean-up exercise of street vendors 
in 1999. New wrangles and clashes continue to arise in conflicts over space for 
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trading.63 These events are spectacular enactments of disaffection by a popu-
lation segment whose livelihoods have been squeezed by the problematic con-
vergence of global and local processes I referred to at the outset.   
The contradictions inherent in a retail investment approach to development 
are visibly evident on Lusaka’s streets and in its overcrowded designated mar-
kets. Chasing for the bottom, recent South African and Chinese investors, and 
probably others as well, in urban retail employ local people at substandard 
wages, often on piecework conditions where casual employment never becomes 
permanent.64 The adverse distributive effects of investments in urban retail of 
this type are among the results of the state’s attempt to pursue an internationally 
endorsed development agenda. Following the initial euphoria in the wake of the 
shift to market liberalization in the early 1990s, it has now become clear that 
investment driven market liberalization is pushing a new wedge between 
Lusaka’s already sharply divided population. That wedge is about space and 
access, specifically markets and streets, and their regulation. 
Claiming space 
Markets and streets are among the most important sources of non-formal 
employment in Lusaka. In the 1970s vendors took their own initiatives when 
they developed Soweto market. When, in the late 1980s-early 1990s, they 
moved outside Soweto market’s built-up area in search of space, they called the 
large section on the bare ground after ‘Kambilobilo’, a rural resettlement center 
established during the Second Republic on the Copperbelt with the aim of 
turning unemployed urban youth into good farmers. The special meaning of the 
name derives from the fact that the young people who were brought there were 
left without any services. At Kambilobilo there is no infrastructure to speak of 
and no amenities. The term Kambilobilo is used for outside sections of markets 
elsewhere where traders are left to their own devices. When they relocated to 
yield space for the construction of the new City Market, many traders went to 
the open field outside Kamwala market, next to the railroad tracks. They called 
this section Gabon, a designation also used in other open-air markets. The 
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237 
 
connotation is to perish in a disaster, like the Zambia National Football Team 
who died in a plane crash in Gabon in 1993.65 
Naming practices such as these highlight widespread cynicism over lacking 
state’s support of efforts to make a living in the past. In the more recent era of 
market redevelopment and ultra modern markets vendors have wondered 
whether ‘Government would allocate them new land, since each time a new 
market is constructed, the less privileged traders lose out’.66 But the state has 
few resources. What is more, externally endorsed development policy con-
strains its ability to promote a development agenda of its own.  Most of the state 
actions I have described here have been ad hoc interventions prompted by 
political convenience rather than vendors’ needs. Other than recent propositions 
directed towards controlling markets through a new management policy and the 
establishment of the TEVET policy, the state has not proposed any consistent or 
substantive policy to improve the opportunities for the thousands of people, the 
majority of them young men, whose livelihoods depend on markets and streets. 
Caught between an impotent state and intrusive global development agendas, 
the vendors’ reactions are evident in the streets. Since the heavy-handed demo-
lition of tuntembas in 1999, many vendors have resisted the state’s efforts to 
contain them within designated market spaces. Only after the 1999 event did a 
new resolve become evident.67  
Vendors will no doubt continue returning to Lusaka’s streets for as long as 
the problems in the economy and the structure of the labor market keep fueling 
overall economic informalization. The hopes and aspirations of a large segment 
of Lusaka’s population for household livelihoods and social mobility are 
nourished by vending. Street vendor Julius Katongo, whom I quoted at the 
outset, spoke about initiatives of self-employment, that is, of filling in the em-
ployment gap that results from the state’s inability to grow the economy. When 
he and other vendors speak about their tuntembas, they make unprecedented 
claims on ownership. The meanings of tuntemba revolve around notions of area 
of operation/influence, that is to say, being in charge, as a part of a larger whole. 
Such narratives undermine the state’s lackluster control efforts and challenge its 
neglect/lack of support in the rhetoric of entitlement and aspirations that demo-
cracy has promoted since the early 1990s.  
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The body politic of vending and marketing 
Zambia’s multi-party elections in 1991 ushered in neo-liberal development 
priorities that have sharpened long-existing socio-spatial polarizations, extend-
ing them by new dynamics that are particularly visible in urban areas. Shopping 
malls are displacing street vendors. Changing property values are relegating 
low-income residents to housing on the edge of the city. While labor is free in 
the sense described by Marx, cut loose from its means of production, today 
much of Lusaka’s potential labor force has few other work options than the 
informal economy. At the center of public confrontations over space are peo-
ple’s livelihoods which are not only, or exclusively, about economic processes. 
Because households are at the heart of the economy,68 household dynamics and 
the gender and generational relations that inform them play important parts in 
generating livelihoods from the informal economy.  
The vast majority of vendors and small-scale marketeers in Lusaka seek to 
ensure household provisioning over enterprise expansion. The activities at this 
economic level are first and foremost oriented around the survival needs of 
individuals and households. This helps explain to some extent the striking 
fluidity of the market scene where traders come and go, change commodities, 
move between indoor and outdoor spaces, and at times handle other jobs as 
well. It also helps illuminate the fragmented expression of political agency on 
the part of vendors. Lusaka’s informal market scene lacks overarching orga-
nized groups that represent the interests of the diverse traders in different goods 
and services, the women, the old, and the young. Although they keep re-
occuring, the struggles of Lusaka’s street vendors and market traders have been 
episodic and disjointed, by and large concerned with immediate survival issues. 
The scene is so fragmented that the ruling party in 1999 had no qualms about 
launching the largest exercise to remove vendors from urban space ever to be 
conducted in Zambia. In recent years, new market associations have emerged, 
adopting the language of free agents and entrepreneurship, calling for a place in 
decision making, including membership in new governance structures such as 
market boards. As with so much else in Zambia including naming practices such 
as ‘Office of the President’, ‘Soweto’, ‘Kambilobilo’, and ‘Gabon’, they do so 
with a good deal of cynicism because experience has made them doubt the out-
come. 
This paper has noted two policy examples whose constraints have adverse 
implications for the future livelihoods of many urban residents, including ven-
dors and traders. One example, hinging on the policy of decentralization, is the 
new market management model that is likely to diminish the role of local 
government and reduce state access to market revenue. The focus of this model 
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is control, rather than support, of vendors. The second example, revolving 
around the PRSP promotion of democracy and governance, concerns the libe-
ralization of the economy. So far, rather than reducing poverty, the free market 
promotion of foreign investment has contributed to widening the extent of 
poverty, deepening its nature and scope, and restricting many people’s access. 
The local effects of internationally endorsed development efforts to bring 
Zambia into the global fold of democracies play out across a reconfigured urban 
space. In effect, the streets have become a major stage in the struggle for eco-
nomic access in Zambia’s open, but very constrained, economy. In the process, 
questions about vendors (young and old; women and men; dealing with differ-
ent commodities/services) have been redefined into ‘the problem of street vend-
ing’, with a formulation that masks the complexities of livelihoods made from 
vending on the streets. Because the problem of vending is bound up with much 
more than vendors, streets, and markets, including all manner of concerns 
ranging from public health to safety, it constitutes a potentially volatile urban 
political geography that invites repressive action by the state. 
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Fighting for democracy of the  
pocket: The labour movement  
in the Third Republic 
 
Friday E. Mulenga 
Introduction 
My main aim in this paper is to answer the question of why did the labour 
movement in Zambia, after playing such a central role in the democratisation 
process of the country, see its power and influence decline from a relatively 
strong position during the First and Second Republics (1964-1991). The poten-
tial for the movement to become really powerful has not been realised in the 
Third Republic owing to a number of internal and external factors that lie deep 
in its history and threaten the very existence of the movement.  
Labour issues in Zambia, one of the most heavily urbanised sub-Saharan 
African countries, have attracted a lot of academic interest over the years be-
cause unions started asserting their interests during the anti-colonial struggle 
and, later, also played a pivotal role in the overthrow of the Kaunda regime.1 
                                               
1
  H.S. Meebelo, African proletarians and colonial capitalism: The origins, growth 
and struggles of the Zambian labour movement to 1964 (Lusaka, 1986), Chapters 7-
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study of mineworkers in Zambia (New Haven, 1971); J.L. Parpart, Labour and 
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union movement in Zambia up to 1968, Institute of African Studies, Communication 
No. 13 (Lusaka, 1972); A.L. Epstein, Politics in an urban African community 
(Manchester, 1958); E.L. Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule: The copperbelt 
from 1924 to independence (Oxford, 1974); A. Gupta, ‘Trade unionism and politics 
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Moreover, given the country’s mono-economy, it was very important for both 
the colonial and post-colonial governments to control the copper mining com-
panies and therefore the mineworkers. This, more than anything else, accounts 
for the centrality of the position attained in the political economy of the country 
by both the European and African mineworkers.2 
Important sources of information regarding the labour movement have been 
the monthly and annual labour reports and the reports of the numerous commis-
sions of inquiry that analysed labour issues from the government’s perspective. 
These reports stopped being produced from the mid-1980s; as a result, data on 
contemporary workers have become more difficult to access. There are, how-
ever, a number of theses that have covered aspects of Zambian post-colonial 
labour history from which this article has benefited.3 Other recent works have 
adopted a narrowly political perspective, being mainly concerned with explain-
ing labour’s role in the democratisation process from the late 1980s and the 
problems the labour movement has faced as a result of that participation.4 By 
concentrating solely on the political role of the labour movement, they seem to 
lend credit to the argument that African trade unions became an interesting 
object of study only when they took up political roles.5 This chapter, instead, 
will examine the factors that have made it difficult for the trade unions to 
                                               
on the Copperbelt’, in: W. Tordoff, ed., Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1974), 288-
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Brandeis University, 1985; B.B. Liato, ‘Organised labour and the state in Zambia’, 
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Zambia’, Chr. Michelson Institute, Report No. 6, Bergen, 1992; id., ‘The pluralistic 
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The Zambian labour movement’, in: H. Thomas, ed., Globalization and third world 
trade unions: The challenge of rapid economic change (London, 1995), 201-14. 
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effectively represent their members in terms of improving their social and eco-
nomic status. 
Development of the Zambian labour movement after independence 
Shortly after Independence, the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance 
was enacted. The official patronising government view was that the Ordinance 
was meant to strengthen the trade union movement and help the trade unions to 
conduct their affairs freely. However, as I show elsewhere in this paper and 
indeed as other writers on labour in Zambia have shown, the Ordinance aimed 
at helping UNIP control the trade unions. The then Minister of Labour and 
Mines, Justin Chimba, a former trade unionist himself, said that the Bill would 
protect the trade union movement from disruptive outside influence by prohibit-
ing affiliation with foreign agencies and the receipt of outside material assist-
ance without his approval.6  
The 1965 Ordinance, however, can also be read as a response to the disunity 
by which the labour movement had been plagued during the last few years of 
colonial rule. It was with these internal tensions in mind that Mwendapole a 
veteran trade unionist himself, wrote: ‘And when President Kaunda and former 
Governor Evelyn Hone stood before the hoisting of the independence flag on 
24th October 1964, the great and exciting history of the trade union movement 
lay prostrate and powerless to make a significant impact upon the life of inde-
pendent Zambia’.7 Among the other things, the Ordinance endorsed the princi-
ple of ‘one union, one industry’ and compelled all registered trade unions to 
seek affiliation with the newly established Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), now the only legal trade union federation in the country. The Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971 later replaced the 1965 Ordinance. For all of these efforts, 
however, the disunity in the labour movement did not end. In 1974, the enor-
mously influential Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) threatened to pull out 
of ZCTU after its leader, David Mwila, lost the ZCTU elections alongside 
numerous other MUZ officials. MUZ only remained in ZCTU because the law 
did not support such a split.8 Enforced membership of ZCTU undeniably helped 
the labour movement to remain relatively strong: In 1990, trade union member-
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ship among workers in formal employment stood at about 56%, one of the high-
est in Africa.9  
From the late 1970s, Kaunda’s increasingly unpopular and embattled regime 
contributed directly to foment divisions within the labour movement. The UNIP 
leadership considered ZCTU’s Chairman General, Frederick Chiluba, a political 
threat and made numerous attempts to weaken and divide the labour movement 
by attempting to incorporate him and General Secretary Newstead Zimba into 
the UNIP Central Committee. When both men refused to work for UNIP, the 
party tried to lessen their popularity among their followers by arguing that the 
duo was pursuing interests different from those of the workers they led. Africa 
Confidential stated that in 1988 the police Special Branch infiltrated the 
National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW) 
with a view to persuading its executive to suspend Chairman Chiluba. The aim 
of the move was to disqualify the latter from standing for election to the ZCTU, 
membership of whose executive was restricted to those who held a post in an 
affiliated union.10 When ZCTU nullified Chiluba’s suspension and suspended 
some NUBEGW officials after charging them with conspiracy to remove Chi-
luba from office unconstitutionally, the NUBEGW officials, led by Luciano 
Mutale, took the matter to court. While the Kitwe High Court ruled in favour of 
ZCTU, the Supreme Court, led by Deputy Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube, 
overturned the ruling in favour of the NUBEGW officials.11 Chiluba’s position 
was only saved by the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) and the 
Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), which 
gave him senior positions in their organisations.12 When he was eventually re-
elected as Chairman of ZCTU in October 1990, Chiluba delivered a speech in 
which he said he believed he had been saved because God sent angels to redeem 
him through ZUFIAW.13 
Although Chiluba had not declared his candidature for the presidency in the 
1988 presidential and parliamentary elections, he was widely seen as a possible 
presidential candidate capable of unseating Kaunda.14 Such was the threat posed 
by Chiluba that, in another attempt to weaken him, Kaunda accused ZCTU of 
being close to the CIA and several unnamed Western Countries. Kaunda also 
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accused Friedrich Brunke, head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Lusaka, of 
funding ZCTU and told him to leave the country.15 
During the late 1980s, the labour movement had shown public support for 
Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party. In fact, 
when this party was voted in power, they celebrated by holding ‘victory 
marches’ in Lusaka and other parts of the country. The workers now looked to 
the Government with ‘great expectations’ of good remuneration for their labour, 
and ‘respect for professionalism’.16 However, after about two years, the labour 
movement realised that it had claimed a false victory. If political democracy had 
been achieved for the people, the workers still had to fight for ‘economic 
democracy’, or ‘democracy of the pocket’,17 by winning better salaries and 
better conditions of service. The MMD, for reasons that I will shortly expound 
on, did not fulfil its promise to the Zambian workers, despite its 1991 campaign 
manifesto on labour.  
The decline of the labour movement in the Third Republic 
Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner, basing their research on some select Asian countries 
argue that a number of factors produced weak unions that hindered the estab-
lishment of genuine and stable collective bargaining. The factors include, the 
relatively small size of the organised industrial labour force (typically, the 
unorganised informal and agricultural sectors were much larger than the indus-
trial one); the comparative low education of a labour force that could be mani-
pulated by leaders whose goals differed from those of the members and firms 
that employed them; the fragmentation that ensued from the existence of several 
unions at both the national and workplace levels; the absence of legislation 
promoting single bargaining agents inside firms and an orderly bargaining 
structure; repressive state policies that granted decertification and deregistration 
powers to government officials; successful employer opposition to union 
formation; government persecution of labour leaders; the absence of a unified 
employer association that could inspire stable industrial level bargaining; and 
union constitutions that mandated union elections on a yearly basis, thus pre-
venting the development of long-term plans by union leaders.18 
Zambia has not been the only African country where trade unions have lost 
much of their former influence. Schillinger argues that with the notable excep-
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tion of the industrially more developed South Africa and Mauritius,19 the in-
fluence of labour movements in Africa have remained weak in the traditional 
fields of labour relations and that, more than elsewhere, trade unions in Africa 
today are fighting an uphill battle. Their financial position is becoming increas-
ingly weak as a result of the continued decline of formal employment and the 
ensuing loss of members. Moreover, the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and 
World Bank have created a labour-unfriendly environment that has eroded their 
chances of influencing policy decisions. In many places, too, internal divisions, 
splits or rivalry between unions organising in the same sector further have 
weakened labour movements. In many cases the divisions are driven by per-
sonal ambitions of (would-be) union leaders.20  
Some of the factors that produce weak unions have existed in Zambia for a 
long time, while others have only come into being after the transition from a 
one-party state to a multi-party state. The revolutionary political and economic 
changes that have taken place in Zambia since October 1991 have obscured 
some of the important continuities in the historical development of the labour 
movement.  
Financial weakness of the trade union movement 
A factor that has existed for a long time and has undermined the strength of the 
labour movement has been its financial weakness. Berg and Butler argued that 
one criterion through which to judge the political impact of a labour movement, 
or its contribution to political affairs, was the money it supplied to political 
parties. He went on to show that labour movements in Africa supplied much 
less by way of financial resources than those in Europe.21 In Zambia, even the 
African Mineworkers’ Union that by 1952 ‘towered over its fellow unions’ had 
financial problems.22 From its inception, the ZCTU was plagued by financial 
problems.23 The weak financial position of ZCTU sometimes negatively af-
fected its relationship with some of its financially stronger affiliates, as hap-
pened in 1973, when MUZ threatened to strangle ZCTU financially by with-
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drawing its contribution over a wrangle involving Edwin Thawe, who had been 
MUZ General Secretary.24  
After 1992, when the labour movement’s membership began to shrink, the 
issue of its financial weakness became, if possible, even worse. Chiluba and his 
team left ZCTU with financial problems, and in May 1995, the Acting ZCTU 
President, Austin Liato, attributed ZCTU’s failure to help out former workers of 
the liquidated Zambia Airways to the fact that the Chiluba-led ZCTU executive 
had left empty coffers because it had not invested wisely the money from 
workers’ contributions. Liato also stated that ZCTU’s financial position was 
being further weakened by the ongoing splits within the labour movement.25  
Lack of political direction of the trade unions 
Another internal factor that has contributed to undermining the strength of the 
labour movement has been the lack of political direction. Berg and Butler 
observed that during the colonial period the African labour movements largely 
failed to become politically involved and that, even when they did so, they only 
had a limited political impact. After independence, the parties that formed 
governments further restricted the unions’ political role. Although Zambia’s 
economic and social structure was conducive to the development of good rela-
tions between the labour movement and political parties,26 there developed 
instead a troubled relationship, as attested, for example, by the frequent tensions 
between MUZ and UNIP.27 In 2000, when the trade unions became disappointed 
with the performance of the MMD government and wanted to urge their mem-
bers to vote against the ruling party in the elections in 2001, ZCTU leader, 
Fackson Shamenda, refused to support this stance, arguing that while leaders of 
individual trade unions might speak on behalf of their own unions, ZCTU must 
not become politically involved. He further argued that in 1990-91 ZCTU had 
became involved in politics only to help restore democracy and not because it 
was a partisan organisation.28 
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Shamenda was reluctant to throw the labour movement into the political 
arena in order to ensure that neither the MMD nor any other party would be 
given an excuse to interfere in the labour movement’s internal affairs after the 
elections. This reluctance was understandable and may be traced as far back as 
Lawrence Katilungu’s behaviour in the 1950s, when the founder of African 
trade unionism in what was then Northern Rhodesia had resisted appeals from 
political parties to use the unions for political strikes.29 But some younger trade 
union leaders challenged Shamenda’s position. Leonard Hikaumba, president of 
the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (now Civil Servants & Allied Workers’ 
Union of Zambia), urged the labour movement to take a stance on politics. He 
argued that trade unions could not entirely stay away from politics, because the 
decisions made by politicians affected both the labour leaders and the members 
of their unions. Shamenda counter-charged that it was difficult for the ZCTU to 
decide which political party to support because the same people were rotating 
from one party to another. He however said individual trade unions could 
choose a political party to support.30  
We could also say that the strength of the unions has been undermined by the 
fact that strong labour leaders have always been co-opted into the political and 
government system. As early as 1963-64, a time of great turmoil in the labour 
movement, UNIP thought that the co-optation of quarrelling labour leaders into 
government would solve the labour movement’s problems. Those who were co-
opted as cabinet or deputy ministers included such prominent trade unionists as 
Wilson Chakulya, Basil Kabwe, John Chisata, Jonathan Chivunga and Matthew 
Nkoloma; others (Alfred Chambeshi, Gabriel Mushikwa and Timothy Kankasa) 
were seconded to the diplomatic service. However, these men came to be 
accused of willingly abandoning the labour movement for government jobs and 
eroding the confidence of rank and file members in labour leaders. It was partly 
because of this that, from 1974, radical trade unionists, such as Chiluba, who 
placed emphasis on the economic interests of the workers and the autonomy of 
the labour movement ascended to its leadership.31  
Another challenge the labour movement faces is its lack of effective bar-
gainers.32 Some observers of the Zambian labour situation have argued that the 
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labour movement’s fight for survival is not made any easier by it lacking a 
university-trained leadership. This damaging situation results from the com-
bined efforts of the UNIP government, the employers and, unwittingly, the trade 
unions themselves,33 all of whom worked towards ensuring that well trained and 
educated workers would normally be placed in management positions and pre-
vented from belonging to trade unions where they could provide an adequate 
leadership.  
Disunity within the labour movement 
Disunity – about which much has been said at the outset – has continued to 
hinder the effectiveness of the Zambian labour movement in the Third Republic. 
In 1990, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was replaced by a new Act that 
abolished the ‘one union, one industry’ policy. Although the 1990 Act contra-
vened ILO Conventions and was greatly resented by the labour movement, the 
MMD Government did nothing to revoke it. Instead, it soon replaced it with the 
1993 Industrial and Labour Relations Act, that not only confirmed the demise of 
the ‘one union, one industry’ principle, but also allowed the creation of trade 
union mother bodies other than ZCTU. The MMD-promoted change of policy 
made an immediate impact and was accompanied by the formation of numerous 
splinter unions, such as the Primary Education Teachers’ Union of Zambia and 
the Secondary School Teachers’ Union of Zambia, which broke away from 
ZNUT. In a similar vein, the Bankers’ Union of Zambia broke away from 
ZUFIAW.34  
The major split occurred in 1994, after MUZ leader, Francis Kunda, lost the 
elections for the position of president of ZCTU to Shamenda. Kunda, unlike 
Mwila in 1974, pulled MUZ out of the ZCTU because in the new democratic 
environment, the law about compulsory affiliation to ZCTU no longer appliedd. 
Four other unions, namely ZUFIAW, ZNUT, NUBEGW and the National Union 
of Commercial & Industrial Workers (NUCIW) followed MUZ’s example by 
pulling out of ZCTU to form the Federation of Free Trade Unions (FFTUZ) in 
1994.35  FFTUZ was only registered as a second trade union federation in 1998 
after the law permitting the formation of a rival federation was changed in 1997. 
The MMD Government had in 1996 ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 of 
1948, which made it inevitable that the relevant provisions of the labour law 
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would have to be amended to conform to international labour standards. The 
Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997 sought to align the 
law with the provisions of Convention No. 87 of 1948. The Amendment paved 
the way for the formation of more trade unions, including union federations. 
The 1993 Act had only changed the law to allow the formation of more trade 
unions but not of more trade union federations. This was allowed after the 1997 
Amendment. As a direct result of this liberalisation of the law on freedom of 
association, there emerged a crop of small unions that faced problems of lack of 
resources, poor organisation and general instability.36  
However, by 1998, all but one of the five breakaway unions had returned to 
ZCTU. Only ZUFIAW remained outside ZCTU and ultimately became the 
nucleus of FFTUZ. In 1992, it had more than 10,000 members, but in 2001 the 
membership had droppedd to 6,300. In 2001, ZUFIAW was joined in the 
FFTUZ by four other unions, including two splinter unions in the teaching 
profession, to bring its membership to about 32,000.37 As shown in Table 10.3 
below, some sources put the ZUFIAW membership in 2001 at only 5,000. 
In 1992, ZCTU General Secretary, Alec Chirwa, said the proliferation of 
unions in one industry would weaken the labour movement (as employers 
would play unions against one another) and break the solidarity that the labour 
movement had had over the years.38 It is interesting that Chirwa should talk 
about solidarity in the labour movement when scholars and many other inter-
ested observers have recognised the fact that the disunity and the emergence of 
splinter unions are processes associated with internal divisions within the ZCTU 
that became apparent in 1994 and culminated in a split in the trade union move-
ment.  
Effects of economic liberalisation  
Finally, another factor that has contributed to undermining the strength of the 
labour movement has been the decrease in numbers of trade union members as a 
result of the country’s shrinking industrial base and the retrenchments and 
redundancies that started well before the MMD era. In 1980, the Department of 
Labour observed that the employment situation had been deteriorating since 
1975, when the copper price on the world market collapsed.39 In 1990, President 
Kaunda called for a ‘quick’ solution to the crisis as the economic decline was 
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creating an unemployment time bomb. He said that formal employment had 
declined from 381,490 in 1980 to 365,190 in 1984, a decline of 4.3%, and that 
and by 1989 it had dropped to 359,620.40 The declining employment levels 
meant that the labour movement was losing members and becoming weaker. 
The period from 1992 was particularly challenging for the labour movement 
because fundamental economic and political reforms, focusing particularly on 
privatisation, trade and agricultural liberalisation, were implemented. They were 
meant to promote growth and development by reforming a non-competitive 
stage-managed economy and integrating it into the competitive global econo-
my.41 The period under review, of course, also witnessed global changes in 
business, trade and information and communication technologies.42 Globaliza-
tion led to intensified trade reforms designed to integrate the Zambian economy 
into global markets, but the policies had fundamental detrimental effects on 
employment and labour relations policies and practices.43 
The MMD Government began the privatisation programme in Zambia in 
1992 with the enactment of the Privatisation Act No. 21 and the creation of the 
Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) that targeted 280 parastatals for privatisa-
tion. By the end of 2001, 257 companies had been privatised.44 There were also 
public service reforms that led to the reduction of the civil service from about 
139,000 in 1997 to approximately 101,000 in April 2000, a decrease of more 
than 27%.45 Chiluba, in spite of his trade union background, strongly supported 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and in August 1994, underlined its 
inevitability in the following terms: 
I don’t like the Structural Adjustment Programme but I kiss it and will continue 
doing so. In this respect I can declare that I don’t care losing the coming presidential 
elections if people hate me because of the programme. Even when I lose, I will go a 
happy man because I have so far managed to change people’s minds from perpetual 
borrowing to fend for themselves.46 
As Table 11.1 below shows, the impact of SAP on the labour market and 
unionisation has been devastating. Zambia’s labour force has continued to grow 
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despite the economy’s inability to create employment opportunities, particularly 
in the formal sector.47 In 1997, out of a total labour force estimated at 4.4 
million, only 11% were employed in the formal sector. The remaining 89% of 
the labour force were either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. It 
is moreover estimated that formal employment has been declining at an annual 
average of 2%. The contribution of the formal sector to employment has conti-
nued to decline mainly due to the retrenchments, closures and liquidations of 
companies that accompanied the implementation of SAP. Even the privatisation 
programme embarked upon by the government did not create the much-needed 
jobs. Experience has shown that jobs were usually lost in the process of privati-
sation.48  
Table 11.1 Formal employment and labour force trends 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total labour force 
(millions)  3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.99 4.4 4.41 4.6 
 
Formal sector employ- 
ment (thousands)  546 526 496 485 479 475 467 478 
 
Formal sector 
employment as %  
of total labour force    17 16 15 13 12 11 10.5 10.4 
Source: ZCTU 2001, citing various CSO sources 1992-1999 
In 2003, President Levy Mwanawasa, his Minister of Finance, Ng’andu 
Magande, and other ministers and deputy ministers, all expressed views that 
suggested that they had lost faith in the privatisation programme. Their views 
mirrored those of most Zambians, who argued that privatisation was enriching 
foreign investors at the expense of ordinary people.49 But Mwanawasa’s break 
with the economic policies of the Chiluba era remained a pious intention. 
Towards the end of the year, the President was forced to admit that Zambians 
needed IMF, whether they liked it or not.50  
FFTUZ leader, Joyce Nonde, expressed a sense of betrayal with the results 
of privatisation. She stated that the labour movement had generally welcomed 
the principle of privatisation on the understanding that both the government and 
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the new investors would protect the workers’ interests. This hope – Nonde 
continued – had not materialized. Shamenda and other labour leaders had earlier 
reached the same conclusion as Nonde. ZCTU supported privatisation and the 
SAP in principle, but resented the rapidity with which the government was 
implementing its programmes, ignoring the plight of the workers who could not 
make ends meet because of the meagre salaries and wages they earned.51   
As shown by Table 11.2, trade and agricultural liberalisation have been 
disastrous for Zambia’s mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors, as em-
ployment declined in all these sectors. 
 
 
Table 11.2 Formal employment in Zambia, 1990-2000 
Year Public Mining & 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture Other Total 
1990 159,000 142,000 80,000 162,000 543,000 
1991 162,000 140,000 78,000 164,000 544,000 
1992 171,000 136,000 82,000 158,000 546,000 
1993 168,000 126,000 83,000 143,000 520,000 
1994 174,000 108,000 79,000 136,000 497,000 
1995 173,000 108,000 69,000 135,000 484,000 
1996 176,000 95,000 68,000 140,000 479,000 
1997 170,000 92,000 59,000 155,000 475,000 
1998 174,000 86,000 59,000 157,000 467,000 
1999 184,000 85,000 60,000 148,000 477,000 
2000 185,000 83,000 50,000 158,000 476,000 
Source: Situmbeko and Zulu, ‘Zambia: Condemned to debt’, 27. 
It is clear that the implementation of the SAPs and the liberalisation of trade 
union activity itself have fundamentally undermined the labour movement’s 
power.52 Various sources put total union membership at under 250,000 (in 
2001). On the basis of wage employment records, a realistic estimate put union 
density at about 50%. While this is comparatively high in the Southern African 
sub-region, the Zambian trade union movement has suffered an enormous de-
cline in membership, particularly during the 1990s. As shown in Table 11.3, 
during a 5-year period, 1990-1995, ZCTU membership declined from 355,197 
to 290,847, mainly due to privatization and industrial restructuring that led to 
the shrinking of the industrial base and to public service reforms that led to job 
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Table11.3 Major Zambian Trade Unions, 1990 – 2001 
Name of trade union 1990 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001 
Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia  
(MUZ) 58,808 48,000 47,000 40,000 31,251 29,106 
National Union of Commercial 
& Industrial Workers (NUCIW) 27,000 18,000 15,000 15,000 18,000 19,780 
National Union of Building,  
Engineering & General Workers  
(NUBEGW) 25,000 11,000 10,000 10,100 11,392 11,346 
Guards Union of Zambia (GUZ) 13,000 10,000 10,000 11,000 6,720 5,038 
National Union of Communication 
Workers (NUCW)   6,319   5,547 5,000   4,500 4,381 9,780 
National Union of Transport & 
Allied Workers (NUTAW) 7,392   5,500  5,000   4,500 1,099 2,050 
Zambia United Local Authorities 
Workers’ Union (ZULAWU) 25,000 22,000 18,000 21,300 10,000 15,000 
Zambia Union of Financial  
Institutions& Allied Workers  
(ZUFIAW) *** 11,754 7,000 6,000 6,000 5,800 5,000 
Airways & Allied Workers’ 
Union of Zambia (AAWUZ) 8,558 2,800 3,000 2,100    775    775 
University of Zambia & Allied 
Workers’ Union (UNZAAWU) 2,794 5,000 4,000 4,000 2,500    300 
Civil Servants & Allied Workers 
Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ) * 28,000 29,000 29,000 34,500 39,267 34,973 
Zambia National Union of  
Teachers (ZNUT) 36,000  52,000 46,000 35,000 38,249 25,249 
National Union of Public 
Service Workers (NUPSW) 65,610 35,000 34,000 33,000 16,000 15,000 
Railway Workers Union of Zambia  
(RWUZ)  10,000 7,000 6,000 4,250 4,000 2,726 
National Energy Sector & Allied 
Workers Union (NESAWU) ** 3,850 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 3,980 
National Union of Plantation & 
Agricultural Workers (NUPAW) 16,674 16,000 18,000 17,000 16,020 16,000 
Hotel & Catering Workers’ 
Union of Zambia (HCWUZ) 7,000 5,000 6,000 4,000 8,000 3,530 
Zambia National Union of Health 
& Allied Workers (ZNUHAW) 1,219 6,000 5,000 4,010 5,000 6,300 
Zambia Typographical & Allied 
Workers’ Union (ZTAWU) 1,219 2,000 1,500 1,200 1,000 5,169 
Total membership 355,197 290,847 272,500 255,460 223,454 211,102 
*        Formerly civil servants union of Zambia (CSUZ) 
**  Formerly Zambia electricity and allied workers’ union (ZEAWU) 
*** Not affiliated to Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
Sources: Various, i.e., ZCTU, CSO & Ministry of Labour & Social Security. 
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losses. The decline, of course, was also due to the liberalization of the labour 
law that led to unions breaking away from ZCTU. The changed labour law has 
also impacted on union recognition by employers for bargaining purposes. 
While in the past the law made it more or less mandatory for an employer to 
recognize trade unions, this is no longer the case.53  
Employers are now able to resist union organization, especially new 
investors who prefer ‘union-free’ workplaces. The effects of globalization on 
employment and labour relations meant the world of work has been changing 
fast. The concept of a job for life is becoming outdated everywhere in the world. 
Many employers have developed various strategies to frustrate union organiza-
tion, for example through informalization, casualization and feminization of 
employment.54 They use threats of lay-offs and redundancies for those who 
want unionization, and these have tended to discourage workers from joining 
unions. The unions attribute employers’ resistance to unionization partly to the 
absence of any effort to inform new investors of the country’s industrial rela-
tions tradition. The ZCTU is aware of the reasons why it has lost a large part of 
its membership and that it needs to strengthen its membership base. In order to 
achieve this, in 1996, it amended its constitution to accommodate informal sec-
tor workers as associate members.55 
All of the factors discussed above have combined to undermine the strength 
of the labour movement, leading to its marginalization and incapacity effective-
ly to influence economic policy making during the period of democratisation. 
The Chiluba government was, therefore, relatively unconstrained by labour and 
pursued a harsh neo-liberal adjustment programme that even threatened demo-
cracy. 
Conclusion: Survival hopes for the labour movement in Zambia 
Schillinger has remarked that for some time now a largely unnoticed genera-
tional change has been taking place in the world of African trade unionism. Its 
potential implications still remain unclear. In South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, a new generation of trade union leaders, who 
have not had their formative years before independence or under the post-inde-
pendence, single-party system, has moved into leadership positions.56 Larmer 
agrees and sees a revival in the Zambian labour movement under new leaders, 
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Hikaumba and Nonde, detached from the MMD.57 Perhaps this is so, but many 
workers I have talked to disagree. The move to incorporate the informal sector 
workers into the labour movement has not yet taken off. What many people see 
is a labour movement that is fortunate to have the support of a vibrant civil 
society and Churches willing to forge alliances all across the board. Relations 
between the labour movement and the Government are as frosty as ever. 
However, it is encouraging that the labour movement is aware of its problems 
and its prospects. It is aware of the challenges it faces and how it should res-
pond.58 
I agree with Schillinger and many other scholars that have argued that as 
long as most African economies do not improve, the prospects for stronger trade 
unionism will remain slim. But Schillinger is also right to argue that it is pre-
mature to conclude that, because of the challenges that the labour movements 
currently face in Africa, the latter should be written off as relics of the past. This 
is because there are important counter-trends as well, such as new foreign 
investment in Africa that promises new areas of employment and opportunities 
for trade union organisation. Above all, in many countries, labour movements 
remain important political forces that have to be taken into account by the 
holders of political power. Despite their massive membership losses, labour 
movements continue to be among the very few societal organisations in Africa 
with sizeable constituencies, countrywide structures and the potential for mobi-
lising members on social or political matters.59 It should be noted that in spite of 
the labour movement being as fragmented as the opposition political parties in 
Zambia, labour leaders still ‘shake’ government and its leaders with some of 
their statements and observations on social, economic and political issues. This 
means that many people, including the political leadership, are aware of the 
potential of the movement to be influential. 
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12 
Gender and politics: The Zambia  
national women’s lobby group in  
the 2001 tripartite elections 
 
Bizeck J. Phiri 
Introduction 
It has long been established that at least fifty-two percent of the world’s popu-
lation is composed of women. What has not been clear is what percentage of the 
women do participate in the electoral process. As observed by Lise Rakner and 
Lars Svasand, “the distinction between qualified and registered voters is one of 
the most problematic issues […]”1 in this respect. In the case of Zambia, most 
political parties tend to appeal to the women electorate for political support and 
encourage them to register as voters in large numbers. Yet, in reality Zambia has 
exhibited under registration by qualified voters for a variety of reason. And 
because one needs to be a registered voter to qualify for nomination to run for 
political office, women’s movements have taken up the challenge to encourage 
women to register as voters and therefore qualify to stand for election. Indeed, 
as Gisela Geisler correctly pointed out “democracy has proven to be no guaran-
tee for a more equal representation of women in government, […]”.2 The appa-
rent withdrawal of women from political participation has a long history. 
Women in national Zambian politics have long been seen as having played 
an essential, but largely supportive, role. There is a sense in which the African 
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tradition of viewing women as mere supporters of the male-dominated society 
has permeated the literature on and discussion of the nationalist struggle. Yet on 
closer examination, and in the context of the twentieth-first century, it is evident 
that women in Zambia played more than just a supportive role in the nationalist 
politics of the country. While it is true that, organisationally and from the 1950s, 
women in Zambian politics were generally confined to the women’s wings of 
the independence movements, they nonetheless created their own political space 
within the larger movement of independence politics. 
The question that remains unanswered is why women are presented as 
followers rather than leaders in their own right. Mbuyu Nalumango provides 
some explanation to this when she observed that “African women were not 
writers until the last two decades, hence the scanty information available about 
their past”.3 It is in this context that “history” is projected as “his-story” and 
therefore largely projects male dominance in the governance of society. Yet, as 
Nalimango has demonstrated, Zambian pre-colonial history has several 
examples of women leaders. In fact, the chapters in their edited volume has 
persuasively demonstrated the role that women have been playing in politics 
through the “three phases political environment-pre-colonial, colonial and post 
independence”.4 Arguably, therefore, when the Zambia National Women’s 
Lobby Group (ZNWLG) and the Zambia Women Writers Association 
(ZAWWA) decided to collaborate on the project they were embarking on a 
project that would highlight the important role that women play in politics and 
governance. 
The ZNWLG decision to lobby for women’s participation in post colonial 
political processes was informed by the concept of power, which “denotes the 
control over material asserts, intellectual resources and ideology”.5 The Wo-
men’s Manifesto sought to redress an imbalance in the distribution of power 
between men and women. In the pursuit of this agenda, the ZNWLG held a 
National Conference to establish the Women in Politics Forum and to adopt the 
Zambia Women’s Manifesto between 26 and 27 March 2001 at the Mulungushi 
International Conference Centre. Of the several objectives of the conference, 
one is most relevant to this discussion and it was to “make women in politics 
visible and acceptable”.6 Undoubtedly, this was an attempt to address the gender 
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inequality in the political arena where Zambian women not only seemed invi-
sible but were projected as only playing the supportive role. 
It is in this respect that both Schuster and Geisler have described Zambian 
politics as ‘an all-men affair’. The latter wrote:  
The Women’s Brigade [of the United National Independence Party (UNIP)], later 
renamed Women’s League, initially had no independent leadership structures but 
instead was ‘an all-men affair’. Its members were expected to help men archive poli-
tical power and not to seek it themselves.7 
In keeping with the ideals of ‘traditionalism’, the UNIP Women’s League 
saw its role in the nation as that of preserving traditions and therefore embarked 
on a vigorous campaign to win the approval of the male-dominated political 
establishments by discrediting the more modern women movements that sought 
to challenge male dominance in the political arena.8 Arguably, therefore, the 
Women’s League was not progressive in advancing women’s participation in 
national politics and giving women support in seeking political power. 
This paper seeks to go beyond this view of women as supporters of men in 
the political arena, but also to deal with the reason behind women’s failure to 
take a leading role in politics despite the increased opportunities of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The paper examines women’s performance in the 2001 tripartite 
elections with a view to understanding the poor performance of women in 
politics, in general, and why they did poorly in 2001, in particular. The focus on 
women’s attempt to enter Parliament in larger numbers than before was as a 
result of the realisation that because Parliament controls finance, women could 
only influence decisions if they were involved in large enough numbers. 
The role of Zambia national women’s lobby group in Zambian 
politics 
In 1995 the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women observed 
that although it was almost two decades since the UN conference on women of 
1975, the statistical picture for women’s participation at high levels of decision-
making remained bleak. Brenda Mofya, further pointed out that most countries 
in the world failed to give due space and representation to women in their 
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political life.9 The paper noted that by the end of 1996 only Norway and 
Sweden had achieved gender equity at ministerial level. Another fifteen coun-
tries throughout the world had achieved twenty to thirty per cent female repre-
sentation at this level. Globally, only 9.9 per cent of all Deputy Ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries were women. The 
need to include more women in decision-making positions was therefore a 
matter of serious concern for all the supporting gender equality. There was, 
however, a need to identify some of the main obstacles that deterred women 
from political participation. The Zambian Non-Governmental Organisation Co-
ordinating Committee (NGOCC) correctly pointed out that ‘the realisation of 
women’s participation in decision-making and the development process requires 
that impediments to such participation be identified, later on addressed’.10 
Earlier, in July 1991, the National Women’s Lobby Group (ZNWLG), a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), was formed in Zambia. Its foundation on the 
eve of the rebirth of multi-party politics in Zambia was a direct response to 
growing concerns about the role and participation of women in the socio-
economic and political spheres. At its inception, the ZNWLG was well aware 
that, despite the fact that women constituted 52 per cent of Zambia’s population, 
they continued to face widespread discrimination, leading to their virtual 
absence from power. With the return of plural politics in 1991, there was hope 
that women’s contribution to decision-making processes would be enhanced. 
The ZNWLG was therefore founded on the premise that it should promote 
women’s equal participation in decision-making at all levels through advocacy, 
lobbying, and capacity building for women in Zambia.11 
Despite its vigorous campaigns during the decade that followed its inception, 
the ZNWLG continued to see Zambian women discriminated against in almost 
every sphere of life. By 1999, the ZNWLG noted that the situation of Zambian 
women remained much the same as that obtaining in the early 1990s. The 
Lobby Group noted, for example, that although women in Zambia constituted 
52 per cent of the population, there were only 16 women parliamentarians out of 
158, a mere 10 per cent. Worse still, there were only 80 out of 1,300 Councillors 
in Local Government (6 per cent). Furthermore, the Lobby Group observed that, 
out of a Cabinet of 25 Ministers, only two were women, and that, out of 8 
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Supreme Court Judges, only two were women.12 The picture was similar in 
other national key decision-making positions in both public and private sectors. 
In January 1995, the Caucus of Women Councillors in Ndola held a Gender 
Consultation Workshop on ‘Increasing Women’s Participation in Local Govern-
ment’. The workshop specifically focused on local government, and was at-
tended by 18 women local government councillors out of the 26 female 
councillors who were in office at the time. In December of the same year, the 
ZNWLG organised a sub-regional conference on the ‘Role of Women in 
Politics’. In 1996 the Lobby Group held a workshop on ‘Women in Politics’. 
One year later, there came a sub-regional conference on ‘International Cove-
nants on Women and Children’. All these workshops and conferences were held 
in Lusaka and were aimed at enhancing women participation in decision-
making processes.  
In August 1998, in preparation for the impending local government elec-
tions, the ZNWLG held a planning meeting of chairpersons and treasurers from 
its provincial chapters to jointly plan for activities concerning local government 
elections. Shortly thereafter, the Lobby Group organised four training work-
shops to empower women candidates who were adopted for the 1998 local 
government elections in Monze (September), Chingola (October), Kabwe (No-
vember) and Lusaka (November). The objectives of the training were to: 
- improve women’s skills as they contested the local government elections; 
- encourage and foster dialogue between women of different political affiliation, to  
 afford them an opportunity to devise strategies among themselves; 
- devise effective strategies for women in the 1998 local government elections; 
- increase gender awareness and its application to local government administra-
tion.13  
The workshops addressed several other issues, including resource mobilisa-
tion and time management   in the political arena. The workshops also ensured 
that more women were equipped with leadership and campaign skills, assertive-
ness and self-confidence – all attributes that were considered lacking in most 
women aspiring political leaders. 
The outcome of these efforts was certainly encouraging for the Lobby 
Group. In 1992, 88 women contested the local government elections and 26 
were elected as councillors. Because of the advocacy work by the Lobby Group, 
in 1998 there were 275 women contestants and 80 were elected councillors. 
This represented an increase of almost 200 per cent. One of these emerged as 
Mayor, while two others emerged as Deputy Mayors. The 1999 symposium 
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therefore expected an improvement on these figures. Yet, despite these efforts 
and achievements, women remained largely marginalised in the political arena. 
Resulting from the above scenario, the Lobby Group decided to hold a 
national symposium on the theme ‘Millenium 2000: Leadership Challenges for 
Women-Changing the Face of Politics in Zambia’. The aim of the symposium 
was to critically examine and analyse the performance of women in political 
decision-making since the foundation of the Lobby Group in 1991. The idea 
was to prepare women for the 2001 tripartite elections. The symposium drew 
women from all walks of life and particularly attracted women who previously 
held or were at the time holding political and other decision-making positions in 
Zambia. A total of 150 participants attended the symposium. A majority of the 
participants were drawn from nine political parties. Others came from the chap-
ters of the ZNWLG from around the country, NGOs and government depart-
ments. Members of the donor community and members of the Press attended 
the symposium, which was officially opened by Professor Elizabeth Mumba, 
then Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University Zambia. 
The organisers set forth four broad objectives, which were to guide the 
symposium participants. These were: 
- To bring together women who [had] held decision-making positions to share 
their experiences; 
- to identify and analyse the obstacles that [...] hindered women from participating 
in decision-making positions; 
- to come up with strategies that [would] address the identified obstacles; 
- to draw up an action plan on how to increase women's participation in parliament 
and local government in the year 2001.14 
The organisers expected that the outcome of the symposium would serve as a 
beacon to women and men in Zambia who were concerned with democratic 
practice. The focus of the symposium was on politics because politics played a 
dominant role in all other spheres: Economic, social and cultural. 
In September 2001, the Zambian Women in Politics Forum, in conjunction 
with the Lobby Group, held a three-day conference on ‘Women in Politics’ at 
the University of Zambia. The conference opened on Monday 24 September and 
closed on Wednesday 26 September. Participants were drawn from all political 
parties and NGOs. The overall objectives of the conference were similar to 
previous conferences and workshops. More importantly, perhaps, the 2001 Sep-
tember conference drew up the ‘Zambian Women’s Manifesto’. Introduced by 
the motto ‘More Women in Politics’, the Manifesto was meant to guide women 
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participation in politics as well as ensure gender balance in the political arena.15 
The conference also called upon all political parties to ensure that when adopt-
ing candidates for the 2001 tripartite elections, at least 30 per cent of the 
adopted candidates would be women. The conference also pledged to support 
all women candidates irrespective of party political affiliation. 
The overall aim of the ‘Zambian Women’s Manifesto’ is to clearly outline 
the issues of gender equality as demanded by female voters. The Manifesto has 
the following eight specific objectives: 
- To assist female politicians to take part in writing, amending and interpreting 
their party manifestoes; 
- to encourage and urge voters to consider issues that are pertinent to women, 
children and youth concerns, as they are selecting candidates for upcoming 
elections; 
- to mobilise and encourage all female voters and candidates to participate actively 
in all elections; 
- to bring political parties and government to accountability to their commitment 
for equality in the sharing of power especially to have at least 30% women in all 
elective positions; 
- to lobby the presidential prerogative in Decision Making appointments to at least 
50% and a constitutional provision that nominated MPs should comprise the 
under represented gender, other minority groups and those with disabilities; 
- to raise the general public’s awareness about gender issues in light of the adop-
tion of the National Gender Policy; 
- to publicise the National Gender Policy and persuade political parties and gov-
ernment to prioritise the interest of women, children, youths and people with 
disabilities in policy formulation and implementation; and 
- to help fund female candidates in good time.16 
The ‘Zambian Women’s Manifesto’ is a comprehensive document covering 
almost all areas concerned with women’s issues. It is therefore not possible to 
address all the issues in this study. 
However, in line with the objectives of this study, let us briefly examine 
what the Manifesto has to say about women and politics. It argued for women’s 
political empowerment on the basis that this has been central in Zambia’s 
development process since the colonial days. The notion of power, broadly 
defined as the control over material assets, intellectual resources and ideology, 
informs the Manifesto, which noted that men hold this power and therefore 
influence the distribution of assets. As a result of this control, men confer on 
themselves the power of decision-making in a way that tends not to favour 
women or take into account their concerns. On the basis of these observations, 
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the Manifesto argued that female voters and candidates faced numerous prob-
lems because the playing field was not levelled. Another observation that was 
brought out by the Manifesto pertained to the question of voter education in 
Zambia, which education did not entrench gender equality as a central feature of 
democratic citizenship. After formulating the ‘Zambian Women’s Manifesto’, 
the ZNWLG began a practical implementation of its objectives, especially the 
empowerment of female candidates in the 2001 tripartite elections which took 
place on 27 December 2001. 
By 20 November 2001 a total of 140 female parliamentary candidates had 
been adopted by various political parties to participate in the tripartite elections. 
The Lobby Group undertook to support these female parliamentary candidates 
and acquired 70 bicycles which it later distributed among them. The Lobby 
Group also acquired 80,000 metres of Women’s Movement chitenge material 
which it distributed equally to all registered adopted female parliamentary 
candidates. Each female parliamentary candidate received fifty metres of mate-
rial. The Lobby Group further undertook to produce 200 personal posters for 
each female parliamentary candidate. Furthermore, it called upon Independent 
Parliamentary candidates to register with the Lobby Secretariat by 26 November 
2001 to qualify for similar assistance. Table 12.1 shows how the 70 bicycles 
were distributed to parties that adopted female parliamentary candidates. 
Table 12.1 Distribution of bicycles by ZNWLG 
Parties Adopted  Number of 
 candidates bicycles 
AZ 1 1 
HP -- -- 
NCC 23 10 
MMD 16 8 
FDD 29 14 
ZRP 11 5 
UPND 26 12 
SDP 3 1 
NLD 16 8 
UNIP 19 9 
PF 4 2 
TOTAL 148 70 
Source: ZNWLG’s press release, 20 Nov. 2001, published in 
The Post, 22 Nov. 2001. 
The Lobby Group also extended this assistance to female municipal candi-
dates throughout the country, and added that the assistance would be made 
available to this category of candidates through Provincial Lobby Chairpersons. 
The assistance to this category consisted of campaign posters and caps. There is 
 THE ZAMBIA NATIONAL WOMEN’S LOBBY  267 
 
no doubt therefore that the Lobby Group did all in its power to assist female 
candidates in the tripartite elections. This was really the first time in Zambian 
elections that a national women’s movement took a deliberate and a clearly 
affirmative action to support female parliamentary and municipal candidates 
irrespective of political party affiliation. The Lobby Group demonstrated that it 
was going beyond the meaningless rhetorical statements that often accompany 
political campaigns and electioneering. 
While the ZNWLG undertook these practical steps to assist female parlia-
mentary candidates, there were cases in which women within political parties 
undermined each other. Symptomatic was the cases of Mandevu Constituency, 
Lusaka, where two female candidates were at the centre of a controversy over 
who should stand as the UNIP candidate. This reflected badly on UNIP, which 
did not seem to follow the letter of the ‘Women’s Manifesto’. Engiwe Mzyece 
won the primary elections for the constituency and, in line with the UNIP 
constitution, should have been adopted as the parliamentary candidate. How-
ever, the Central Committee of the party chose to adopt Mwangala Zaloumis as 
its candidate. The decision prompted Mzyece to threaten legal action against her 
party.17 The squabble appeared to work against what the Lobby Group and the 
Zambian Women in Politics Forum stood for and to undermine that gender 
solidarity that the ‘Zambian Women’s Manifesto’ had so forcefully advocated. 
Engiwe Mzyece eventually stood as an independent, a decision that obviously 
divided the UNIP votes in Mandevu. 
Despite these developments, the NGOCC, together with the ZNWLG as-
sisted 200 female aspiring parliamentarians in the tripartite elections with cam-
paign materials. The NGOCC also gave material support to 300 women who 
contested ward positions to enable them successfully conduct their campaigns 
in their respective areas. The support was channelled through the ZNWLG, 
which was mandated to distribute the campaign materials to all women par-
liamentary and ward candidates irrespective of political party affiliation. The 
NGOCC mobilised 120 bicycles, 25,000 posters, 8,000 metres of Women’s 
Movement chitenge material and 18,000 caps The support for women candi-
dates was carried out under the M2000 programme, whose objective was to 
provide room for pooling resources together to assist women advance their 
status.18 There is no doubt that the 2001 tripartite elections provided the wo-
men’s organisations for the first time with opportunities to assist women in the 
political arena. 
While the ZNWLG mobilised resources to assist women parliamentary and 
local government candidates during the campaign period, chances on women 
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being elected in large enough numbers were undermined by lack of strategy. For 
example, while there were at least 170 female parliamentary candidates, there 
was a tendency for women to stand against each other in various constituencies. 
It would appear that political parties preferred to have women candidates stand 
against each other instead of standing against male candidates. The list of all 
parliamentary candidates who successfully filed in their nomination papers for 
the 27 December elections shows that very few female candidates were fielded 
in constituencies where there were no other female candidates. Undoubtedly, 
political parties felt that their female candidates stood a better chance of win-
ning the seat if they stood against fellow female candidates. 
Consequently, there were no female parliamentary candidates in as many as 
36 constituencies. Another 52 constituencies fielded only one female candidate. 
Twenty-nine of the 150 available constituencies fielded two female parliament-
ary candidates each, bringing the number to 58. The remaining 33 constituen-
cies fielded three or more parliamentary candidates each, thus accounting for 
the remaining one hundred female candidates throughout the country.  
To be sure, this strategy worked against the aims of the Women’s Manifesto 
because only few women would emerge victorious under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, even where female candidates stood as independents, they tended 
to do so in constituencies where there were already female candidates adopted 
by various political parties. It is largely because of this that the number of 
female elected candidates represents a minute fraction of the total figure of 
female parliamentary candidates. It is the view of this author that, in future 
elections, female parliamentary candidates should avoid standing against each 
in constituencies if their number in elected positions is to increase to a level 
where they can make a substantial difference. 
The 2001 tripartite elections results 
The Electoral Commission (ECZ) set 27-30 November 2001 as nomination 
dates for presidential candidates. At the close of nominations, Chief Justice 
Matthew Ngulube declared that eleven presidential candidates had successfully 
filed valid nominations. For the first time in the political history of Zambia, 
there were two women presidential candidates. While this indicated the deter-
mination of women to rise to the occasion, there were however some disturbing 
reports of lack of support for the female presidential candidates during nomina-
tion. Although both female candidates managed eventually to lodge in their 
nominations with the Chief Justice, they had difficulties in raising the required 
200 supporters who were registered voters. Dr. Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika, the 
President of Agenda for Zambia (AZ), failed to file her nomination papers on 
time because she had a shortfall of 18 supporters. She only managed to file her 
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nomination when the Heritage Party (HP), which was next to file its papers, 
assisted in finding volunteers from the crowd of its supporters.19 
Ms Gwendoline Konie, President and candidate of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), faced a similar problem and took over four hours to find the 
required 200 supporters. She only managed to file her nomination papers after 
renting supporters who demanded to be paid K20,000 each. At the end of the 
exercise, the rented supporters blocked her vehicle within the Supreme Court 
premises demanding to be paid their dues. Police went to her rescue and advised 
the mob to discuss the matter outside the Supreme Court premises. Ms Konie 
left to organise the payment while some SDP leaders were ‘detained’ by the 
mob as ‘hostages’. According to the programme the SDP was scheduled to file 
nomination papers at 09:30 but because it could not raise the 200 supporters, the 
party only managed to do so at 14:30, after allegedly bringing in some students 
from a college at a fee.20 
The difficulties experienced by the women presidential candidates in mus-
tering the required 200 supporters to file in their nominations raise serious 
questions about the commitment of the ZNWLG and the Women in Politics 
Forum towards the participation of women in elections. It is hard to envisage 
how the Women’s Manifesto can be transformed into practical reality if its 
signatories fail to support female presidential candidates even at the nomination 
level. Interestingly, there were many more women who turned up to support and 
provide pomp when male presidential candidates were filing in their nomina-
tions. It is tempting to suggest that the majority of Zambian women are yet to 
come to terms with the struggle they have on their hands. It is also tenable to 
suggest that Zambian women contribute quite significantly to the process of 
marginalising each other in the political arena. This is borne out by the various 
cases in which female politicians have failed to cooperate and enhance their 
chances of success against male politicians. 
Reacting to the almost humiliating experience of female presidential candi-
dates, some women complained against gender-sensitive NGOs for failing to 
support female presidential candidates when they were receiving donor funding 
for such a cause. When the author conducted a quick survey in Lusaka, a female 
lawyer observed that while educated women were clear about the issues and the 
need to have women in decision-making positions, the majority, who were 
largely illiterate, held different views.21 She pointed out that there was a big gap 
between the educated women and their fellow women in the compounds. These 
views were confirmed by several women in the compounds, who did not appear 
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to have much trust in female politicians. A considerable number of the inter-
viewees justified their stance by using the vernacular expression: ‘Ninchito yaba 
muna’, meaning that politics was a men’s job. It would therefore seem that the 
major problem facing female politicians is the cultural baggage, which has 
become heavier and heavier as more and more women leave school premature-
ly. Evidently, while the ZNWLG and the Women in Politics Forum gather 
women and lobby for women to support one another, the majority still look to 
men for political leadership. It is for this reason that male presidential candi-
dates easily mobilised women to add colour to their nomination programmes, 
while women were almost failing and had to hire supporters. 
While the female presidential candidates faced difficulties in raising 200 
supporters, some male presidential candidates succeeded in doing so by using 
paid cadres. The National Citizens Coalition’s presidential aspirant, Dr. Pastor 
Nevers Mumba, was reported to have courted trouble when his party failed to 
pay the cadres the promised allowances for rendering their support on 
nomination day.22 The confusion is said to have started soon after Dr. Pastor 
Nevers Mumba had successfully filed in his nomination papers. Similar inci-
dents were reported regarding Patriotic Front (PF) cadres in Kaunda Square, 
who threatened to beat up PF officials who failed to honour their promises to 
the cadres who supported Michael Sata’s nomination for the presidency. These 
demands for payment raised serious questions regarding the true affiliation of 
the supporters. The above revelations prompted Times of Zambia’s political 
editor, Samuel Ngoma, to ask, ‘Nominations: Was it a rent-a-mob affair?’23 Be-
cause of the immediate benefits involved in supporting presidential candidates, 
the nomination process succeeded in producing ‘professional cadres’ who 
literally camped at the Supreme Court premises, ready to be hired to provide the 
required numbers for nomination. Ngoma likened the ‘professional cadres’ to 
the shanty compounds’ notorious ‘professional mourners’, who specialise in 
moving from one funeral house to another with a view to taking advantage of 
the hospitality traditionally provided by mourning families. These ‘professional 
cadres’ are not committed to any one political party. Their behaviour was driven 
by economic necessity. 
That the 2001 tripartite elections were heavily contested was exemplified by 
the large turnout of voters on 27 December 2001. Throughout the country, 
queues formed as early as 05:00 in most polling stations. Voting was officially 
scheduled to start at 06:00 and voting went one well beyond the official closing 
time of 17:00. This was because of the large numbers of people who turned up 
for voting, as well as the fact that voters were casting votes for three candidates. 
                                               
22 
 Times of Zambia, 30 Nov. 2001. 
23
  Times of Zambia, 1 Dec. 2001. 
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The process was unusually long. In several polling stations around the country 
voting went on until the early hours of the next day. For the first time in the 
political history of Zambia there was a visible presence of young voters who 
had mounted a strong campaign urging young voters to, first, register as voters 
and, secondly, to vote on 27 December 2001. As Royda Banda observed in the 
Times of Zambia, the response to the 2001 tripartite elections included an 
overwhelming turnout by youths. This reflected the successful campaign by the 
Operation Young Vote, a youth NGO formed to mobilise youths to register as 
voters.24 This observation was confirmed by the ECZ in their voters’ analysis by 
age. For the first time in the electoral and political history of Zambia, the 
youngest Member of Parliament elected in the Eastern Province was twenty-six 
years old. 
Table 12.2 2001 National presidential election results 
Political party Candidate’s name Results % 
AZ Dr. Inonge M. Lewanika   9,882  0.57 
HP Brig. Gen. Godfrey Miyanda 140,678  8.09 
NCC Dr. Pastor Nevers Mumba  38,860  2.24 
MMD Mr. Levy P. Mwanawasa 506,694 29.15 
FDD Lt. Gen. Christon Tembo 228,861 13.17 
ZRP Mr. Benjamin Y. Mwila  85,472  4.29 
UPND Mr. Anderson Mazoka 472,697 27.2 
SDP Ms Gwendoline Konie  10,253  0.59 
NLD Dr. Yobert Shamapande   9,481  0.55 
UNIP Mr. Tilyenji Kaunda 175,898 10.12 
PF Mr. Michael Sata  59,172  3.4 
TOTAL Eleven 1,741,948 99.37 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia, 18 Jan. 2002. 
In addition to the eleven political parties that provided presidential candi-
dates, a further four parties put up parliamentary and local government candi-
dates throughout the country. There were also at least eighty independent 
parliamentary candidates, and at least one hundred independent candidates for 
local government elections throughout the country (Table 12.3). Because of the 
large number of presidential, parliamentary and local government election can-
didates campaigning was very heavy. Voting continued for a second day running 
on Friday 28 December 2001 in a number of constituencies. In some parts of 
Northern and Luapula Provinces, voting continued up to Saturday 29 December 
2001. This later became a source of concern by losing opposition political 
parties, because the extension of the voting period that resulted from logistical 
problems on the part of ECZ was interpreted as a deliberate move to rig the 
                                               
24
  Times of Zambia, 12 Jan. 2002. 
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elections. Opposition political parties would later cite this, among other irregu-
larities, in their unsuccessful petition to the High Court. 
Table 12.3 Parliamentary candidates by party and gender 
Political party Male Female Total % 
AZ  14    1  15 6.66 
HP  96    21 117 17.94 
NCC 58    20  78 25.64 
MMD 133    17 150 11.33 
FDD 117    32 148 20.94 
ZRP 123    16 139 11.51 
UPND 122    28 150 18.66 
SDP   2     3   5 60.0 
NLD  7    10  17 58.82 
UNIP 126    19 145 13.01 
PF  88    16 104 15.38 
NP   1     0   1 0.00 
DP   1     0   1 0.00 
ZUDP   3     0   3 0.00 
ZAP  10    4  14 28.57 
Independents  62    18  80 22.50 
TOTAL 963   205 1168 1755 
Source: Compiled by author from lists of nominated candidates published in the national press, 2001. 
The FDD fielded the largest number of female parliamentary candidates with 
32 aspirants and was followed by the UPND, which fielded 28 parliamentary 
candidates. Third in line was the HP, with twenty-candidates; it was followed by 
NCC and UNIP, which fielded 20 and 19 parliamentary candidates each, res-
pecttively. Disappointingly, the ruling MDD only fielded 17 female parliament-
ary candidates. This was disappointing because the ruling MMD government 
was a signatory to the SADC protocol which required members states to 
adopted at least thirty per cent female candidates in elections in order to raise 
the number of female participants in decision-making bodies. The number of 
female candidates adopted by the MMD accounted for only 11.33 per cent. 
The 2001 tripartite elections were not only the most heavily contested 
elections in the political history of Zambia, but also attracted the largest number 
of female candidates, among whose number were two presidential aspirants. 
Yet, as observed elsewhere, female candidates for presidential, parliamentary 
and local government elections performed very poorly (Table 12.4). Only 
eleven female parliamentary candidates won seats out of the more than two 
hundred who stood in the 2001 tripartite elections. 
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Table 12.4 2001 National assembly elections results: Seats won per party and by  
 gender 
Political party Male Female Total % 
AZ 0 0 0  0.00 
DP 0 0 0  0.00 
FDD 9 3 12  8.00 
HP 4 0 4  2.67 
MMD 65 4 69 46.00 
NCC 0 0 0  0.00 
NLD 0 0 0  0.00 
NP 0 0 0  0.00 
PF 1 0 1  0.67 
UNIP 13 0 13  8.67 
UPND 47 4 49  32.67 
SDP 0 0 0  0.00 
ZAP 0 0 0  0.00 
ZRP 0 1 1  0.67 
ZUDP 0 0 0  0.00 
Independent 0 1 1  0.67 
 
TOTAL 137 13 150  100 
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia, 18 Jan. 2002. (Male and female columns added by the author.) 
 
Conclusion 
On reflection, it can be suggested that political parties in Zambia, and women 
politicians in particular, need to develop mechanisms for realistically assessing 
their real potential for winning elections. Most opposition parties attracted large 
crowds, mostly of women, at their rallies and confused that with membership 
and people who would vote for them. What most political party leaders failed to 
comprehend was that the crowds at most rallies were composed of the same 
people who also attended rallies organized by different political parties. Because 
of handouts that were given at most rallies, such as money, chitenge material 
and other forms of rewards, people attended rallies to get ‘empowered’, but 
voted differently on voting day. The concept that one’s vote is secret was 
effectively put to use by the voters. Women politicians were most disadvantaged 
because they lacked resources compared to male politicians. Women entered the 
political arena as a disadvantaged lot and did not enjoy the same support that 
male politicians enjoyed. 
While the opposition parties’ complaints that they lost the elections because 
of suspected rigging is a clear manifestation of their denial of the realities on the 
ground, for women, the same complaint reflected the difficulties of their role in 
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politics. Democracy, especially mature democracy, takes long to develop and 
the path towards it is not a smooth one. Thus with each election that takes place, 
democracy moves a step further towards maturity. Zambia is no exception, and 
it is to be hoped that the lessons learnt from the tripartite elections of 2001 will 
go a long way towards consolidating the democratic process and women’s 
changing fortunes in the political arena. 
 
  
13 
Subsidiary sovereignty and  
the constitution of political  
space in Zambia1 
 
Jeremy Gould 
The irony of writing the history of ‘post-Independence’ Zambia is, sadly, the 
nation’s stark lack of genuine independence. Over the course of her forty-odd 
years as an internationally recognized state, Zambia – like much of Africa – has 
had less and less to say about the basic facts determining the welfare of her 
citizens. A further irony is that Zambia’s vulnerability to forces beyond her 
control – a condition which can be termed ‘subsidiarity’ – seems to have 
deepened in the wake of the post-Cold War onslaught of liberalization that 
promised to revitalize the nation’s economy and her democratic institutions.  
Evidence of Zambia’s deeply rooted subsidiarity is extensive. For starters, 
her constitutional order, and indeed a sizable chunk of her extant legislation, are 
not of the nation’s own making but a colonial legacy. Zambia’s gross national 
product – based heavily on copper export revenues – is hostage to strategic 
commercial, military and technological decisions made in cabinet meetings and 
                                               
1
  This paper is the product of a research project sponsored by the Academy of Finland 
(2002-2006) on ‘Legal pluralism and state formation in Zambia.’ Many thanks to 
seminar participants at Cambridge University and the London School of Economics 
for valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper. Thanks also to the editors 
for their patience and encouragement. I am deeply in debt to a great many Zambians 
for sharing their time and knowledge with me in the course of my fieldwork. I would 
like to note especially Fr. Joe Komakoma, Prof. Alfred Chanda, Dr. Patrick Matibi-
ni, Wynter Kabimba and Ngande Mwanajiti for insightful discussions. Needless to 
say, none of the above are responsible for my inevitable errors and misunder-
standings. 
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corporate boardrooms on distant continents. Her state budget, and the policy 
instruments by which government claims to address the banes of poverty, 
unemployment, ill-health and illiteracy, are strictly controlled by transnational 
debt-masters in Washington. Even Zambia’s major religious bodies – and their 
concomitant items of doctrine and faith – are beholden to unassailable episcopal 
hierarchies the apices of which reside in Europe and North America. On the 
whole, Zambians have virtually no say at all on vital questions of life and death 
– like the price of copper and fossil fuels, the right of Christian clergy to 
exorcise demons or the affordability of anti-retroviral drugs.  
 
 
 
Photo 21 Oasis protestors at the University of Zambia during the final years of  
 President Frederick Chiluba’s rule. 
 
 
The frailty of Zambia’s sovereignty is well known, yet still we continue to 
use the vocabulary of ‘independence’. Why is this? Partially, no doubt, out of 
discretion. Given devastating deterioration of living standards over the past four 
decades, the benefits of Zambian citizenship have been reduced to little else 
than a rather empty juridical sovereignty. Etiquette aside, the prevailing con-
cepttual diplomacy is also based on the premise that ‘independence’ is the 
normal state of affairs for a sovereign nation like Zambia. The endless list of 
caveats that belie this fundamental truth, for Zambia as for countless of her 
neighbors, must be aberrations. Whether these anomalies are seen to be struc-
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tural or contingent, constitutive or transient, contemporary thinking on state-
hood is such that sovereignty and subsidiarity are mutually negating concepts.  
The inability of state theory to problematize subsidiary sovereignty as an 
analytical notion is evidenced by the generous use, of late, of the residual cate-
gory of ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states in African political analysis; ‘failed’ states 
are effectively excluded from the domain of established theory by relegating 
them below the normative threshold of genuine stateness. But this move, as 
noted by Roe, ‘exceptionalizes’ African government and effectively removes 
African concerns from the realm of serious consideration – beyond the pale of 
what could lead to new insights in political or social theory.2  The fact that this 
methodological ploy is a sign of theoretical torpor is evidenced by the volume 
of empirical entities that are assigned, ad hoc, to this shelf. Somewhat alarming, 
for the dedicated Africanist at least, is the tendency for African politics as a 
whole to be portrayed as a failed enterprise. Indeed, Africa is increasingly repre-
sented as a continent of states in various stages of failure, either imploded or 
simple waiting for the inevitability of collapse. Conventional political actors of 
democratic discourse – parliaments, nationalist politicians, civic activists, intel-
lectuals, professionals, the enlightened urban middle class – are widely dis-
misssed as ineffectual or actively complicit in the ostensible, self-interested 
patrimonial meltdown. 
Within academic discourse, one finds two competing explanatory frame-
works which uphold the perceived crisis of politics in Africa. The dominant 
position, especially within mainstream political science, asserts that the sorry 
state of national economies and populations are evidence of the somehow 
flawed (or incomplete) nature of African states. Collapsed states like Somalia, 
or even relatively stable polities like Zambia, are all plagued by the survivals of 
a premodern political order which systematically block or co-opt efforts at con-
solidating institutions and practices of rational, not to say democratic, govern-
ment. Despite the post-Cold War return of political pluralism and elements of 
media independence, elected leaders are prone to ‘semi-authoritarian’ practices 
– self-interested abuse of office and kleptocracy, nepotism and ethnic bias – all 
of which corrode the developmental potential of state regulation. As a result, 
                                               
2
  E. Roe, Except-Africa: Remaking development, rethinking power (New Brunswick, 
1999). ‘African concerns’ are of course no different than the concerns of any section 
of humanity. Yet, as Ferguson has compellingly argued, ‘Africa’ has become an 
idealized place in the Western imagination in which empirical facts and differences 
are reduced to stereotypical abstractions. Such stereotypical features of ‘Africa’ – 
hunger, war, superstition – can arouse disgust or compassion, but for mainstream 
academia in much of the West, they are not interesting. J. Ferguson, Global 
shadows: Africa in the neoliberal global order (Durham, 2006). 
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economic productivity and competitiveness falter, rendering the national as a 
whole hostage to the vagaries of global market forces. 
The competing view is equally single-minded. It reaffirms the aberrations of 
subsidiarity, but reveals them to be externally imposed – caused by the male-
volent foreign masters of an unjust global system. The thrust of this defensive 
narrative is to provide a reasonable explanation for the vast evidence of state 
failure and the persistence of authoritarianism despite nominal democratization. 
Thandika Mkandawire, for example, explains the persistence of authoritarian-
ism by reference to the conditions on public policy and action imposed by 
external debt masters. These conditions have produced, in his memorable term, 
“choiceless democracies” by which the very notion of democratic and account-
able government is compromised.3 Following this track, Mary Kaldor argues 
that choiceless democracy is a main cause of the spate of intrastate violence and 
associated state collapse that plagues post-Cold War Africa.  
These are the circumstances that give rise to the ‘new wars’. It is the lack of 
authority of the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that 
the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or 
unwillingness to regulate the privatisation and informalisation of violence that 
gives rise to violent conflicts.4 
The internalist and externalist portrayals of subsidiarity and concomitant 
socio-political pathologies are functionalist, airtight explanations that negate 
one another. Neither has any room for a notion of political contestation as a 
source of social change. In the end they agree on everything but on whom to 
blame. Indeed, voluminous empirical evidence suggests that both accounts are 
valid. All African governments perform their self-assigned functions – collect 
revenues, manage the economy, regulate social institutions, deliver basic social 
services and amenities – far more poorly than almost any other states on the 
planet. Equally true is the assertion that this poor performance is largely an 
outcome of decades of ill-conceived and erratic intervention by foreign govern-
ments and development agencies.5   
Clearly sovereignty and subsidiarity are not mutually exclusive, but can and 
do intermingle in complex ways and in relatively stable social formations. 
Asking where the blame lies for Zambia’s marginal position in the world order 
would seem to be the wrong question. What we need to understand better is 
                                               
3
  T. Mkandawire, ‘Crisis management and the making of “choiceless democracies” in 
Africa’, in: R. Joseph, ed., The state, conflict and democracy in Africa (Boulder, 
1999), 119-36. 
4
 M. Kaldor, ‘Cosmopolitanism and organized violence’, n.d.,  
 http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010kaldor.pdf (accessed on 21 Aug. 2006). 
5
  See, e.g., W. Easterly, The white man’s burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the 
rest have done so much ill and so little good (New York, 2006). 
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how, specifically, do the internal and external factors interact to produce states 
of subsidiary sovereignty.6 This demand for specificity is not simply about 
attention to empirical detail, important as this is. It also implies that internal and 
external articulations vary substantially from context to context – from country 
to country, and over time in the same socio-physical space. Different political 
contexts exhibit different factors, different configurations of actors and institu-
tions. And these (f)actors and configurations have specific histories, that are not 
identical with the assemblages or trajectories one will find in any other context. 
These specificities can only be made clear through close empirical study of a 
given context. 
Zambian subsidiarity 
In the case of Zambia, then, the years of the Third Republic7 have been a unique 
and curious concoction of ultra-liberalism coupled with deep subsidiarity, 
deriving from severe indebtedness and concomitant aid dependence. Upon 
secession to executive power in 1991, President Chiluba and his Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) became model pupils of structural adjustment as 
endorsed by Washington-aligned transnational public financial institutions.8 
Under the tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF, the MMD government, 
among other moves, sold off the bulk of the nation’s public assets, relinquished 
regulation of the value of the national currency, eliminated import and export 
restrictions and abdicated responsibility for the welfare of small-holder agricul-
tural producers.9  
It is not unusual, of course, for a government to accede to power, and/or hold 
onto it, by virtue of its deference to a vastly more powerful foreign patron. In 
                                               
6
  Cf. Harrison, ‘Post-conditionality politics and administrative reform: reflections on 
the cases of Uganda and Tanzania’, Development and Change, 32 (2001), and T. 
Callaghy, ‘Networks and governance in Africa: Innovation in the debt regime’, in: 
Id., R. Kassimir and R. Latham, eds, Intervention and transnationalization in Africa 
(Cambridge, 2001). 
7
  The revision of the Zambian constitution in 1991, revoking the political monopoly 
of the reigning United National Independence Party (UNIP) of President Kenneth 
Kaunda, ushered in a new constitutional regime, termed the Third Republic. Zam-
bia’s First Republic was born at independence in 1964. The transition to a Second 
Republic was the result of UNIP’s constitutional instatement of a ‘one-party partici-
patory democracy’ in 1972. 
8
  Lusaka rumor in the mid-nineties had it that the IMF felt obliged to exhort the 
Zambian government to slow down its over-zealous program of liberalization and 
privatization. 
9
  See, e.g., L. Rakner, Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001 
(Uppsala, 2003).  
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imperial and colonial history, such a relationship has been often termed ‘suze-
rainty’ – the subsidiary state is run, in practice, by a configuration of political 
forces which operates within more or less stringent limits laid down by foreign 
patrons; the subsidiary sovereign plays ‘vassal’ to the external ‘suzerain’ power. 
In Zambia’s case, her astronomical indebtedness has left her defenseless against 
the dictates of the transnational development industry. Indeed, Zambia’s con-
temporary niche in the global political economy is a function of her role as a 
subservient client of the transnational development industry – above all, the 
Bretton Woods institutions, countless bilateral donor bodies, and the numerous 
agencies of the UN system, from UNDP to UNHCR.   
Since the final years of the 1990s, the transnational development industry 
has dealt with the world’s heavily-indebted poor nations as problematic clients. 
They owe too much to be abandoned, but are no longer considered productive 
investments in any foreseeable timeframe. Countries like Zambia (and most of 
Africa) are no longer expected to ‘take off’ into industrial modernity. From the 
point of view of their major creditors – the World Bank and the IMF –the main 
aim is to build their capacity to be good clients. Good clienthood involves, 
above all, maintaining a large loan portfolio and meeting repayment targets 
conscientiously. In the rhetoric of contemporary development-speak, this speci-
fic form of suzerain subsidiarity is termed ‘partnership,’ and it comprises three 
key elements:  
1) ‘ownership’ – this means that the client politicians will take responsibility for policy 
decisions and refrain from blaming the creditors for the negative social consequen-
ces of neo-liberal measures; 
2) ‘good governance,’ which implies that the client government will keep its expendi-
tures within the agreed macro-economic frame, thus ensuring predictable debt repay-
ment; and 
3) ‘rule of law’, which means that individual officials can be held accountable for the 
abuse of public resources (but not, for example, for incurring bad debt), and that 
whatever assets foreign investors bring into the country can be repatriated upon de-
mand. 
In general terms, one might hypothesize that the structural tension within 
subsidiary sovereignty is heightened under conditions of political pluralism. An 
asymmetrical ‘partnership’ such as prevails between the Zambian state and its 
transnational creditors requires a configuration of complicit social forces to 
manage the client state. Since the political leadership is theoretically account-
able to its electorate, this implies a basic contradiction: the needs of the electo-
rate are subordinate to the demands of foreign creditors, and yet the political 
leadership must appear to be the people’s advocate and to hold full responsibi-
lity for its actions.  
Despite some turbulent moments (related to the privatization of the copper 
mines and the concomitant theft of large cobalt reserves), the MMD has 
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managed this balancing act rather well. The most serious challenge to its hege-
mony has come, ironically, not at the polls, but from outside the conventional 
political arena.10 While the MMD presidential candidate came close to losing 
the 2001 elections, and MMD managed to garner less than half the seats in the 
same parliamentary elections, this was not so much the result of a successful 
oppositional challenge (UPND’s performance at the polls was much weaker, 
and regionally even more lopsided than that of the MMD11), but reflected near-
fatal wounds inflicted on the MMD by a coalition of civic advocates calling 
themselves the Oasis Forum. 
In what follows I will examine the background and experiences of the Oasis 
Forum to illustrate the contradictory nature of the political space of subsidiary 
sovereignty.  
The Oasis saga 
The Oasis Forum was formed in 2001 to block the bid by the then-incumbent 
President, Frederick Chiluba, to manipulate the Republican constitution so that 
he could stand for a third term in office. The Forum united the efforts of the 
statutory Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), Zambia’s three main Christian 
mother bodies, as well as the country’s numerous and geographically diffuse 
women’s organizations. An auspicious wedding of ‘the legal authority of the 
lawyers, the moral authority of the Church, and the popular authority of the 
                                               
10
 I don’t want to overestimate the empirical legitimacy of the MMD regime. Despite 
the Supreme Court’s ruling to the contrary, evidence submitted to that august court 
strongly suggest that MMD systematically abused public resources in the 2001 
elections while also engaging in at least sporadic rigging to secure its razor-thin 
(29%) mandate. In the previous 1996 general elections, MMD’s actual support at the 
polls was 70% of a 40% turnout, i.e., also around 28% of the franchised electorate 
(J.K. van Donge, ‘Flexible SWAPs for strategic policy-making: reflections on the 
Zambian experience’, paper presented to the Development Studies Association 
conference, Milton Keynes, 7-9 September 2005). In other words, one can make a 
strong argument that MMD has ruled Zambia for at least the past ten years with the 
active support of less than a third of the population. Clearly, much of its ‘success’ is 
the harvest of political skullduggery and manipulation. On the other hand, no other 
political grouping has managed to garner more substantial support at the polls. 
11
  While the United Party for National Development (UPND) came within roughly 
35,000 votes of wresting the presidency from MMD in 2001, its showing in the 
contemporaneous Parliamentary and Local Government elections lagged consider-
ably behind. According to the Electoral Commissions results, MMD surpassed 
UPND by 75,000 votes in the parliamentary poll, while in the council election, 
MMD candidates received roughly 110,000 votes more than their competitors from 
the UPND. 
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women’s movement’,12 the Oasis Forum represents an unparalleled alliance of 
Zambia’s mainstream civic leadership. Nothing like it had ever occurred before 
within Zambia’s civil society, which had been chronically prone to competi-
tiveness and divisiveness. The earlier fragmentation was fuelled, in part, by the 
subcontracting processes of donor agencies which constantly pitted fragile civic 
organizations against one another. The government’s practice of establishing 
and funding loyal ‘non-governmental’ organizations also tended to politicize 
relationships within the civic sector. Against this background, the emergence of 
the Oasis Forum, and its proven ability to hold together amidst funding droughts 
and other adversity clearly signalled an unprecedented turn in the constitution of 
political society. The initial impetus for this turn was the dramatic collapse of 
Frederick Chiluba’s credibility as a political leader.  
In 1991, Mr Chiluba and his MMD forced Zambia’s president of 27 years, 
Kenneth Kaunda, to change the Republican constitution and reinstate political 
pluralism. MMD then proceeded to defeat him and his United National Inde-
pendence Party at the polls in a landslide victory. MMD captured a 2/3+ 
majority in Parliament in 1991, and again (albeit contentiously) in 1996, 
allowing Chiluba to co-opt the constitutional reforms and effect constitutional 
changes at whim. Among his reforms were constitutional provisions restricting 
presidential tenure to two terms. These reforms were widely seen as a deliberate 
move to end Kaunda’s political career once and for all. Chiluba was fêted as a 
national emancipator in 1991, but by 2001 his administration was at the nadir of 
its popularity. For one, the MMD government’s drastic neo-liberal reforms had 
plunged large sections of the population into absolute poverty without the 
protection of a safety net. Adding insult to injury, Chiluba was ensconced in 
widespread allegations of abuse of office and the plunder of public assets.  
In February of 2001, as Chiluba’s second term of office was coming to a 
close, key figures in the LAZ; in the national Catholic, Protestant and Evan-
gelical church bodies; and in the umbrella organ of Zambia’s women’s organiza-
tions joined forces to organize a Public Debate in order to rally popular 
opposition to Mr Chiluba’s third term bid. The meeting issued a tightly-worded 
Declaration instructing the incumbent to respect the constitution and give up 
further designs on the presidency. After the convention, the organizers – con-
stituting themselves as the Oasis Forum – mobilized a national campaign in 
support of these demands.13 
The Forum’s campaign incited an extraordinary wave of non-violent civil 
protest across the country and proved unexpectedly successful. In early May, 
                                               
12
  Paraphrasing Fr. Joe Komakoma; interview, Lusaka, 4 Apr. 2003. 
13
  The names Oasis Forum and Oasis Declaration come from the site of a February 
2001 rally, held at the Oasis Restaurant in Lusaka. 
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after less than three months of concerted pressure, Chiluba announced that he 
would not be available as a candidate for the presidency in the forthcoming 
elections, ‘in the interest of the nation’. Although his announcement aroused 
deep scepticism, he stood by his word and anointed lawyer Levy Mwanawasa as 
the MMD candidate. Mwanawasa eventually won the contentious elections in 
December of 2001 on an incredibly thin majority. 
A new strategy 
The Oasis Forum leadership was understandably elated by their unexpected 
success and somewhat intoxicated, perhaps, with their display of civic muscle 
following Chiluba’s official withdrawal from the presidential race. In June 2001 
(5 months before the slated elections) the Oasis Forum retreated to a lodge 
outside of Lusaka to reconnoitre and strategize. The gathering – comprising 17 
participants all tolled – concluded that the Zambian people still needed the 
Oasis Forum, and the five original partners organizations vowed to consolidate 
their alliance. With the issue of Chiluba’s third term out of the way, the Forum 
needed a new rationale and focus. At the retreat, the organizing committee 
redefined their purpose as follows: 
− promote a culture of Constitutionalism 
− promote the doctrine and practice of separation of powers 
− promote gender equity 
− promote law reform 
− promote civic activism 
− promote and conduct public interest litigation 
− promote professionalism and integrity in the holders of the public offices; and 
− promote a culture and practice of accountability and transparency in governance.14 
As a shopping list of liberal aims, this agenda is ambitious, but unexcep-
tional. Over the preceding decade, African advocacy groups had become in-
creasingly adept in producing cosmopolitan charters, often in hope of securing 
foreign donor funding. The Oasis Forum’s Strategic Plan 2002-2004 (from 
which this and the following list are drawn) falls in this category, and was 
drawn up at least partially with a view to attracting further financial support.15 
What is remarkable about the Forum’s strategic plan is not so much the ends as 
the means. In pursuit of its liberal agenda, the Oasis Forum charted out a 19-
step path of activities, including the following key items: 
 
                                               
14
  The Oasis Forum, Strategic Plan for the Period 2002-2004 (mimeo, n.d.), 5. 
15
  The volumes are hard to establish but, unsurprisingly, the Oasis Forum received 
substantial donor support during its anti-Third Term campaign. 
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4.  Conduct public debates and consultations in relation to laws requiring reform… 
7.  Mount a civic education campaign to introduce people to basic principles of a 
constitution and governance, including the rule of law, through media, work-
shops, meetings 
8.  Arrange for points for collecting submission from the public 
9.  Gender training in constitutional drafting 
10.  Drafting a popular constitution 
11.  Carry out Constitutional development conferences 
12.  Annual Convention 
13.  Convening of a Constituent Assembly16 
Given the fact that the Forum’s Organizing Committee (its sole management 
body until late 2001) comprised at most a couple dozen individuals, all of 
whom had heavy responsibilities in the leadership of large and busy organiza-
tions (e.g., the Non-Governmental Organizations’ Coordinating Committee and 
the Catholic Church), the sheer scope of the Plan is astonishingly immodest.  
But mundane logistic considerations aside, one is struck with the outright 
audacity of the Forum’s self-proclaimed mandate. After having been in exist-
ence for less than a year, the Oasis Forum considered itself ‘legally, morally and 
socially’ entitled to oversee the drafting and adoption (through a Constituent 
Assembly) of a new Republican Constitution for the Zambian nation! And they 
expected to be taken seriously. Against all odds they were and, at this writing 
nearly five years down the line, still are. 
This remarkable situation – how a small elite group of cosmopolitan pro-
fessionals finds itself imagining itself as the genuine (moral) leadership of a 
country – opens up space for a discussion of two central issues. The words in 
italics highlight the first issue. These terms indicate the central concern of the 
Forum with what one might term, borrowing from Habermas, the public 
sphere.17 I hypothesize for the sake of argument that the Oasis Forum embodies 
the sensibilities of an emergent “public bourgeoisie” that is preoccupied, much 
like the emergent European bourgeoisies of the eighteenth century studied by 
Habermas, with establishing, expanding and consolidating a realm of public 
political discourse based on ‘critical-rational debate’. A corollary of this concern 
with publicity is the problem or representation, in both of the term’s primary 
meanings: the new public bourgeoisie is involved in a critique of the way that 
the incumbent political leadership (mis-)represents its exercise of power to the 
citizenry. At the same time, the elite social forces undergirding the Oasis Forum 
are concerned with their own mandate, i.e., with their right to represent ‘the 
people’ and their interests. 
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  Strategic Plan, 17-8. 
17
  J. Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a 
category of bourgeois society (Cambridge, 1989). 
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The text in boldface signals a second dimension to the analysis. These terms 
relate to the Constitution and to the legal domain more generally. Their preva-
lence in this pivotal policy document indicate that, despite the fact that lawyers 
represent by far the smallest partner to the alliance (LAZ’s membership totals 
roughly 600), juridical concerns dominate the Forum’s agenda. Following 
suggestions originally formulated by Judith Shklar,18 I would argue that some 
form of ‘legalism’ constitutes the ideological and rhetorical common denomina-
tor for this remarkable socio-political experiment.  
The irony here is that this ideological frame of legalist liberalism derives 
from the same realm of transnational institutions as the development industry, 
the steward of Zambia’s subsidiarity. Yet it is intrinsically contradictory. It pro-
vides standards for critique of the prevailing political culture (of unaccountable 
government); but at the same time empowers a procedural, formalistic legalism 
that is prone to privilege (individual) ‘rights’ over collective ‘justice’. 
But before we can discuss the conundra of representation and legalism as 
elements of the political landscape of the Third Republic, there are some 
preliminary issues to deal with. The Oasis Forum story raises three immediate 
questions: Who are the social actors behind the Oasis Forum, why did they opt 
to challenge the prevailing political culture, and how (and to what extent) did 
they succeed? The following section attempts a provisional sociology of the 
political society of the Third Republic with a focus on the professional elite 
from which the Oasis Forum draws its leadership. This social mapping then acts 
as a backdrop to a discussion of the central analytical issues of representation 
and the role of legalism in the post-Chiluba era political arena. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom about the disembodied nature of the 
African state, the Zambian state is embedded in ‘society’, but this is an elite 
political society (in Chatterjee’s sense) of middleclass, largely urban profes-
sionals. The social context of the Zambian state is a complexly interwoven 
assemblage of elite social forces who share, if nothing else, a substantial social 
distance from the vast majority of the population whose living standards have, 
since the 1970s, gradually slid down the slippery slope into ‘absolute’ poverty. 
This section of the population – living in both in rural villages and urban 
compounds – is many, many times more likely to be unemployed, scantly 
educated, undernourished, suffering from dilapidating but treatable illnesses, etc 
– than any senior member of government, the upper crust of the civil service or 
the leadership of the Oasis Forum. On the other hand, individuals in the latter 
three categories are very likely to share a large number of social qualities with 
respect to education, income, property ownership and lifestyle, which are 
beyond the ken of most of their fellow Zambians. 
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This is not to say that ‘political society’ as a whole is cut from the same 
cloth. On the contrary, and here is the rub – members of elite political society 
differ sharply in their political values, in their ideas about the ‘rules of the game’ 
and in their conception of their role in society. They are thus caught up in 
zealous struggle among themselves, a struggle over the scope of state power 
which is simultaneously a contest of ideas and principles. Unlike many coun-
tries in the region, ethnicity plays a negligible role in this struggle (pace 
Posner19). Nor is it simply a struggle among political parties – of incumbent 
politicians vs. the opposition; indeed, this distinction can be relatively fuzzy as 
politicians circulate among parties and ever-shifting inter-party alliances with 
dizzying speed (especially in election years). Rather the key confrontation 
within political society is between an ‘old guard’ of partisan veterans, on the 
one hand, whose raison d’être and modus operandi is alignment with whoever 
controls the Executive branch of government, with broad discretionary powers 
and, at the other end of the continuum, an emerging new faction of nonpartisan 
political agents, epitomized by the Oasis Forum, who seem to be driven by 
principles of accountable government, which they hope to promote by strict 
constitutional constraints on Executive discretion. The roots of division are 
more difficult to trace than the actual point of fissure. 
What kind of a class or classes populate Lusaka’s political society? The bulk 
of the political class derives its livelihood from the state; that is, indeed, its 
basic objective. The public bourgeoisie from which the Oasis Forum springs, is 
similarly an ancillary, even parasitic class. Its main incomes derive from service 
provision (lawyers) and rents20 (clergy, NGOs). Much of the wealth that 
supports this group originates abroad. Professionals appear to invest their often 
substantial but irregular earnings in property, in their children’s education, and 
in ‘appearances’ (furnishings, personal vehicles, attire, recreational electronics, 
etc). Beyond this, the more successful have subsidiary business interests in real 
estate, services (private schools, clinics) and commerce (restaurants, boutiques, 
tourism).  
As a rule, this class/stratum has little interest in manufacturing and process-
ing, and has only subsidiary connections to primary production (with only 
minor agricultural investments, mostly as a ‘retirement fund’ rather than a 
serious business). These people – many members of the clergy will be an 
exception – largely think of themselves as involved in ‘business’; but they do 
not take significant risks with – nor enjoy large returns on – their generally 
meagre capital (although one pair of lawyers managed to purchase the former 
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  Rents, i.e., based on exploiting an ‘artificially created transfer’ (Tollison) which 
derives primarily from international donors agencies (including, e.g., the Vatican).  
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presidential jet). If this is a bourgeoisie, its relationship to circuits of capital 
accumulation, be they national or international, is tenuous. It is, one could say, 
an ‘imaginary’ class, whose bourgeoisness resides more in its liberal-cosmo-
politan value-orientation than in direct capitalist interests. It is also an ‘inter-
mediary’ class – caught between the ruling faction of its class and the people it 
would represent; and between its vision of the future and the harsh realities of 
the present. The precariousness of its situation is hard to overestimate: In 
absolute terms the rural and urban poor are most vulnerable to life-threatening 
crisis. But in relative terms, any major economic or political upheaval can easily 
erode whatever security this non-productive bourgeoisie currently enjoys, 
flinging them out into the margins of the formal economy. 
This sense of in-betweenness resonates with my experience of contemporary 
Lusaka. The rising public class is anxious to be recognized for its lavish and 
conspicuous material achievement. Perhaps this reflects the pervasive insecurity 
of social life in Zambia today. The HIV epidemic has left a horrendous dent in 
the population pyramid, and has no regard for class. A number of my living 
middle-class friends from the 1980s – and many more have died than not – are 
the last surviving offspring in a family of 6 or more children. But of course the 
anxiety of the rising public bourgeoisie is also about distinction. Lusaka’s 
middle class is not a cultural elite. The South African Ster Cinekor cinema 
complex at the new Arcades shopping mall thrives on action cinema and ethnic 
comedy; cinema for the new public bourgeoisie is an escape, not a source of 
critical debate.21 There is a new generation of Zambian playwrights, but 
performances at the Lusaka Theatre Club play to half-empty halls of expatriates. 
My middle-class friends have lavish bookshelves, but John Grisham – and not 
an up-and-coming Zambian Emile Zola – would seem to be the most popular 
author. There is also a boom in the Lusaka music scene, a veritable mush-
rooming of independent labels and local artists. Although the genre is heavily 
influenced by American rap/hip-hop – a textual art form – there is little social 
content in the lyrics. Popular rappers and lyricists dwell on off-colour humour 
and soap opera themes: the obsession of the modern Lusaka girl with finding a 
guy who could deliver ‘House, money, car’ provided the biggest popular hit of 
2005. 
Critical debate is channelled, then, directly into politics, without diversion 
through the arts. Nevertheless, humane, liberal values prevail. The Forum’s cos-
mopolitan orientation reflects legacy of colonial rhetoric and practice as well as 
contemporary international influences. To a large extent, these are the children 
of junior colonial civil servants, brought up in the ethos of public profession-
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alism preached, if not always practiced, by the British colonial service that 
administered Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was previously known) until 1964, 
and remained a major element of government administration well into the 
seventies. In the postcolony, the rhetoric of public service has largely been 
supplanted by a (neo-)liberal rhetoric of good governance and efficiency. And 
yet, when asked about its aims and motivation, the Oasis leadership invokes, in 
quite a consistent pattern, a vocabulary of patriotism, duty and service. Many 
central Oasis actors see themselves as a social conscience. They claim to be 
driven by a strong social obligation deriving from their elevated social position, 
and from the privilege of education and employment provided by society. 
Another motivational theme, especially among the Forum’s juridical and 
clerical members, is that of law and justice. Both lawyers and clergy stress the 
persistent lack of ‘rule of law’ under MMD (and later) as insidious and deeply 
frustrating.  
In my reading, the somewhat aristocratic values of duty and service, along-
side an emphasis on rules and transparency express nostalgia for an (idealized) 
version of Zambia as imagined in the immediate postcolonial period, i.e., 
initially a product of the anti-colonial struggle. The hankering for law and 
justice in particular, appears as a longing for a return to a primordial, more 
genuine form of government, where public authority was exercised for the 
greater good, and not for private benefit. While this vocabulary is not unaffected 
by other influences – i.e., the transnational rhetoric of human rights and good 
governance – the immediate referent is to the practical experience of recent 
Zambian history. In any event, this specific public bourgeoisie would seem to be 
in pursuit of greater stability, reciprocity and equilibrium, be this modelled on 
an idealized past or a keen vision of the future. 
Nostalgic or not, the Forum’s perspective on politics contrasts sharply with 
the rhetoric of the MMD. From its inception, the MMD has deployed a 
‘modernist’ language of change. Its 1991 slogan ‘the hour has come’ meant that 
Zambia was ready for new leadership, but it also referred to the ambitious and 
ambiguous projects of democratization, liberalization and modernization. Far 
from nostalgic, MMD promised to lead the nation away from the bad habits of 
the past (the Second Republic). This inevitably meant a journey into an un-
certain, but promising future. As it turned out, the open-endedness of the 
MMD’s political vision – about change and process, and not about an explicitly 
imagined social order – proved fully compatible with the Chiluba’s govern-
ment’s gradual drift away from accountability into semi-authoritarianism and 
plunder. 
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‘Representative publicness’ and the postcolonial party/state  
Despite its nominal transition to a more liberal, pluralist dispensation in the 
1990s, Zambia’s political system retained much of the legacy of ‘absolutist’ 
Party/State publicity. For most of the Second and Third Republics, the 
Party/State has functioned as a kind of ‘quasi-feudal’ public authority. The party 
elite under the ‘Humanist’ President Kaunda, and again under ‘neo-liberal’ 
President Chiluba, constituted a kind of state nobility (to borrow Bourdieu’s 
term), surviving primarily on rent extraction (copper revenues and foreign aid; 
later on the proceeds of privatization). It was socially positioned on the basis of 
ascribed status (i.e., as Central/National Executive Committee members and 
Cabinet Ministers) and linked to society through an elaborate system of political 
patronage, which fanned out from Provincial Party executives and Members of 
Parliament to Ward Councillors and beyond. This Party ‘nobility’ dominated the 
public sphere – it directly controlled the media, defined the terms and 
vocabulary of public discourse and represented itself through ‘a strict code of 
“noble” conduct’, i.e., ‘insignia (badges and arms), dress (clothing and coif-
fure), demeanour (form of greeting and poise) and rhetoric (form of address and 
formal discourse in general)’.22 
This pattern brings vividly to mind Habermas’ notion of ‘representative 
publicness’ (representative Öffentlichkeit), against which an earlier emerging 
bourgeoisie struggled in eighteenth-century Europe. Thomas McCarthy summa-
rizes Habermas’ basic idea like this: 
In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, 
the emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler’s 
power was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state 
authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the 
people.23 
Not unlike the feudal nobilities of Habermas’ historical study, UNIP exer-
cised a similarly opaque form of absolute power, especially after 1972, wherein 
the population was largely deprived of information concerning the rationale or 
inner workings of government. The Oasis Forum’s consistent tirade against the 
government’s lack of ‘transparency and accountability’, then, might be seen as a 
direct strategic reaction to this absolutist legacy of performative representation. 
Through this critique, the new public bourgeoisie has explicitly set itself against 
the ancien régime grounded in an absolutist culture of politics – of repre-
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sentative publicity, neo-patrimonial domination and parasitic clientelism.24 This 
can be seen in their dedication to mass mobilization campaigns; to public 
‘workshopping’ as a means of provoking critical debate; in their insistence on a 
regular stream of clear public statements explaining their positions and actions; 
and in their scrupulous maintenance of full public transparency in all dealings 
with government. In all of these efforts, the Forum has been closely allied with 
the independent Post newspaper which carried the Oasis Declaration on its 
websites for years, and which has been a major channel for all Forum publicity.  
The political strategy of the Forum, then, might be defined in relationship to 
the problem of representation – in the dual sense of mandate and publicity. 
Publicity refers to the means – including the language – by which the common 
concerns of Zambian society are dealt with in public. The Forum’s fundamental 
aim, as we have seen, appears to be a transformation of ‘the public’, the rules of 
the game of political behaviour. But what support can it leverage in this 
endeavour? Rooted in an ancillary class, the Forum is plagued by a general 
anxiety about its mandate – to what extent can it genuinely exercise the voice of 
‘the people’ who interests it seeks to promote? Their long-term success in 
institutionalizing a democratic transformation of the public realm will inevitably 
depend on the strength of their mandate.  
The limits of success 
The Forum was immensely successful in its politics of mobilization against 
Chiluba’s third term bid in 2001. It clearly responded to a deeply felt public 
demand and provided a conduit – the green ribbon and car-honking campaign – 
for Zambians to vent pent-up frustrations with the political establishment. The 
Oasis Forum was also successful in its innovative exercise in alliance-building 
and maintenance. Above all, it contributed profoundly to the shaping of the 
agenda of public discourse – the Forum’s actions between February and May 
2001 effected a transformation of public culture, the issues discussed and the 
vocabulary used, but also the attitude of public debate. The Oasis Forum (re-
)instilled in Zambian ‘bourgeoise society’ a sense of confidence about its 
political efficacy, something that had been deeply shaken by MMD’s apparent 
betrayal of the liberal ideals that brought it into power in 1991. 
The Forum’s attention to publicity is also an attempt to constitute a public 
sphere in its own image, i.e., create a forum where they will be fully understood 
by their ‘audience’. This implies a strong dose of ‘education/capacity building’, 
first around the Third Term issue and more recently around Constitutional 
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reform. The Forums’ rhetoric does not only attempt to speak to an audience, a 
public, it also seeks to constitute a public sympathetic to its agenda.  
Despite its significant and unprecedented successes, the Forum seems to 
have had virtually no impact on established partisan politics, opposition politi-
cal parties in particular. Despite its popularity and success in mobilization and 
agenda setting, and despite the keen interest of opposition parties in associating 
themselves with and indeed co-opting its campaigns and slogans, the Forum 
cannot claim any clear real leverage on partisan politicians. The point is not 
really whether or not the Forum has been efficacious in the partisan political 
arena, but about the lack of a mechanism linking civic and partisan action. 
Two political registers 
The new ‘public’ bourgeoisie represents a liberal-bourgeois vision for the future 
of Zambia, rather than any specific social constituency. Their liberalism ties 
them – especially the clergy and the feminists – to specific segments of the 
population – i.e., ‘the poor’. But their claims to represent these groups vis-à-vis 
the government or donor agencies are simply claims. They are reasonable 
claims and in most respects borne out by practical actions, but not established 
by any tangible mandating mechanism (vote, charter).  
The elite urban professionals that conjured up the Oasis Forum had, quite 
evidently, sufficient legal-moral ‘credibility’ to challenge the Party/State 
apparatus of Chiluba’s MMD. But just as evidently, this pivotal asset of legal-
moral credibility is both immaterial and fragile. It is easily compromised by any 
impression of intimate association with unscrupulous politicians. The lack of a 
clear, verifiable constituency generates insecurity within the Forum and its 
social base. This insecurity expressed itself in a fundamental distrust of partisan 
politics and political parties in general. The basic dilemma was an 
understanding of the need to ‘do politics’ in order to achieve their substantive 
normative ends, but the inability to identify or even conceive of a political 
mechanism – a form of collective agency – that could be expected to survive the 
corrupting bruises of Zambian political skirmishes with its integrity, and 
credibility, in tact. 
As the Chisamba retreat of June 2001 concurred: ‘The Oasis Forum should 
not be transformed into an organization, but should remain as a loose alliance, 
faceless’.25 I understand ‘facelessness’ in this context to imply the lack of 
personalized self-promotion. The Forum’s credibility can only be maintained if 
it draws directly on abstract, or perhaps better, transcendental forms of autho-
rity – spirituality, morality, legality, solidarity. Immediately there are grounds to 
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suspect that such intrinsically authoritative rhetoric is (ab)used to advance the 
ambitions of a specific individual, it loses legitimacy. Clearly this is not true of 
conventional political campaigning. Party politicians clothe their soapbox rheto-
ric in references to ‘development’ and ‘peace’ – selfless aspects of the greater 
good. But no politician campaigns ‘facelessly’. This suggests that the Oasis 
Forum is intuitively working a different political register, one reserved for dis-
interested political rhetoric, walled off from the partisan fray.  
Like apartheid in South Africa, subsidiary sovereignty is a legal order pre-
mised on exclusion. It operates through a constitution, caters to regular elections 
and encompasses a range of institutions of democratic representation. At the 
same time, the voice and genuine interests of the vast majority of the population 
are kept in the margins, with no real power to influence public policy and its 
implementation. 
As in South Africa, where lawyers played a crucial role in the fight against 
apartheid,26 the legal profession has been a key actor in the struggle for in-
stitutional reforms to ensure greater justice in the exercise of power. Indeed, 
their imprint on the Oasis Forum and its achievements has been far greater than 
the jurists’ modest numbers would suggest. Through becoming the architects of 
the Forum’s public rhetoric, and its leading authority on the strategically crucial 
constitutional review process, the lawyers have had a huge impact on the 
Forum’s political trajectory. 
I have discussed the implications of legalism at length elsewhere and will 
not repeat those arguments here.27 One related issue deserves special attention, 
however. As we have argued above, the Oasis Forum has played an unprece-
dented and progressive role in defining a political agenda for the reform of 
Zambia’s political culture. Yet it has been silent on the issue of subsidiarity. 
Perhaps this reflects the fact that many individuals in the Forum leadership have 
benefited, or expect to benefit financially from a commissioned assignment 
from the World Bank or an allied agency. While it is my informed belief that the 
Forum would have reached all of its major goals without any donor support, it is 
also true that the women’s movement (NGOCC and many of its member 
organizations), the various church bodies and even the Law Association are all 
benefitciaries of the donor dollar to some extent. It is in the very nature of 
subsidiary sovereignty, no doubt, that the suzerain must, from time to time, 
invest in the sovereignty of the client state. 
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Such cynicism aside, one might also ask to what extent might the ‘juridifi-
cation’ of the Forum’s approach itself affect the role that subsidiarity takes on in 
the political agenda of the new public bourgeoisie. Echoing Benhabib’s critique 
of Habermas, one can claim that the Forum has exercised a very weak dis-
tinction between ‘“juridification” […] on the one hand, and making public, in 
the sense of making accessible to debate, reflection, action, and moral-political 
transformation, on the other’.28 Indeed, the Forum draws on three bodies of 
rather inflexible canon: Statutory law, religious dogma and orthodox develop-
ment discourse. None of these is particularly conducive to critical-rational 
debate in the Habermasian sense; but, more cogently, neither do they provide 
conceptual tools to reveal the mechanisms of subsidiarity. Of the three, it is 
perhaps the procedural mindset of legal reasoning that provides the dimmest 
view of the broader structural mechanisms that constrain Zambia’s economy. 
Perhaps the main problem is that the new public bourgeoisie’s strategy of 
incursion into the public sphere does not address long-term structural problem 
of its social reproduction as a class, its base in material production/capital accu-
mulation. Without such a base, can the public bourgeoisie exercise sustained 
leverage on the state? Can it effect a transformation of the public sphere without 
solid links to a wider ‘public’ beyond itself? Or, to put a Marxist twist on the 
problem at hand, can the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie constitute itself as a class 
without controlling the material conditions of its social reproduction? 
Perhaps it is enough, at this juncture to suggest that subsidiary sovereignty 
be thought of dialectically – as an organically constituted struggle between two 
contradictory principles: Subordination and emancipation. Neither of these prin-
ciples exists in a ‘pure’, abstract form. The specific motives and mechanisms of 
subordination, and the social sources of the emancipatory moment derive from a 
specific historical, ideological, political context. This is an important reason 
why it is so necessary to maintain rigorous scrutiny of the unfolding history of 
independent Zambia. 
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